JOHN F. KENNEDY AND THE AMERICAN CITY: THE URBAN PROGRAMS OF THE NEW FRONTIER, 1961-1963 by Foley, Jr., William  Albert
                                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
JOHN F. KENNEDY AND THE AMERICAN CITY: THE URBAN PROGRAMS OF 
THE NEW FRONTIER, 1961- 1963 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
William A. Foley, Jr.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Faculty of the University Graduate School  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in the Department of History 
Indiana University 
December, 2005 
 
 
 
                    ii 
 
 
 
 
Accepted by the Graduate Faculty, Indiana University, 
 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
 the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
    ________________________________________ 
    Joan Hoff, PhD, Director of Dissertation Research 
 
Doctoral   ________________________________________ 
Committee:   James H. Madison, PhD, Chair of Committee 
 
    ________________________________________ 
    George I. Juergens, PhD, Third Reader 
 
    ________________________________________ 
    Irving Katz, PhD, Fourth Reader 
 
 
Date of Oral Examination:      December 20, 2005 
 
 
 
           iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© December 2005 
William A. Foley, Jr. 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
 
 
           iv 
 
 
 
Dedication 
 
To the Foley Families of Massachusetts and Indiana, “May the Road Rise to Meet You, 
May the Wind Be Always at Your Back, (and) May the Sun Shine Warm 
Upon Your Face.” 
      An Old Irish Blessing… 
 
 
          v 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 Many individuals and institutions contributed to the completion of this 
dissertation, and I wish to acknowledge them. First, my parents, the late William A. 
Foley and Miriam E. Foley, helped in so many ways, with encouragement, advice and 
financial assistance when we were starving graduate students, that the debt of gratitude is 
overwhelming. To my wife of 39 years, Mairin T. Foley, the debt is equal and even more 
significant. She not only typed this whole manuscript, but as well helped reproduce huge 
amounts of material, and further when I was unable due to other requirements to work on 
it, remained faithful to the cause and encouraging to the end, until completed. To our 
children, William M. Foley and Sonya F. Berle, extensive and special thanks are due for 
the same like kind encouragement over the years, and support, plus ideas. Additionally, I 
owe them both a huge debt for all the good times missed when they wanted to do things, 
but could not because the dissertation had to be completed. I wish to thank our son-in-law 
Bob Berle who offered many great ideas and much encouragement, and an enthusiastic 
“thank you” goes to our grandchildren William and Michael Foley, and Lila, Adeline, 
Miriam and Beatrice Berle. Particular thanks are in order to our oldest two 
Grandchildren,  William for “typing” and helping design the “book cover,” and to Lila 
for art work along the same lines, and for carefully helping align documents for writing 
sequence. 
 Dr. Joan Hoff has been outstanding in all of this as chairperson and a true 
academic mainstay of solid support, excellent ideas, plus always willing to listen to my 
problems, no matter how trivial. Moreover, she contributed greatly to my views regarding 
the Kennedy administration and its policies, and performed marvelous editorial work. 
Additionally, in the human dimension, one could not ask for a finer chairperson and 
mentor. Dr. James H. Madison provided excellent advice and support on this dissertation, 
and I wish to thank him for his assistance with my graduate program over the years, and 
for his friendship. Dr. George I. Juergens served as an outstanding advisor and mentor 
regarding American social, intellectual and urban history, and has provided exceptional 
encouragement over the years in completing this dissertation. Dr. Irving Katz’s role has 
been truly significant as well, providing continuous excellent advice and support 
throughout, mixed with enlivened discussion and sprinkled with humor. A special thanks 
is as well given to Dr. Jeanne Peterson as a member of my coursework committee in 
British history, for her fine assistance and marvelous help with historiography. At Indiana 
University, recent past Chairs and Directors of Graduate Studies, deserve special thanks 
for their faith in me and for their continued support.  I humbly wish to acknowledge Dr. 
James Madison again, Dr. Michael McGerr, Dr.Alex Rabinowitch, the late Dr. William 
Cohen,  Dr. Carl Ispen and Dr. Peter Guardino for their support, advice and assistance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           vi 
 
 And very importantly, Ms. Alexia Bock, Administrative Assistant and Graduate 
Secretary,  has been has been a true inspiration in all of this, and over the time it has 
taken me to finish, she has become a fine confidante and grand facilitator. I also wish to 
thank the Archivists at the John F. Kennedy Library. William Johnson, Sylvie J. Turner, 
Larry J. Hackman, William Moss, Magan DeNoyers, Suzanne K. Forbes, Alan B. 
Goodrich, Steven Plotkin, John Stewart and Tim Fitzgerald. My thanks also go to all the 
Archivists at the National Archives and Records Administration, in Washington and 
College Park. As well, I wish to thank William Capron, Lee White, Bob Weaver, Dan 
Fenn, Dave Powers, Ted Sorensen, and Fred Hayes, of the Administration, whom I met, 
communicated with, at times worked with, and have the greatest respect for, because they 
helped move America into a better place, and they helped keep her there. To all the 
poverty planners of the Kennedy administration, whom I met at the Brandies Conference 
in June 1973, my thanks for your bravery, hard work and your compassion in framing a 
“war on poverty.”  Finally, to my thousands of students, in 26 years teaching American 
History at Harvard, Boston, Simmons, Curry College, Emmanuel College, the JFK 
Library, Indiana University, Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis, Ball 
State University,  and the Army War College, thanks so much for all the great intellectual 
collaboration, discussion,  and for your ideas.  In addition, a “happy day,” to Dr. Robert 
G. Gunderson, who cannot be present at my defense, but more than anyone, built the 
American Studies Program at Indiana University at Bloomington. I also wish to thank Jon 
Haywood of Boston University, Dan Delvecchio of Boston and Harvard University, and 
Drs. Kevin Reynolds and Clay Chun at the Army War College, collectively for providing 
great work environments and encouraging completion of this dissertation.  
 
 
        
           vii 
 
Preface 
 
 Since this dissertation is long, the preface shall be short. I had the honor to teach, 
to the best of my knowledge, the only complete history course on the presidency and 
administration of John F. Kennedy anywhere in the country, from the fall of 1973 
through the spring of 1980, at Harvard University, Boston University, Simmons College, 
Emmanuel College, and lecture on the subject at Curry College and in JFK Library 
workshops.  While doing that, I became somewhat a regular at the JFK Library, and had 
the true honor of serving on several committees or participating in certain Library 
sponsored conferences, and actually contributing to other “teaching workshops.” No 
group of professionals ever so warmly welcomed me, as did the JFK staff, and I shall 
always remember them, as “the best of times.” My students came to the JFK with 
enthusiasm and left the same way. Treated so very well, particularly by the amicable and 
outgoing Dr. Dan Fenn, Dave Powers, John Stewart, Larry Hackman, Megan DeNoyers, 
Alan Goodrich, Will Johnson, Bill Moss, Joan-Ellen Marci and all the archivists, they left 
with magnificent impressions of the Library, its staff and its ambience, as well they 
should have. I have yet to meet a finer group at any presidential library. They did not try 
to “fool” anybody, and collectively, they simply represented character and still do.  
 However, although my parents took me while in early high school to see JFK, the 
young candidate for president in the autumn of 1960, I firmly wanted to believe what the 
event appeared to be in the press: that the New Frontier stood for good things, later 
simply stopped by dark and malevolent forces from accomplishing greatness. Graduate 
School altered some of that impression, but regarding the cities, I continued that 
somewhat “wishful” view, until I finally completed this research.  In urban affairs this 
story is hard to tell simply because it is a painful revelation of illusion versus reality, and 
the late president does not come out well. Others do, but not JFK.  
 Covering all aspects of urban affairs and housing, from the “central administration 
level at the White House and HHFA,” over three years down to the “city level” in certain 
cases, any one chapter could constitute a complete dissertation if expanded. However, 
although warned, I chose to do it the hard way, by covering most of the entire urban 
program, and succeeded only after great effort. I hope you find this interesting, because 
there are some real causes, and heroes and heroines here, who tried to advance effective 
federal policy for America’s cities in the first half of the 1960’s.  
 
December, 2005       William A. Foley, Jr. 
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        Abstract 
 
William A. Foley, Jr. 
 
John F. Kennedy and the American City: The Urban Programs of the New Frontier,  
1961-1963 
 
Out of necessity in 1960, John Kennedy promised to find the “workable solution to urban 
problems.”  Yet he failed to do so, because his interests lay elsewhere.  Balancing his 
1963 budget for Congressional approval to gain a 1964 tax cut meant more than an 
effective urban program.  Had Kennedy exercised leadership and emphasized 
implementing his promise through combining new and existing programs, he might have 
found the elusive workable solution.  Contrasted against JFK’s lackluster leadership in 
urban affairs, the hard work of Dr. Robert C. Weaver, his Housing and Home Finance 
Agency staff and later the “reformers” also becomes a focal point.  Collectively, they 
came closest to finding the solution.  They tried to reshape urban America using 
available programs without being able to fully implement their newer ideas, before 
the “fires” came.  In addition, this dissertation highlights seven themes.  In urban affairs, 
JFK remained an enigma, and he wanted it that way.  Secondly, he used his office as a 
“modern” president, but thirdly, he presented many serious policy contradictions. 
Further, Kennedy had a tough time with Congress some due to his own making.  
Consequently, political tradeoffs undercut his own urban program.  Last, blatant 
open racism also permeated the early 1960s and affected political choices everywhere.  
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But lastly, in spite of this, Weaver plus JFK’s “reformers” under Robert Kennedy 
fostered new ideas, that if combined, implemented and funded, could have led to the 
workable solution. This dissertation studies Kennedy’s entire urban program: JFK’s 1960 
urban message; formation of his White House and urban team; the 1961 Housing Act; his 
failed effort to gain HHFA cabinet status; his urban budget and the tax cut maneuvering; 
Kennedy’s vast suburban housing “boom;” public housing and urban renewal; his open 
housing executive order; and the early “war on poverty.”  Researched at the John F. 
Kennedy Library and the National Archives and Records Administration, this dissertation 
adds to the historical record in three ways.  It traces JFK’s level of involvement in urban 
affairs and clarifies his interest; it shows the effort made by many key members of his 
administration to achieve a workable solution to urban problems in spite of their leader; 
and it explains the overall importance of Kennedy’s program in American urban history.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Now that the trumpet summons us again… 
     embattled we are [in] a call to bear the  burden 
    of a long twilight struggle, year in and year 
       out…a struggle against the common enemies 
             of man: tyranny, poverty, disease and war itself.1
 
 In domestic affairs in the two years, ten months and two days he held office, John F. 
Kennedy will be remembered more for what he said than for what he did.  This is not to 
say that all of Jack Kennedy’s domestic policies lacked substance.  Rather, it is to 
underscore that based on the high level of “anticipation and hope” he presented while 
campaigning, only a few of his domestic programs could be called genuinely successful 
when he left for Dallas in that late November of 1963.  The question is why?  Why in 
1961 with all the resources available and with such a talented staff, should Kennedy’s 
overall domestic programs be so piecemeal and so limited?  This dissertation investigates 
that in one significant domestic area - urban affairs. 
 The thesis of this dissertation is that out of necessity, Kennedy promised to find the 
overall solution to urban problems.  Like most of his recent predecessors, he put urban 
affairs high on his domestic agenda in the campaign.  But once elected, he faced three 
choices for dealing with the urban crisis: keep the old programs; find new solutions while 
maintaining the best of the past; or strike out in bold new directions and come up with the 
comprehensive, workable urban program he promised while running.  Publicly he 
appeared to choose the latter theme which his 1960 Task Force on Housing and Urban 
Affairs strongly recommended he should pursue, and that emerged from his campaign 
message.  Headed by Joseph P. McMurray, that Task Force sent an ominous message to 
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Kennedy.  It implored, “No administration in the past has...attempted to fashion a 
comprehensive program of well planned, coordinated activity to replace the individual, 
haphazard, old-fashioned, fragmented approach that has characterized the housing and 
urban renewal program to date.”  It concluded by warning that, “Our Task Force believes 
that day is over.”2  Indeed, as would soon be seen in “the long hot summers” following 
Dallas, they were right. 
 But another aspect of my thesis is that John F. Kennedy deliberately did not deliver 
on his promise to solve the crisis of U.S. cities.  Kennedy is criticized for being 
somewhat short sighted in his ultimate solution to urban problems and also for having 
great difficulty getting his programs through Congress.  However most importantly and 
in direct contrast to his campaign pledges, his interest in urban affairs was low, at times 
bordering on complete indifference.  And the late president was willing to “trade off,” 
even cut his own urban program to advance his political agenda: a balanced budget that 
would gain a tax cut from a skeptical Congress in 1963, to please voters for the 1964 
general election.  
 Yet in spite of limited progress, “reformers” in his administration, much more liberal 
than he, proposed several significant elements of a workable urban formula that if 
combined at the White House level with other existing programs and resources, might 
have succeeded.  This constitutes a final aspect of my thesis.  Had Kennedy exercised 
proper leadership and placed effective emphasis on coordinating and funding these 
efforts and combinations, the elusive workable solution to urban problems might have 
been found.  There is both danger and excitement in stressing that impact.3   
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      His “reformers’” efforts offered major changes in the direction of federal “social city” 
programs and if combined with some of JFK’s successful “physical city” initiatives, 
under an already existing framework supported by strong presidential leadership and 
proper funding, a “workable solution” to urban problems could have been found.  And to 
make matters worse for Kennedy’s legacy in urban affairs, Lyndon B. Johnson changed 
JFK’s fragmented program, when he became president, and not for the better. 
 This study explores what Kennedy proposed in relation to what he actually 
delivered.   The emphasis is on federal policy and on the interaction of Kennedy with his 
urban staff, specifically Dr. Robert C. Weaver, Administrator of the Housing and Home 
Finance Agency (HHFA) and his Agency in implementing it.   At the federal level, 
planning is described, implementation discussed and results are measured against 
Kennedy’s expressed goals.  It emphasizes housing programs and community 
development directed by Kennedy and managed through the Housing and Home 
Financed Agency (HHFA), which later became the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD).  Additionally, this dissertation examines all aspects of the 
“physical city” as seen in public housing, urban renewal, and suburban growth, plus 
looks at “social city” issues as well, like open housing, urban civil rights and poverty 
programs.  Transitional programs as area redevelopment, mass transit, community 
development, and open spaces are touched upon also.   
      This dissertation adds to the historical record about John F. Kennedy and the city in 
three ways: it traces JFK’s level of involvement in urban affairs and clarifies what he 
really valued; it shows the effort made by members of his administration to advance a 
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workable solution to urban problems in spite of the president’s indifferent leadership; and 
it explains the overall importance of the Kennedy program in American urban history.  
 In my analysis, seven themes emerge.  First, John F. Kennedy remains a public 
enigma and in a way he wanted it so.  Kennedy’s public image changed often and where 
he stood on many issues remained evasive.  His life and presidency “mixed myth, theory 
and saga into an unfolding tale carefully self presented,” which produced a hero and a 
politician simultaneously.4  With his assassination, he immediately became a legend.  
The hero fed on receiving America’s second highest award for valor in combat, Harvard 
football, six published “works” under his name and a Pulitzer Prize, overcoming youthful 
disease, plus the Kennedy charm, education and money.  The politician in him grew out 
of his campaigns, fourteen years in the House and Senate, his political network and his 
well developed political agenda.5  Publicly, Kennedy could easily shift his image to fit 
the political occasion and to his advantage.  As many scholars have noted, with an 
adoring press corps, he remained the last president who could easily get away with that, 
as the killing fields of Vietnam permanently altered America’s relationship between the 
presidents and the press.  Kennedy, however, got so good at this he “clouded” who he 
was and what he stood for.  For example, in the McClellan Committee hearings on the 
Landrum-Griffin Act in 1959, he “straddled the fence with such absolute brilliance that 
he sustained the political support of both pro-labor liberals and anti-labor 
conservatives.”6  Actually, John as well as Robert Kennedy thought conservative 
businessmen and political liberals both to be “SOBs.”7  After the assassination Robert 
changed somewhat regarding the latter.  And not unlike many politicians, JFK’s overall 
goal remained simply getting reelected and staying in power and the way he led the 
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nation always remained subordinate to that.8  Kennedy maintained his power base by 
making himself the ultimate domestic centrist.9    
 Secondly, Kennedy can be classified as a “modern president.”  He used “increased 
unilateral policy making capacity at home and abroad,” centralized, and set a “national 
agenda,” utilizing “increased media visibility” while furthering presidential “reliance on 
growing numbers of White House advisors” and professional politicians.10  These 
advisors, known as the “best of the brightest,” were the “faceless, nameless, non-elected 
bureaucrats around the president” who manifested a “know-it-all, arrogant, technocratic” 
behavior that produced “the packaged passionless presidency.”11  For the media, 
Kennedy of course appeared “passionate” and openly “exercised power” in public.  
However, his technocrats who shaped policy were willing to readily change and even 
more ready to jump ship “ideologically” should their leader’s position begin to falter in 
the polls.12  They caused Kennedy problems with an old and conservative Congress, set 
in its ways from a racist past, and he did little to correct this dilemma. 
 Third, John Kennedy presented many serious political contradictions regarding 
what he said versus what he did.  In the 1960 campaign, he “over promised” and over 
stated what could be accomplished.  He created a public impression the New Frontier 
would become another New Deal, wherein the political climate at the time would never 
have permitted that.  In a way, Kennedy created exaggerated expectations.13  Kennedy 
also made misleading assertions that he cared equally about domestic problems as he did 
foreign issues.  In reality, he unabashedly favored foreign affairs over domestic maters.  
Not only did he neglect some domestic programs, he quickly compromised others to 
advance foreign policy interests.  Regarding the cities, Dr. Robert C. Weaver, who 
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incidentally held three degrees from Harvard, stated that Kennedy “was more housing, 
than urban, if at all.”14  Actually, Kennedy had a relatively low interest in city problems, 
which meant that key subordinates would develop the president’s program around him or 
without him, but this is not what he led urban voters to believe in 1960. 
 Fourth, John F. Kennedy had an unusually tough time with Congress.  The 
arrogance and inefficiencies of his staff and legislative team, often coupled with 
inexperience, plus his own lackluster leadership in legislative affairs created huge 
problems.  Kennedy also suffered from only a small working majority, “on paper” in both 
the House and Senate and even with the 1962 elections, failed to shape that into an 
effective coalition.  He could not build consensus with them because conservative 
southern and mid-western Democrats formed stronger informal coalitions with mid-
western Republicans to kill his most progressive legislation.15  For example, even though 
Democrats had a 263-174 advantage in the House and a 64 to 36 one in the Senate, 
“conservatives” held the real power.  In the House, Jack Conway, who will be discussed 
later, lamented he could count on only 164 “hard” votes that would support Kennedy and 
needed 218 to move legislation.16  Kennedy had a “fear” of “losing” in Congress, which 
in my opinion, prevented him from giving full legislative support to certain issues.17  He 
said citing Thomas Jefferson, that “great innovations should not be forced on slender 
majorities.”18  As Weaver points out “early on Kennedy became over cautious” with 
Congress.19  
 So Kennedy, having a terrible time with Congress, used his broad executive power 
to bypass it, make some changes, many grudgingly and a few willingly, of both substance 
and symbolism.  He issued Executive Order 10925 to establish the Committee on Equal 
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Employment Opportunity in 1961, although its results were mixed.20  He also appointed 
several African-Americans to high government positions, in part to impress his newly 
formed African-American constituency from the 1960 election.   He established White 
House Regional Conferences on government and planned a White House conference on 
urban affairs for 1963, then backed off.  He appointed the Commission on the Status of 
Women.21  Further, he extended the Civil Rights Commission, and established the small 
President’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency by executive order, plus endorsed 
provisions of the Fair Employment Practices Commission.  In addition, after receiving 
much pressure to do so, headed by brother Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, JFK 
initiated suits to reapportion segregated congressional districts.22  Lastly, after extreme 
pressure from civil rights groups, in November 1962 Kennedy finally issued his long 
awaited executive order against discrimination in housing.  Called “The Executive Order 
on Open Housing,” it proved very limited in scope.  Further Kennedy capitalized on 
building a political base outside Congress, with the “youth movement” of the post World 
War II baby boom generation.  By 1961, they constituted seventy million young people 
under the age of twenty, equating to an overall population surge of seventy-eight million 
from 1945 through 1964.23    He “motivated” them to come into public service through 
programs, messages, and commissions ranging from Youth to Fitness and the Peace 
Corps, through to VISTA, which LBJ later implemented.24  They were of course 
emerging as a potential voter block for his second term as well, but he did “inspire” them.
 Fifth, unfortunately Kennedy sold out his city constituents to the urban developer 
and suburban construction business through compromises on key legislative proposals.  It 
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has been argued that these compromises helped some of his housing and urban affairs 
legislation pass, but the net result remains that those involved in building the new urban 
and suburban architecture of the early 1960s became the true beneficiaries.  Moreover, 
his desire to offer the 1964 voter a tax cut in 1963, with a congressionally mandated 
balanced budget required, caused him to cut or curtail some of his own urban programs to 
save money.  This was not what he promised in 1960.  
 Sixth, as a theme, open racism permeated society then much more than it does 
today, and many of Kennedy’s decisions are studied in relation to that overriding political 
variable of his times.  JFK “choices” are reviewed in detail regarding his urban program 
versus the segregation and discrimination of his era, in relation to Congressional or 
business interests he wished to appease.  Segregation, discrimination and racism are 
roundly examined in relation to the suburbs, open housing, public housing, urban 
renewal, and poverty. 
      Finally, my concluding theme is that despite compromises, the Kennedy 
administration revived the reform tradition in federal urban planning, absent throughout 
the 1950s.  Despite JFK’s ambivalence, his reformers fostered new ideas, proposed and 
tested concepts, and began implementing limited demonstration projects.  Had these been 
combined with existing efforts, a workable solution to urban problems might have been 
found.  The cumulative effort started there, brought a constant tension into the arena of 
public action, until Lyndon Johnson's war on poverty began.  The Kennedy reformers 
brought federal activism back to the cities, in spite of their leader.25 
 The cities in America desperately needed some help by 1960.  By the mid 1950’s, 
for nearly thirty years the suburban edges around U.S. cities had been encouraged to 
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prosper while the centers deteriorated.26  Starting with the New Deal, segregated 
suburban housing and towns developed by federal subsidies, blossomed into commuter 
communities under the Eisenhower housing boom and with the start of federally 
subsidized highways.27   Early strip malls prospered and the workplace itself began to 
move to the suburbs.  By John Kennedy’s Senate years, many urban centers had become 
“disassembled ingredients of city sprawl.”28  This became particularly noticeable in 
Western U.S. cities. 
     Another problem, called the nightmare of numbers hit western states as well, 
particularly California.  In 1960, that state had fifteen and a half million people, a one-
third increase over 1950 and by 1980, California's population numbered thirty million.  In 
the 1960s, the Golden State alone gained fifteen hundred people daily.  Eighty-five 
percent of these people flocked to cities where ninety percent of California's total 
population resided on only five percent of the land.  In 1960 during the height of the 
recession, California tried to “study the problem away” but it only grew worse.  Fifty 
experts cumulatively spent “twenty months and four thousand man-hours,” resulting in 
no good ideas.  They concluded “Washington” needed to help them.29        
         But urbanites no longer had Franklin D. Roosevelt’s two economic centerpieces - 
community based service jobs and/or the right kind of earnings supplements.30   Thus, two 
anxieties began to build.  Fear of the loss of self government regarding the direction 
urban America would take, became heightened by a feeling that as the job base shifted, 
urban communities at anytime could unravel neighborhood by neighborhood.31   
 However, other changes were under way in urban America in the very late 1950s 
and early 1960s.  In Ike’s last couple of years, developers with money decided renovation 
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of the urban core could be very lucrative.  Excluding the suburbs, quick zoning 
modifications to America’s downtown created a two dimensional city by 1960 with a 
core business district and a frame around it.  Certain political leaders, housing authorities 
and corporations “became the gatekeepers,” shaping that “urban form.”32  Powerful 
individual planners and developers concocted schemes to put hundreds of millions of 
dollars of both private and public money into the core development of cities leaving the 
frame around it to develop on its own.  Changes in the “Golden Triangle” of Pittsburgh, 
massive renovations in Baltimore, Hartford, Cleveland, St. Louis, and San Francisco all 
produced substantial functional, cultural, technological, and political improvements along 
with great profits.33
      But the old linkages within downtown districts fell apart.  An “ecology of power” 
developed based on money and tax incentives.  With it came a dynamic fusion of 
corporate and state power which “blended with the new private money of transportation 
and communications interests, banking and security managers, energy and technology 
elites” to create a new breed of urban developer.34  Social assimilation within the central 
city core thus took on new dimensions in the 1960s.  If, as Henry Adams charged, his 
generation “was mortgaged to the railways,” urban America in the 1960s became 
mortgaged to the “developer.”  The development of urban geography would “dominate 
race and culture.”35   But there would be a high price for this “progress.” 
 The price hit three-fold.  First, community cohesion - “that commonness of feeling, 
thought, tradition and commitment would be lost,” at least for two decades.36  Secondly, 
the cost of municipal redevelopment strained city budgets to unparalleled breaking 
points, akin to the 1930s.  Even with federal money and matching funds, by 1960 the 
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shrinking tax base due to job displacement and suburban growth, hit many old 
municipalities so hard, some fell into severe financial trouble.37   David Potter describes 
recent American political history as a “grab bag of isolated events, strung together 
chronologically, garnished with personalities and spiced with anecdotes.”38  This also 
applies to urban policy in the 1950s. 
 In the words of Daniel Patrick Moynihan a third price paid was born by “the urban 
subset.”39  The velocity of massive downtown redevelopment in the very late 1950s cut 
hard into the urban poor, both white and non-white, but chiefly non-white.40  Where free 
enterprise reigned, “social needs became secondary.”  A third municipal revolution 
would have to take place to correct this, coming a decade later pitting class against 
power.41 
 The civil rights movement taking place in the South created another problem for the 
cities as it gave the impression that all areas nationally were being affected and 
subsequently improved which was false.  In fact, although the civil rights movement had 
a dramatic impact on relieving severe structural inequities in Dixie, helping the rural 
southern and middle class African-Americans, it had little impact on the extensive social 
problems of urban America.42  In the big cities by 1960, segregation became the norm 
with eighty-two percent of all public housing being segregated.43  For example, from 
1954 to 1967, 99.4 of the Chicago Housing Authority family units were divided by 
race.44   According to the 1960 U.S. Census, African-American families had been 
increasingly concentrated in the central cities of metropolitan America, where 73.7 
percent resided.45  Yet that central urban core where they lived soon would be displaced 
by urban renewal.  Although aimed chiefly at African-Americans, segregation also 
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excluded Hispanics, the Latino-Americans who came to the United States in the early 
1960s by the hundreds of thousands fleeing Fidel Castro’s 1959 coup.  They quickly 
became segregated as well even though this evil’s chief victim remained African-
Americans.46   Created by public policy at all levels, racially based ghettos formed while 
simultaneously cities overall lost population and tax base revenue due to white flight.47 
 Some of that public policy also catered to the great “Federal Bulldozer” of urban 
renewal which caused a housing crisis for the poor.  From 1949 through 1963, 177,000 
homes were demolished by urban renewal, but only 48,000 new ones replaced those 
destroyed in urban renewal zones.48  Eisenhower’s urban policy funded “re-housing” 
programs at such minimal levels and required such an extensive application process, that 
it serviced only a small percentage of city needs.  But individual city public policy was 
often worse.  In Chicago for instance, although the windy city appeared well managed by 
the affable Democratic Mayor Richard J. Daley, his political machine actually 
“maintained shamefully segregated housing and public schools, and an apartheid union 
structure” while simultaneously growing a stable and successful white population and 
creating a dependent and subservient African-American one.49  It would take Supreme 
Court litigation in Gautreaux v. the Chicago Housing Authority to change some of this.50  
 Regardless, African-Americans continued to flood to cities, both north and south, 
but chiefly northern.  The bulk of the African-American northern migration which took 
place in this last century happened between 1940 and 1970.  In 1940, eighty per cent of 
the African-American population lived in the south and two-thirds in the rural south.  Yet 
by 1970, eighty-one per cent of African-Americans lived in urban areas, and half resided 
in northern cities.  The average annual migration rate northward swelled to 135,815 
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yearly, representing more than two and half times the annual average for the previous 
thirty years.  This brought the total urban population in the United States to nearly one 
hundred and twenty million Americans by 1960.51  Minority population shifts resulted not 
only in segregation but also re-segregation, as seen in cities as Cleveland, Baltimore and 
Milwaukee and around Chicago.  By statistical percentage, in 1960 the levels of 
segregation in these cities reached all time highs for the Twentieth Century.52   Gunnar 
Mydal’s contention in An American Dilemma that racism in the United States constituted 
a vicious cycle seemed validated.53  
 These changes brought far reaching consequences to urban America.  A new and 
widespread kind of urban poverty developed.  Unlike previous generations of urban poor, 
this poverty, based on racial segregation, created “block upon block of wretched housing, 
abandoned buildings, littered lots and dilapidated schools which sat like fortresses behind 
high fences.”54   In human terms, high unemployment among African-American youth 
and a high dropout rate from school, both at nearly fifty per cent, caused another urban 
pathology called large-scale “juvenile delinquency.”55  More than half of all African-
Americans lived in “substandard housing, nearly three-fourths had only one parent 
present,” and that coupled with a high infant mortality rate, plus “half the total population 
and nearly three-fourths of the children living below the poverty line, led to a tripling of 
crime.”  As the mean streets of the “enduring ghetto” prevailed, a “poverty of lost 
expectations” also settled in.56   Gone for decades would be the African-American inner-
city communities that prior to 1960 passed “a sense of community, neighborhood 
identification, explicit norms, and sanctions against abhorrent behavior, reinforced by the 
adults.”57  By 1960, the African-American middle class became another casualty, 
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abandoning the inner city.  The “doctors, lawyers, teachers and other professionals of the 
African-American community which had been the stabilizing force,” left in droves.  
Determined to get into transitional neighborhoods somehow, their exodus from the 
“enduring ghetto” left behind a severe leadership void.58  Although Michael Harrington 
in The Other America called this to the attention of white Americans, massive “passive 
poverty” in a nation of plenty continued.59 
 Extensive homelessness loomed as another unresolved issue.   A new “kind or 
breed” of homeless emerged by 1960 in substantial numbers.  Whereas the homeless of 
the previous generation slept in parks under newspapers, yet got a meal on Skid Row in 
Chicago or in New York’s Bowery, their condition actually resulted from a shift in the 
economic order they could not immediately overcome.  But the new homeless who 
emerged in 1960 in staggering numbers became a constant, growing, social problem, that 
would not go away.60 
 Thus, in attempting to fix all of this, massive changes in public policy would be 
needed.  Yet since the end of the Great Depression the effectiveness of old public 
policies, which included small housing programs, improvements to the general economy 
that supposedly benefited all, and numerous kinds of urban renewal programs plus 
limited community development plans, had run its course.61  Everyone in 1960 looked to 
the federal government for a stronger if not newer response. 
 However in a way, government at all levels had already responded and had been 
unable to resolve the urban crisis.  The search for an urban consensus, finding a viable 
and workable urban formula for federal aid to cities remained on the national agenda for 
decades.  Placed there in the early 1930s, every administration since the New Deal had an 
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urban policy.  But by 1960, no national, workable formula had been discovered and 
neither consistency nor cohesion in federal programs existed.  An entire cycle from urban 
“laissez faire” under Herbert C. Hoover, to direct federal aid by Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower had ended without reaching a consensus on 
how best to cope with city problems.  Further, by 1960, certain kinds of urban difficulties 
became far too big for states or municipalities to solve on their own.  Many cities had 
already tried, and in most instances, failed. 
 Even the private sector had intervened but without consistency.  Improving the life 
cycle process of cities suggests that “a city can sustain and grow by nurturing and 
attracting new and innovating industries.”  Yet, if regional industries dominated, limited 
to one product or line, city employment was “corner-stoned on that industry” and it 
became “subject to its market cycles.”62   Neither business nor government had figured 
out by 1960 how to create a diversified urban job base.  As a model, an effective 
marriage of federal, state, municipal and private resources had not been successfully 
located. 
      One reason for this failure stemmed from the fact that the two layers of sovereign 
government in America (federal and state) often had competing agendas “directly 
affecting the geographical distribution or the internal spatial development of urban 
communities.”63  To 1960,   Eisenhower came closest to correcting some of that with his 
1954 Housing Act’s Workable Program for Community Development, which blended 
policy into a known framework, but membership was too small. The only “consistent” 
exceptions then were federal road projects that traveled through cities or financial 
 16
guidelines for spending federal urban renewal and public housing money.  This was not 
an overall national policy. 
      Uniquely, the municipalities most often attempted to effectively control their own 
city landscapes with large amounts of federal money, were also the most often vulnerable 
to strong private interests.  Those interests then shaped a city’s destiny based increasingly 
on private agendas, not public ones.  In housing, for every dollar spent in federal housing 
programs, one went to housing the poor and ten dollars provided housing assistance to 
the non-poor.64  Historically, in the creation of the modern western city, massive 
government intervention never developed the real means to ensure most of its money 
reached those who really needed it.65  But since federal level intervention is highlighted 
in this dissertation, a short prologue to the Kennedy years is important.     
      Before 1932, Washington showed little interest in cities and many urban centers truly 
felt the same about Washington.  Yet the impact of the Great Depression changed that.  
So profound became the financial situation that cities appealed to the states and 
subsequently begged for help from the federal government itself.66  Franklin D. Roosevelt 
began his New Deal for urban America in March of 1933.  He became the first president 
to place the federal government squarely into the business of helping cities.  Although the 
New Deal targeted saving the national economy, plans quickly ensued to put people back 
to work and to bail out financially troubled cities.  His landmark 1937 Housing Act, 
while recognizing that too many slums existed, planned on replacing them with low rent 
or subsidized middle-income housing at the same locations.67  Harry S. Truman 
continued Roosevelt’s programs and after his own election, he passed his most 
significant 1949 Housing Act.  Under its Title I, cities were permitted to reuse cleared 
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urban land for whatever purpose they wanted.68  Private enterprise enthusiastically 
“jumped in” to help clear that land.  Although Truman also had a strong “public housing” 
provision imbedded in his 1949 Act, his varied “local” use clause for renewed land 
created many future problems.  While establishing broader and more flexible slum 
clearance and urban redevelopment possibilities, unfortunately much of this highly 
valuable urban land could now be developed into new enterprise zones catering to the 
interests of the well healed.  For many reasons the supposed companion expansion of 
public housing did not happen, and poor people cleared from renewed sites, continued to 
seek adequate housing.69  Martin Anderson leveled a severe criticism of this process in 
his classic The Federal Bulldozer.70  Even though significant progress under Truman 
reduced the number of substandard housing units across America, the very poor still 
received very inadequate housing. 
      The two most important federal city agencies created during the Great Depression did 
not help much either.  The Federal Housing Administration established in 1934 became 
the government’s cornerstone for providing mortgage insurance coverage to financial 
institutions, that subsequently made loans.  The U.S. Housing Authority, originating in 
1937, apportioned public housing, and became the Public Housing Administration.71  But 
neither really targeted the massive need for federally assisted housing in relation to the 
numbers of poor requiring it.  Indeed, by 1960, while the FHA can be given credit for 
building the middle class by broadening home ownership, in many cases, FHA actually 
subsidized the well off.  Regarding public housing, much of America has always 
maintained some “distance” from the poor, but as racial stereotypes began to be assigned 
to being poor, hostility toward public housing dramatically increased in the late 1950s.72 
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      Dwight D. Eisenhower championed a small policy revolution in housing and urban 
affairs, but with a conservative view that supported government intervention only “to 
protect or enhance the opportunities of the market place, rather than forcing market 
participants to reallocate resources,” urban America’s serious problems continued to 
grow.73   As he tried to influence “urbanization,” he created “sub-urbanization.”74  Ike’s 
Housing Acts of 1956 and 1959 chiefly continued older federal programs, but his 
landmark 1954 Act brought public housing, slum clearance and urban renewal itself into 
one “workable program for community development” while creating the Urban Renewal 
Administration (URA).75  That was important.   
      Under his “Workable Program,” cities received grants for planning urban 
improvements, albeit through an exceptionally complex application process that often 
stifled participation.76  Those cities qualifying for money, channeled it through a new 
kind of big builder, a significant trend for the future, called the “community developer.”  
These firms worked with all businesses as well as all levels of government throughout a 
city.  But older yet strict government codes “constrained what could be done in each 
segment of planning or construction.”77  Thus, cities developed “in parcels” based on a 
given developer's plans and the city’s rules, but developers slowly gained the power. 
      Eisenhower’s chief accomplishment remains creating the first extensive and 
prolonged suburban housing boom in the twentieth century.  Albert M. Cole, his most 
effective Administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA), deserves 
credit for that.  He did this through changes to private sector incentives and mortgage 
financing, as he literally forced the FHA and the Federal National Mortgage Association 
(FNMA) into broadened lending and monetary practices.78  By 1960, 53 million 
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households comprised urban and suburban America, an increase of fifteen million from 
1950.  Yet African-Americans would be deliberately left out of this housing boom and as 
the swift development of the central core of cities continued and the suburbs prospered, 
the segregated city poor suffered from “urban euthanasia.”79   By 1960, areas with the 
highest concentrations of segregation and poverty “became the urban crisis.”  Except for 
civil rights, “city” became the code word for what most consistently troubled America in 
1960 in domestic affairs.80  
      Thus, on a very cold January 20, 1961, when John F. Kennedy took the oath of office 
in Washington D.C., he inherited the responsibility for the well-being of the country’s 
cities, but not the solution to its problems.  After nearly thirty years of spending federal 
money, creating agencies, planning and experimenting, no agreed upon solution to urban 
problems existed.81  Public housing had proven woefully inadequate to the actual need, 
with urban renewal bogged down hopelessly in red tape.  In many major cities, it took six 
to twelve years to complete less than half the urban renewal projects already approved.82  
Almost all cities lacked effective mass transit.  Urban blight, dilapidated housing, and the 
injustice of racial zoning worsened.  Whites fled to newly constructed suburbs and city 
revenues declined due to the dramatic move of urban businesses to suburbs.  Completely 
broken down, social programs suffered while the czars of urban development prospered 
with new renovations to the city core, and this dichotomy often referred to as the “social 
versus physical city widened.”  Lastly, a great need existed for federal coordination in its 
diverse, existing, yet fragmented urban programs. 
      Thus, these difficulties required a comprehensive solution, which the new Democratic 
administration promised to provide.  Kennedy stated, “We as a nation have before us the 
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opportunity...and the responsibility...to remold our cities, to improve our patterns of 
community development, and to provide for the housing needs of all segments of our 
population.”83   But he did not deliver. 
      In the thirty-four months of his truncated presidency, John Kennedy and his 
administration went through a cycle - from promise to limited success and back to 
promise.  By Dallas, the substance of most of his urban program remained promise and 
his record marginal.  JFK’s chief contribution to cities turned out to be a continuation of 
Ike’s massive suburban housing boom.   
      Yet his record has a positive side.  Kennedy slowly improved the quality of life in 
American cities and suburbs and his administration stimulated the housing market.  It set 
in motion patterns for urban planning for the entire decade: experimentation and 
demonstration; increased community participation; and a revival of the federal 
commitment to public housing.  Further, JFK’s reformers had procured more good ideas 
at the end of the administration than at the beginning, in spite of their leader’s lack of 
interest. 
      In any appraisal of the Kennedy years, as well, some subjective factors must be 
considered as well.  John F. Kennedy’s administration ended as an unfinished presidency.  
Cut short by an assassin’s bullet, Kennedy in early November of 1963 rode the crest of 
legislative “anticipation” for the next session in 1964.  Coupled with almost assured 
Democratic landslides in 1964, historians favorable to Kennedy can point with some 
credibility that had he lived, his record would have improved.84  However, Kennedy’s 
presidency, simply put, ran out of time. 
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      Another hard to measure aspect of the Kennedy presidency is what value to place on 
his tremendous popularity.  In the Gallop Polls, Kennedy held the highest positive 
percentages for any president in the second half of the twentieth century, except for 
George Bush just after the first Gulf War, and Kennedy’s ratings remained elevated 
throughout his administration.  In 1961, he hit a high of eighty-three per cent approval, 
carried seventy-nine percent as the average approval rate for most of 1962, and stood at 
about sixty per cent in the fall of 1963.85  
      Kennedy also maintained “public” credibility and remained one of the last presidents 
to do so.  Had the public known about his almost daily affairs, the Marilyn Monroe 
scandal, his wild parties with mob associates, his problem with a possible illegitimate 
child, his Addison’s disease and his drug addictions, JFK’s approval ratings might have 
been different. Kennedy’s private life had so many secrets and possible major 
controversies, that he lived just “one news story away from cataclysmic political 
scandal.”  He associated with people who moved “easily through Hollywood, Democratic 
politics, and organized crime.”86  But the public knew of none of this. 
      Therefore, when Kennedy spoke of things that needed to be enunciated by a president 
during his time, people believed him.  Even though he did less overall than Lyndon B. 
Johnson and perhaps even Richard M. Nixon in civil rights, his messages fostered hope 
that help was coming.  After his “grand-standing” on the King phone call, he became 
accepted by African-Americans as the candidate who would help them the most, and he 
received a startling almost seventy percent of the African-American vote in 1960, while 
maintaining that level of support or higher, throughout his entire presidency.  A large 
block of his African-American support also came from his urban constituents, because a 
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bonding took place between those who lived in the “enduring ghetto,” to both Kennedy 
and his program.87  Although an early version of the “long hot summers” began in 1964, 
with “the flames” clearly visible in every year of the 1960s thereafter, Kennedy’s urban 
“disturbances” occurred in small numbers and for different reasons.88   By Dallas, the 
urban poor still believed John F. Kennedy would deliver. 
      But what the average city voter, particularly the poor did not know, was that JFK 
actually had no agreed upon plan at the start of his administration to cure the woes of 
urban America and, with the exception of his small group of reformers, ended  the same 
way.  Moreover, they did not know that he was uninterested in social city problems; that 
his favorite urban program was an unsuccessful middle-class housing one even though he 
did create another suburban housing boom; that he was absolutely not going to push 
Congress for significant changes; that he would directly cut or curtail expansion of his 
own urban program in several areas in favor of a politically driven balanced budget to 
hopefully appease Congress into approving his 1963 Tax Cut, aimed at the 1964 
elections; and that most of his urban program, save for a few measures to be discussed as 
the failed DUAH and Mass Transit bills, were “retreads” of previous programs.  With 
urban renewal, it was simply easier to make the physical city look and function smoother.  
Moreover, JFK so frequently delayed issuing his long expected open housing order that 
he almost made his “limited” executive order politically laughable.  Only his small group 
of reformers, just before Dallas, unlocked keys to an effective “urban solution,” but they 
did so in spite of their boss’s lackluster leadership.  Kennedy failed to creatively integrate 
those remaining pieces into his existing programs which might have resulted in an overall 
“workable solution,” with proper emphasis and funding.  Consequently, some of the 
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blame for the “flames in the cities” in all years of the 1960s after Dallas falls on JFK’s, as 
well as LBJ’s shoulders.  Johnson foolishly rushed into spending, billions on a program 
not fully tested, to improve his chances in November’s 1964 elections. 
      Firsthand, and after the assassination, even Lyndon Johnson a true civil rights 
champion saw the Kennedy legacy and image.  He described visiting a poor family and 
discussing his war on poverty with them.  Johnson remarked: 
They had seven children, all skinny and sick.  I 
promised the mother and father I would make 
things better for them...I told them of my hopes for 
their future...But then as I walked toward the door, 
I noticed two pictures on the shabby wall. 
One was Jesus Christ on the cross, the other was 
John Kennedy.  I felt as though I had been slapped 
in the face.89
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
JOHN F. KENNEDY, THE 1960 CAMPAIGN 
AND THE URBAN THEME 
 
                                   Once again we must take uncertain risks - sail                                  
                                   uncharted seas - explore unconquered territory. 
                                   I have called this challenge the New Frontier.   
                                   I have made it the theme of my campaign…                  
                                   Will you join me in this endeavor…I pledge       
                                   an administration that will get this nation             
                                   moving toward a new and better world.1                                                                     
                                                                           
      When the men and women of United States forces returned from World War II, they 
became the new generation, which would lead America.  They may have been America’s 
greatest generation, “coming of age during the Great Depression” and winning the 
Second World War, they “went on to build modern America and were the men and 
women whose everyday lives of duty, honor, achievement, and courage gave us the world 
we have today.”2   Sixteen million men and women served but with the war’s end, 
demobilization, retrenchment and reform also brought retooling, retraining and high 
inflation. 
      In late 1945, America also became a land with key shortages in consumer items.  
Housing  remained in dangerously short supply as during World War II, non-defense 
construction virtually stopped and utilization of private housing as well as rental housing 
strained to near capacity.  Housing shortages soared with each troop ship that 
disembarked.  President Harry S. Truman enforced temporary wartime controls, but 
Congress would be key to continuing them, controlling inflation and easing the housing 
crunch.  Lobby groups lined up for the fight.  In a way this would become a contest 
between the “comfortable and the concerned,” but one decided by the politicians.  
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      The Kennedy family wanted a son in politics.  Their choice Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr., 
on his last air mission was shot down and he would remain “forever young.”  Their hopes 
passed to the next eldest son, John F. Kennedy.  After a primary struggle, with his 
father’s money, he won the fall election in 1946 and became the freshman Congressman 
from the Eleventh District of Massachusetts.3  Lower and middle class Irish and Italian 
Americans lived in the Eleventh District and many had served in one of the two world 
wars.  Adequate housing had always been a problem and the war made it even worse. 
      Kennedy expressed some overall interest in veterans housing, public housing, and 
city problems and politically not to do so would cost him his seat.  In tracing his housing 
and urban affairs efforts it should be noted JFK never approached the topic with the zeal 
of an “urban houser” nor that of social progressives of two generations earlier.  JFK’s 
record in this area on his road to the White House, presented a mixed signal, ranging 
from of some interest and effectiveness, often for political reasons, to no interest at all 
and to producing only marginal success.   
      Yet, in January 1947, he became a leading spokesman and co-sponsor for the 
continuation of rent controls, which helped limit housing inflation and focused his efforts 
on passage of the 1947 Housing and Rent Control Act.  But a large, stronger coalition of 
Midwestern Republicans and Southern Democrats opposed this act and offered two 
alternate, more conservative bills.  In sum, these called for increases varying up to fifteen 
percent over then current rates, at the discretion of the FHA or local VA, even with rent 
controls in place.  Along with other Democrats, the fight over these bills consumed 
Kennedy’s energy throughout the spring and early summer of 1947, but his version the 
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1947 Housing and Rent Control Act, extending rent controls for certain groups, finally 
passed the House in June of 1947.4     
      More importantly, during the 1947 session, a bipartisan effort launchd a new bill for 
thousands of federally subsidized low income and moderate-income housing units.  This 
would become the famous Taft-Ellender-Wagner (T-E-W) legislation and young 
Kennedy quickly signed on as a co-sponsor, another wise political move.  T-E-W 
represented the most dramatic increase in housing for the poor and working poor, plus 
veterans housing assistance since Franklin D. Roosevelt’s landmark 1937 Housing Act, 
and Kennedy labored hard for its passage, both in Washington and in his district.  On 
April 16, 1947, he flew to Boston to drum up support, at the invitation of Lew Weinstein, 
a major contributor to his 1946 campaign.  Scheduled to speak at Faneuil Hall to the 
Allied Veterans Housing Council, on the way there he learned the American Legion 
national headquarters opposed public housing, but that most of their leadership sat on the 
boards of national real estate associations.  After a rousing welcome, he opened with, 
“Our worst enemy in our fight for veterans’ public housing is the national office of the 
American Legion.”  He paused, then continued “The American Legion hasn’t done a 
damned thing for the American veteran since World War I - if ever.”5  Although a bold 
statement for a World War II veteran, this attack did not hurt him at all with most of the 
World War II survivors and nearly all the World War I ones, who felt the same way JFK 
did about the American Legion and had since 1919.                                                                                      
      Kennedy’s housing stand against the American Legion brought him national 
attention, but it would not be enough to save the 1947 version of the Taft-Ellender-
Wagner Act, which expired in late summer of 1947.  JFK spoke bitterly of the defeat 
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saying, “I was sent to this Congress by the people of my district to help with the most 
pressing problem facing the country - the housing crisis.  When they ask if I was able to 
get them any houses, I will have to answer, not a one - not a single one.”6  
      In 1948, Congressman Kennedy worked longer hours for the Taft-Ellender-Wagner 
housing bill, speaking repeatedly in favor of it on the house floor.  In June, he and 
Congressman Jacob Javits (D - NY) sent each member an in-depth position paper on how 
the public housing section of the 1948 version would significantly decrease the housing 
shortage.  Kennedy based his study on extensive research from the results of the 1937 
Housing Act.  Revealing that this Act produced “190,000 single but adequate 
homes…which lower income families can afford,” Kennedy claimed the new legislation 
would double that.7  Charles Abrams who authored the acclaimed The Future of Housing 
also supported Kennedy and strongly endorsed Federal intervention to help, chiefly in 
cooperative housing.8  Yet the bill became bottled up in the House Committee on Rules 
and Kennedy countered by signing a discharge petition to bring it to the House floor for a 
vote.  Yet in a bitter fight, the entire 1948 program met defeat.9  He was outraged:         
I would like to protest this high-handed action of the leadership of this 
House in bringing about the defeat of the comprehensive Taft-Ellender-
Wagner housing bill.  The sellout to the real estate and building lobbies 
that have swarmed over this Hill for the past two years, is complete - 
public housing for the benefit of veterans and low income groups is gone -
slum clearance to rid this country of slums that are a stench in the nostrils 
of every American, has been put aside.10
 
      In 1949, Kennedy again co-sponsored the Taft-Ellender-Wagner bill again and 
passage looked quite favorable, due to the results of the 1948 election.  In April, he 
introduced into the House Record another lengthy, detailed position paper entitled, “Is 
there a Housing Shortage?” which of course argued one existed.11  In early June, JFK 
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blasted the real estate lobby working feverishly against the Taft-Ellender-Wagner bill, 
calling their views “total propaganda.”  He reemphasized that the housing “shortage is 
not being solved by private enterprise…and the slums are still increasing” and offered 
documentation that “speculative builders are only reaching the richest third of the 
population.”  He concluded that if “a real housing program was badly needed in 1946, 
1947, and 1948, it is an absolute necessity today.”  On June 23, 1949 Kennedy made an 
emotional address registering his “unqualified support” for H.B. 4009, now re-titled “the 
1949 Housing Act.”  He said that this bill would “help meet the needs for low-rent 
housing in this country.”  Finally as passed in 1949, it proved to be a major housing 
triumph of the Truman Administration.12 
      After passage of the 1949 Act, in housing and urban affairs Kennedy spent his 
remaining years in the House pushing for extensions of rent control and made numerous 
other speeches on the subject.  However, his level of involvement with these matters 
lessened, as he turned his attention to getting into the Senate.  In his haste to get there 
though, he often took negligible interest in housing and urban matters and importantly, 
this set a pattern he would continue throughout his presidency.  For example, Marie 
McGuire, who later became Kennedy’s Public Housing Administration Commissioner, 
recalls she wrote an urban speech for him which he had not even read before meeting the 
press and subsequently delivering it at the National Housing Conference.13   Nonetheless, 
he did express some interest on the record for rent controls being extended from 
December of 1950 through June of 1951.  Yet that legislation went down to defeat. 
      Elected to the United State Senate in 1952, Kennedy immediately supported issues he 
thought would gain true public notoriety, but in so doing he accomplished some things 
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for the cities as “sidelights.”  He, along with Senators Joseph S. Clark (D-PA) and 
Hubert H. Humphrey (D-MN), championed the more “glamorous” area redevelopment 
and labor reform initiatives while Kennedy served on the Senate labor committee.14  
Many of their bills had some impact on urban unemployment, but only as a sidelight. He 
further co-sponsored or floor managed several area redevelopment bills such as Senate 
Bill 2663 in 1956 and Senate Bill 772 in 1959 which extended that coverage to large 
geographic portions of the country and of course, to their voters.  These bills also 
contained some measures for the urban poor in their public facilities loan provisions.15  
Additionally, in early 1954, he helped stop the conservative 83rd Congress from capping 
existing housing programs, and he always worked against caps throughout his Senate 
career.                                                                                                                                          
      Yet his overall Senate record in housing and urban affairs must be considered 
inconsistent and ineffective.  A bill in 1956 to place a limit of 35,000 on the number of 
annual low rent public housing starts passed the Senate 66-16 anyway.  In 1957 Kennedy 
supported a bill to construct 200,000 more low cost public housing units, but the Senate 
saw otherwise by a vote of 54-20.  In 1959, two additional housing bills, which Kennedy 
endorsed, met defeat, one because of a presidential veto and the other by Senate vote.  
Toward the end of that year, a Kennedy bill to boost urban renewal funding from 300 
million dollars to 450 million also failed.  Further, in 1960, a housing bill Kennedy 
supported went down to defeat on June 16.16   But even though having little success, his 
political efforts in housing and urban affairs drew notice to him from several national 
urban organizations. 
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     Capitalizing on this, Senator Kennedy heavily courted the major city groups, of 
course representing huge voting blocks.  He targeted those organizations favoring 
changes in public housing and in urban renewal, as the National Association of Housing 
and Redevelopment Officials (NAHRO), the National Association Against 
Discrimination in Housing (NCADH), the United States Conference of Mayors (USCM), 
the American Municipal Association (AMA) and the National Housing Conference 
(NHC).  With them, he let them know he supported their position either in person or in 
writing.  In 1957 due to illness, brother Robert Kennedy spoke for him at the convention 
of the United States Conference of Mayors.  As by now an accomplished public speaker, 
in 1958 in Denver and in 1959 Kennedy gave rousing speeches to the American 
Municipal Association (AMA) and made extensive promises.  In his 1959 AMA address, 
he quoted from an article he wrote in the New York Times entitled “The Shame of the 
States.”  There he criticized state legislatures, particularly rural ones, for failing to 
adequately fund their cities.  He also blamed the federal government as well for not 
forcing states to reapportion.17   When declaring for the presidency in December 1959, 
one of the reasons he gave for running, sprang from state legislative failures to 
adequately fund urban programs.  He said he would change that as president.18    
      After the Democratic National Convention, JFK proudly made it known that he and 
his running-mate Lyndon B. Johnson would test their agenda publicly in the Congress 
during the “short session” between the end of the conventions and the start of the 
presidential campaign.  Kennedy said his legislation would measure whether or not 
positive change could win against entrenched Republican “stand-patism.”   For the short 
  
38
session he and Johnson announced their priority legislative list in a joint press 
conference on July 30, 1960 with a list of twelve priorities.19   
      On their list of domestic priorities, Kennedy and Johnson placed housing and urban 
affairs second and widely advertised that all their legislation would be passed.  To the 
national press in a series of releases from August 8 through August 10 Kennedy called 
for a significant expansion of public housing construction.  But Congress, along with 
conservative organizations as the National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB), 
the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB), the National Association of 
Manufacturers (NAM) and the National Association of Mutual Savings Banks (NAMSB) 
would have none of it.  Kennedy’s housing bill failed to clear the House Committee on 
rules and died with the end of the short session.20  His maneuvering in trying to get this 
legislation passed can be described as undistinguished and in the words of James 
MacGregor Burns represented a “profile in caution and moderation.”21  Yet in the press 
he scored heavily when he exploded publicly about the outcome,  which gained great 
notoriety for him with the voters.  With some, Kennedy began to be recognized as “the 
city man.”22 
      However, in crafting an urban message to capitalize on being “the city man,” 
 Kennedy’s developed slowly and cautiously, throughout the primary and general election 
campaigns and it became the product of many advisors.  Kennedy had no firm set of 
beliefs he brought to the table about urban programs, save for what appeared to be 
popular at the time or would improve his overall chances in the campaign.  Thus he 
piecemealed his urban message to fit the circumstances of the campaign, and tailored that 
to his local audiences.   
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      To understand the Kennedy urban message, terminology must be clarified.  After 
failing to become the Democratic vice-presidential nominee in 1956, Kennedy’s interests 
immediately focused on winning the presidency.  Thus, in public statements he carefully 
selected his terminology so as not to alienate anyone.  This is important.  In general, his 
mode of expression reflected moral rather than political imperatives but in reality, 
Kennedy aimed solely at getting votes rather than leading the nation.  Specific words 
were carefully selected. 
      Kennedy’s political speech writers played an important role.  “Cities” conjured 
impressions in voter’s minds of things they wish to forget.  In 1960, cities represented 
“gathering points for minorities, the poor, the infirm” and a challenge to the public’s 
conventional conservative values.  Cities created a mental image “that neither life nor the 
American Dream is all that secure.”23  Thus “urban” became the preferred word when 
referring to cities.  It certainly appeared less irritating and spoke to everyone’s 
circumstances who lived in or around a city or town, “no matter how desperate those 
conditions actually were.”24   “Housing” pleased everybody and if deliberately left vague, 
included everybody.  Accordingly, “urban” and “housing” dominated the rhetoric of the 
1960 campaign for both Democrats and Republicans.  Moreover, due to the 
“Balkanization” of local city governments in the late 1950s, plus Eisenhower’s tight 
money policy, many urban politicians and urban construction bosses, felt comfortable 
with this language as well.  Any terminology in the public limelight other than “rural” 
pleased these groups to no end.25   
      Some of the advice which built Kennedy’s urban message came from the private 
sector.  In February 1960, sensing a possible Democratic victory that fall, Chicago’s Field 
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Foundation of the Marshall-Field Department Stores and the Sears and Roebuck 
Company sponsored a national conference on “Housing the Economically and Socially 
Disadvantaged Groups in the Population.”  Chaired by Philip M. Klutznick, a previous 
head of the Public Housing Administration and vice-chaired by Warren J. Vinton a 
former ousted Eisenhower public housing consultant, other luminaries among the thirty 
attendees included Albert M. Cole, Ike’s recently resigned HHFA administrator and Neal 
J. Hardy of the National Association of Home Builders, who would soon become 
Kennedy’s FHA appointee.  This will be discussed later.  But the conference concluded 
that only the federal government with its extensive resources and revenue raising 
capabilities could resolve America’s urban dilemmas.  This paralleled the 1957 National 
Housing Conference (NHC) recommendations and went completely against Ike’s concept 
of “transfer it all to the state and local governments.”26  It also fit nicely into Kennedy’s 
definition of federalism with increased centralization, and he happily adopted the 
recommendations.    
      Two other advisory bodies helped develop the Kennedy urban message as well.  The 
first one comprised twenty-two scholars, chiefly from Harvard and MIT.  Headed by 
Professor Robert C. Wood of MIT, Martin Meyerson of the Harvard - MIT Joint Center 
for Urban Affairs, and Albert M. Sacks of Harvard, this became the academic “Advisory 
Group” which drafted several position papers for Kennedy.27  They also provided the 
urban material for Kennedy’s January 1960 speech in Milwaukee which kicked off his 
primary campaign.28   The Democratic National Committee’s Advisory Committee on 
Urban and Suburban Problems constituted the other urban advisory body for the 
campaign.  It sent information to all six candidates vying for the nomination.  Called the 
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“Advisory Committee” and chaired by New Haven, Connecticut Mayor Richard C. 
Lee, it handled urban and housing issues for the campaign. The “group” worked for 
Kennedy and the “committee” for everybody. 
      On January 2, 1960 the primary campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination 
began in earnest.  Vague is the best way to describe the start of Kennedy’s urban 
message.  He made some references in his Milwaukee and Denver speeches to how he 
would correct “urban” problems over five, then subsequently ten years if needed.  But 
real specifics were not there.  His intention remained focussed on getting the nomination 
in states which at that time had a diversified means of pledging delegates; the popular 
primary, the write-in, and the delegate caucus.  Not all these states had big cities. 
      With his father’s money and through good organization Kennedy established himself 
as the frontrunner by convention time.  He had a good campaign organization in all fifty 
states.  On January 5, he got Ohio’s Governor Michael V. DeSalle to commit seventy-
four delegates to him, as a “favorite son.”  In April, Kennedy “won” the write in field in 
Illinois, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania.  In May, two other big delegate victories came 
his way: as he won Indiana and on the 12th; and key leaders in New York’s delegate 
convention pledged all one hundred fourteen members to him a week later.29   Along the 
way, he also won outright the popular vote primaries of New Hampshire, Wisconsin and 
West Virginia.  He also had a strong delegate base in other big non-primary caucus states 
as New Jersey and California.30  
      After securing the nomination, at the convention his urban message began to take 
shape within the platform itself.  James B. Sunquist, administrative assistant to Senator 
Joseph S. Clark (D - PA) and Abram J. Chayes, a professor at the Harvard Law School 
  
42
wrote most of that.31  Kennedy’s supporters packed key drafting committees to ensure 
what he wanted got into the platform.32  Chester W. Bowles, a Kennedy man chaired the 
Committee of Resolutions and Platform and Arthur Goldberg, Theodore Sorenson, Paul 
Ziffren, Jeb Davidson, and Thomas Quimby managed the writing and Meyer Feldman 
played a leading role, as he later would in the administration.  Feldman, a former lawyer 
from Philadelphia and previous Counsel to the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, 
joined Kennedy’s senatorial staff in 1958 and wrote significant portions of the platform.   
Through these people, Kennedy influenced platform drafting directly.  Senator Clinton P. 
Anderson (D - NM) stated “we had certain positions that we took that they, [Kennedy 
representatives] one or another of them said ‘No, Senator Kennedy wants this or that, or 
the other.’”  Entitled the “Rights of Man,” the resulting fourteen-page platform spoke in 
strong, progressive, reform terminology, some even calling it the most liberal to that date, 
regarding urban affairs and civil rights.  
      In housing and urban affairs, the platform insisted on the “right of every family to 
have a decent home.”  It called for building two million homes a year for ten years.33  
Referring to itself as the new “economic Bill of Rights,” it promised to eradicate poverty 
and juvenile delinquency. While organizing the “policy making machinery of the 
executive branch to provide vigor and leadership in establishing national goals,” it also 
promised that a new Democratic administration that would give the cities a “voice” at the 
Cabinet table.34 
      Further the Rights of Man proclaimed the Democrats if elected would “create a new 
atmosphere…to deal with racial dimensions and inequalities including ending 
discrimination in…voting, education,…housing and employment.”  The platform assured 
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“access for all Americans to…housing and public facilities.”  It made a public contract 
to provide Federal assistance to implement Constitutional rights “in housing and 
employment.”  It concluded, “the new Democratic administration will take action to end 
discrimination in federal housing programs, including federally assisted housing.”35  
Kennedy stated later to his regret, that some of these promises could be kept by issuing 
executive orders “with the stroke of a pen.”  In sum, the Democrats at Los Angeles 
placed the federal government back into the city, its housing market, low income 
housing, and urban development.  The Republican platform made no reference at all to 
low income housing of any kind.36     
      One voting “community” liked most of the platform, but not the nominee.  For 
African-Americans the problem was not what the platform said but rather with what the 
nominee had not said.  Kennedy’s Catholic faith had not openly embraced African-
Americans and the Democratic party’s legacy of states rights and slavery caused most 
African-Americans to vote Republican save for FDR, and Kennedy’s record on civil 
rights issues in Congress could not be called progressive.  In his effort to become the 
ultimate “centrist” he had overlooked their concerns.  Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary 
of the NAACP stayed so mad at Kennedy over his legislative compromise on enforcing 
school desegregation rules in 1957 that he would not even return Kennedy’s phone calls. 
He called Kennedy a “compromiser with evil.”37   
      Frankly, Kennedy lacked the support of nearly all prominent African-Americans.  
Congressman Adam Clayton Powell began as a LBJ supporter.  Baseball legend Jackie 
Robinson refused to have his picture taken with Kennedy and proclaimed to be a Nixon 
devotee.  Singer Harry Belafonte supported Stevenson, Roy Wilkins - LBJ, and although 
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Dr. Martin Luther King remained neutral, his father strongly endorsed Nixon.  So did 
most of the African-American press.  Thus to capture the African-American vote 
Kennedy would have to do more than simply endorse a strong platform.38   
      In the 1960 presidential campaign twelve domestic issues overall were involved, with 
the economy, a comprehensive minimum wage, civil rights, medical care, education, and 
housing and urban affairs comprising the major ones.  But neither Kennedy nor Richard 
M. Nixon, Vice-President and the Republican nominee, discussed how extensive slum 
clearance had “uprooted thousands of families and had exposed long festering social 
chasms and racial cleavages” nor how to resolve that.39  The minor issues consisted of 
area redevelopment, the farm surplus, job retraining (overcoming automation), 
conservation, public works (impacted money) and the status of small businesses.  In his 
post convention organization Kennedy appointed political “issues” people to provide 
ideas for each topic in the campaign.  Under the direction of R. Sargent Shriver, Adam 
Yarmolinsky who would later serve in the administration, headed the urban affairs area.40 
      As an overall summary the 1960 presidential general election campaign saw Kennedy 
slowly and barely pull away and win, and housing and urban affairs remained an issue.  
Kennedy began his housing and urban message in vague terms but finally ended in 
specifics.  He eventually made quite detailed recommendations at just the right time, 
causing urban affairs to become a real hot campaign issue.  Not to do so would have 
produced little interest about city problems and only by assigning urgency and 
“criticality” to the issue could Kennedy gain the voters attention.  This paralleled what he 
was doing with other campaign issues.  Overall, JFK developed his urban message 
though quicker and more effectively than his opponent, forcing Richard Nixon to take an 
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unwanted stand on urban affairs.  Then with the two candidates both holding 
announced public positions on city matters beyond their platforms, Kennedy convened a 
major urban conference during the campaign.  That stroke of genius gained him the urban 
vote and it almost forced Nixon into a fifth debate on “city problems.”  In October 1960, 
at this “Pittsburgh Conference,” Kennedy finally set forth his “comprehensive” 
 urban program, at least the campaign version of such.  The specifics of this campaign are 
a story in themselves, which follows.  
      Kennedy’s urban theme in his 1960 presidential campaign evolved in unique phases.  
His message went through several stages, developed by the candidate as well as for the 
candidate.  The initial phase of Kennedy’s urban message began in early August 1960 
and ended on Labor Day.  That consisted simply of attacking the Republican controlled 
House Committee on Rules for defeating his housing bills.  He followed that with an 
assault on the Eisenhower administration for not using “a stroke of the pen” to end 
discrimination in the federal housing program; for its lack of initiative in urban affairs 
and housing.41  At Hyde Park, New York on August 14, 1960, in a speech 
commemorating the signing of the Social Security Act, Kennedy blasted the Republicans 
for having no housing program for the elderly.42 On September 1, he chided them for not 
taking executive action to end inequality in federal housing programs.  On September 3 
in San Francisco he talked emotionally about losing his housing bill in the short session 
and denigrated the Republican “tight money policy.”  This basically constituted his early 
“all purpose urban speech.”43 
      Starting with the campaign’s traditional Labor Day “kick-off” on September 5, 
Kennedy changed his urban message and began generally discussing what should be done 
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for American cities.  In Detroit he began this second phase of his urban message 
calling for “better homes”…” new housing programs” and said “the new frontiers at 
home lie in revitalized and beautiful cities with good homes for Americans to live in.”44   
He claimed America’s cities had fallen into breeding places for juvenile delinquency and 
called for a “rebirth of our cities.”  Traveling to Flint, a General Motors town, he 
suggested more direct federal aid for housing would create a better life for all 
Americans.45 
      As he traveled west, Kennedy called for a business partnership for the cities and 
promised to create another housing boom.  Courting the housing construction industry, in 
a letter to Texan Harry Blackmon, appointing him to the Democratic National Committee 
of Business and Professional Men, Kennedy praised the private housing sector. He said 
his administration would make the economy healthy enough to “enable us to build two 
million homes per year, in wholesome neighborhoods, for people of all incomes.”  He 
promised “a decent home and suitable living environment for every American family.”46  
In Oakland, California he promised that with private and public cooperation, fifteen 
million homes could be built and poverty wiped out.  He virtually promised everything to 
everybody. 
      Upon returning to the Capitol on September 9, 1960, the Democratic nominee started 
the third phase of his urban message which emphasized making urban housing and urban 
affairs enough of a campaign issue to force Nixon to take a stand.  His advisors urged 
him to increase the urban theme’s frequency and visibility while simultaneously attacking 
Nixon for his silence on urban affairs.  Kennedy responded by calling an “Urban 
Problems Press Conference” in Washington D.C. where he said, “he was getting to work 
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now to bring this, the urban issue, home to the American people.”  He advocated that 
housing and urban problems are “one of the greatest challenges of the next decade,” 
stating “we are losing the race against spreading slums.”47         
      Kennedy also announced on September 10, that a month later he would hold a 
“showcase” urban conference in Pittsburgh to consider what should be done “about the 
urgent human problems of American cities and suburbs.”  Pennsylvania Governor David 
Lawrence and New Haven Mayor Richard C. Lee would chair that event.  The conference 
would make Kennedy the clear advocate for the cities in the 1960 campaign and he hoped 
to use its announcement as the means “to draw Nixon out” into an open public debate on 
urban affairs. 
      By the end of September, Nixon still had not accepted Kennedy’s urban challenge, 
even though the race stagnated into a virtual dead heat and thus Kennedy increased his 
attack.  Lambasting Nixon for opposing all of “the great domestic issues...of the last eight 
years,” JFK told a Denver audience that “the housing bill [was] defeated because we 
could not get a single Republican on the House Rules Committee to vote to send it to the 
House floor.”48  In Chicago on September 26, the day of the first “Great Debate,” 
Kennedy blamed Nixon for all shortcomings in the housing industry, and called for all 
building trades to support the Democrats and for a national debate on urban issues.49  In 
the first of the “Great Debates,” he challenged Nixon again by proclaiming he would 
ensure by 1970, the United States led in education, health, home building, and in 
economic strength.  He boldly concluded that only the Democrats could do that.50 
      This finally drew Nixon out.  The vice president accepted Kennedy’s urban challenge, 
which is what the Democratic nominee wanted, because to remain silent would be 
  
48
politically damaging.  On September 29, in a full-page “position paper” in the New 
York Times, Vice President Nixon countered Kennedy by setting forth his own housing 
and urban affairs program which deviated significantly from the Republican platform.  
Nixon proposed improving urban America with outright federal grants for urban renewal 
projects, which he would do later as president in a modified form in revenue sharing.51  
He also proposed liberalization of federal credit policies, constructing more single-family 
housing and additional suburban starts.  He emphasized the need for improved mass 
transit and touched upon the plight of minorities displaced by federal projects.  While 
emphasizing that the Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA) should be made more 
powerful, conversely he did not endorse cabinet status for it.  Nixon concluded with 
“obviously we need a general federal urban policy.”52
      For the next ten days before Pittsburgh Urban Conference, Kennedy repeatedly 
attacked Nixon.  He had two trump cards, one being Nixon’s new  position paper and the 
other Nixon’s old voting record on urban affairs dating back to 1946.  Kennedy called 
Nixon’s urban proposal nothing new, politically opportunistic, and too little, too late.  He 
labeled it a worn out effort just to get votes and accused the vice president of “leap year 
liberalism,” quipping “Mr. Nixon as a Congressman had voted against the Housing Act 
of 1949 and all public housing for our people.”  Reminding the voter that as vice 
president, Nixon cast the deciding negative vote “on a bill which would have decreased 
the interest on GI home loans,” and he castigated Nixon as the nominee of the party that 
caused slums and substandard housing to grow while good housing decreased overall.  
When Nixon criticized the Democratic platform’s urban plank as too costly, Kennedy in 
Indianapolis asked the audience “how can you measure the cost of no juvenile 
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delinquency in slums which have been torn down by an effective urban renewal 
program?”53  Although this statement overstated what could be done, Kennedy felt 
comfortable in promising it, as it looked good to an increasingly attentive public. 
      The Pittsburgh Conference on urban affairs detailed Kennedy’s solution to city woes.  
It opened October 10 with Edward J. Logue, administrative assistant to Mayor Richard C. 
Lee of New Haven, Lee himself and, Hugh Mields, Jr. at the speaker stand.  They, along 
with Robert C. Wood planned it over the late summer and early fall at Ed Logue’s 
summer place on Martha’s Vineyard.  Robert Hazen staffed an office in Washington D.C. 
to work out the administrative details.54   William Slayton and William L. Wheaton 
headed the policy making team,55 but Dr. Robert C. Weaver, because of the Hatch Act, 
remained in New York.56  The “Pittsburgh” plan called for approving a comprehensive 
urban program beyond the Democratic platform which Kennedy would embrace in the 
national spotlight at the conference’s conclusion.  Proposals from the 1958 United States 
Conference of Mayors and the 1959 meeting of the American Municipal Association 
flowed throughout the literature. Statistics were updated and planks already part of the 
1960 Democratic platform were improved with new ideas from big city mayors and city 
organizations.  The Conference aimed at specifying an urban agenda for the 1960s.57 
      Kennedy arrived for the conference’s final planning session fresh from his second 
debate of October 7, while enjoying a slim lead over the vice president.58  He “warmed 
quickly” to the approximately 450 mayors, urban planners and urban builders in 
attendance.59  Using the recommendations of the conference, as the cameras rolled he 
delivered one of his best and most definitive campaign speeches.  Here he presented his 
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vision for urban America, and in the view of Robert C. Weaver, also made the real 
commitment for a Department of Urban Affairs and Housing.60 
      Kennedy quickly came to the heart of the matter.  He offered to create a partnership 
between the federal government and local communities, with each municipality planning 
its future.  This was a big change which the reformers had influenced.  He wished to 
combine the resources of federal, state and city government to solve urban problems over 
a ten year period and stressed that cooperative federal assistance and local planning 
would be the key to eradicating slums through five distinctive approaches.61 
      The first step would be to “marry” urban renewal to a mix of federal, state, city and 
private money.  Those displaced would be resettled on or near the site.  Secondly, he 
pledged to find an “appropriate” balance between the construction of high, moderate and 
low income housing and use federal authorities and incentives to create that.  Thirdly, he 
called for another housing boom, which would build half again more homes every year 
than in 1960 and as a fourth point, mass transit planning would receive new emphasis and 
money.  Kennedy intended to spend millions to help metropolitan America build mass 
transit.  Lastly, he wanted to preserve urban open spaces as parks, recreational facilities, 
and city lakes to help eliminate juvenile delinquency.  To implement this plan, he called 
for a Department of Urban Affairs and Housing (DUAH) for coordinating all federal city 
activities and concluded that the cities deserve a seat at the cabinet table along with the 
Department of Agriculture which “was created ninety-eight years ago to serve rural 
America.”62 
      Kennedy’s solution to urban problems could not be called new or radical.  But this 
ten-year, five-point plan if enacted, with an urban department, represented the most 
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comprehensive city program since the 1949 Housing Act.  Increasing local community 
participation in federal urban planning represented a significant change.  It stood as a 
rejection of the centralization recommended by the February private sector conference in 
Chicago but then again, Kennedy was in front of an audience of community mayors.  The 
cost though was a first.  In 1961 dollars, this program would require two and a half 
billion over Kennedy’s first four years, based on HHFA “from year of start estimates” 
plus a doubling of urban renewal funds over the same period.63
      But Kennedy’s Pittsburgh ideas lacked a social conscience.  Kennedy chiefly 
addressed only solving the problems of the physical city.  Those favoring programs to 
resolve the grinding poverty of the “enduring ghetto” would only be listened to later in 
his presidency.  Ideas from those willing to experiment with social redesign were not 
included, in my opinion, because JFK wished not to offend “conservative voters.” 
Moreover, urban civil rights and urban housing matters were not mentioned. 
      However, some people would be heard from whether Kennedy wanted it or not.  At 
the urging of the NAACP, CORE and the National Urban League, on October 20 the 
Democratic National Committee added several additional specifics regarding urban civil 
rights.  These included two concrete pledges for minorities, completely banning racial 
discrimination in public housing and promising direct federal action to assist minorities in 
finding decent homes.  Without much enthusiasm, Kennedy subsequently issued separate 
statements endorsing these additions.  Because the Pittsburgh conference had been 
planned since August, one would assume these kinds of statements would have already 
been included.  Yet, Kennedy in his “centrist” role had overlooked them. 
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      Thus a pattern emerged for Kennedy’s presidency even before his election, which 
he maintained throughout his administration.  John Kennedy remained cautious on social 
issues until forced by others to take a stand, or the issue required a stand, or it looked 
good in the polls.  This is not to say he held conservative views on social issues or that he 
would not take a moral stand.  Rather it is to underscore that he did not intend to become 
the standard bearer of reform for the 1960s social agenda.  His caution would later 
prompt Clarence Mitchell of the NAACP to quip, “the New Frontier looks like a dude 
ranch with Senator James Eastland (D - MS) as the general manager.”64 
      To counter African-American suspicions regarding his urban civil rights position, 
after the Pittsburgh conference he spoke at a NAACP political meeting but received only 
lukewarm response.  African-Americans were still not ready to take Kennedy on an act of 
faith.  Then he and brother Robert Kennedy stumbled through an event, which in the end, 
would secure him the presidency. 
      Arrested on October 19 in a protest of segregated facilities at an Atlanta department 
store, Dr.Martin Luther King, Jr. was jailed and further prosecuted for a minor traffic 
infraction over an Alabama drivers license.  Sentenced to four months of chain gang 
labor, he was transferred in the middle of the night from Atlanta’s jail to the Georgia 
State Penitentiary.  After the continual and almost frantic urging of Harris Wofford, the 
campaign’s civil rights advisor, Kennedy finally called King’s wife, Corretta Scott King, 
to offer his sympathies.  The press interpreted this call as an offer of help to King.  
Simultaneously, brother Robert Kennedy called the judge who sentenced King, to 
question the legalities of the sentence.  Having already received pressure for King’s 
release from Atlanta Mayor Hartsfield, Robert’s Kennedy’s call provided enough impetus 
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to get King out of jail and Jack got the credit for it.  Subsequently he also got the full 
endorsement of Martin’s father, the Reverend King, Sr. and as African-American press 
and churches began to hear about this, Kennedy started receiving their endorsements.  To 
ensure nobody forgot, the Kennedy campaign established a front organization which 
issued a “blue pamphlet” to these groups explaining Kennedy’s help.65  This one gesture 
gained him seventy percent of the African-American vote that fall.66 
      The Pittsburgh conference and the King “phone call” provided the momentum 
Kennedy needed to capture urban America.  Now, with his urban proposal on the table as 
well as Vice President Nixon’s, Kennedy compared the two relentlessly throughout the 
remaining days and nights of the campaign.  He hammered Nixon’s urban proposal as 
well as Nixon’s follow through “white paper” on urban affairs which the vice president 
wrote to rebut Kennedy.  Having won a narrow victory in all four debates, by late 
October Kennedy tried to get the vice president into a fifth one on housing and urban 
affairs.  But Nixon kept issuing “fact sheets” while delaying any decision about a fifth 
debate and Kennedy countered by emphasizing Nixon’s willingness to debate “by 
mimeograph but not in front of seventy million on television.”  He also accused Nixon of 
having a “housing credibility gap” which Kennedy later called the “Nixon Gap.”67 
      On November 8, l960, the campaign ended and the voting began.  John F. Kennedy 
had been hoping for a political mandate the next day that would sweep him and his party 
into the White House and the Congress.  He had covered carefully selected northern, mid-
western and western states with repeated appearances and huge sums of money.  Lyndon 
B. Johnson, the other half of the ticket, capitalizing on his southern background, made 
extensive appearances throughout the south.  There he aptly mixed his brand of “down 
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home” politics and southern wit, to appeal to that Democratic voting tradition.  Thus, 
in the autumn of 1960, John Kennedy kept together the remnants of the New Deal 
coalition and Lyndon Johnson the majority of the “solid south,” for the last time. 
      Yet Kennedy produced a razor thin victory.  In the closest election in the century to 
that date, he defeated Richard M. Nixon by 49.72 percent to 49.55 percent of the popular 
vote.  Kennedy’s margin stood at 119,450 votes in 68,836,385 ballots cast.  Yet he 
carried only twenty-three states to Nixon’s twenty-six, with one remaining independent.  
Michigan, with a heavy turnout, put him over in the early morning hours of November 9, 
1960.  And like in Michigan, the voters nationally turned out in record numbers.  Of a 
total of 107,000,000 eligible voters, sixty-four percent went to the polls.  This marked the 
election of 1960 as the highest participatory election, by percentage as well as numbers in 
the nation’s history. 
      But the 1960 election of John Kennedy still has a cloud over it.  Illinois, in particular 
Chicago, under staunch Democratic Mayor Richard J. Daley, probably produced 
fraudulent voting and in numbers large enough to have turned the outcome.68  Daley 
would be the second official visitor to the Kennedy White House on January 21, 1961, 
following only behind former President Harry S. Truman.   Throughout Kennedy’s 
presidency, Daley received innumerable political appointments he wanted and had free 
access to the President.69  Michigan, Texas and Louisiana also may have produced some 
irregularities with a few of these by type, continuing into the 1962 off-year elections.70  
      Overall had Kennedy not received seventy-seven percent of the Catholic vote, nearly 
seventy percent of the African-American vote, sixty-four percent of the labor vote, fifty-
four percent of the youth vote, and fifty-two percent of the women’s vote, he would not 
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have become President.71  Kennedy also owed a significant debt of gratitude to 
American cities.  He captured the urban vote in both older industrial cities and in many 
new urban centers and did this, not only because of the traditional Democratic Party 
machinery, but because of his urban message.  For the first time since Al Smith’s 
unsuccessful bid in 1928, urban America “thought” they finally had a genuine “city man” 
on the way to the White House.  Kennedy captured twenty-nine of the thirty-nine major 
cities and ran very well in the suburbs.  He ran so well in the suburbs of the top fourteen 
major cities that he bested Stevenson’s 1956 tallies by eleven percent across the boards.  
The cities truly gave John Kennedy their endorsement.72 
      However, what the urban voters though they were getting in the election of John F. 
Kennedy as president was in reality, something less.  What Kennedy would or could 
deliver for the cities in the “thousand days” to begin on January 20, 1961, did not live up 
to his urban message.  There are three reasons for this beyond the fact that Kennedy 
“overpromised.”  
      Initially, John Kennedy did not get the mandate he wanted.  He won, but neither he 
nor his program were widely endorsed.  In addition, the Democrats lost twenty-two seats 
in the House and one seat in the Senate while Kennedy eked out his narrow victory.  This 
placed Kennedy’s entire program on shaky ground before he ever entered the Oval 
Office.73 
      Second, Kennedy failed to educate the urban voter about the depth of opposition to a 
big urban program from within his own party.  Short of a miracle, the conservative 
Democrats of the 87th and 88th Congresses would greatly slow his domestic initiatives or 
kill them.  Along with their Republican counterparts they would put brakes on anything 
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in the “New Frontier” which appeared radical, liberal or progressive and had already 
done so for almost a quarter of a century.74  There would be only a short “honeymoon” 
for Jack Kennedy in urban affairs but it would not last. 
      Most importantly and unbeknown to the city voters, John F. Kennedy’s real interests 
lay elsewhere.  As a young Cold Warrior elected president, he decidedly favored foreign 
policy which had a serious effect on the attention he gave to domestic matters.75  Thus the 
urban voter had been mislead.  For when aspiring to the White House, in the primaries, 
the campaign, the debates, and other means of expressing his ideas, Kennedy alluded to 
attending equally to both foreign and domestic issues.  When trying to get elected, he 
made himself the champion of the “politics of expectation” in all areas.  He promised to 
find a workable solution to urban problems.  Hinting at bold designs and new programs, 
he painted the picture of an administration equally active across the boards.76  This was 
not to be the case. 
      So the nation and the city voted in 1960 for a new leadership which promised to 
deliver a comprehensive urban program.  John F. Kennedy retired to his Palm Beach 
estate to begin planning how to lead that nation.  In his campaign travels, he discovered 
three important things: poverty in America; how serious the civil rights struggle had 
become; and the extent of the deterioration of American cities.  Kennedy would embark 
on a journey where he promised great things to correct these problems.  Sandwiched 
between the stoic 1950s and the riots and turmoil of the Johnson years, the New Frontier 
offered great hope for the United States and its cities.  It promised comprehensive 
solutions to complex problems, without easy answers.  It would take a great effort, in a 
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long struggle to try and accomplish Kennedy’s ten-year urban plan for the 1960s, and 
neither the candidate nor the public knew how hard that would be.  
      But on November 9, many in America’s cities waited with genuine hope and 
excitement for the New Frontier to begin.  They would greet Kennedy’s inauguration 
with a new sense of public service, good will, patriotism, and exuberance.  Tom Hayden 
recalled about Kennedy’s call to serve one’s country, “Nobody ever asked me to do 
anything before, and then Kennedy did.”77  Thus, many readied themselves to get started, 
but unknown to them, the question remained whether Kennedy was really up to the task 
or could deliver on his promises.                                                                                                                    
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CHAPTER  III 
THE NEW FRONTIER AND THE CITY 
                             …As a historian, I predict that we are on the threshold 
                             of what will be called the Kennedy Era, that the whole 
                             atmosphere of the country will now change as it changed 
                             when Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson and 
                             Franklin D. Roosevelt took office, and that the new era 
                  will be one of the most constructive …in our annals.1  
                          
        After his election on the evening of November 11, President-Elect John F. Kennedy 
began a short working vacation at Palm Beach in Florida.  He received thousands of 
congratulatory telegrams and letters ranging from average citizens as the corresponding 
secretary of the El Cerrio, California Democratic Club to corporate executives and 
foreign leaders.  Others as Samuel H. Beer, National Chairman of Americans for 
Democratic Action added his endorsement to a long list of well wishers welcoming the 
end of eight years of Republican control of the White House.2
       Many placed demands on the new president-elect.  Still doubting the depth of his 
civil rights commitment, Roy Wilkens Executive Secretary of the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People felt obliged to spell out for Kennedy a few 
important things a president can fix.  He called for an immediate liberalization of the 
Senate filibuster rule, significant changes to the House Committee on Rules, plus he 
reminded the president-elect of his now famous “stroke of the pen” commitment.  He 
warned Kennedy that seventy per cent of African-Americans voted for him and that he 
could jeopardize that support through inaction.3
       Before January 20, Kennedy had to write an inaugural address, Congressional 
messages, a legislative agenda, State of the Union Address, and select or approve nearly 
two thousand federal appointments.4  Kennedy had to make very careful selections in 
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domestic affairs for two reasons.  One reason stemmed from the fact that America “at 
home” in 1960 had very serious problems.  On the date Kennedy would take office, more 
people were out of work in the United States than at any time since the Great Depression, 
juvenile delinquency had significantly increased, poverty remained more widespread than 
assumed, and a quickly emerging national civil rights movement would grab his 
attention, whether he wanted it or not.5  The other reason came from the fact that known 
only to Kennedy, domestic affairs would not receive anywhere near the same attention as 
foreign policy, so those appointed would have to handle domestic matters themselves, 
often with only general guidance from the president.
       Kennedy wanted the transition of power to be smooth and to ensure this, early in 
August, he established a transition team.  Clark Clifford, with extensive government 
experience during the Truman years, became the budget and staffing director.  Kennedy 
told Clifford that “If I am elected, I don’t want to wake up on the morning of November 
9th and have to ask myself, what in the world do I do now?”6
       Desiring a list of priorities for an effective transition, Kennedy assigned that task in 
early fall 1960 to Professor Richard E. Neustadt of Columbia University.  On October 30, 
Neustadt responded by providing him two position papers entitled “Organizing the 
Transition” and “Staffing the President-elect.”  Neustadt’s chief recommendation focused 
on “establishing conditions” which would foster real accomplishments right after the 
election.  By conditions he meant “postpone whatever is postponable” regarding small 
issues and concentrate on the important ones.7  
       Important issues for Neustadt focused on “establishing liaison with the outgoing 
regime,” “organizing the reorganization,” and “installing a shadow government in 
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Washington” early for “arranging the physical take-over.”  “Designating White House 
aides, executive office aides, cabinet officers, and heads of agencies” came next.  Other 
appointments “as in national security” and “below cabinet rank” would then evolve.  
Further, Neustadt recommended Kennedy should do some fence mending by “reassuring 
the [Washington] bureaucrats, business, Congress and the Republicans that he would 
work with them.”  Neustadt thought the best way to do this would be by sound 
appointments and good communications.  Indeed, Kennedy selected a larger proportion 
of his appointments from big Fortune 500 corporations than did Eisenhower, by sixty-
five to fifty-six percent.8  Neustadt also assigned high priority to “giving Congress a 
preliminary agenda” via press conferences and staff visits, and writing the actual program 
shortly after the inaugural.  He recommended “Task Forces” should be established in 
twenty-nine critical areas for preparing a comprehensive plan.9 
       However, Neustadt had an important warning for Kennedy.  He cautioned “one hears 
talk all over town about ‘another Hundred Days.’”  Neustadt warned Kennedy talk of that 
kind “is good only for a first impression of energy, direction, action and 
accomplishment.”  But he noted “‘the Hundred Days’ analogy can also be taken -- and is 
being taken -- as an expectation of [the] fulfillment of every sort of legislative promise in 
the platform and in the campaign.”  He cautioned with some foreboding, that “in 
legislative terms, it is 1949 not 1933, that offers an analogy -- and warnings -- for 
1961.”10 
       Regarding recruiting, R. Sargent Shriver handled a large portion of that chore.  
Shriver followed recommendations from Clifford and Neustadt on who to get and at what 
salary.  To Shriver, Neustadt’s advice that “the staff you put together now in the days 
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after the election, must be regarded as the core of your official staff…during your early 
months in office, not a continuation of your campaign,” seemed reasonable.11   Further, 
Neustadt believed that the staff must be able to “meet two kinds of needs: on the one 
hand, [the] needs of the President…on the other hand, [the] needs of other government 
officials, [i.e.] the bureaucracy.” 
       Both Neustadt and Clifford emphasized Kennedy should organize his staff more like 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s than Dwight D. Eisenhower’s.  They recommended Kennedy act 
as his own “chief of staff.”12  He followed this and became “the first modern president to 
break with the traditional cabinet based system” by attempting to control the extensive 
executive bureaucracy himself.13  He also dismantled Eisenhower’s military style 
national security bureaucracy and attempted to create “lines of power…all coming from 
him.”  The net result created a certain climate of disorder which Kennedy liked because it 
made people “work harder to stay abreast.”  But he intended to “control” and exercise the 
full, specified powers of his office as well as “some that were not.”14                                
       During his tenure as a modern president, Kennedy also participated in some of the 
early nuances of the post-modern presidency, such as the beginning of the recent national 
debate on federalism, replacement of some traditional lobby groups as the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) with ones from “outside politics,” particularly in civil 
rights, and waging local “turf protection” wars in urban planning.15  Regarding poverty, 
the battle for the possession and interpretation of federal policy would take place during 
the Kennedy presidency.16  The poor would become “visible” during his years.  As 
Michael Harrington wrote in The Other America in 1962, “clothes” served as costumes 
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making the poor invisible because to be reasonably dressed remained much easier than 
to be decently housed and fed.17  Their invisibility was about to come to an end.
       In making appointments, Kennedy had to deal with deeply divisive political opinions 
between three divergent groups.  A tension existed between the “old left,” “new left,” and 
“conservatives” vying for nominations.  Rooted in fundamental political, social and 
economic differences, resolution of these conflicting views would not be resolved by 
Kennedy in the appointments process.  Rather he made a montage of nominations, which 
included people from all three groups.   
        The old left consisted of radicals who came of political age during the New Deal 
supporting trade unions, democratic socialism, creation of a Jewish state and although 
occasionally borrowing ideas from Karl Marx, remained strongly anti-communist.18  
They also valued capitalism.  Concerning social programs, they built a structure, actually 
an infrastructure, within which the federal government had functioned since 1933. 
      On the other hand the emerging new left of the late1950s and early 1960s prided itself 
on being undogmatic while still having a social conscience that staunchly defended civil 
liberties but at the same time mandated strong state intervention in specific areas.19  
These liberals viewed the poor as suffering from a “pathological” condition called the 
culture of poverty and defined it in social rather than economic terms.  They called for 
state “activism” to correct the problem.  Conversely the conservatives in1960 considered 
the poor to be victims of their own “improvidence, incompetence, or corruption” and felt 
the way to end poverty lay in creating more jobs under the banner of the “free market” 
system.20  All three groups believed in continuing Roosevelt’s “benevolent state” where 
government, by varying degrees, looked out for its citizens’ welfare, but the level and 
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method of government involvement differed widely.21  In appointing people from all 
three camps Kennedy produced a maintenance of the old federal programs, along with 
some reform possibilities, but the overall result was a diluted product.  Nonetheless it 
would be an interesting journey.                                                                         
        In housing and urban affairs Kennedy faced a significant challenge with staff 
appointments.  Since he knew he would give housing and urban affairs low priority, his 
appointments must be of quality as they would be running a large majority of the 
activities and providing most of the leadership.22  Yet, he could not tell those considering 
nomination of his intentions, as his pro-urban philosophy from the campaign, promising 
meaningful departure from Eisenhower’s “reign of the bland,” still reverberated in their 
ears.23   Thus, he had to act carefully. 
       Those appointed in domestic affairs including urban policy, fell into four broad 
categories: White House appointments, agency selections, administrative hires, and 
regional selectees.  Kennedy wanted the most outstanding staff he could find, perhaps 
even a “brain trust,” akin to when he later greeted a group of Nobel laureates at the White 
House, saying “they represented the greatest collection of minds ever assembled there 
except for when Thomas Jefferson dined alone.”24  He hoped his appointees would be 
comparable.  In sum, all would be very well educated, bright, loyal, but chiefly short on 
real government experience.  They would however by their credentials bring some 
“status” back to city planning which was needed.  Recently cities had been losing status 
and important political clout to the suburbs where the “spirit of the supermarket… 
homogeneous extensions of stainless surfaces and psychoanalyzed people, packaged 
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commodities, and ‘ranch homes’ reigned supreme.”25  Kennedy always valued status 
although at he pretended it did not count.26 
       Filling the White House staff came first and controversy surrounded some selections.  
The initial one to come under heavy scrutiny concerned John Kennedy selecting his 
brother Robert Kennedy for Attorney General.  Based on JFK’s view of politics in 
Washington, his brother was a reasonable choice for this position.  The younger Kennedy 
could serve as a sounding board for the President’s ideas and as an insider for 
information.  Moreover, he would be a confidant in the cabinet.27   The final push to have 
him appointed came from the president-elect’s father who stated flatly “this is the only 
thing I am asking for and I want it.”28  Thus his thirty-four year old younger brother, 
Harvard and Virginia Law educated and former council to the McCarthy Committee, 
became the nominee for attorney general.  He would play a leading role in domestic 
policy and urban affairs.  After the assassination RFK would also begin to flirt with 
genuine social reform in urban planning.  Robert Kennedy came to the job with few 
political and business obligations, but with several enemies and Vice-President-Elect 
Lyndon B. Johnson headed that list.29  Over time and through to the end of 1964, Robert 
Kennedy remained the second most important man in Washington.30  But initially he 
simply served on a cabinet of “nine strangers and a brother.”31 
        Designated for Special Counsel to the President, Theodore C. Sorensen inherited the 
“de facto” White House “Chief of Staff” job and was the best person there with whom to 
discuss domestic legislstion.32   He served in JFK’s campaign and presidency as the chief 
speech writer and according to Kennedy as his “intellectual blood bank.”33  Sorensen, 
who hailed from Nebraska and received his law degree from the University of Nebraska, 
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had previously served on Kennedy’s senatorial staff.  As a prolific writer he also 
helped JFK write most of his best seller, Profiles in Courage.34   In the administration, 
Sorensen assumed a “central advisory roll” and acted often as a “de facto” “chief of staff” 
for domestic matters, and sometimes for foreign policy ones.35  He would write many of 
JFK’s now famous speeches.36   
        Sorensen had two assistant special counsels, Lee C. White and Myer Feldman, both 
reporting to him.  Lee White, a fellow Nebraskan and also an attorney, served on the 
Hoover Commission in 1954-1955 and as Counsel to the Senate Small Business 
Committee later.  He would play a leading role in housing and urban affairs.37   Through 
his proximity to Sorensen, he received regular attention from the President.38   Myer 
Feldman, the other assistant special counsel, joined Kennedy’s senatorial staff in 1958 
and served as liaison between JFK’s staff and Lyndon Johnson’s during the campaign.39   
Educated at the Wharton School and the University of Pennsylvania Law School, 
Feldman’s role in the administration would be to handle legislative proposals and 
domestic programs, as he did along with Sorensen during Kennedy’s late senate years.  
Later, as Kennedy’s congressional legislative liaison team began to falter, Sorensen, 
Feldman and White handled all domestic matters for the White House, except the 
economy and civil rights.40   
        In the White House, civil rights issues were managed by Harris L. Wofford, Jr. who 
did an extraordinary job getting Kennedy to take notice of the subject during the 
campaign.  Born in New York City and educated at the University of Chicago and Yale 
Law School, Wofford taught law at the University of Notre Dame prior to joining the 
Kennedy campaign.  Hired to manage both urban and rural civil rights, with his 
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appointment into the White House came a true civil rights advocate who would 
pressure JFK to be more forceful and forthcoming about the subject.  Enjoying some 
early success, Kennedy “endorsed all the items on Wofford’s agenda, but he consistently 
drew back from their exection.”41   For a time, Wofford chaired the Subcabinet Civil 
Rights Group, composed of key deputies from the executive departments and charged 
with surveying and coordinating all civil rights aspects of public programs.42   However, 
power would slowly slip away from Wofford, to Burke Marshall, Chief of the Civil 
Rights Division of the Department of Justice.43   Wofford subsequently resigned in late 
1962 to take a Peace Corps position in Ethiopia, but when I spoke with him in 1980 while 
he was a guest on the “Larry King Show,” he still sang Kennedy’s praises.44   
     Frederick Dutton and Ralph Dungan, two other special assistants to the president 
played important roles in shaping domestic policy and remained part of the close knit 
Sorensen click.  Since Kennedy depended much less on the Cabinet than did Eisenhower, 
he thus relied more on his White House staff and frequently worked directly with Dutton 
and Dungan.45   Both of these men would also work the housing and urban program.  
       For the critical job of congressional relations, Kennedy selected six former campaign 
workers and would pay dearly for that choice.  Headed by Larry O’Brien, other members 
of the congressional liaison team included Richard K. Donahue, Charles U. Daly, Claude 
DeSautels, Michael N. Manatos and Henry H. Wilson.  They may have done great things 
in the campaign but they would be, and O’Brien in particular, out of their “element in the 
halls of congress and had no more idea than a small child of its complexities and 
Byzantine courtesies.”46   Mike Mantos came from Wyoming and worked the Senate.  
Henry Wilson, from North Carolina did the same in the House.  Dick Donahue and 
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Charles Daly got assigned the urban and industrial state members for both Houses.  
Claude DeSautels helped where needed.47   At the time, all were young, bright, energetic, 
and very, unprepared. 
         But their leader would also let them down.  Kennedy repeatedly asked that “people 
be kept from him so he could clear his desk and concentrate on a domestic agenda.  But it 
never happened.”48  That would require he “renegotiate endlessly…with business, with 
labor, with governors, and particularly with Congress,” and he simply did not have the 
interest.49  So his liaison team would pay the price, compounded by their own 
shortcomings. 
       The Justice Department employed several people important to the cities during 
Kennedy’s years.  Except for Robert Kennedy, Burke Marshall held the most power 
there.  He rose from an assistant attorney general to Chief of the Civil Rights Division 
during a turbulent and violent era.50   Once the President finally came around to issuing 
his Executive Order, Marshall enforced those policies aimed at stopping discrimination in 
some federally assisted housing.  He dealt directly with civil rights in urban areas.  Byron 
“Whizzer” White, a former football standout and “friend of Jack’s” became a deputy 
attorney general on his way to the U.S. Supreme Court.  Norbert Schlei served as legal 
counsel to the Justice Department and John Doar, subsequently to head one of the 
country’s leading law firms, became first assistant to Burke Marshall in the Civil Rights 
Division.51   
        Budget, Commerce, Area Redevelopment, and Defense received appointments 
important to urban affairs.  David C. Bell, new Director of the Bureau of the Budget 
(BOB) became a leading proponent for funding experimental urban programs as did 
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Walter Heller, Chairman of the President’s Council of Economic Advisors (CEA).  
These two entities played a leading role in juvenile delinquency and poverty programs.  
William L. Batt Jr., a long time supporter of strong social agendas, headed the Area 
Redevelopment Administration (ARA) and it along with HHFA, ran a few joint programs 
to help the urban poor.  Hyman H. Bookbinder remained a friend of the cities as Special 
Assistant to the Secretary of Commerce.  Adam Yarmolinsky, Assistant to the Secretary 
of Defense, transitioned a non-housing job into a national housing campaign to improve 
defense housing.  As a true zealot for equal housing as well, his stands later got him into 
trouble, when Major General Edwin A. Walker in testimony before the Special Senate 
Preparedness Subcommittee, said he was a communist, but subsequent investigations 
proved nothing.52  Yarmolinsky would be one of the real reformers of the Kennedy years 
and later quite important in the early “war on porverty.”53  At Defense, he was “the 
housing man” for everything from “high rises to fall out shelters.”54  
       Staffing the Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA), the “hub” of urban policy, 
was crucial.  The Administrator of the HHFA served as the chief urban planner for the 
United States and although at sub-cabinet level in 1961, shouldered cabinet level 
responsibilities.  Established by Reorganization Plan Three on July 27, 1947, the HHFA 
ran housing and urban affairs for the President.  Further reorganized in 1954 by 
Eisenhower, in Kennedy’s time it had five subordinate agencies uniquely called 
“constituent administrations.”55   By 1960, within its headquarters, local, state and federal 
offices it employed almost fifteen thousand people.56  
       Being Administrator of the HHFA required the performing of staggering 
responsibilities.  Not only did the Administrator set and implement policy, but he or she 
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was also responsible for the supervision, management, and coordination of five large 
and very expensive constituent administrations, which spent millions and later billions of 
tax payer dollars.  They included the Federal Housing Administration (FHA); Public 
Housing Administration (PHA); Urban Renewal Administration (URA); Community 
Facilities Administration (CFA) and the Federal National Mortgage Association 
(FNMA).  To make matters worse, many of these administrations had become quite 
independent from HHFA by 1960.   
       Additionally, the head of the HHFA served as the Director of two important boards: 
The National Housing Council (NHC) and the Advisory Board for Agency Policy 
Coordination in Housing (called the “Advisory Board”).  On the NHC he or she sat with 
the Directors of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, which used to be HHFA’s sixth 
constituent agency, the Director of the Veterans Administration and the Assistant  
Secretaries or Special Assistants to the Secretaries of the Departments of Agriculture, 
Commerce, Labor, Defense, and Health, Education and Welfare.  The Advisory Board 
consisted of the five actual constituent administrators of the HHFA.57  Thus, in 
organization, the HHFA represented a splendid bureaucracy empowered by law to 
influence all aspects of America’s most vital market, the housing industry. 
       The HHFA intervened daily in that market through its policies and programs.  
Among those, ten were critical for the domestic economy.  The Voluntary Home 
Mortgage Credit Program helped rural and urban poor get mortgages.  The Community 
Disposition Program sold former or current federal properties and housing.  The 
Workable Program for Community Improvement, which used to be called “Community 
Development,” provided federal money to local communities to plan for and implement 
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community improvements.  Those included the big ticket items of urban renewal, slum 
clearance, and relocation of those displaced.58   Kennedy would add a new FHA below 
interest market rate (BIMR) program of insured loans to help lower income families get 
mortgages.  He also added a FNMA program to purchase original mortgages for low and 
middle income families and to service those at below market rates.  Under Kennedy, 
HHFA gained the authority to finance the planning and construction of local mass transit 
facilities, but the fight to pass appropriate Congressional funding would engage much of 
the Administrator’s time and energy.59   The “Senior Citizens Housing Act of 1962” 
created programs for low and moderate cost housing for the elderly.60   Under the new 
president, HHFA and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) would stimulate the 
private sector to start another suburban housing boom.61  And lastly, HHFA played a 
minor role unfortunately, which should have been very much larger in the development 
of America’s biggest urban anti-poverty program in history, through some interaction 
with the President’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency (PCJD).  These ten programs, 
plus the hot issue of open housing and cabinet status for the cities, placed serious 
demands on the HHFA Administrator.  What time he or she had left would be spent in 
HHFA’s interdepartmental role in managing the forty federal grant programs in the 
nation’s largest cities, that in 1960 allocated $3.9 billion annually.62   
       In the nominating process, an unfortunate exception took place for President 
Kennedy from the old “inside politics” of the 1950s where Congress generally deferred to  
presidential selections, shielding nominees from an outright public fight, as contrasted to 
the post-1960s “outside politics” conformations where opposing groups relentlessly 
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demonized the candidate.63   That exception happened when John Kennedy chose Dr. 
Robert C. Weaver, an African-American to be Administrator of the HHFA. 
       The late Dr. Robert C. Weaver was an excellent choice.  He held three degrees from 
Harvard, the last one being a Ph.D. in Economics, and represented a transitional figure 
between the old left and the new left.  His experience and credentials were solid but his 
race would become a hot issue.  The maternal great-grandson of North Carolina slaves, in 
1933 with Harold Ickes’s backing, Weaver became the number two person in the Office 
of Negro Affairs of the Interior Department.  He came into that position after co-founding 
the Negro Industrial League which informed the NRA of the concerns of poor African-
American workers in textile, lumber, steel and construction.  In 1934 Weaver consulted 
for the Public Works Administration’s new housing program and later served as its 
number one advisor on Negro affairs.64   When the 1937 Housing Act transferred PWA 
housing function to the new United States Housing Administration (USHA), Weaver took 
charge of the Office of Race Relations.  There he played a major role in expanding 
African-American membership in local USHA Housing Authorities.  In late 1940, he 
became assistant to the Director of the National Defense Advisory Commission and when 
President Roosevelt established the Fair Employment Practices Committee 1941, Weaver 
accepted the job of Chief of the Negro Training and Employment Branch (NTEB).  
During the War, Weaver’s Branch became the Negro Manpower Service Branch of the 
War Manpower Commission.65
        However in January 1944, seeing little significant progress in civil rights and feeling 
some of his functions were “irrelevant, unimportant…and…yes man” in nature, he 
resigned for a position in Chicago city government.  Thus, ended over ten years of federal 
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service during which he also was a member of the “Black Brain Trust” or “Black 
Cabinet,” a group of African-American advisors in federal government.66  He became the 
first African-American appointed to an advisory position in the Federal service.67   But, 
not all African-Americans viewed Weaver as a champion of civil rights. The Chicago 
Daily Defender called him a de facto race advisor to official functions of a segregated 
institution (the federal government).68   Some other African-American newspapers also 
felt the same way.
       In Chicago, as Executive Director of the Committee on Race Relations under Mayor 
Ed Kelley, Weaver served as “housing facilitator” in the planning of Chicago’s post 
World War II housing program and later as Director of the Community Services Division 
of the American Council on Race Relations.  In 1946 he published his first book, Negro 
Labor: A National Problem.  In 1948, after making a major contribution to open 
occupancy in Chicago, he published his second book, The Negro Ghetto, and its success 
led to a job in New York City. 
      Weaver was offered and took a position on the New York State Commission on 
Discrimination in Housing.  In 1950, he became the Chairman of the National Committee 
Against Discrimination in Housing (NCDH) and an elected member of the National 
Board of Directors of the NAACP.  He would later become its Board Chairman.  His 
good work at NCDH soon provided the opportunity to be Deputy Housing Commissioner 
of the State of New York and an advisor to and subsequently Director of the Rent Control 
Board.  There he became a member of HHFA’s Advisory Committee on Urban Renewal 
in the late 1950s, and further served as a consultant to the Ford Foundation while 
lecturing at New York University.  While at Rent Control Weaver played a key role in 
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the establishment of the Joint Center for Urban Studies of Harvard and  MIT.69  His last 
job during the Eisenhower years was Vice-Chairman of the Housing and Redevelopment 
Board of New York City.70  
       John Kennedy wanted to appoint one African-American to a really high position and 
Weaver would be the one.  William H. Hastie’s name surfaced, and as a Harvard Law 
graduate and circuit court judge, he would receive a Federal Appeals Court job.  Andrew 
Hatcher, Carl Rowan, and Thurgood Marshall also got nominations from Kennedy, 
among over forty African-Americans he appointed to reasonably high posts, and Louis E. 
Martin moved from the Democratic National Committee (DNC) to the job Harris 
Wofford wanted at the Justice Department.  But none would be as high as Weaver’s 
assignment until Thurgood Marshall joined the Supreme Court.71
       Weaver’s selection surprised him.  He hardly knew Kennedy, supported Humphrey, 
and only met JFK once in July of 1960.  He had no further contact with him except for 
one inconsequential meeting in “late October or early November.”72   After the election, 
Louis Martin of the DNC talked to Weaver about a Washington post, but he “thanked 
Louie and forgot about it.”  Thus Weaver’s appointment did not stem from the president-
elect courting an old friend, supporter, colleague, or close compatriot, but rather one 
where Kennedy wished to appoint an African-American and Weaver fit the bill.  Weaver 
himself surmised: “I think the Administration felt they had to have a Negro in a high 
position.  And I think there was a question of finding the Negro, and then finding the 
particular area that the particular Negro had some competence in.  I think for some reason 
I was the guy that they found, and housing was the area.”73    
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       On a snowy December 26, New York City Mayor Robert F. Wagner called Bob 
Weaver and asked if he would come to City Hall.  Weaver thought the Mayor would be 
offering Borough President of Manhattan to him.  But Wagner told him that President-
Elect Kennedy wanted his services as either Commissioner of the Federal Housing 
Administration or Administrator of HHFA.  Weaver told the Mayor he would take the 
latter.74 
       Back in November when he talked to Louie Martin, Weaver told him if he took any 
job in Washington with Kennedy, there would have to be some set pre-conditions for his 
employment.  After meeting with Wagner, Weaver began to negotiate these.  He would 
accept the HHFA job if Kennedy agreed to issue an executive order on equal opportunity 
in housing and he wanted assurances that if HHFA achieved cabinet rank, he would be 
the Secretary.  Lastly, Weaver wanted guarantees he would have the authority to tighten 
Agency control over the five HHFA constituent administrations.  On December 29, he 
flew to Palm Beach to meet with Kennedy to finalize these pre-conditions.  Kennedy 
assured him the executive order would be issued and that “if there is a Department of 
Urban Affairs, he [Weaver] would be the logical candidate for Secretary.”  Promises 
were also made to Weaver by Kennedy’s staff assuring him he had the authority to 
tighten Agency control over the constituents.75   
       Weaver wanted guarantees from Kennedy because, like Roy Wilkens on civil rights, 
he never really felt comfortable with Kennedy’s commitment on urban affairs.  He felt 
comfortable with Kennedy as a person, but regarding his leadership on urban issues, he 
considered Kennedy “over cautious.”76  As well, Weaver thought JFK would have a hard 
time getting legislation passed.77   In the words of Roy Wilkens, “Kennedy was so hot on 
 80
the Department heads, the cabinet officers, and agency heads that everyone was 
scrambling around trying to find himself a Negro in order to keep the President off his 
neck.”78   Additionally, Weaver was more of an integrationist than Kennedy would be and 
he knew it.79   Kennedy would always be considered by the civil rights movement as slow 
to act, yet ironically by 1963 due to actions by his Justice Department he became the 
most hated president in the deep South since Lincoln.80   So with a set of assurances most 
nominees did not receive, at 11:00 on December 29, Dr. Weaver, the president-elect, and 
presidential press secretary Pierre Sallinger met the media and announced his 
appointment.  This also happened to be Weaver’s fifty-third birthday.81   
       Mixed emotions greeted Bob Weaver’s nomination.  Traditional conservatives were 
against it, particularly the Southern ones.  Thinly veiled racism was the primary reason.  
The National Association of Real Estate Boards and the National Association of Home 
Builders offered a technical explanation about Weaver’s lack of expertise in the private 
sector, but they said they certainly would give him a chance.  The old left felt vindicated 
that an urban “houser” like Weaver received the nomination.  The NAACP became 
overjoyed that one of its members got nominated, particularly after the Congressman 
William Dawson debacle for Postmaster General.82   Martin Meyerson of the 
Harvard/MIT Joint Center wrote to Weaver that “you have more imagination and clear 
headedness than any other candidate to head HHFA and eventually a cabinet department 
of urban affairs….I expect a vitality in the program of your agency which it has never 
shown before.”83   
       But the African-American new left felt otherwise.  They called Weaver’s nomination 
a sellout to the private interests in the federal housing program.  Weaver, a light skinned 
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African-American and married to a woman of the same racial characteristics, was well 
off through education and hard work, and also kept housekeepers.  He was not one of 
their favorites.84    John H. Senstacke in the Chicago Daily Defender wrote, “Dr. Weaver, 
doubtless is a capable administrator, but we will be most interested in his politics…as a 
test…to whether his appointment is mere window dressing.”  He concluded that “we will 
watch with interest to see if Dr. Weaver will concern himself with enforcement of the 
law…for the benefit of the population as a whole.”85   
       Weaver’s confirmation hearing turned out to be a real fight.  He wrote Ralph Dungan 
on January 11 that…“I think that it is desirable prior to any hearing for a group of us to sit 
down and have a dry run in which all of the difficult questions will be raised and some 
sensible answers…developed.”86    It took him three weeks to prepare for hearings due to 
researching things like where he was twenty-five years ago and what he said.  On January 
24 he met with Vice-President Johnson about what position he should take on the open 
housing order.  Johnson suggested that a good stand would be to tell the Committee that 
“the timing of such an order was within the jurisdiction of the President and not within 
my jurisdiction.”  Regarding the scope of an open housing order and who or what should 
be covered, Johnson further suggested that Weaver testify that “the President would issue 
the order and not I.”87    
       On February 1, Johnson called a meeting in Senator Mike Mansfield’s (D-MT) office 
with all Democratic members of the Committee to lay out the administration’s position 
concerning Weaver.  To Kennedy’s credit this was one nomination from which he would 
not back down.  The nomination was already the talk of the town in Washington not only 
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because of Weaver’s race but also in response to press leaks from conservatives that 
Weaver was soft on communism.88   
       A coalition of conservative Southern Senators laid in wait for Dr. Weaver on the 
morning of February 7 when he walked into the chambers of the Senate Committee on 
Banking and Currency.  This Committee reviewed housing nominations and had the 
important Sub-Committee on Housing.  Weaver’s dilemma consisted of being forceful 
enough to obtain the appointment without permanently alienating the Committee which 
would jeopardize future housing legislation.  Composed of fifteen members and chaired 
by Senator A.  Willis Robertson (D-VA), others included Senators John D. Sparkman (D-
AL), Wallace Bennett (R-UT), George Smathers (D-FLA), William Blakey (D-TX) and 
Robert Byrd (D-WVA).  Weaver’s appointment could not be counted as a forgone 
conclusion.  He realized several senators would be playing this hearing for “local 
consumption,” i.e., their Southern constituents.89  
       After personally failing to get Weaver’s name withdrawn, Robertson started with a 
demand President Kennedy issued a letter to the Committee validating that his nominee 
was not a security risk before he would convene the hearing.  He claimed to have 
assertions about Weaver which associated him with communists in the 1930s.90    
Kennedy complied and the hearings started late, but Robertson’s demand angered the 
moderates which helped Weaver.  The moderates had previously selected their own 
candidate for the job, Joseph P. McMurray, a staff member of the Committee itself and 
former New York State Commissioner of Housing when Weaver served as Deputy.91   
They had planned, if things went poorly for Weaver, to side with the southerners in favor 
of McMurray.  Now they were more sympathetic to Weaver. 
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       But Weaver himself carried his own day at the hearings.  As a former college 
debater, he accepted the fact that he would be in the debate of his career and rose to the 
occasion.92  He opened eloquently with a strong affirmation that housing consisted of 
more than just shelter.  According to him, it made communities, created adjacent sites, 
spawned transportation routes and produced various other facilities.  He concluded with 
“when you talk about housing…you are talking about people.”93  This set a very positive 
tone.  With prepared answers he also effectively side stepped numerous questions on 
integration, open housing and civil rights.  Then Senator William Blakely (D-TX) 
brought up the issue he thought would kill the Weaver nomination. 
       Weaver had been to the Soviet Union, written articles favorable to Russian civil 
rights for minorities and his book, The Negro Ghetto, and his book had been 
recommended by a communist bookstore in New York City. Blakely confronted Weaver 
with these facts.  The NYU professor said he did go to the Soviet Union but so did many 
people at least until recently, that the articles he wrote specified his views at the time 
about housing there, and any bookstore which wanted to recommend his book was free to 
do so.94   The questioning though went on for hours and well into the next day. 
       Weaver very greatly resented this intense cross-examination and considered much of 
it to be   “irrelevant…demeaning and…indicative of the fact that Negroes in America are 
still not first class citizens.”95   But at he end of the day on February 8, his very effective 
testimony plus support from Committee moderates insured his nomination.  To guarantee 
this, Kennedy called out the “heavy hitters” the night before, with Vice-President Lyndon 
Johnson and Senators Hubert H. Humphrey (D-MN), Jacob Javits (R-NY), Paul Douglas 
(D-IL) and Joseph S. Clark (D-PA) making numerous telephone calls before the final 
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vote.  On February 8, confirmation of Weaver took place by a vote of eleven to four in 
the Committee and by a voice affirmation in the Senate.96   He was sworn in on the 
afternoon of February 11, 1961 as the highest ranking African-American office holder in 
American history up to that time.97    
       Staffing for the HHFA supposedly would be turned entirely over to Weaver.  Yet a 
unique situation existed as Commissioners of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), 
Public Housing Administration (PHA), and Urban Renewal Administration (URA) 
required presidential appointment.  Through negotiation with Theodore Sorensen, Ralph 
Dungan, Lee White and Adam Yarmolinsky, Weaver received Kennedy’s go ahead to 
appoint his own staff.98  Yet during this process, Kennedy reversed himself and informed 
Weaver that he wanted to be the key player in making the appointments.  Kennedy did 
this because he had some commitments he had not told Weaver about and it seems also, 
because he did not entirely trust Weaver.  He scarcely knew him and had never worked 
with him. 
       Created by the National Housing Act on June 27, 1934 and made a constituent 
agency of HHFA in 1947, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) originally 
approved housing standards and provided a system of mortgage insurance.99  It grew in 
the quarter century to 1960 into a very significant influence on the housing and mortgage 
market and slowly gravitated from serving the public to serving itself and the private 
sector, growing quite independent.  Weaver stated, “I felt very strongly that the most key 
appointment of all was the Commissioner of FHA.”  He noted disapprovingly that FHA 
had become “a separate and distinct operation from HHFA…with…strong industry 
forces…which want to keep it separate.”100   But both he and the White House agreed the 
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best choice for FHA would be Neil J. Hardy.  Hardy came from the HHFA, had 
previous private sector housing experience  and represented the best chance to bring FHA 
back into the fold and keep it there.101  He had been an HHFA assistant administrator 
during the Truman administration and gained quick industry approval by virtue of his 
seven years of dutiful service in a top office of the National Association of Home 
Builders.102   The FHA under Hardy was not going to be in the vanguard of housing 
reform during the Kennedy years but at least Weaver felt he could control it. 
      The Urban Renewal Administration (URA), created in 1954 under Eisenhower’s 
important 1954 Housing Act, had the responsibility for slum clearance and urban 
redevelopment under Title One of the 1949 Housing Act.  The URA managed and 
awarded grants to state, city, and regional planning boards under Section 701 of the 1954 
Housing Act.  To these public enterprises, it provided planning advice and money for 
programs to eliminate blight, slums, and help relocate those displaced.  Most importantly, 
it experimented with new ways to eliminate and control slums through a “demonstration 
grants” program, Section 314 also of the Housing Act of 1954.  The URA carried out 
field operations through regional HHFA offices.103     
       The appointment of URA Commissioner did not go as smoothly as FHA.  Weaver 
believed very strongly that the person holding this job should be “people oriented,” 
because “this was a program which took poor people, pushed them out, and put in a 
redevelopment activity of a different type.”  Having long been an urban renewal critic, he 
wanted to effect positive change.  For Commissioner, Kennedy desired former Baltimore 
Mayor Anthony D’Alesandro, and at Weaver’s swearing in ceremony, Kennedy had 
“more or less made the commitment to him.”104   Weaver though, wanted a more liberal 
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commissioner, as William Slayton whom he had already asked to do the job at 
Kennedy’s Inauguration.105  This became a quite awkward and embarrassing.  At both 
respective appointing ceremonies, the two key policy players promised the job to two 
different people.  Good communication between Kennedy and Weaver started out poorly 
and would not improve much.  One can also question why with his progressive campaign 
rhetoric, Kennedy did not want the more liberal Slayton.  Speculation was he did not 
want URA to move too far or too fast from where it was; moreover, he liked the control 
he had over D’Alesandro.    
       Slayton came with solid experience.  Previously with HHFA, and while a member of 
the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials (NAHRO), had served 
as vice-president of an urban renewal contracting firm in Washington D.C.  On the other 
hand, Weaver had nothing personally against D’Alesandro but felt “a good mayor is not 
necessarily a good Commissioner of Urban Renewal.”106  Anthony D’Alesandro 
remained on Kennedy’s “IOU” list from the election and represented nothing more than a 
potential political appointee, yet Kennedy would not budge and neither would Weaver. 
       The solution came as Weaver simply left the job open and appointed no one.  He just 
“out waited” Kennedy until the President gave the former mayor another job and then he 
appointed Slayton.107   Fortunately for Weaver, by then JFK’s interests had now shifted to 
his forte, foreign policy, where he had engulfed himself in plans for an invasion of Cuba 
and the forthcoming a summit with Khrushchev.  While Kennedy was thus occupied, 
Weaver and Slayton further established a new deputy position in URA, Assistant 
Commissioner of Relocation and selected James T. Banks.108  Banks would introduce 
 87
progressive ideas into relocation and had ten previous years experience in relocating 
families and businesses in the Washington D.C. area.109   
       Within HHFA, the Public Works Administration (PHA), loomed as the third most 
important agency.  Established as a constituent of the HHFA by Reorganization Plan 
Three in 1947, the job required managing all of the government’s public housing 
programs including federally assisted low-income public housing, authorized under the 
1937 United States Housing Act, as well as programs to improve it.110  Marie C. McGuire 
became the agreed upon nominee for PHA Commissioner.  From San Antonio, Texas, 
she had been an innovative and dedicated public housing designer and manager.  She also 
had been the very successful Director of the San Antonio Housing Authority.111  
Appointed on March 11 and confirmed by the Senate on April 23 she took office on April 
25.112  Her appointment was a “concession to Lyndon Johnson,” but over time she would 
become reasonably independent of his influence as she had in San Antonio  and joined the 
ranks of the reformers on the urban team.113  In gaining her appointment, it also did not 
hurt that she wrote some urban speeches for JFK during the campaign. 
       The fourth HHFA constituent instrumentality, the Community Facilities 
Administration (CFA) held lesser importance.  Weaver had more latitude in selections 
and fewer problems with Kennedy from here forward.  Created on December 23, 1954 
the CFA directed a wide range of programs that included providing technical and 
financial assistance to state and local agencies in the planning of community facilities 
plus some multi-unit housing as college housing, public works projects, housing for the 
elderly, school construction, and defense community housing.  The CFA managed 
research and demonstration projects and the prefabricated housing program.  It 
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supervised the public facilities loan program, the Lanham Act wartime public housing 
program, the Alaskan housing loan program and managed the public facilities portfolio 
for HHFA.114  Weaver selected Sidney Woolner for Commissioner of  CFA.  One of G. 
Mennen “Soapy” William’s (Governor of Michigan) assistants Woolner came highly 
recommended by the members by the White House Staff.115  Considered a hard worker, 
Woolner would be effective but had a rather dour personality and little innovative 
spirit.116     
       The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA), nicknamed “Fannie Mae” but 
called the “Association,” was originally chartered on January 10, 1938, and subsequently 
redesigned under Eisenhower’s 1954 Housing Act.  It remained the last agency with 
appointments to be filled.  FNMA developed the secondary market for home mortgages 
by purchasing outstanding older ones from the primary sector, thus freeing funds there.  
As FNMA moved purchases from the primary market, it increased its capital worth and 
stood ready to provide emergency capital for the entire home mortgage market if needed.   
FNMA could also assist special groups, as minorities in getting home financing, if 
directed to do so by either the President or Congress.   Lastly, FNMA maintained and 
liquidated its own mortgage portfolio.  Underwritten by preferred stock sustained and 
held by the Secretary of the Treasury, it also held common stock issues for mortgage 
lenders in the secondary market.117   With little difficulty, Weaver selected J. Stanley 
Baughman to head the Association.  Baughman had managed the FNMA from its 
inception.  
       Three major problems confronted Weaver in selecting staff for HHFA headquarters 
and the regional offices of the five administrations.  One was organizational, the other 
 89
political, and the last monetary.  CFA and URA maintained a parallel structure to the 
HHFA central administration and ran all of their regional programs directly through 
HHFA regional offices, generally in the same buildings.  On the other hand, FHA, PHA 
and FMNA had separate regional offices across the country.  FHA had one field office in 
every state.  Weaver had to make appointments in these offices for all senior 
administrative, managerial and research staff.  Lines of communication and lines of 
loyalty would thus be hard to define under this archaic structure. 
       The HHFA head also had less control over regional selections than he wanted.  
Weaver believed that “the biggest problem was getting really competent people in the 
really key spots,   [like] State Directors of FHA.”  He estimated his “batting average was 
about forty per cent in getting around politics with good people.”118  He would not “take 
anyone he could not live with…but certainly haven’t taken the best guy that I wanted in 
many instances.”  Along with local politics, he had to contend with Senatorial 
preferences where occasionally people with minimum qualifications got endorsed by 
powerful Senators.  Weaver often had to hire them and lamented they were not “the top 
people we want to run that activity.”119  Lawrence Katz in Milwaukee and Lester Eisen in 
New York, stood out as two significant exceptions.120   
       Different is the word to describe Weaver’s administrative philosophy in HHFA 
central office selections.  In total, he had seventeen “Schedule C” appointments from the 
Eisenhower administration on hand when nominated.  He fired all of them before he even 
had met them, as he wanted people loyal to him and loyal to the new administration.  He 
wanted them to be “part of the administration” and even though all were quite competent, 
Weaver wanted to avoid a power struggle.”121  His philosophy of management was that 
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when a new administration came in “the policy people ought to be all…or 
mostly…new people because the old ones unconsciously…identify…the past with their 
own integrity…and changes hurt their ego.”122   Thus Weaver appointed an all new 
HHFA central office staff.  For program continuity, this may not have been the best 
course of action but it gained him loyalty. 
       Then the unexpected problem arose about acceptable salaries.  Low government 
wages caused serious difficulties and several people “went through the pain of the 
damned wanting to be part of the new administration,” but not being able to afford a 
salary cut to take the job.  For example, former Boston Mayor Edward Logue who ran 
urban renewal there, made $30,000.00 a year but the job of URA Commissioner paid 
only $20,000.00 annually.  Many qualified individuals simply could not afford 
appointments.123
       Of the ones who could, Weaver made some outstanding choices for the central 
office.  Jack T. Conway, the newly appointed HHFA Deputy Administrator, had known 
Weaver for many years and came to the Agency from the United Auto Workers Union.  
Highly recruited by the transition team, Conway spoke extensively with Ralph Dungan, 
Kenneth P. O’Donnell and others about several jobs.  He considered Ambassadorships, 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Under Secretary of Labor or Deputy 
Administrator for HHFA.  Hailing from Detroit, he represented one of Walter Reuther’s 
“boys” but Reuther, head of the powerful United Auto Workers (UAW), was locked in a 
power struggle over Kennedy appointments with the more powerful George Meany of the 
American Federation of Labor - Congress of Industrial Organization (AFL-CIO).  
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Reuther lost, and Meany blocked any serious consideration of Conway for the Defense 
and Labor jobs with President Kennedy.  Those went to Meany’s people.124
       Thus Conway took the HHFA position and HHFA would be better for it.  Conway 
became a good second in command for Weaver who “was going to need some strong 
backup because he’d be vulnerable due to his race.”125  Conway became the tough guy at 
HHFA, particularly negotiating the poverty program and also handling the “personnel 
stuff in the Agency, all of the shifting and changing” and most “of the politics.”126  
       But Conway was at HHFA for another reason as well.  He would not only help 
Weaver, but he could also report on how things were going there to his friend the 
Attorney General.  Always very close to Robert Kennedy, Conway consistently advised 
him on organized labor throughout the 1960 campaign.  He was present at the confused 
and heated meeting that offered the vice presidency to Lyndon Johnson and warned 
Bobby not to do it.  As the housing representative on the President’s Committee on Equal 
Employment Opportunity (CEEO) while reporting to Weaver he also reported what 
transpired directly to Robert Kennedy as well, particularly after the latter left the 
Committee because of a dispute with Lyndon Johnson.127    After Jack Kennedy’s death, 
he would become one of Robert Kennedy’s leading zealots in the poverty program. 
       Another good selection Weaver made included Milton P. Semer for General Counsel 
of the Agency.  He came to HHFA from the staff of the Senate Banking and Currency 
Committee.128  It handled all housing and urban legislation and would be critical to the 
success of the 1961 Housing Act.129   Frederick A. Forbes, appointed as Assistant 
Administrator for Public Affairs and Morton J. Schussheim, Assistant Administrator for 
Public Policy, along with Semer played leading roles in the development of the 1961 
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Housing Act.  Schussheim came to HHFA from New York, having worked previously 
with Weaver in public policy research at the Rent Commission, and was a member of the 
Weaver clicke within HHFA.  Hugh M. Mields filled the post of Assistant Administrator 
for Congressional Liaison and joined the HHFA from the League of Cities.  There he 
developed strong ties with what some thought to be too many city bosses, but Weaver 
thought not.  Sidney Spector gained the job of Assistant Administrator, Housing for 
Senior Citizens.  Lastly, Weaver appointed a liberal, Harvard educated, urban sociologist 
named Nathan Glazer, for HHFA research and policy development.130   
       Nathan Glazer and his subsequent collaborator Daniel P. Moynihan, studied ethnic 
consciousness in neighborhoods in old mid-western and eastern cities.  They concluded 
in Beyond the Melting Pot (1963) this was rising rather than declining, which went 
against the conventional view at the time.131  Glazer’s data became important in planning 
the poverty program for “maximum neighborhood participation” which capitalized on 
that consciousness, particularly in African-American communities.  Even though it had 
been declining there, they predicted it would rebound. 
       Regarding poverty, Dave Hackett, a fellow Milton Academy classmate of Robert 
Kennedy, would work with HHFA under the auspices of the President’s Committee on 
Juvenile Delinquency (PCJD).  In so doing, he and others unearthed the idea that creating 
neighborhood opportunity reduced delinquency.  They used demonstration programs to 
prove it.  But this had to be credible opportunity, localized to known problems in specific 
urban neighborhoods.  Washington could only learn this by listening to those who lived 
there.  With Joseph Heller from the Council of Economic Advisors and Lloyd Ohlin and 
Richard Cloward of the University of Chicago’s Sociology Department, who collectively 
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wrote Delinquency and Opportunity (1960), a miniscule program stated which would 
set in motion the massive “war on poverty” after Kennedy’s death.  Unfortunately, 
Lyndon Johnson changed the methodology during his “accidental presidency.”132  This 
also changed the outcome.   
       Most appointees took office by the end of the third week of January.  Kennedy, just 
before his inauguration returned to Georgetown from Palm Beach and began pouring 
over the twenty-nine task force reports.  In urban affairs and housing, two major task 
force reports crossed his desk.133    One came from the existing housing bureaucracy, and 
Kennedy commissioned the other.  Some minor ones also came his way from the U.S. 
Conference of Mayors, American Municipal Association and National Housing 
Conference.134  Others evolved from individual states like California.”135  Through such 
task forces Kennedy ensured he would have ample, good, and solid advice.   
       The first report consisted of an analysis from the outgoing Eisenhower 
administration. Headed by Lawrence B. Robbins, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, 
Oscar H. Nelson, Director of the Office of Budget and Management, Department of 
Commerce and Charles B. Brownson, Assistant HHFA Administrator for Public Affairs, 
and it studied “Coordination of Federal Metropolitan Area Development Activities.”136   
Written by this Ad Hoc Committee on Metropolitan Area Problems of the permanent 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, it comprised forty-six pages of 
fairly good ideas. and as presented on January 9, 1961 offered some excellent 
solutions.137    
       The Eisenhower report traced the development and evolution of increased 
government activity in cities and the subsequent loss of program control that ensued.  It 
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noted very serious coordination problems between the interstate highway program, 
urban renewal, PHA, and FHA in efforts to “rehabilitate the now decaying central cities.”  
According to the report, “current highway law and administration is so rigid it prevents 
the use of highway funds for local mass transit purposes while itself disrupting mass 
transit planning.”138   Additionally, the problems of reapportionment, gaps between 
federal and state programs, and the tendency of federal agencies to draw away from each 
other creating parallel programs, needed to be corrected immediately.  Three 
recommendations concluded the study.  Initially, a “real focal point must be established 
in the White House…for dealing with…activities affecting metropolitan areas.”  This 
could be designated the “Office of Executive Management within the Executive Office of 
the President” and under it regional offices should be set up to coordinate federal efforts 
at state and city levels.139   Further, HHFA should be substantially strengthened and given 
Cabinet status.140   Lastly, Ike’s administration felt the Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations should conduct an active program designed to encourage 
state and local jurisdictions to deal with metropolitan problems “in a coordinated 
fashion.”141  Nothing was done with these recommendations except for the attempt at 
Cabinet status for HHFA.    
       Kennedy’s report entitled, “Report of the Task Force on Housing and Urban Affairs 
for President-Elect John F. Kennedy” submitted on December 30, 1960 was written by 
members of the Urban Advisory Group of the campaign.  The Task Force served under 
the direction of ex-Baltimore Mayor Joseph P. McMurray, who happened to be the 
Senate Banking and Finance Committee’s choice for HHFA Administrator, with John 
Barriere of the House Banking and Currency Committee serving as senior writer.  Dr. 
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Robert C. Wood, of the Harvard-MIT Joint Center, contributed many of the ideas.  A 
pair of bankers, Harry Held and Charles Wellman rounded out the authorship.142  They 
basically took the ideas of the Pittsburgh Conference, added a couple of new ones and 
costed everything out over four years.  
       This eighty-five page document presented solutions to thirteen significant issues 
facing America’s cities in the 1960s.  These were costed out over four years while also 
keeping in mind Kennedy’s ten-year campaign pledge.  The report championed HHFA 
receiving Cabinet level status as soon as possible.  Secondly, it recommended an entirely 
new program for subsidizing low income family housing through both public and private 
participation.  Third, FHA authorizations should be increased and coverage expanded to 
form a more diverse housing market.  To do this liberalization of FHA mortgage terms 
plus a new FHA mortgage insurance program needed to be created.  The Task Force 
suggested sweeping changes for the Federal National Mortgage Association  (FNMA), 
with new special programs and a revised central mortgage banking system.  Fifthly, 
federally assisted housing for the elderly must be expanded.  Here, significant funding for 
a direct loan program to non-profit corporations constructing elderly housing was to be 
incorporated and financed into the public debt.  A dramatic increase in college housing 
loans up to $500 million annually comprised the sixth recommendation and seventh topic 
addressed urban renewal.143  In Kennedy’s first four years, two billion, six hundred 
million would be recommended for urban renewal, including relocation money.  The 
eighth recommendation offered changes in the community facilities program for 
broadening eligibility, more money for public works and increasing funding for water 
pollution control.  Transferring that program from HEW to HHFA was suggested and 750 
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million dollars in grants proposed.  As an urgent priority, the Task Force stressed that 
the mass transit problem should be immediately investigated by a Presidential Study 
Commission with an initial outlay of 100 million dollars for public facility loans.144    
       The second from the last recommendation concerned suburban and rural housing.  
Quizzically this report recommended orderly suburban development could only take 
place if it became a potential federal project.  Here a series of planning grants and a 
limited number of loans topped the list of ways to help suburban communities acquire 
and improve land.  For farm housing, the Task Force thought the current farm housing 
program should be extended for four additional years.  They codified farms for 450 
million dollars in direct loans as “adequate farms,” 110 million dollars to “potentially 
adequate ones” and 50 million dollars to improve sanitation on small family size ones. 
     The final topic focused on research and recommended a substantial funding increase.  
Innovation and experimentation were encouraged and a commission ordered.  The Task 
Force suggested four research sub-groups to investigate standardization of mortgage 
instruments, the special problems of residential mortgage credit, standardization of local 
building codes, and studying the tax policies of federal, state, and local governments 
affecting cities.145  In costing out the Kennedy program over four years a truly significant 
amount of money was proposed.  Eight billion, seven hundred twenty-five million dollars 
became the price tag over Kennedy’s first term.  According to the Task Force, three 
billion, nine hundred million dollars would be grants and slightly more than three billion, 
five hundred million should be repayable loans.  It also recommended one billion, three 
hundred million dollars for subsidized low income housing.146   
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       However, the Task Force report could have made other and stronger 
recommendations.  For instance, the leading urban social problem was racial segregation 
in housing.  Of 179.3 million Americans in 1960, 20.5 could be classified as non-white 
and almost seventy-three per cent of these lived in the central city.147   Forty-four per cent 
of the housing occupied by these Americans remained substandard by official 
classification.148   The same federal government which classified this housing as 
substandard, also openly advocated segregation in housing through to 1948.149    Since 
seventy-five per cent of the non-white housing had been constructed before 1939, the 
federal government helped segregate people into now substandard housing by its own 
admission.    The FHA underwriting manual of 1938 recommended using restrictive 
covenants to “stop inharmonious racial groups” from moving into white 
neighborhoods.150    The PHA regularly segregated African-Americans in the 1950s 
through “racial equity” clauses and by 1961, over eighty per cent of all public housing 
could be called segregated.151  If an African-American in 1961 could get an FHA loan, 
the chances were ninety-eight to two that he or she would be barred from what was then 
considered a “good neighborhood, through the practice now called Red-lining.”152   For 
an entire decade the housing industry produced over a million homes per year, but only 
three per cent of these “newer homes” were available to non-whites.153   Segregation in 
housing virtually assured segregation in schools, recreation and community facilities.154     
Kennedy’s Task Force failed to mention open occupancy, by Executive Order or any 
other method, because it knew that was low on Kennedy’s agenda.155    It was also low on 
the “average” voters’ agenda in 1960. 
 98
       The Task Force report also overlooked urban poverty.  In 1961 no real social 
program existed and jobs were hard to find in the central city with few new ones being 
created.  Leon Keyserling, a well known contemporary economist estimated “that in 
1961, thirty-eight million people live in poverty and another thirty-nine million live in 
deprivation [near poverty].”156    No mention of how to address this filled the Task Force 
pages.   According to Keyserling high unemployment in cities continued because of 
Eisenhower’s attempt to “balance the budget without regard for the health of the 
economy.”157  Joseph A. Peckman, Director of Economic Research for the Brookings 
Institute, told the Joint Economic Committee of Congress in December of 1960 that, “in 
my view, the major impediment to economic growth…has been a combined monetary 
and fiscal policy which placed excessive restraints on the growth of aggregate 
demand.”158    All economic indicators in cities had declined by 1961 with over five 
hundred billion dollars worth of real property in the United States needing renovation, 
with the rate of improvements slowing from the previous year.159   Construction of public 
housing units fell from 21,939 in 1959 to 16,401 in 1960 and new home starts slipped 
from 1,494,600 in 1959 to 1, 230,000 in 1960.  The percentage of the market insured 
under VA mortgages fell from 27.8 in 1959 to 24.4 in 1960  and  many of the urban poor 
were veterans.160  Specific social programs for “battling the culture of poverty” by 
creating opportunity, could not be found in the Task Force Report either.   
       Lastly, the report failed to discuss the management of federal programs affecting 
cities like the Eisenhower report had.  Since 1949 urban renewal displaced hundreds of 
thousands, with the federal highway program ranking a close second.161    Regarding 
urban renewal, obtaining land caused people who lived there to be displaced, but only 
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nine per cent of the proposed projects on that land could be completed in three years, 
fifty per cent took three to nine years, and ten per cent, twelve to fifteen years.  Thirty-
one per cent never got finished at all but the people were gone.162   A clamor from the 
housing industry existed for the establishment of national construction building codes 
similar to those in Canada.  Across the country, lack of uniformity cost the housing 
industry a billion dollars annually.  Other than proposing a commission to study this 
problem, the Report failed to address it at all.163   Moreover, most cities in 1960 had no 
“metropolitan master plan” and looked to the federal government to draft one, based on a 
model for individual city size and geography.164   Yet while the Kennedy administration 
called this Task Force the most comprehensive in history, its leading contributor Dr. 
Robert C. Wood remarked, it was no more than “pushing out some ideas that were still in 
pretty rough, crude form, and forcing the bureaucracy of the departments and agencies to 
work on them.”165   It seemed that was fine with the president-elect as comments about 
the Report’s comprehensiveness looked good in the press. 
      One final event though needed to take place which the press would also cover in 
depth.  On a cold, bright Friday, January 20, 1961, John F. Kennedy became the thirty- 
fifth President of the United States.  Surrounded by his family, well wishers and his 
nominees, he stated “In your hands, my fellow citizens, more than mine, will rest the 
final success or failure of our course.”166   No truer words were ever spoken.  For while 
his nominees were preparing early drafts of his new omnibus housing bill, his special 
urban message to Congress, and ghosting his urban mayoral telegrams, Kennedy was 
busy elsewhere.  During the inaugural festivities and inaugurals balls, he had slipped 
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away to private rooms more than a couple of times “to be with Angie Dickinson, a 
twenty-eight year old actress.”167   Truly the New Frontier was now launched.
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CHAPTER IV 
STIMULATING THE ECONOMY AND THE 1961 HOUSING ACT 
                                 Within fifteen years our population will rise to 235 million 
                                 and by the year 2000 to 300 million people.  Most of this 
                                 increase will occur in and around urban areas.  We must 
                                 begin now to lay the foundations for livable, efficient and 
                                 attractive communities.1   
        Activity at the Kennedy White House began early on Saturday, January 21, 1961.  
The new President and his staff arrived at 8:50 a.m. and swearing-in started immediately.  
Official visitors followed, led by Ex-President Harry S. Truman and Chicago Mayor 
Richard J. Daley, the most influential person in the country in guaranteeing Kennedy’s 
razor thin victory.  Telegrams and congratulatory letters poured in from across the world 
and nation.  In the early months, the Kennedy White House averaged 35,000 letters per 
week, with most of them discussing the economy.2  
      This chapter covers that early robust activity, discussing JFK’s initial plans for 
emergency relief which drifted into a full blown anti-recession package and into his 
“urban” plans as well.  This paralleled Weaver’s efforts to gain control and streamline 
HHFA to play a major role in city development, and unbeknown to him, he would act as 
a conduit for JFK’s anti-recession program as well.  JFK’s desire to saving the economy 
and Weaver’s efforts toward improving cities and housing, merged and as the final 
subject of this chapter, culminate in the 1961 Housing Act which is discussed in detail. 
        As an astute politician, Kennedy was also concerned with the domestic economy 
and he both took minor and major steps to improve it immediately, which would please 
voters.  He began with a series of swift, minor actions.  As his first official act he issued 
Executive Order Number 10914, distributing food to the rural poor of Appalachia.3   
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Releasing funds into areas of high unemployment to construct federal facilities as 
post offices came next, pouring money into “impacted areas” of high defense activity, 
and releasing government insurance dividends early to American veterans rounded out 
these minor initiatives.4    
      Kennedy even did his part to save money, eliminating seventeen Eisenhower policy 
panels costing $301,375 annually.  Yet at the same time, he increased the White House 
Staff to 476 over Ike’s 388 of 1960.5  But eventually, he decided to balance his budget for 
his 1963 tax cut effort, so that remained short lived.  But as previously mentioned, 
economic issues were critical to the country in 1960, with housing and urban 
development at a dangerous low, so new initiatives were needed.  New private home 
starts in 1960 declined eighteen percent from 1959, one out of six construction workers 
endured long term unemployment, and urban renewal remained at its lowest ebb in 
years.6   
        So Kennedy’s major initiatives consisted of a series of stimulus programs to  
“prime” the economy.  He wanted quick results and so did the voters.7   In the January 
11, 1961 Gallup Poll, sixty-three percent of Americans believed “Holding down prices 
and preventing inflation” should be the number one concern of the new administration 
and Congress.8   In late January, JFK met with his White House Staff, Council of 
Economic Advisors and his Bureau of the Budget personnel, laying out a plan called “A 
Program to Restore Momentum to the American Economy.”  Comprised of three main 
features, this initiative supposedly would improve the national economic climate and 
bring the country out of recession.  Housing construction, automobile production, and 
farm income would be energized and the major market sectors supplying them, 
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stimulated.  The timber, steel, and coal industries became focal points as did their 
supporting rail, truck and air distribution systems. 
        To help voters directly, Kennedy offered a new minimum wage of $1.25 per hour 
(Minimum Wage Act), a program to increase employment in poor rural and some urban 
areas (Area Redevelopment Act), and legislation to retrain and reemploy those laid off by 
plant closings  (Manpower Redevelopment and Retraining Act).  He also “suggested” the 
Federal Reserve not raise the prime rate and that businesses, particularly steel, “hold the 
line” on prices.  None of his economic initiatives though could be labeled brilliant, bold 
or daring but rather represented a thoughtful effort to focus federal action on managing an 
economic crisis.  For Kennedy, stimulating America’s massive housing construction and 
urban redevelopment business would be key to ending the recession and he would begin 
that effort shortly. 
        It should be noted however, Kennedy viewed all domestic programs except civil 
rights as catalysts for economic growth.  Thus, if urban social programs had to be cut in 
favor of economic stimulus, they would be.  This held particularly true later when he 
made an effort to balance the budget while simultaneously pushing for tax cuts aimed at 
voters in 1964.  Over the course of his administration, those favoring increased capital 
mobility waged an internal struggle against those supporting economic conservativism.9   
This fight at the national policy level would be about the “proper” kind of 
macroeconomic intervention.10 
        Kennedy’s urban policy people split into two groups as well: planners who wanted 
Eisenhower’s program to continue; and reformers who clung doggedly “to a vision 
opposed to private redevelopment,” if the poor continued to be displaced.  If as Lewis 
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Mumford wrote, “the city…is the point of the maximum concentration of power and 
culture of a communit,” then it would also be in the city where the values formed in that 
concentration would be tested.  Both conservatives and  reformers favored federal 
assistance in resolving persistent social problems, but differed as to the ways.11  For most 
of Kennedy’s presidency conservatives prevailed, yet at the end he began to listen more 
to reformers.  The sounds of social unrest on the horizon plus political pressure from 
liberal and civil rights groups with large voting blocks caught his attention in the early 
fall of 1963. 
        Regarding urban planning, Kennedy was no visionary. In order to give him a 
moniker one must assume he qualified for one.  Kennedy only held general beliefs, that it 
would be good for cities if he stimulated the national economy, ended the recession 
particularly in cities, and achieved high urban employment while creating another 
housing boom.  That would please voters while improving urban life. To do this he 
needed a housing act, with one of its chief goals a “massive” FHA middle income 
housing program, expanded urban renewal, increased community facilities spending, and 
some kind of mass transit assistance.  A small public housing program would also help.  
A Department of Urban Affairs and Housing (DUAH) should be created to manage all of 
this while also renovating downtowns, creating parks, and handling special housing 
programs for the elderly, Native Americans, veterans and college students.  A small 
poverty program might evolve, and with these generalizations, a little bit of 
reapportionment, Kennedy believed all would be well in urban America.  
          As an overview, not much regard for the “social compact” of the campaign can be 
seen in Kennedy urban policy.  His enthralling blend of social action and progressive 
 115
rhetoric in the campaign remained exactly there.  No “values based” legislation would 
be immediately forthcoming and his long awaited housing order would not be issued until 
Thanksgiving of 1962.  It must be remembered that in the early Kennedy years, nobody 
making decisions saw that they stood less than four years away from social and political 
protests the likes of which had not been seen since Progressivism, nor witnessed since.  
On the other hand, Robert C. Weaver, a progressive African-American, would have been 
willing to “rock the boat” but the president was not ready.  By the end of January 1961, 
Kennedy enmeshed himself deeply into foreign policy where he remained, save for off-
year elections and when civil rights issues were forced upon him.  Moreover, in achieving 
the goal of getting elected, he promised so much to so many people, he would be very 
hard pressed to fulfill it all.  Meyer Feldman, a speechwriter and later presidential special 
assistant, drew up a summary of all promises and commitments Kennedy made in the 
campaign, and with analysis that filled five hundred pages.  When Feldman showed it to 
him, Kennedy responded with surprise, saying “Well, my God Mike, what’d you get me 
into?”12  He then had aids prepare his major anti-recession policy. 
        Meanwhile, at the start of the Kennedy years Weaver concentrated on wresting 
control of the vast empire known as the Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA).  
Located in numerous buildings across Washington D.C., with regional offices scattered 
robustly throughout the country, HHFA constituted a splendid bureaucracy that had 
“drifted” during the latter Eisenhower years.  It routinely spent billions of dollars, 
creating mountains of paperwork while dramatically altering America’s urban landscape, 
without possessing a soul.  It suffered from a benign yet inbred social insensitivity.  
Revealing in its annual Congressional reports, slow but determined progress in improving 
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the “physical city,” it nonetheless had no effective measuring device for what 
happened to the “wretched” it displaced, evicted or relocated in the “social city” context.  
When Weaver took over it had no mechanism for intra or inter-agency cooperation in 
coordinating urban programs.  HHFA basically, chugged along making and implementing 
urban policy and unless Weaver gained control, it would simply continue on without him.  
        HHFA’s dysfunctional nature could be seen in its duplicating and overlapping 
programs.  Public and private housing belonged to the Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA), the Public Housing Administration (PHA), the Communities Facilities 
Administration (CFA) and the Urban Renewal Administration (URA).   Elderly housing 
fell under the FHA, PHA, CFA, URA and the Federal National Mortgage Association 
(FNMA).  Relocation of poor people became the simultaneous business of URA, PHA 
and CFA.  Mass transit planning grants had to go through URA, PHA and CFA and this 
became easy compared to obtaining outside agency approval.  The Workable Program for 
County Improvement (WPCI), managed by the HHFA’s central Office of Administration 
(OA), spanned all five constituent administrations but often ran into direct conflict with 
the Department of Agriculture and the Area Redevelopment Agency.13
        In trying to provide vision and synchronization, Weaver first had to set priorities.  
Strengthening agency interaction, improving HHFA field activities, obtaining an 
adequate budget, preparing presidential messages to Congress, drafting important 
legislation, bringing reform to elderly housing, pressuring the president for executive 
orders, getting mass transit off the ground, reforming urban renewal, dealing with a spate 
of civil rights complaints, doing the same with equal housing issues, and creating a larger 
public housing program, headed his list.  Conflict of interest and ethical conduct issues, 
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regional personnel difficulties, and budget problems constituted secondary ones.  
Lastly, compliance with Federal reporting requirements, improving agency space in 
principle cities, energizing the housing demonstrations program, working with new 
ventures like preventing juvenile delinquency, and defending the agency against 
litigation, constituted the next grouping.  Interacting with the five HHFA administrations, 
responding to important constituent mail, national magazines, and resolving local 
planning disputes comprised his daily activities.14  
        Weaver initially sat on or contributed to numerous commissions, committees or 
boards.  Bodies as the Federal Executive Board’s reorganization committee, the 
President’s Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, President’s Council 
on Aging, President’s Committee on Minority Labor, President’s Committee on 
Consumer Interest, President’s Committee on Children and Youth Protection, and nine 
others captured his time and attention.  Under Executive Order 11004 he shouldered 
Department of Defense responsibilities as an emergency preparedness officer for human-
made or natural disasters and these Cold War duties made him the president’s chief 
advisor for rebuilding America’s cities after nuclear attack.  Weaver managed a cadre of 
“executive reservists,” experienced non-government or governmental retirees, who 
assumed HHFA responsibilities when a nuclear attack disabled the federal government 
killing key leaders as himself.15  
        Both Weaver and Kennedy became transitory figures between the old way of 
conducting public policy and the new.  In the past, politicians, bureaucrats and lobbyists, 
particularly popular politicians were given more of a “free pass” by the press for making 
“attempts” to resolve public policy issues, without the results being carefully measured.  
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They operated more in isolation from political movements around them in relation to 
the postmodern era where being really well attuned to the surrounding political culture 
remained paramount for staying in office.16  By the time the “New Frontier” ended in 
Dallas on November 22, 1963, “old line” agencies as the HHFA no longer remained 
insulated from the great political moments sweeping the 1960s.  Advocacy groups, bent 
on changing inherited institutional power, judged those agencies with suspicion and 
hostility.  By the end of Kennedy’s presidency, Weaver and his agency would be on the 
cutting edge of new urban politics that no longer debated process, but measured only 
outcomes.  Simple persuasion that progress was “in process” no longer counted.17  
        Before Weaver could make improvements, he had to master HHFA’s archaic 
structure, refine its organization, and revamp the central office.  Staffed with a deputy 
administrator and ones for community improvement, inter-group relations, audit, 
international housing, program policy, public affairs, congressional liaison, general 
counsel, elderly housing, compliance, security, mortgage credit, and community 
disposition, the HHFA maintained a sizeable central office called the OA.  This “OA” 
managed budget, personnel, finance and administrative support plus the Workable 
Program for Community Improvement (WPCI) and the Voluntary Home Mortgage Credit 
Program (VHMCP).  It provided field office support to seven HHFA regional offices 
covering all states and territories with Region I in New York, Region II in Philadelphia, 
Region III centered in Atlanta, Region IV in Chicago, Region V in Fort Worth, Region 
VI in San Francisco, with Region VII located in Puerto Rico.18  Each regional 
headquarters had a regional administrator and deputy, plus assistant regional  directors 
for each of six major functional areas.  
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        Weaver commenced revamping the HHFA central office from a well conceived 
plan.  From Maurice H. Stans, Ike’s last Bureau of the Budget Director and also from 
Norman P. Mason, Ike’s last HHFA Administrator, he received sets of personnel books 
(files) and operating budget data.19  Due to his confirmation delays, acting commissioners 
operated urban renewal, community facilities, federal housing and technical standards at 
the beginning of the Administration and Weaver had time to read and prepare.20  While 
these acting commissioners performed daily business, Weaver strengthened his policy 
position, scheduling regular meetings with the five acting commissioners and key OA 
staff.  He began physically centralizing as many HHFA staff into the headquarters as 
possible.  He established a uniform HHFA orientation program for new employees and 
strengthened staff evaluations as well as quality assurance reviews.  He channeled all 
contracts with the White House through his office including those with Budget, required 
all important public announcements to go through him, and caused all subordinate 
personnel changes to cross his desk.21  In determining what positions actually reported 
directly to him, he found that twenty-seven did, while others reported to commissioners 
and then to him, and some reported to both.  Weaver ordered all of these latter ones to 
report directly to him.22  The White House intervened with a forty-eight hour pre-
approved speech clearance rule, and also directed that all requests for intervention from 
them be given serious consideration only if “the group can be helpful to us.”23  Weaver 
implemented both of these policies as well. 
        The HHFA administrator also had to reshape conflict of interest rules and standards 
of conduct policy, particularly in light of a brewing scandal.  Former Acting FHA 
Commissioner and subsequent Deputy Federal Housing Administrator, James B. Cash, Jr. 
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proved an embarrassment and later in 1961, Weaver dismissed him. This happened 
when Drew Pearson broke a richly detailed story in the Washington Post about how Cash 
lost $7,000.00 during an all night poker game to a San Diego real estate developer at the 
1960 Home Builders Convention in Chicago.  The developer in turn had Cash’s I.O.U. 
“torn up” by a Washington real estate lobbyist.24  This could not be permitted.    
        Another directive Kennedy issued in anticipation of his major economic stimulus 
effort required Secretaries and Agency Heads to “tighten up” regional administration and 
Weaver complied. Thus, after establishing his priorities and gaining some control over 
the agency, Weaver began that journey.  Within regional offices, levels of authority 
varied greatly and problems abounded.  Roles needed to be redefined, and in some cases 
regional administrators needed more authority and in others, less. Weaver wanted 
regional administrators to actually exercise direct authority in field operations, and 
through their directors, make decisions without relying so much on him.  Over reliance 
on the central office caused delays and confusion and since regional administrators 
represented him, once they understood his goals, they should implement them.25  
Regional administrators in URA and CFA exercised responsibility and managed agency-
wide programs well,  whereas the leaders of PHA and FNMA field operations exercised 
less power and initiative, while FHA maintained its own secular empire.  Weaver tried to 
balance this.26   
        In a strange congressionally mandated carry over from the past, two of HHFA’s five 
administrations worked directly within HHFA, but the other three conducted business 
separately while reporting to it.  The URA and CFA constituted the duo operating within 
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HHFA and FHA, PHA and FNMA operated separately, possessing neither the same 
organizational structure nor physical locations as their parent HHFA.27 
        The largest of the three mavericks, the Federal Housing Administration, chartered to 
provide mortgage loan insurance for seven major housing programs and itself as powerful 
as HHFA, amazingly divided the country into six “zones” rather than HHFA’s seven 
regions.  The FHA central office in D.C., itself a plebiscite bureaucracy, had a 
commissioner, deputy, and six primary assistants who managed nine assistant 
commissioners, who in turn supervised seventeen directors and all their support staff.  
Uniquely the six zone commissioners also located themselves in D.C. rather than in the 
“field.”  So the largest housing program in the free world managed itself from one central 
location while maintaining seventy-five scattered FHA Field Insuring Offices (FHA-
FIOs) in the largest seventy-five American cities and towns. These also came with 
healthy cotories.28
        Unfortunately, Weaver could only make minor changes in FHA regional 
administration because the big ones, fully reorganizing that confusing structure, were 
reserved by law for Congress.  The long-standing regulatory language of the National 
Housing Act of 1934 required that any FHA reorganization, must go before Congress.  
Thus, until the departmental status bill passed, Weaver could only initiate limited 
changes.  He improved communication and consolidated FHA-HHFA field activity 
wherever possible.29  He began holding regular “FHA” meetings and exchanging all basic 
market data, economic studies and housing market analysis.30  He required FHA zone 
offices to be located at least in the same cities and hopefully in the same building as 
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regional HHFA offices and tasked Neal J. Hardy, new FHA Commissioner, to obtain 
GSA authorization to begin that consolidation.   
        The Public Housing Administration (PHA), home-based in D.C. as well, had 
regional offices in the same regions and cities as the HHFA, but in separate locations and 
buildings.  Weaver streamlined internal reporting structures, improved communications, 
and made some regional personnel changes.  Those constructing and managing housing 
for low income Americans received assistance from PHA, either in direct loans or federal 
guaranteed loans, plus help in paying their long-term bond issues. The managers of low 
income public housing incorporated themselves into Local Public Housing Authorities 
(LPAs), some being public, municipal or state owned but most remaining private.  During 
the Kennedy years LPAs fluctuated numerically, based on their financial viability, 
litigation over poor construction, or from revelations about discrimination, all of which 
ended up in court.31   
        The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) also headquartered in D.C., 
managed three important programs: supplementing private secondary mortgages by 
purchasing and selling FHA/VA insured mortgages; purchasing “special” mortgages 
which improved national economic stability; and when the economy required, liquidating 
its special mortgage portfolios.  FNMA had regional offices in six of seven HHFA 
regions, but not in the same cities in half of them. Also a FNMA affiliate managed by the 
HHFA’s “OA,” the National Voluntary Mortgage Credit Extension Committee 
(NVMCEC) located in D.C., fielded its Voluntary Home Mortgage Credit Program 
(VHMCP) in five of the seven HHFA regions, sometimes in the same city. Weaver 
improved internal reporting and communications within them. 
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        Keeping track nationally of this astonishing bureaucracy required a “score card” 
which Weaver kept as an organizational chart in his office, with an “X” marking the 
current city location of each agency and by program.32  Beyond its complexity and 
inherent disfunctionality, Weaver’s capacity to provide direction and leadership were 
stifled by this archaic organizational architecture.  Unless the Department of Housing and 
Urban Affairs (DUAH) legislation passed, it would remain so for the entire Kennedy 
presidency.     
        All regional inter-agency processing needed improved coordination.  For example, 
when a FHA zone office delayed mortgage applications in an urban renewal area, URA 
approvals fell behind and CFA infrastructure improvements slowed.  Joint planning 
ventures between FHA and URA for housing the relocated in urban renewal areas never 
went smoothly and an Agency-wide phenomenon called “red tape” bled into all 
programs. That could also be seen where outside federal agencies constructing airport, 
rail terminal or harbor projects, became delayed by CFA because forms and processing 
procedures differed.33     
        While Weaver finished the sometimes infuriating task of attempting to gain control 
over HHFA, Kennedy launched the major element of his anti-recession package which 
consisted of using the big American housing and urban development business as the 
means.  He wanted to do three things: manipulate interest rates and monetary policy to 
stimulate the housing market; dramatically accelerate HHFA completion of current 
projects putting hundreds of millions of dollars into the economy; and enact a Housing 
Act which would stimulate growth.  As with most measures, the president on February 2, 
1961 show-cased the subject by holding a major press conference.  He informed the 
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public that telegrams would be sent to mayors of all major cities along with an 
economic message to Congress.  In his press release, “A Program for Economic 
Recovery and Growth” Kennedy emphasized that the federal government would 
stimulate home buying by increasing aggregate demand through decreasing both short 
term and long term interest rates and by providing incentives for more credit.34   The 
Congressional economic message, “A Program to Restore Momentum to the American 
Economy,” detailed how Kennedy saw housing and urban development as pivotal in 
bringing the country out of recession.  He stressed “no part of our domestic economy is 
more significant in terms of future economic growth and the well-being of the nation than 
that of housing and urban development.”35
        In the most dramatic domestic expansion since World War II, building the suburbs 
as vast rings around all U.S. cities, “required a national exertion greater than that of 
clearing the wilderness.”  By 1960, housing and home construction headed the list as 
America’s greatest single industry, employing over five percent of all citizens and the 
largest single sector of capital investment.  It affected the entire credit structure of the 
United States, tying up $116,000,000,000 in private mortgage money.36  From the late 
1940s through the early 1960s, over thirty million new private homes had been built 
increasing American home ownership from forty to over sixty percent.37  And these really 
were “new” homes with seventy-five percent of all existing U.S. housing in 1960 being 
built since the end of World War II.38  Increased capital mobility was critical to this 
housing explosion.39  Yet private housing as an industry suffered the most from recession.  
This is where Kennedy’s anti-recession package met Weaver’s HHFA restructuring head 
on in hopes of bringing the country out of recession.  JFK wanted HHFA to be the funnel 
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or conduit for his plan.  To do this, JFK would involve all six major programs of all 
five HHFA constituent administrations, handling three and one half billion dollars in 
vested and “roll over” public funds. 
        Kennedy started with interest rates and monetary policy, attempting to enlist 
national support for lower rates. His advisors believed lower interest rates, longer term 
mortgages and a reduction of government portfolios would be required, along with 
changes in how savings and loans (S and Ls) did business.40   The prevailing monetary 
policy impacting financial relationships between the Federal Home Loan Banking Board 
(FHLBB), FHA, FNMA needed to be “improved.”  In 1961, Savings and Loans, life 
insurance companies, commercial banks and mutual savings banks in order, accounted 
for eighty percent of mortgage financing.  All had become trapped in “contra-cyclical” 
economic behavior where regardless of the economic cycle, mortgage borrowers 
competed with larger ones for the same “pot of money.” The mortgager usually came in 
second to the more powerful corporate borrowers who even in a bad economy, could 
afford to pay higher interest rates.41   The other part of contra-cyclical financing was that 
even with a recession when housing demand dropped, conventional mortgage rates did 
not. 
      Initially, Kennedy instructed Weaver to reduce the maximum permissible FHA loan 
rates from five and three-quarters to five and a half percent.42  He would eventually 
reduce it again in June to five and one quarter percent.43  Simultaneously he dispatched a 
White House team headed by C. Douglas Dillion to meet with major banks and S and Ls 
about reducing interest rates.44  In mid February, Kennedy through Weaver, instructed 
FNMA to raise its selling price on mortgages by two points to stop investors from 
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purchasing older FNMA mortgages and force them to buy new ones in the 
conventional market.45
        On March 1, Kennedy held a follow on press conference about interest rates.  He 
announced that Joseph McMurray, Chairman of the independent Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board would now join the national team canvassing the country to reduce housing 
interest rates.  McMurray concentrated on S and Ls, urging them to reduce rates and 
began in the West which had the highest ones nationally.46   On the advice of HHFA, 
McMurray wanted S and Ls to reduce dividends paid on savings which were artificially 
high, forcing S and Ls to charge more for mortgages to offset paying these dividends.    
        After lengthy discussions with savings and loan officials in Los Angeles, San 
Francisco and other cities, McMurray recommended the Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
reduce the rate it charged S and Ls from four and one quarter to three and a quarter 
percent, which took place on March 15.47  McMurray also increased the FHLBB’s 
available credit line for savings and loans by seven and a half percent, which produced 
one billion dollars in additional credit nationally.48  His efforts were warmly received by 
the S and L community with executives pledging to do “everything in their power to 
reduce interest rates.”49   The United States Savings and Loan Association League 
estimated that because of McMurray, a reduction of one quarter of a percent in 
conventional mortgage costs nationally would take place by late spring.  However, a brief 
but unexpected rise in discount points occurred and Kennedy flirted with controls, as 
previously tried by Ike in 1957, but he decided rather to continue to use Dillion and 
McMurray in “jaw boning.”50     
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        Throughout the late spring, slight improvements could be seen.  A greater supply 
of funds became available for FHA issued loans at lower rates.  The same applied to VA 
guaranteed loans and a decline in conventional rates soon followed.51  On March 24, the 
President served notice, in another formal “Message on the Budget and Fiscal Policy to 
the Congress of the United States,” that when the economy improved, he would balance 
the budget, thus further “curtailing inflation, reducing the debt, and freeing funds for 
private investiment”.52  This caused the stock market to rise. 
        Kennedy began this second phase of ending the recession using housing and urban 
renewal as a catalyst, by instructing Weaver to dramatically accelerate completion of 
every currently approved HHFA projects even though Weaver remained skeptical of the 
outcome.53   He further asked Weaver’s constituent administrators to accelerate 
acceptance of new projects and quickly approve “fully planned ones,” “particularly in 
areas of chronic unemployment.” Further, he wanted all project starting dates moved 
forward substantially.54  The idea was also that as federal money began to flow, private 
sector investment of a similar if not larger sum could be expected, and both would help 
end the recession.55
        Acceleration started with urban renewal.  The president wanted the two billion 
dollar federal commitment already allocated spent as soon as possible, along with the 
expected billion dollar private sector contribution.56  Specifically, early acquisition, and 
speedy site clearance, accelerated construction, swift disposal of land to redevelopers, 
quick land reconditioning, and a hastened loan approval process constituted the effort.57   
Kennedy described this in telegrams to two hundred ninety-seven mayors and received 
solid support.58  Regional HHFA administrators received favorable mayoral 
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correspondence and an increase in applications as well.  In one Region, over a 
hundred new urban renewal applications arrived just after the president’s telegram. 
        In some cases, Weaver directly worked urban renewal project acceleration for the 
president in the HHFA regions, personally advancing completion dates 90 to 120 days 
while in others he left it to the regional administrators. In the heavily industrialized 
northeast, Region I Administrator Lester Eisner held an emergency meeting with mayors 
and urban developers from the fifty-eight largest cities at the Hotel Commodore in New 
York on March 3.  Attended by 250 people it headlined luminaries as Mayors Robert 
Wagner (New York), Richard Lee (New Haven), Frank A. Sedita (Buffalo), and Ed 
Logue representing Boston.   Eisner emphasized how accelerated urban renewal would 
create “more new jobs and put more money into the economy.”   To prove his point, 
using his own reorganization, already underway before the President’s February message, 
the result produced “a near doubling of production.”59 
        However, the worthiness of some of those projects fell secondary to the “need” for 
speed.  Land acquisition, demolition, and expedited redevelopment took place in a flurry.  
Eisner alone accelerated 597 million dollars in urban renewal money.60  The downside of 
these accelerations however, fell on the very poor who quickly became victims of 
removal. 
        But speed prevailed.  Region I sent a Task Force on March 9 to the field to make on 
the spot “accelerations” to “eliminate bottlenecks.”  The senior task force engineer 
received authority to approve demolition and site improvements “on the spot” from the 
HHFA Region I Administrator.  In Cambridge (MA), immediate approval to spend ten 
million dollars in urban renewal money took place even though all agreed doing it 
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constituted a “calculated risk” as the city council, state government and regional 
planning authorities had not yet approved the site.  That site might be used for a federal 
highway route favored by of the Bureau of Roads.  Other swift approvals followed for 
New York City, New Haven, Springfield, (MA) and Buffalo.61  Ending the recession, 
extremely popular with voters, meant more to Kennedy than the careful urban planning 
he voiced in the campaign.  
        The use of “Letters of Consent,” a HHFA Regional document authorizing the start 
of federal projects, became a tool for acceleration as well.  In Region I, Eisner granted 
full project approval using consent letters only, a rarity during initial planning phases, 
based on “special presidential justifications.”  He also authorized early title search and 
land acquisition even before the initial planning phase, which was even rarer.62  In 
Region II, the mid-eastern states, the Administrator there conducted a comparable 
meeting in Pittsburgh on March 7 with similar outcomes.63  Daily “acceleration” meetings 
followed and urban renewal throughout the mid-eastern states emulated the same pattern 
as in Region I.64   Nationally in all seven HHFA regions urban renewal spending 
dramatically increased. 
        The Community Facilities Administration (CFA) accelerated its activities also.65  
After the president’s telegram, on February 6, CFA project approval rates jumped.66   
College housing, public works planning, and public facility loans all picked up in 
volume.67  The CFA reduced its interest rates on government loans and removed 
population requirements for loans so smaller cities could apply.68  In one Region, CFA 
“revised” its “Field Service Manual” allowing its field engineers to approval bids on the 
spot.  This transaction could be completed with only a phone call to Region.69  In total, 
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Region I accelerated twenty seven million dollars in CFA college housing money.70  
In the mid-western and border states of Region IV hastened the spending $60 million 
dollars.71  Field engineers out west in Region V approved spending $51 million dollars in 
public facilities money on the spot and an outrageous $268 million in college 
construction money.72  This method of “fixing” the economy by any quick measure, 
continued nationally with abandon.  Although many of these projects merited 
consideration, others were approved simply to spend money.  The CFA’s program 
became so successful, Kennedy would later introduce a separate accelerated public works 
bill to extend the program’s life. 
        Using the president’s anti-recession message, the FHA developed an accelerated 
plan akin to URA’s and CFA’s.  On February 2, the FHA wired field insuring offices to 
drop the interest rate from five and three quarter to five and a half percent and by May 
29, 1961, to five and one quarter percent.73  FHA also quickly implemented a program 
they had previously developed.  That consisted of sending “mortgage contact teams” of 
housing specialists out to broaden the market.  FHA teams descended upon rural 
communities under 25,000, already in trouble from the recession in coal, timber or 
agriculture and pre-qualified people for housing coverage.74  This gently expanded the 
number of eligible families.  The PHA began expediting construction of 60,000 already 
approved public housing units worth $700,000,000 and sent its regional staff to several 
new field locations to approve on the spot bids.75  PHA also expedited planning for the 
additional 75,000 low rent public housing units under contract, but awaiting funding but 
of course these great PHA ideas, to be discussed later, remained chiefly as ideas.76  
FNMA joined the anti-recession bandwagon increasing by half a percent what it would 
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pay for mortgages covering elderly housing and urban renewal housing.77  FNMA led 
the nation in the purchase of conventional mortgages.78  Lastly, the OA  expedited 
applications for the Workable Program for Community Improvement (WPCI) and did the 
same for re-certification of community programs with lapsed status.79  Commencing in 
February, to track all of this, Kennedy required Weaver to submit weekly reports directly 
to him on all HHFA activities and this requirement lasted for the entire course of the 
administration.80  Kennedy was determined that HHFA would take the lead in ending the 
recession. 
        Yet only minimal results in slowing the recession could be seen by July 1961.  New 
monthly FHA home loan applications increased slightly from 222,000 in February to 
227,000 in May.  FHA existing loans in effect slowly rose from 485,000 a month in 
February to 556,000 in May.  Private housing starts in January numbered 1,105,000 yet 
by May had improved to only 1,298,000.81  Urban renewal, community facilities, and the 
Workable Program volume only gradually increased.  Weaver had been right, there 
would be no quick fix.      
        Yet in his haste to end the recession, Kennedy jeopardized the continuity of 
Eisenhower’s past urban policy without defining the quality of the outcome.82  In 
hindsight, most of this was already doomed from the start as the country suffered from 
what would later be called “stagflation.”  In international economics, the poor U.S. 
balance of trade, balance of payments, and the gold flow drain caused some of this.  But 
at home in the stagnant domestic market, it had more to do with high prices not falling, 
wherein firms simply cut production but did not drop prices, then laid off workers but did 
not cut the wages of those remaining at relatively high salaries, while at the same time 
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worker productivity across the entire economy continued to fall.83  No amount of 
tampering with housing programs would change this.  
        Accelerating housing and urban development spending to improve the domestic 
economy also created a false perception.  Many felt this flurry of activity improved urban 
life, but often quite the opposite resulted.  Regarding poverty, as none of this made much 
difference to the very poor, rapidly approving projects actually resulted in urban 
developers receiving more latitude to complete work quickly with less regard for human 
conditions.  Implementing the anti-recession package, further put the HHFA into a state 
of turmoil, with some Regional Administrators holding daily meetings, and executing 
actions quickly which previously had received greater consideration.  Other tasks 
remained undone.  
        Moreover, if federal grant money to cities supposedly made an immediate 
difference, in 1960 that accounted for only 3.9 percent of all city revenues.  It would take 
another twenty years until 1980 to reach approximately twenty percent of city revenues.84  
 To make substantial improvements, really big dollars would be needed and Kennedy was 
simply not going to propose spending that kind of money, nor frankly would Congress 
have approved it.   He simply tampered with the existing programs in hopes of 
stimulating something that might work and also please the voters, by “shoving” anti-
recession money through HHFA.
        Yet serious economic politics were being played out here.  As a stimulus Kennedy 
believed in growth rather than redistribution.85  Under this school of thought when the 
economy went “bust” Washington either spent more, cut taxes, or did both to stimulate 
expanded private investment and increased consumer consumption.  Kennedy saw clearly 
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how Eisenhower’s recessions cost Republicans control of Congress in 1954, 
significant Senate and House seats in 1958 and the White House in 1960.86  He did not 
want that to happen to the Democrats.  
      Yet the cities had other problems which growth side economics simply would not 
correct. In 1960, most city revenues were unfortunately based on corporate and 
household property taxes, which continued to decline.87  Where whites left cities, in every 
urban business sector, employment and profits fell, particularly in manufacturing, 
wholesale trade, and retail trade.  In the twenty-five largest Standard Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas  (SMSA)s, new jobs dropped below 1948 levels.88  Yet while work 
declined in cities, poor African-Americans continued to flock there and from 1950 to 
1960, the African-American population of the twenty largest cities increased by fifty-two 
percent, with eighty-three percent of those Americans living in the central city, a location 
of the very worst poverty.89  However, Kennedy “ploughed forward” as a conservative 
Keynesianist would eventually introduce across the board tax cuts for both individuals 
and corporations.90  The urban poor needed some “redistribution” themselves, through a 
poverty program but under Kennedy that came too late.     
        As a prelude to introducing the 1961 Housing Act which itself was the third major 
means of using housing and urban renewal as an anti-recession package, Kennedy 
assigned to Weaver the task of drafting a special Congressional message which spelled 
out the entire urban program and explained the housing legislation.  Its purpose was to 
create public support and test Congressional reaction.91   So while Weaver drafted the 
housing legislation, he also composed the Special Message.92   Kennedy’s Special 
Message on Housing and Community Development discussed all four areas where he 
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wanted Congressional action: the omnibus housing bill, the urban departmental status 
bill, the urban mass transit legislation and it ever so briefly touched upon the small anti-
poverty initiative.  It left out the Executive Order on open housing, with its main focus on 
the housing act.  
        In writing the message Weaver received help from Mort Schussheim, assistant 
administrator for public policy; Saul Klayman of the National Association of Mutual 
Savings Banks; Neal Hardy, FHA commissioner; John Frantz, HHFA budget officer; M. 
Carter McFarland, HHFA director of economics and program studies, and Milt Semer, 
HHFA general council.93   What Weaver wrote, Kennedy readily approved and when he 
brought it to the White House, Weaver met with Ted Sorensen who said it was either 
“damn good or else he was awful tired,” and then they, Lee White and Larry O’Brien 
took it to the President.  Kennedy said he “thought it was alright and he would… send the 
message up.”94   Weaver vividly remembered two things about that meeting.  First its 
singular significance stood out as on only one other occasion would he ever formally 
meet with the president. That happened by accident in connection with a mass transit 
measure.  Kennedy’s housing and urban affairs chief only set foot in the Oval Office 
twice in the nearly three years of his presidency.95   It seemed the president was too busy 
with foreign policy to spend a lot of time with Weaver regarding America’s cities.  
Secondly, in this meeting Kennedy did not even read the entire message before he 
approved it.96  That of course reflected his interest level in urban affairs.
        Thus on a warm March 9, 1961, the first ever “Presidential Special Message on 
Housing and Community Development” was read before the Senate and House.  It 
outlined in rather sweeping objectives the 1961 Housing Act, spelling out what 
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Kennedy’s desires “to renew our cities, provide decent housing for all our people” 
while “encouraging a prosperous and efficient construction industry as an essential 
component of general economic growth.”97  
        The message incorporated campaign excerpts from Kennedy’s Denver speech, the 
Pittsburgh Conference material and ideas from both Task Force Reports, into a montage 
of promises and expectations.  Though discussing the 1961 Housing Act, the message 
revealed little new in urban planning except the price tag, which would be a record to 
date.    
        Regarding metropolitan planning, Kennedy wanted to increase the federal share of 
community development to two-thirds.98   For mass transit, he wanted a study group to 
immediately assess what the federal role should be and he called for a massive increase in 
urban renewal funding with home rehabilitation being allowed on urban renewal sites.  
Increased money would be requested for urban open spaces.99
        In “providing decent homes for all Americans” Kennedy proposed a new FHA 
middle income family housing program with no down payment forty year mortgages and 
government rehabilitation of older homes for middle income families.100  In 1961, middle 
income meant  your household made $5,000 to $7,000 annually.  Low income amounted 
to $2,500 to $4,999 per year, and those families could “rent” their way into the middle 
income program.  Poverty defined those whose incomes fell below $2,500 per year, and 
Kennedy wanted an additional 100,000 units of public housing for them. Although an 
increase over Ike’s program, it remained miniscule in relation to the need.  Kennedy also 
proposed demonstration grants so communities could conduct their own low income 
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housing research.101  But public housing’s lack of popularity with voters meant 
Kennedy would not propose the needed massive low income federal program. 
        Other initiatives in the Housing Message consisted of direct loans for more elderly 
housing, and monthly rent subsidies for the elderly who in 1960 numbered sixteen 
million Americans averaging only $3,000 annually.  Government guaranteed mortgages 
at five and a quarter percent would also be offered to veterans, and in a joint HHFA-
Agriculture venture, to farmers.102  Kennedy wanted to create another housing boom 
through an expanded FHA and FNMA program.103   
        Reaction to the special message was both positive and negative.  The New York 
Times and other papers ran front page stories praising Kennedy’s “vast housing aid to 
combat slums and to revitalize cities while helping families of low and moderate 
incomes.”104  The Times cost out the program which Kennedy had not, so as not to alarm 
Congress, at over 3 billion dollars in loans and grants covering five years and over $800 
million a year for other programs.  This sum represented twice the money over four years 
that Eisenhower spent.105
        But not all press coverage was favorable however.  House and Home, a magazine 
for private contractors, stated in an open letter to the President, “the program you propose 
is far too small to cure the vast need you state.”  They warned that $7.5 billion over four 
years constitutes “too much money in the wrong place, yet too small to solve the major 
problems” and cited as evidence that the 100,000  public housing units would meet just 
two-thirds of one percent of the need; that the FNMA special assistance program would 
only cover one-third of one percent who needed help, and that the elderly housing plan 
would meet less than one half of one percent of the need.106   House and Home’s analysis, 
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although decidedly biased, stimulated the White House into several rebuttals as their 
figures were correct, and the debate between to two continued publicly through late July 
1961.107  For Kennedy’s program to be effective, not just the $7.5 billion he proposed but 
rather the billions which both Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon later spent, would be 
required all at once.  In 1961 Kennedy had no intention of making an economic and 
political statement of that magnitude nor did Congress.  
        Others also criticized the message. Civil rights organizations asked why open 
housing, mentioned so prevalently during the campaign could not be found in the special 
message. They wondered publicly why the now famous stroke of the pen, legalizing open 
housing by executive order, was not addressed.  More conservative organizations as the 
National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) called Kennedy’s housing program a 
“fix-up and paint-up activity”…“completely inadequate...to accomplish the purpose” of 
revitalizing America’s multi-income housing program.  Yet surprisingly, NAHB called 
for more private construction of low income family housing, stimulated by significant 
regulatory changes which Kennedy was not about to make.108  Uniquely Eisenhower’s 
out going FHA commissioner stressed now was the time to make dramatic changes to 
FHA financing, substantially broadening coverage, and even offered an inventive 
condominium plan.109 
        In analysis though, the special message represented a political impulse to an 
economic problem.  No coherent effort at shaping the contours of a national housing 
policy could be found in it, other than to pour more money into a loosely coordinated 
composite of programs from the recent past headed by hopefully a new urban department. 
  Yet it effectively laid the groundwork for introducing the housing legislation. 
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        The first piece of major urban legislation introduced by Kennedy would be the 
1961 Housing Act, also called the “omnibus housing bill” since it had something in it for 
nearly everybody.  As an economic growth stimulus package it reflected the ideas of the 
“physical city” planners over those, to exclusion, of the urban social planners. If as 
Kennedy often quipped “a rising tide floats all boats,” then this bill represented the high 
tide of macro-economic stimuli.110   
        Drafted by Weaver, a task force of Milt Semer serving as “drafting manager” and 
Hortense Gable as a major contributor and editor, Mort Schussheim, Saul Klayman, John 
Frantz, M. Carter McFarland, Jack Conway, Fred Forbes, and all five HHFA 
administrators rounded out the talented group of contributors.  Neal J. Hardy, FHA 
Commissioner, played a major role and the bill’s drafting was completed in record 
time.111  When Weaver brought it to the White House, Sorensen said “Well, at least it’s 
literate,” a comment which irritated Weaver, as it represented a form of deprecating 
humor aimed at the poor housing and urban folks from down the street.  Nonetheless it 
went to Kennedy who as with the special message, signed it, and sent it to the Hill 
without completely reading it.112  His interest level had not changed.   
        Conceptually the bill presented some realistic as well as symbolic proposals.113   It 
recognized that creating more housing remained the underlying principle.114  If well done, 
that would help tremendously in bringing the nation out of recession. Imbedded in that, 
could be found the idea that making housing more affordable, represented the ultimate 
objective leading to national prosperity.  Income class rather than ethnicity would be the 
variable manipulated.  The Act placed its emphasis on the middle class rather than on the 
lower class, the latter being where the need for good housing was highest, but voter 
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participation was lowest.  The middle class also had more spendible, income so this 
would emphasize FHA over PHA.   
        Thanks to Weaver, some progressive features found their way into the legislation.  
Weaver wanted to create more elderly housing, humanize urban renewal, and expand 
public housing.115  In the past, when public housing grudgingly received approval, low 
out year appropriations cut the number built.  Conversely, private sector housing 
remained the bastion of local influences while urban renewal cleared poor people off sites 
and into limited public housing with abandon. Elderly housing drifted slowly into a sea of 
difficulties similar to public housing and most housing of any kind continued to be built 
without regard for urban mass transit links.  Demonstration and effective experimentation 
remained virtually non-existent.116  These constituted the issues Weaver wanted to 
address and improve with the new act.  
        Getting the 1961 Housing Act through Congress would be a test of domestic 
diplomacy.  Both the Senate Housing Subcommittee Chairman, John L. Sparkman (D-
AL) and the House Housing Subcommittee Chairman Albert J. Rains (D-AL) came from 
the deep south, yet uniquely both wanted the legislation passed.  However their 
respective bosses, the full committee chairs, came from the “deeper” south and were not 
as enthusiastic about the legislation. All had to play to their southern constituents while 
having no open or tacit agreement with Kennedy that he might not at any time issue an 
open housing executive order or propose strong civil rights legislation.117
        The Senate would be where the 1961 Housing Act stood the most immediate chance 
of passage. There, Senator A. Willis Robertson (D-VA) Chair of the important Banking 
and Currency Committee and one of the “deeper southerners,” granted his permanent 
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housing sub-committee chair, John J. Sparkman, virtually autonomous status and 
active oversight.118  Senator J. William Fulbright (D-AK), one of many Democrats who 
previously served on the full committee, held the honorary title of “service chairman.” 
The reason this held importance was most of these Democrats were Senators who Vice 
President Lyndon B. Johnson could readily influence, as could his chief influencer, 
Bobby Baker.119  Baker, an accomplished liar according to Senator Joseph D. Clark (D-
PA), and soon to be investigated on numerous charges, still held significant clout.120  So 
if influence was needed it was quite available. 
        As the HHFA readied the legislation, eighteen other “housing and urban affairs” 
bills reached Senate and House committees. This phenomenon represented not only the 
usual business of Congress, but also Kennedy’s indifference, so Senators and 
Congressmen form urban states or areas wrote legislation with relish to impress their 
constituents.  Six bills hit the docket in January, the first being Senator Jacob K. Javits’ 
(R-NY) call for FHA rate reduction and expanded CFA college housing coverage.  Other 
bills ranged from Senator George A. Smather’s (D-FLA) request for an expanded FHA 
role in covering Savings and Loans, to Prescott Bush’s (R-CT) request that the federal 
share of urban renewal funding substantially increase to Clifford P. Case’s (R-NJ) desire 
that HHFA fund federal highways in urban renewal areas, to Estes Kfauver’s (D-TN) 
called for a complete revamping of the CFA.  Weaver responded to each bill that the 
forthcoming administrative one would address it, which often placed him in the 
embarrassing position of having to testify against a good faith, card carrying member of 
his own party.121
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        On March 29, 1961 Kennedy introduced the Housing Act into both Chambers 
accompanied by a vast public relations campaign.  That campaign focused on marshalling 
public support, with key administration officials appearing on the big television news 
shows like “Face the Nation,” the “Dave Garroway Interview” and NBC’s “Meet the 
Press.”   On April 9, Weaver appeared on the latter show and performed marvelously.122   
Fred Dutton and Ted Sorensen of the White House staff spelled out what Kennedy 
wanted to see during these interviews.123  A central pool of representatives including 
Weaver, Ribicoff, Goldberg, Hodges, Udall, Heller, Day, Freeman, Conally, Zuckett, 
Star, McNamara, Seaborg, and Dillion got the word out.124  Upcoming Congressional 
testimony followed the same process.  Senate hearings commenced on April 4 before the 
Subcommittee on Housing of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee.  Housing 
subcommittee members included Chair John T. Sparkman (D-AL) with Paul H. Douglas 
(D-L), Harrison Williams (D-NJ), Edmund S. Muskie (D-ME) and Homer E. Capehart 
(R-IN) among the notables. 
        Conflict began early.  Capehart of Indiana warned against going too far with 
government intervention and cautioned Congress would not approve a massive new 
federal program.  Sparkman countered that a decent home for every American remained 
“a goal” not a mandate and Weaver, surrounded by representatives from all five HHFA 
administrations, responded with the “company line.”125  In opening the ten days of 
testimony, Weaver called the Kennedy program a valuable blend of old and new with the 
fresh ideas being the moderate and low income housing program, forty year mortgages, 
big dollars for urban renewal, the effort to improve mass transit planning, elderly housing 
subsidies and the open spaces program.  
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          Forty year mortgages and open spaces caused most of the debate.126   Paul 
Douglas (D-IL) felt the forty year mortgages might lead to “purchasers finding 
themselves holding a mortgage but not having a house after forty years.”  Weaver 
explained the program would be experimental, but it would significantly reduce monthly 
payments for moderate and low income buyers and should be tried.  In his housing 
message, Kennedy said “open spaces” constituted the most imaginative part of his urban 
program.127  If he really believed that, then cities in the 1960s were in trouble.  Yet since 
he neither wrote nor fully read the housing message, one could easily question this 
statement. Others felt open spaces represented a small, but unneeded measure in relation 
to the severe problems facing American cities.  They were right.  
        Testimony favorable to the administration followed that of Weaver.   Mayor Richard 
J. Daley of Chicago proudly endorsed Senate 1478, the 1961 Housing Act, calling it a 
“turning point” in urban history.  Of course he had been the turning point for Kennedy in 
the 1960 election, and “had done as much as one politician could do for 
another…rounding up a few thousand crucial votes from Democrats who died between 
presidential elections.”128  Among his other pronouncements, Daley proudly proclaimed 
that by 1971 he “would achieve the goal of removing Chicago’s slums and blight.”129  
Mayor Richard Lee of New Haven explained his success with urban renewal and pointed 
out how Kennedy’s billions would improve things even more.  Speeches and discussions 
by mayors from Boston, Norfolk (VA), Philadelphia and numerous other cities ensued.  
Along with an endorsement from the American Municipal Association, all generally 
praised the legislation or offered only minor changes.  Nobody took aim at the 
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legislation’s Achilles heel, i.e. how “comprehensive” it actually was in fixing the 
problem.130   
        That came on the morning of April 14 from the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People.  The NAACP sent its Housing Secretary, Jack Wood 
instead of its president or board chairman so as not to completely alienate Kennedy, 
whom they did not entirely trust, but nonetheless wanted to remain intimate with if 
possible.  Wood said Federal housing programs strongly influenced and increased racial 
segregation.  He cited cases where lenders would not make home loans to African-
Americans and criticized the FHA’s lackluster leadership in correcting the problem.  He 
said Congress should define and enforce a policy of complete nondiscrimination, which 
could also be construed that the NAACP did not have a lot of faith in the White House to 
do so.  Wood further contended that the FHA should refuse guarantees to lenders who 
would not make minority loans.  He concluded by reading a list of all the states which 
had passed open housing and nondiscrimination legislation while the White House and 
Congress did nothing.131  This was a strong attack upon the administration’s inaction.  In 
his response to open housing accusation, Kennedy set in motion a sequence he would 
follow through to Thanksgiving of 1962: that he agreed something should be done; that 
he was planning action; and that the Executive Order would be issued at the proper time.  
Weaver of course, as former Chairman of the Board of the NAACP was well aware of 
these facts as well as Kennedy’s cautious position and publicly stated the Executive 
Order should be released immediately.132  This did not move the president but did not get 
him in trouble either. 
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        Comments from Monsignor John O’Grady of the National Conference of 
Catholic Charities followed Wood and O’Grady criticized the public housing program as 
too small, too limited, and only capable of “providing relief for about a year.”133   He of 
course, was also correct.  Leon H. Keyserling, the renowned economist who drafted the 
1949 Housing Act, who representing the Americans for Democratic Action, critiqued 
Kennedy’s legislation as a “kiddie kart bill” of piecemeal items which would not change 
much.  Kennedy called for 100,000 units of public housing over four years; Keyserling 
said we needed a 100,000 per year.  Kennedy envisioned 1.3 million new homes per year; 
Keyserling wanted to see 2 million.  According to Keyserling, Kennedy’s standard for 
defining “middle income” needed to cap at $7,000 and baseline at $4,000 annually.134   
These latter criticisms from Wood, O’Grady and Keyserling signified they, representing 
“progressive” organizations did not think of Kennedy’s legislation as very progressive.  
They were however persuasive, leading sizable voter blocks of civil rights, public 
charities and liberal organizations.  Yet they did not hold much of power on the Hill that 
spring. 
        On the other hand, those who held the power there, the conservatives, did not like 
the Act either.   Curtis Huber, of the National Association of Real Estate Boards 
(NAREB) started quizzically “we will never win the fight against slums unless and until 
we can make slums profitable,” and criticized the bill further in colorful detail.  He 
wanted FHA’s coverage decreased and the middle income range reduced, which would 
allow more private sector financing.  He wanted all below market interest rate (BMIR) 
programs cut so as to encourage low income private financing.135   H. Manning Bowen of 
the Life Insurance Association of America, representing the number three means of 
 145
mortgage financing in 1961, stood fast against the forty year mortgages and wanted 
the middle and low income program “stripped to its essentials.”136   E. J. Burke, Jr., 
president of the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) called the low and 
middle income plans propaganda “embarking the FHA and FNMA on a welfare 
program.”137
        While Sparkman, Williams and others listened to witnesses from the left and right, 
an emerging pattern could be seen by Weaver.  If housing legislation would pass in 1961, 
it must have something in it for both those with persuasion and power on Capital Hill.  
Wood, O’Grady and Keyserlig could persuade the most voters but the developers 
controlled the most power.  Not far from Huber, Brown and Burke’s positions stood those 
of the prestigious U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Insured 
Savings and Loans, the American Institute of Architects, National Apartment Owners 
Association, and the American Hospitals Association.138  Not far from the views of 
Wood, O’Grady and Keyserling fell those of the national municipal and city leagues, the 
public housing organizations and urban reform groups, so everybody needed to get 
something. 
        Weaver returned for a final word before the Subcommittee on April 26 went into 
executive session after a final word from Weaver.139   In executive session the 
Subcommittee made the forty-year, no down payment mortgages really  “experimental” 
and put more eligibility restrictions on it.  It also gave the president discretion as to 
whether or not to release funding for forty year mortgages in the budget “out years.”  
That would be important later as it gave Kennedy significant political and financial 
leverage.  The Subcommittee retained the 100,000 units of public housing to be built over 
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four years and added fifty million dollars to elderly housing, while approving the 
miniscule open spaces plan and increasing federal participation in urban renewal funding 
to five-sixths.140   Weaver felt those last changes would discourage state participation 
since cities could now afford the one-sixth  without a state commitment, but he let it go.141 
 Late on April 27, the Housing Subcommittee reported the bill to the full Committee.  
        Commencing on May 7 the full Committee made their changes.  They increased the 
direct loan program for elderly housing by another 100 million dollars, added 100 million 
dollars to open spaces which Senator Sparkman liked, and 350 million to the college 
construction loan program.  On May 10, they voted ten to five to send S.1478 forward.  
Senators Homer M. Capehart (R- IN), Wallace F. Bennett (R-UT), J. Glen Beall (R-MD), 
William A. Blaley (D-TX) and Committee Chairman A. Willis Robertson (D-VA) voted 
in the negative.142  
       Thus full Senate debate on the Act became anti-climatic as it now was really 
“omnibus”.  Most members had already made up their mind and only peripheral issues as 
open spaces received much debate.  On June 12 the administration won in the Senate by a 
64 - 25 margin.143  Kennedy had also been prudent in following the advice of Senator Joe 
Clark (D-PA) in not placing the departmental status issue into the housing legislation.144
        In the more conservative House though, no guarantees existed.  The bill might not 
ever get out of the House Committee on Banking and Currency chaired Brent Spence (D-
KY), even if it cleared the Housing Subcommittee headed by supporter Albert Rains (D-
AL).  Spence was the other “deep southern” thinker.  Further, no guarantees existed the 
bill would clear the House Committee on Rules nor survive a floor vote.  Thus, the 
administration approached the House differently than the Senate.  The sales “pitch” 
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remained the same but emphasis shifted.  How the fact that the 1961 Housing Act 
would stimulate the economy remained paramount.  Weaver worked up several papers on 
this subject for Ted Sorensen who farmed them out to “talking heads.”145  How the bill 
had something in it for everybody, particularly smaller communities also received more 
attention.  In the words of Al Rains, since you could not pass housing legislation on big 
city votes alone, some sugar on the bill would be needed for “congressmen whose towns 
don’t have renewal or public housing programs.”146  
        The HHFA team itself played a larger role selling the bill in the House than in the 
Senate, which would become the key difference.147   The successful passage of the bill 
then depended on how well Weaver, Milt Semer, and Jack Conway worked with 
individual members of the Committees rather than just Kennedy’s liaison team.   Weaver 
spent a lot of time with Rains, and consumed a lot of catfish with Wright Patman, the 
Democratic Congressman from east Texas.  Because of direct lobbying by Weaver, 
Committee staff members also joined the Kennedy bandwagon as did Frank Horton (R-
NY).  Milt Semer, then HHFA general counsel and formerly from the Senate Banking 
and Currency Committee staff helped with previous House counterparts.  Getting the key 
Committee staff members behind the bill constituted a great idea.  Further, Jack Conway, 
HHFA deputy administrator, with strong labor ties going back many years, worked three 
Congressmen himself.148  
        Weaver and crew provided detailed information to favorable interest groups 
regarding who in the House needed more persuading. There, William Widnall (R-NJ), all 
Congressional personnel from North Carolina, particularly Congressman Charles R. 
Jonas (D-NC), and all members of the South Carolina delegation required some 
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“convincing.”  Literature from organizations like the National Association of Housing 
and Redevelopment Officials (NAHRO) and others flowed into their offices.149   
        Back in the late winter upon his appointment, Weaver had started a regular 
correspondence with Brent Spence explaining the advantages of the bill.  Although he did 
this with Sparkman as well, Weaver emphasized to Spence how H.R. 6028 would 
“stimulate country-wide activity in home improvement,” through “a new and broadened 
FHA insurance program, including an extensive low and middle income one…at local 
discretion on a case by case basis.”  He continued to emphasize this through early 
summer, espousing the value of expanded communities facilities programs for rural, 
semi-rural and suburban communities.  Even though many southern states had few big 
cities in 1961, they had many small towns.150   
        In the more conservative House, Area Redevelopment and the 1961 Housing Act 
were debated simultaneously and which federal agency would run area redevelopment 
became a dispute.  HHFA, Commerce and Labor were choices but the outcome became 
creating a new agency.  This was Kennedy’s choice because it would increase his power 
base and visibility.  A “memorandum of agreement” between HHFA and ARA clarified 
how the agencies shared responsibilities.151    Professor Robert C. Wood of the Urban 
Task Force provided some advice on this.152 
        Not unlike in the Senate, extensive debate over HR 6028, the 1961 Housing Act, 
took place throughout the House.  Before the Act ever made it into committee, 
Congressman Thomas M. Pelly (R-WA) cost out the entire program at seven billion, 173 
million over four years and publicly called it a “tremendous boondoggle at high cost.”153  
He threatened and subsequently did introduce his own version of the bill.154  But as a 
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series of federal grants, guarantees and loans under nine titles covering eleven areas, 
even if the Act was the most expensive urban program to date, others saw what Pelly 
missed. 
         This legislation would both stimulate the economy and please voters.  Every 
president since FDR had passed a housing act when the economy got into recessionary 
trouble and Eisenhower passed three of them.  Since the Act represented nothing new or 
radical, constituting non-threatening legislation, the same old machine mayors, 
construction bosses and urban developers would benefit.  Every city mayor had a pet 
project and favorite location, called “local scattered site,” for the increased money in 
public and elderly housing.  These sites of course would help ethnic voters as the poor 
Irish of Boston, the low income Italians of New York, the poor Portuguese of 
Philadelphia, and the disadvantaged Polish of Detroit and all of the above in Chicago.  
But only small amounts of this money would go to poor African-Americans of the central 
city.       
        The same private sector representatives who spoke before the Senate also provided 
House testimony, plus a few new ones, many of those coming from the private sector.  
Edgar V. Hall, Executive Director of the Home Improvement Council testified that 
applications for the housing program remained too complicated and officials from the 
National Association of Apartment Owners, Home Improvement Council, and National 
Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials called for broadened FHA 
coverage. 
        When Weaver testified on April 24 his speech represented a brilliant effort at not 
being provocative.155  It was almost to the point of being conciliatory.156  He wanted 
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House members to see the value of the Title I housing provisions targeted at middle- 
income home buyers and voters.  Eleven million families fell into the middle income 
category, and those at the bottom often purchased America’s sub-standard homes.  These 
sixteen million houses comprising twenty-seven percent of the available market.  Weaver 
emphasized how the Act, broadening FHA eligibility and with new FHA thirty-five year 
and forty year mortgages, would also provide incentives to lenders and buyers alike. The 
Act tailored financing, eligibility, and coverage of certain kinds of new houses to specific 
FHA and VA rules and FNMA would establish a special secondary market program for 
them.  The now famous Section 221 (d)(3) provided FHA loans of one hundred percent 
of the cost of constructing rental housing for middle and lower income families who 
could not get the new FHA/VA mortgages.  Interest rates on these loans to nonprofit 
cooperatives and limited dividend corporations would be at “below market interest rate” 
(BMIR).  All of this could happen both in and out of urban renewal areas and could be 
included in a Workable Program for Community Improvement (WPCI).  Weaver did his 
best to sell this “down home.”157 
         Al Rains helped immensely by working in something that would “sell in the country 
as well as in the city.”  He increased community facilities money by $450 million beyond 
the administration’s proposal and upped college housing by $100 million per year.  He 
doubled farm housing, while adding $575 million to the available FNMA portfolio and 
$50 million more for elderly housing.  Rains also cut urban renewal money which sold 
well in the country.158  This displeased Weaver but he let it go.      
        However the overall increases did not please Kennedy, who down the road wanted a 
balanced budget and across the board tax cuts.  In a masterful display of mismanagement, 
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his White House liaison team tried to get Rains to recant the changes, and failing that, 
attempted to substitute the Senate version of the bill to Spence and the full Committee, in 
lieu of Rain’s Subcommittee one.  This ill-conceived effort lost by a 13 - 5 vote before 
the full Committee.159  It so permanently angered Rains, that he would not attend the 
Bill’s signing.  Kennedy had placed his economic interests over those of old city friends 
once too often.  
        Yet the bill still remained in some trouble in the House Committee on Rules 
(HCOR) as well as the full House.160   Kennedy though, had a trump card to play.  
Weaver and his HHFA team headed by Jack Conway, had written into the legislation 
some particularly “tough and restrictive language” which adversely affected Saving and 
Loan Associations “notoriously tied into the Republicans and Nixon especially in 
California and Chicago.”  Weaver and Conway always intended that this would be 
removed but no “quid pro quo” existed.  However, the trade off came when “eight to ten 
congressmen,” feeling pressure from the S and Ls, said they would support the Act if the 
Saving and Loan provisions were withdrawn.  This was done with the “concession” 
approved by Dick Donahue at the White House.  Conway called this an example of the 
trade off called “What the hell happened to my project?” versus “Well, what the hell 
happened to your commitment on this piece of legislation?”  He also called it a “kind of 
legalized extortion.”161   The Kennedy legislative team further went to undecided House 
members one by one and showed them in grand detail the “importance” of this legislation 
for their respective districts.162   Subsequently, the HCOR released HR 6028, the 1961 
Housing Act, and it passed on a critical House vote, 168 - 141.163   
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        In Senate/House Conference Committee in early June, the administration backed 
away from changes which might upset the fragile balance it had achieved.  Regarding a 
later balanced budget attempt to gain a tax cut, Kennedy received latitude to release 
supplemental funding for the forty year mortgages or not to do so, at “presidential 
discretion.”164   He thus could actively withdraw some funding for his urban program to 
help balance the budget to justify cutting taxes, both popular for the 1964 elections, 
should he choose to go forward with those ideas.  So after eliminating the land bank 
portion of open spaces, House changes prevailed with no major opposition and the 
Conference bill returned to Chambers, passing the Senate 64-25 and the House 235- 
178.165
        The 1961 Housing Act became law for a number reasons.  Kennedy’s “honeymoon” 
was real and Weaver quickly produced a well written and erudite piece of legislation 
before it ended.  As introduced, the Act represented a neutralist document free from 
controversy which could have polarized conservatives.  Party loyalty still meant 
something then and, some Democrats seeing eighty-seven percent of Senate Republicans 
and eighty-four percent House Republicans voting against it, recalled what party they 
represented.166   The HHFA legislative team headed by Weaver and Conway expertly 
worked both chambers and together with White House staff and Congressional liaison, 
bested the opposition by effective weekly strategy meetings in the White House Fish 
Room.167  Cloaked in the attire of an anti-recession measure, the Act also presented a less 
vulnerable target and had something in it for nearly everyone.  Lastly, its language 
provided the big urban developers and suburban contractors a green light and plenty of 
money for a middle class housing boom.  The “concessions” also fostered this. 
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        Chiefly, what the 1961 Housing Act represented was a doubling of Eisenhower’s 
federal city spending to nearly seven and a half billion dollars over four years.  It 
included adding 2.5 billion more for urban renewal, bringing that available total to 4.5 
billion.  In spending the money, Section 701 urban renewal planning grants could be used 
by a city regardless of whether of not it had a Workable Program for Community 
Improvement (WPCI), which survived as a major change, and  housing could be 
rehabilitated directly on an urban renewal site. 
         Further, the Act helped older political metropolises to economically leap beyond the 
boundaries of their central city, and changed the tax structure of municipal America, 
causing hundreds of government units to spring up nationally each with much needed tax 
authority.168 As amended later these suburban communities formed units of government 
and councils.  Thus the Act spread government and brought into power a new generation 
of municipal leaders.169  Through increased capital mobility,  the Act also fostered the 
growth of interlocking urban communities particularly on the coasts, made famous in 
Jean Cottman’s Megalopolis.170  Thus, it not only helped build suburbs, but it also spread 
cities out.  In 1950, thirty eight cities had densities of 10,000 people per square mile, but 
by 1990 that number had dwindled to fifteen.171  This Act created suburbs and cut 
density.   
        The Act subsidized a covert welfare program for the middle class and suburban 
developers under the 221 (d)(3) Below Market Interest Rate [BMIR] program. 
Contractors for FHA middle income housing now obtained guarantees at the federal fund 
rate, below market, and when finished could sell the mortgages to FNMA at the market 
rate, with the government absorbing the loss.172   In 1960 the federal government held 
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five percent of the debt for homes and by 1979, eighteen percent, and the Act helped 
create this outcome.173  The omnibus bill also provided the elderly with a first time 
subsidy of $120 annually which became the mainstay of many local housing authorities 
income.174    Low income housing came out intact with its minimal funding, as did large 
amounts for the popular college housing and small sums for mass transit planning and 
demonstration programs.   
        Still the Act represented a piecemeal approach to urban problem solving and it 
lacked both a conscience and soul.  By mid summer 1961, time was rapidly running out 
to solve the problems of the “enduring ghetto” peacefully.  It would be just a few more 
summers before central cities would burn, hundreds would die with thousands injured, 
and billions in capital worth would be destroyed.  Yet the Act did not address racial 
issues, open housing, urban reapportionment, housing construction code enforcement, or 
a poverty program.  In Kennedy’s defense presenting these issues then would have killed 
the bill. Yet nobody even tried.  The Act also was not comprehensive as three other 
pieces of legislation would be needed to supposedly make Kennedy’s urban formula “fit 
that description.” 
        With a reception following in the Rose Garden, at noon on a resplendent June 30, 
1961, John F. Kennedy signed into law the 1961 Housing Act.  He called it “the most far 
reaching federal legislation for housing and community development”…in a long time 
and…“that it recognizes the forgotten families.”175  Neither statement was quite true.  
Among the hundreds of invitees ranging from the Vice President to city mayors, two 
seats remained vacant.  Those would have been filled by Senator John Sparkman and 
Congressman Al Rains, the two key individuals in the bill’s passage, but neither came.  
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Sparkman supposedly absented himself so his Alabama constituents would not see 
him pictured at the signing of a housing program managed by an African-American.  
Rains, because of Kennedy’s high-handed tactics with his House subcommittee, chose to 
be elsewhere that day.  The significance of those absences meant that the honeymoon was 
over and regarding John Kennedy’s city program and Congress, perhaps the marriage as 
well.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
THE DEPARTMENT OF URBAN AFFAIRS AND HOUSING 
 
              …The reason given by President Lincoln for establishing 
                                  the Department of Agriculture was that agriculture was  
                                  at that time a leading interest of the Nation. …for one of  
                                  the leading interests of the Nation, housing and urban affairs… 
                                  cabinet rank is necessary to give proper weight to those interests   
                                  among the overall interests of the Federal Government.1 
 
      As the 1961 Housing Act inched its way through Congress, John Kennedy as part of 
his urban package, prepared another bill.  That consisted of establishing a federal 
Department of Urban Affairs and Housing (DUAH) to manage national urban programs 
and eliminate the organized chaos of HHFA.  Along with the 1961 Housing Act, a 
meager mass transit scheme, a small poverty program and his limited executive order, it 
would count as step two in his campaign pledge to “formulate a workable and 
comprehensive urban program.”  Yet it would also become Kennedy’s most bitter 
congressional fight and most embarrassing defeat. 
      Politically, the departmental status bill became connected to the controversy  
surrounding JFK’s lingering but overdue “threat” to issue an executive order banning 
housing discrimination and his nomination of Dr. Robert C. Weaver, an African-
American, for DUAH secretary. This made Kennedy the first president to date to play the 
“political race card” with both voters and Congress, on two concurrent federal actions, 
one executive and one legislative.  To smooth the transition to introducing the DUAH 
legislation to create a new department, Kennedy wisely used his executive authority to 
implement a plan to improve how existing departments functioned.  The new president 
wanted to force federal agencies to communicate more effectively at the local level.2  
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      To do this in early 1961, Kennedy established a “Federal Executive Board” 
emphasizing “presidential management policies…in the field.”3  Comprised of the special 
assistant to the president for interdepartmental coordination, the executive assistant 
director of the bureau of the budget, and the chairman of the civil service commission, 
the Board traveled the country meeting in cities, some of which had over a hundred 
different federal field offices.  The Board’s mission became making them communicate 
more effectively.  
      To implement his “share” of these changes, Weaver had to move quickly.  The HHFA 
had regional offices in seven of the largest cities and field offices in most others.  
Kennedy wanted Weaver’s regional directors to serve on a regional “board of federal 
executives” headed by the civil service commissioner in each city.4  Not surprisingly, the 
Board also managed several aspects of Kennedy’s communications with the local media, 
civic, business, and professional groups “to reinforce special programs,” in a way 
providing a federal lyceum for JFK's domestic initiatives.5  
      In its meetings the Board produced one bright spot, recruiting southern minority 
students for federal service.  Spearheaded by Douglas E. Chaffin, HHFA Director of 
Personnel, young African-Americans were solicited for federal service.  But this was 
done with little White House emphasis or enthusiasm, because Kennedy did not want to 
cause a revolt within the Southern congressional hierarchy.  As a result, the students 
slowly became aware that “the federal government talked a lot about equal employment 
opportunities” but concluded it was “better to stick to ‘teaching and preaching’ if they 
really wanted jobs.”6    
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      Weaver also hosted a series of public relations efforts for HHFA.  In a feature Look 
Magazine story, which hit the newsstands on March 28, 1961, he enthusiastically 
highlighted his reformation of the agency.  On April 9, he appeared on “Meet the Press” 
discussing among other things, how the 1961 Housing Act would make urban America a 
better place and on June 9 with Senator Joe Clark (D-PA), he endorsed numerous urban 
renewal improvements in Pittsburgh as a model for the country.7  
      Kennedy considered Weaver a loyal member of the administration.  Yet the former 
NCAAP Board Chairman represented a potential challenge to Kennedy’s desire to play 
both sides against the middle, while going slowly on civil rights.8  Operating somewhat 
as a loner in the chiefly white Camelot, Weaver tried not to be absorbed by it while still 
being a leading team player.  According to HHFA General Counsel Milt Semer, even 
though there was no real “professional intercourse between the president and his chief 
housing man, except indirectly through Ted Sorensen and Lee White…Bob Weaver's 
reputation as a [Negro] grew in the White House…because he was not [a] bother and he 
got his work done [and] stayed out of trouble.”9  Semer continued that “one of the 
concerns on the Hill was, could a Negro get housing legislation enacted, [and] the way it 
worked out he [Weaver] got the biggest piece of domestic legislation of anybody, the 
1961 Housing Act.”10   Kennedy liked how this arrangement worked, but Weaver did 
not.11   
      Weaver completed his headquarters restructuring, in anticipation that DUAH would 
pass, but built some new “super grade” positions in case it did not.  For his final 
revamping, he proposed several GS-16 through GS-18 positions to start just after the 
1961 Housing Act passed.  He established a commissioner for multifamily housing as 
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well with an assistant multifamily housing commissioner, in total upgrading or adding 
thirty-five current or new positions.  Six of the GS-18 positions would manage program 
policy and urban transportation for HHFA.12  Weaver’s initiative also followed 
Kennedy’s anti-recession directive to add federal employees working with distressed 
areas.  Although later cutting federal jobs except in the White House to balance the 
budget, JFK did not start that way.  By June he had 37,102 more people working for 
Uncle Sam than under Ike the previous June.13    
      But after completing staffing, many variables were at work which from the start, 
lessened DUAH’s chances even with White House and HHFA staff now stabilized.   
Congress headed that list, and managing it required handling three things - numbers, 
perception and intensity, and Kennedy came up short on all three.  Filled with “unknown” 
coalitions, the chambers of the House and Senate did not constitute comfortable turf for 
Jack Kennedy.  To gain congressional approval for an urban department with a probable 
African-American secretary and with a housing anti-discrimination order looming, would 
require good political management, a carefully conceived and artfully written bill, and a 
relentless effort.  None of this transpired.  Kennedy wanted the organization, control and 
additional federal power DUAH provided, as well as what it would do for city 
management, but remained unwilling to pay the political price and unable to find ways to 
force others to do so. Yet, it did not have to end as it did. 
      As a political entrepreneur, Kennedy’s key with Congress would be to preserve the 
New Deal coalition, while adding new urban African-American representatives, as well 
as the emerging suburban ones.14  Hanging onto southern Democrats would be critical.  
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Although constituting a nearly impossible task, he had nonetheless every opportunity to 
form a coalition and the 1962 and 1964 elections offered chances to purge the unfaithful.     
      Had Kennedy built this coalition and really tried to implement “a workable solution” 
urban America in the mid and late 1960s might not have been in flames.  The four year 
lead-time, provided by a 1961 DUAH instead of the 1965 HUD, could have been critical 
to urban stability.  The perception and some of the reality that urban problems were 
actually being addressed might have prevented many from loosing their lives during the 
“long hot summers” of the Johnson presidency.  Kennedy has been called by some the  
president of liberal affluence and the politics of adjustment.15   DUAH in 1961 might 
have given some of both to cities at just the right time. 
      Yet the numbers Kennedy had for coalition building were worse than he thought.  In 
the Senate, the 87th Congress had 66 Democrats and 34 Republicans and that chamber 
was perceived as the more receptive one for urban legislation.  The Senate had sixteen 
standing and six special committees, some chaired by Kennedy supporters.  Yet, it valued 
rules, protocol and procedure much more so than the House, even though Senators 
regularly filibustered civil rights legislation.  From 1917 to 1960, 23 cloture votes were 
attempted to end filibusters designed to kill bills prohibiting poll taxes, civil lynching, 
and advancing civil rights, and nearly all failed.16  Early as president, by remaining mute 
during the introduction of three unsuccessful anti-filibuster resolutions and a cloture 
measure, all from Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (D-MN), Kennedy offered no leadership 
for the Senate in correcting those problems.17 
      Regarding the Senate’s unique respect for protocol, provoking  John L. McClellan (D-
AR) over procedure would prove fatal for DUAH and McClellan and Democratic 
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Senators from the deep South had little use for Kennedy.  From January through October 
1961, only one of them, Estes Kefauver (D-TN), voted with the president 100% of the 
time and the rest regularly voted against him.18  Additionally Senate Republicans voted 
51.6% against area redevelopment, 66.6%  against aid to agriculture, and 80% against 
Kennedy on minimum wage.19  
      But the House constituted an even tougher problem.  Its 87th edition had 261 
Democrats and 174 Republicans.   A paradox between the erudite and well educated 
versus the backward, unimaginative and discriminatory existed, and both powerful 
elements had deep roots back into the Depression ridden 1930s, surviving both the war 
torn 1940s and somber 1950s by forming coalitions.  By today's standards, a startling 
number of white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, elderly males from the rural south held 
extensive power.  Through the House’s seniority system, twenty-five percent of them 
controlled ninety percent of the key positions on twenty-two standing and eight special 
committees.20  One hundred and six congressmen came from southern states which, only 
99 years ago had flown the Confederate battle flag in combat, and most had few urban 
constituents.  This group often voted bygone interests and sided with mid-western 
Republicans to form a strong conservative coalition.21    
      Moreover, party loyalty meant little to southern and border state Democrats in the 
House who voted regional rural interests.  Of thirty-five key White House backed 
domestic bills, from January 20, 1961 through May 17, 1961 only thirty-two 
Congressmen voted “with the president” 100 percent of the time and none came from 
“Dixie.”22   Across the South, Congressmen voted with the White House in 
embarrassingly low percentages, ranging from 14% for South Carolina, through 23% for 
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Florida Democrats to a high of only 66% for the somewhat more progressive North 
Carolina.  The entire Georgia delegation answered the president’s call only 55% of the 
time.23  Still more worrisome, House Republicans demonstrated exceptional cohesion.  
They voted 88.8% against a social security increase; 88.6% against public works 
acceleration; 81.5% against the area redevelopment, 80.7% against the minimum wage 
bill; 84.8% against the 1961 Housing Act and 85.7% against water pollution control.24  
To get a majority in the House, 219 votes would be required and there were only 157 
northern and western Democrats.  Conversely, 280 members came from a combination of 
106 southern Democrats and the 174 Republicans.25  By the most favorable count, 
Kennedy had only 164 hard-core votes in the House at any one time.26  Truly he needed 
to work Congress skillfully if DUAH stood a chance.   
      To overcome this mathematical handicap, for DUAH the administration’s launched a 
two pronged strategy.  That consisted of a public one which differed from the legislative 
version and both would be managed simultaneously.  But the strategy itself was ill 
conceived and further, poorly implemented. 
      Using his popularity, Kennedy appealed to public support for DUAH from the press, 
national municipal organizations, urban redevelopers, the housing industry, the average 
citizen and African-American voters in that order.  His goal was to exert specific pressure 
on Congress to pass DUAH, and failing that in 1962 or at the latest in 1964, to vote out 
the opposition.  Thus, the administration viewed DUAH as a long-term struggle.  
      His public relations strategy built DUAH support on “popular support for Kennedy” 
and by the end of April 1961, Jack Kennedy was immensely popular.  Gallup Polls had 
him at 83% in late April and 70% throughout most of 1961.  His April numbers reflected 
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the artful and very successful “spin” he and his aides put on the Bay of Pigs Disaster.  By 
year’s end, he stood at 77%, higher than Eisenhower’s 71%, Truman’s 50%, and FDR’s 
69% at the end of their first year.27  Capitalizing on his strong television image, Kennedy 
used “press conferences” as one of his chief means to engage the public.  He even 
changed how these were scheduled.  Initially, he held only one weekly, but when he 
learned that his Neilsen percentages and Arbitron ratings grew if the networks aired these 
live, he changed their times and frequency to increase his audience.28     
      In maintaining his favorable image, Kennedy had to convince the public he was 
succeeding.  In May, he began releasing a series of short statements and media position 
papers which “confirmed” how well the New Frontier was doing.29  These releases 
alluded to extensive congressional Democratic support but his numbers were 
considerably inflated.  As reported, his percentages often included a mix of precommittal 
votes, conference votes, and sometimes even appropriations votes, rather than final 
tallies30  This infuriated Republicans and began to irritate some Democrats.  Even though 
looking good in the press, Congressional insiders began to perceive the administration as 
deceitful and willing to trade headlines for evidence.  During the week of September 14, 
1961 Larry O’Brien and Ted Sorensen held off-the-record briefings to thirty Washington 
news correspondents in a private D.C. home.  They show-cased Kennedy’s 
accomplishments to date citing thirty-three major bills passed, and compared that to just 
twelve for Eisenhower, and only eleven for FDR during the New Deal’s first “hundred 
days.”  As temperatures rose on both sides of the isle, incensed Republicans labeled this 
“brain washing” and cited Kennedy “successes” as a montage of retreads and minor 
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legislation, while calling his percentages “a fable.”31  Regardless, still a darling in the 
media, he received positive press coverage which is what he wanted. 
      But one nagging issue crept into his public relations campaign.  The harder Kennedy 
pushed DUAH, while not issuing this open housing order, the more doubt he created with 
African-Americans and the more fear he kindled among white southerners.  His public 
strategy attempted to get both blocks to forget about the executive order.  He would 
eventually nominate Weaver to appease the first block, but was afraid and unable to 
effectively deal with the southern Democrats.  This was a mistake. 
      Deep within his legislative strategy, Kennedy had two choices: pressure southern 
Democrats to support him or pressure moderate Republicans.  Overall as it happened, 
Kennedy chose initially to exert pressure on southern Democrats, even though more 
Republicans came from urban states.  But he never played “hard ball” with them and 
when exerting only slight pressure on elderly southerners who preferred mint juleps to 
mixed housing failed, he then shifted to the Republicans.  When that also proved 
insufficient, he blamed the GOP for all his legislative short comings.  Managed like a 
“campaign,” his DUAH legislative strategy only ended in angering nearly everybody.32 
      Kennedy began this legislative strategy by attempting to collect political IOUs from 
southerners.  For example, just after issuing his executive order on equal employment 
opportunity but before regulatory policy was set in place, director of the bureau of public 
roads and federal highway administrator Rex M. Whitton ordered strict state compliance 
for highway contracts.  In Louisiana, one state highway engineer complained to Senator 
Russell B. Long (D-LA) and Congressman Hale Boggs (D-LA) that they were being 
"sand-trapped” and “…the administration was doing them dirt” forcing them to hire 
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African-Americans.  Long complained to Kennedy, who had Meyer Feldman investigate.  
Feldman found “a little freedom here” in that “the Bureau of Public Roads could be tough 
or they could be a little bit lenient.”  Kennedy said, “will you tell them for God's sake on 
my say so not to insist on anything…don’t require them to do anything until the 
regulations are done,” and he continued “Now get those guys together [the federal 
highway people] and make sure that they understand what is required of them, and don’t 
put any burdens on them [the state highway people] that are not absolutely essential.”  
Long gleefully received the news, relayed it to state officials, and contracting in 
Louisiana went back to the old ways of doing business.33  Kennedy now had I.O.U.s from 
Long and Boggs for DUAH. 
      He also met regularly with Democratic congressmen in small groups for breakfasts 
and coffees.  During a September 12, 1961 coffee he attempted to charm “supporters” as 
Congressman William M. Colmer (D-MS) and fourteen other southerners.34   He was not 
against using stronger beverages, as during one evening social prior to passing Kennedy’s 
House Committee on Rules (HCOR) packing plan, it “was necessary to get one key 
congressman drunk before the voting.”35     
      Clearly the president wanted to win DUAH.  It not only represented the proper thing 
to do for managing urban problems, but it also provided a strong mechanism to control 
budget resources.  A strong DUAH at the cabinet level also gave the White House 
additional authority over cities.  Concerned about his “historical record,” DUAH would 
also add to JFK’s legacy.36  Further, it brought a sense of national unity to urban affairs.37  
 It resolved the basic clash of philosophy over common goals in urban planning.38  But, in 
the minds of the southerners, lurking behind DUAH stood the specter of JFK’s  
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forthcoming executive order on open housing, with the outcome being managed by an 
African-American secretary, if DUAH became law.39
      In attempting to synchronize his DUAH legislative strategy, Kennedy made several 
mistakes. Initially, trying to court southern Democrats first represented his biggest error. 
Kennedy over estimated his persuasive abilities with them and when unsuccessful, 
conversely was unwilling to go to total war with them, though a party purge had been 
recommended.40  He should have written them off and concentrated on big city 
Republicans completely, because when he finally attempted to woo them, it was too late. 
Too much time had been wasted on the southern Democrats.  Secondly, Kennedy handled 
Weaver’s nomination for DUAH secretary in an abysmal fashion, first by pretending 
Weaver was not the nominee, then at the height of the fight over his Reorganization Plan 
which will be discussed, proudly announcing Weaver was the nominee.  Moreover in 
never clarifying his position on the open housing order, he failed to build support for it 
connected to DUAH, but as well he failed to abate the fears of the opposition because 
they did not know what his intentions were regarding it.  His last mistake with Congress 
though, simply put, consisted of sending up to the Hill poorly written legislation, which 
cost him his “legislative effectiveness.”41  
      In drafting DUAH, at the start everyone remained enthusiastic.  Weaver as the titular 
author drew from a rich heritage and legacy.  Since1933 an urban department had been 
bandied about and during Eisenhower’s presidency, it had been attempted several times 
under different titles, without his approval.  In one of these instances, Albert C. Cole, 
Ike's HHFA administrator, wrote to then Senator John F. Kennedy, chairman of the 
senate subcommittee on reorganization of the government operations committee, eight 
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full pages explaining why a cabinet department was needed, even though he could not 
support it.42  Kennedy’s 1960 Task Force Report, submitted by McMurray but written by 
Dr. Robert C. Wood, also provided Weaver with numerous ideas.  The Report justified 
creating a department to arrest rapid urbanization, coordinate social and physical city 
programs, and to improve the urban economy while providing a unity of purpose for 
urban affairs.43
      Many problems could have been resolved by a successful DUAH.  Born from 
historical accident, the HHFA grew out of the National Housing Agency (NHA), FHA, 
and PHA, while leaving sizeable statutory authority behind with the latter two 
administrations.  Formerly created under Reorganization Plan Number 3 of 1947, the 
HHFA administrator had complete authority over only URA and CFA.  FNMA sprang 
from the Reconstruction Financial Corporation (RFC) and maintained independent status 
even though the administrator appointed its president.  “Muddled” became the best word 
to describe HHFA’s lines of operation.  If a community received a “workable program,” 
HHFA's office of administration (OA) processed the application, URA handled the 
renewal projects, and PHA managed the displaced families’ housing plan, while FHA 
helped with home insurance.  Any agency that delayed part of the process, delayed 
everything.44   HHFA’s operating 213 regional or field offices in 147 cities and towns 
also magnified the problem. 
      Selecting the appropriate title for the new department proved to be bothersome.  The 
administration discussed everything from a Department of Urbiculture coinciding with 
Agriculture, to a Department of Urban Development, but rejecting the latter because it 
abbreviated to DUD.  Everyone finally agreed “housing” should be in the title and 
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Kennedy settled upon “urban affairs and housing” as it would be less threatening to 
Congress.45  Housing and urban development (HUD) had been Wood’s choice.   
      A committee wrote the DUAH legislation.  Under Weaver’s leadership, general 
counsel Milt Semer, public affairs administrator Fred Hayes, and deputy administrator 
and tough guy, Jack Conway did the actual writing.  White House assistants Lee White 
and Meyer Feldman formed the rest of the committee with all working about two months 
part-time to come up with a short 13 page bill.  But the hidden hand behind the final 
revision was Bureau of the Budget Director David E. Bell.  With DUAH in draft, 
Kennedy placed special trust in Bell, to revise the legislation.  On February 4, 1961, the 
White House issued guidance to all departments and agencies preparing legislation, that 
before the president received it, all bills must go through Bell and he would present them 
to the president.  This gave Bell extensive authority to write anti-recession measures into 
legislation and Kennedy’s unannounced but forthcoming balanced budget attempt as 
well.46
      Kennedy of course, emphasized the need for DUAH in his State of the Union Address 
on January 30, 1961, and paid special attention to it in his March 9 Congressional 
Message on Housing and Community Development.47  However he received advise from 
Professor Richard E. Neustadt on November 3, 1960 warning against an early 
announcement of the nominee for department secretary and further caution over how 
FHA should be restructured, but no evidence exists that he heeded this guadance.48  Both 
these matters would return to haunt him. 
      Two problems shaped the timeline for submitting legislation. First, Kennedy wanted 
to ensure his 1961 Housing Act was well on its way before releasing DUAH.  Secondly, 
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he decided not to issue the executive order on open housing until after DUAH’s baptism 
by fire, and nominate Weaver publicly only if he had to resort to a reorganization plan, 
but he told no one of the latter idea.  Even after the Freedom Rides in 1961 the 
administration believed “the Negro and his problems were still pretty invisible to the 
country as a whole,” and Kennedy was not about to rock the boat with an early executive 
order or Weaver’s announcement.  Most senior Democrats, including Senate Majority 
Whip Mike Mansfield (D-MT) shared this view.49  
      The bill itself contained several bombshells.  DUAH did not alter HHFA field 
operations but once passed, gave the secretary the power to do so. That constituted a ploy 
by the administration to avoid a committee fight about revamping field operations, but it 
back-fired.  Many in Congress had close ties to the FHA, and wanted to know exactly 
what was going to happen.  The DUAH legislation stated that FHA would move its zone 
commissioners from D.C. to the field and all administrations would be in the same 
building in the same cities, but left actual field  “functioning” up to the imagination.50
      What the bill specified worried rural Congressmen even more.  Under Section 8, the 
FHA and PHA would be abolished and Sections 5(b) and 7(b) transferred FNMA’s 
functions to the DUAH secretary.  Although abolishing FHA and PHA was only 
procedural in nature since all their functions carried over, by the legislation the new 
secretary now had authority over FHA and  could later “revamp its field operations.”  The 
only aspect of FNMA’s charter remaining in effect was mixed ownership of common 
stock within its secondary mortgage market operations.51  URA and CFA would be 
transferred intact.  Abolishing the HHFA central office with its office of the administrator 
(OA), and National Housing Council, and replacing them with a DUAH secretary, under 
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secretary, three assistant secretaries, a general counsel, an administrative assistant 
secretary (GS-18), plus “Commissioners” for FHA, PHA, CFA, URA, and a “president” 
for FNMA rounded out the changes.  Salary increases were proposed for all.52  In 
practical terms, DUAH represented only a moderate change to HHFA’s structure, so 
Kennedy should have had an easy congressional sell.  
      But many in that august body could not accept that FHA authority, even with a titular 
“commissioner,” would be vested in the new secretary.  It pleased Congress even less that 
the departmental status bill allowed the DUAH Secretary to delegate other 
responsibilities yet to be defined, for the Workable Program for Community 
Improvement and Urban Renewal Relocation Program.53   The perception that they were 
going to lose control, due to the vagaries of “leadership to be exercised by the 
secretary…[as] determined by the president personally” greatly concerned them.  That 
the president could further assign “independent status” to forthcoming programs bothered 
them as well.54  As written, the bill was too “gray” for many Congressmen.  
      During a recession, economy in government would not sell DUAH either.  A 
recapitulation of new “top level” positions showed $64,000 more would be needed 
annually.  None of this included the thirty-five new “super-grades” (GS16 - GS18) which 
Weaver had initiated as part of his separate HHFA reorganization.55  These latter jobs 
were presented to Congress in a different package which constituted a very poor sales 
approach and looked duplicitous, to say the least.  
      In attempting to appease rural interests, DUAH left out farm housing, veterans 
housing, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and some other local programs.  The idea 
here was not to cause heated debate, but uniquely the omissions provided serious 
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rationale not to vote for it at all by those who wanted more recognition for programs left 
out.  And during drafting, Kennedy let it be known publicly that a federal “reorganization 
plan” might be used if the bill failed.56  This was a very bad idea. 
      The most significant controversy about the legislation though came over a fascinating 
policy statement boldly embossed on page one.  It, the “Declaration of National Urban 
Affairs and Housing Policy” sent shivers down the spine of rural Representatives and 
would cause lively debate.  Chiefly the handiwork of Dave Bell from his April 17 
influential memorandum to Kennedy, the declaration called “for full recognition and 
consideration of the problems…of our urban and metropolitan areas.”57  Lee White, Ted 
Sorensen, and Myer Feldman approved this bad idea but BOB’s Bell created it in a series 
of “executive sessions,” deep within his Legislative Reference Department.  There, 
during several meetings, Bell, Phillip S. Hughes and John Seidman framed it with only 
the “consent” of HHFA general counsel, Milt Semer.58
      The declaration boldly stated “that the welfare and security of the nation requires the 
sound and orderly growth and development of the nation’s urban communities.”  It asked 
Congress to openly endorse this concept as national policy and to affirm the federal 
government’s requirement to assist local communities in developing programs for 
comprehensive community planning including “local educational and cultural pursuits.”  
In a 13 page bill, the declaration itself took up three.59  Regarding it Weaver stated, “I 
don’t think it could have been handled much worse than it was.”60  In the words of 
Senator Joseph S. Clark (D-PA), who managed the Senate bill after Senator John L. 
McClellan (D-AK) declined, DUAH “could have been passed if it had been handled 
right.”61  Conservatives fell over one another to proclaim how this strong federal policy 
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statement would usurp state authority, crumble local determination, build a stronghold of 
federalism, drain the treasury, and stifle city government.62     
      Accompanied by Bell’s memorandum, on April 18 Kennedy sent his formal 
transmittal letter with HR 6433 and S.1633 to the respective chambers.63  Trouble started 
early.  Kennedy’s legislative sponsors were all second string.  Unknown Congressman 
Dante B. Fascell (D-FL) led the fight in the House and the only slightly stronger Clark in 
the Senate.  This sent a dubious message of weakness.  Most considered Dante Fascell 
such a housing lightweight that Milt Semer suggested that Fascell seek advice from Al 
Rains.64  But Rains was still angry about the administration’s maneuvering on the 1961 
Housing Act.  
      Both bills went to their respective government operations committee (GOC). The 
House GOC had thirty members, chaired by African-American Representative William 
L. Dawson (D-IL) who had been “considered” for Postmaster General and in 1960, held 
the “titular” chairmanship of Kennedy’s campaign, and represented the Chicago machine 
of Mayor Richard J. Daley.65  Nine Senators served on the Senate GOC, under 
McClellan’s watchful eye.  The House GOC appointed an eight person executive and 
legislative reorganization subcommittee (ELRC) chaired by Dawson.  In a remarkably ill 
conceived idea and after numerous delays, Fascell introduced the House bill on May 24 
with no prepared statement.  In his “remarks” he thought first and foremost of the 
declaration and abruptly focussed attention on the bill’s most provocative section.66  
Having said little of substance, he yielded to other speakers. 
      Subsequently, Dave Bell, the administration’s first heavy hitter followed, who, now 
attuned to the dangers of the declaration, tried to soften its impact by calling it only a 
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statement of “appropriate federal concern…” and spent his time “interpolating” the 
merits of the legislation.  However, he revealed no cost savings which this consolidation 
would render, constituting a significant lost opportunity.  For questions, Dawson threw 
soft pitches to Bell, which the Chicago Congressman then proceeded to answer himself.  
After dismissing Bell, Dawson then called his boss the “honorable” Richard J. Daley, 
Mayor of Chicago, whom he called the best spokesman available “for all the people of 
the United States.”67
      Daley put the committee to sleep.  He discussed by name and association, every 
supporter of departmental status back to 1889.  Nobody had any follow-up questions, yet 
Daley posed a rhetorical one.  He posited, “no exact criteria have ever been prescribed for 
determining at what stage in its development an agency merits departmental status.”  
Daley attempted but did not succeed in proving that HHFA had reached that stage.  
However, the examples he used resonated with the terms “increased federalism,” 
“national significance,” impending “presidential direction,” and “magnitude of 
spending.”68  This did not look good “down South” when printed in the Congressional 
Record.      
      Through most of June, the saga continued with House public hearings.  Mayors of 
Nashville, Tucson, New York, and other towns testified as did the AFL-CIO and 
veterans’ groups.69  The president of the American Institute of Architects and executive 
director of the American Institute of Planners, both for DUAH, also let it be known this 
support did not represent their organization’s political leanings.70  The National 
Association of Mutual Savings Banks supported DUAH but wanted FHA transferred 
intact.71   “Intact” now became the catch word for “FHA commissioner with authority.”  
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Other friends of DUAH, the American Municipal Association, National Association of 
Housing and Redevelopment Officials, and the National Housing Conference lent 
support.72   
      Weaver was told in a politically transparent move that he should not testify which did 
nothing to alleviate “racial overtones.”73  As an African-American and as HHFA Chief, 
Weaver performed so well to date that nobody on the Hill believed he would not be the 
nominee, yet he could not testify.  When Kennedy continued to state openly he would 
announce his DUAH nominee “at the appropriate time,” suspicions grew since that was 
exactly what he also said about the executive order.  “Deeply southern” members in 
Congress became deeply concerned.   
      Keeping Weaver under wraps did not work.  He appeared on TV talk shows and 
remained far from invisible.  During one in an exchange with Senator Kenneth B. 
Keating (R-NY) when asked if DUAH’s defeat would be viewed as racial in nature, 
Weaver responded “…a large number of the electorate will so interpret it (that way).”74  
Weaver testified regularly for the 1961 Housing Act and maintained a robust 
correspondence with Congressman Dawson about DUAH.75  Kennedy countered some of 
Weaver’s “invisibility” by sending up a smoke screen that Mayor Richardson Dilworth of 
Philadelphia might be the DUAH nominee and he also said Weaver was under 
consideration for Secretary of H.E.W.76   But none of this decreased Weaver’s visibility 
with southerners.  
      In House Subcommittee testimony, the same set of old regulars stood in opposition to 
DUAH.   The National Association of Real Estate Boards, the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the National Association of 
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County Officials, all believed DUAH would undermine federal-state relations and expand 
the federal role in cities.77  Actually, their objections could have been decreased had the 
administration given clear and early priority to DUAH, discussing its merits with them.  
But DUAH was not on the administration’s 1961 priority list in January.78  House 
Democratic Whip Carl Albert (D-OK) and Speaker of the House Sam T. “Mr. Sam” 
Rayburn (D-TX), had to quickly placed on the list in April and the same thing happened 
in the Senate.  Much political capital had been lost not laying the groundwork with the 
conservative opposition in both parties.  Not giving it clear-cut and early priority also 
fostered the belief that the administration was “up to something.”79  
      The House subcommittee went into executive session, and on August 1 recommended 
the bill to the full committee which debated HR 6433 for the month.80  On August 23, 
Congressman Fascell submitted the legislation with amendments as HR 8429 and on 
August 28, the GOC reported it favorably with amendments.81   
      Amendments were substantial.  Fifty-three lines of the hated “declaration” were 
struck, but the “image” of creeping federalism remained.82  The House still had to 
approve a shortened twenty-four line declaration “that the general welfare and security of 
the Nation [depends on] sound development and redevelopment of our urban 
communities.”83  
      Some of the “vast” powers of the secretary were reduced. The secretary would be 
required to give special consideration to small town problems regardless of the 
community’s size.  Along the urban-rural split, these were labeled as anti “big city bias” 
measures.84   The FHA would be transferred intact and its commissioner would retain the 
old powers.  Restrictions were placed on what the secretary could do to FNMA.85
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      On August 29, DUAH left the GOC and went to the House Committee on Rules 
(HCOR) where it hit a permanent roadblock and remained stuck in time, for the rest of 
1961.  Larry O’Brien wrote to the president that due to racial overtones about Weaver, he 
was encountering great difficulty “with certain members of the Rules Committee.”  He 
cited Congressman Carl Elliot (D-AL) who was “particularly desirous of not having to 
vote on the proposal at all.”86  Uniquely, as the fall came, the administration turned to 
Congressman Al Rains for help behind the scenes, as they were out of answers on HR 
8429. 
      One of the reasons the House remained unmoved was meager gubernatorial support.  
By June 28, although the Democrats controlled thirty-eight statehouses and the 
Republicans occupied twelve, only seventeen state governors had initially signed as 
supporters of departmental status and no more than thirty could really be counted upon by 
mid July.87  To gain the written endorsement of Kennedy’s home state governor, John A. 
Volpe (D-MA) eventually supported it, but this remained in doubt for a while.88
      It also became well known on the Hill that the executive branch reserved the right to 
make DUAH into a reorganization plan should trouble appear.  Kennedy had initially 
intended to enjoin Congress with a reorganization plan, but he was talked out of it to 
appease McClellan.89  Yet the possibility of a reorganization idea pleased some mayors, 
but not JFK’s staff.90  Moreover, backing for such a reorganization plan idea received 
only was floated at the only lukewarm endorsement at the recent Governor’s 
Conference.91  Nonetheless, Kennedy continued to threaten Congress with the idea 
because he believed the reorganization idea gave him more credit and control should 
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DUAH become law.  Pragmatically, it also my have been the only way to get a vote on 
DUAH, which will be subsequently discussed. 
      The administration regarded the Senate as more favorable turf for DUAH, but 
unfortunately this would not be the case.  On April 18, 1961, Senator Clark along with 
fourteen cosponsors, including Hubert H. Humphrey (D-MN), Henry M. “Scoop” 
Jackson (D-WA) and Jacob J. Javits (R-NY) introduced Senate 1633.  It went to the 
Senate GOC consisting of nine members and which further reassigned it to the 
reorganization and international organizations subcommittee (RIOS), comprised of six 
members and chaired by Humphrey.92  The GOC chair Senator McClellan, maintained a  
close vigilance over DUAH.  
      Unlike the House, additional bills were introduced into the Senate to create an urban 
department.  Senators Kenneth B. Keating (R-NY), Vance D. Hartke (D-IN) and Prescott 
Bush (R-CT) each respectively wrote S.289, S.375, and S.609.  Senator Humphrey, 
delaying hearings until the 1961 Housing Act was on safe ground, announced on May 23, 
that S.1633 would take precedent over other bills and debate started on June 21.93   
      In Senate subcommittee, Bell’s memorandum followed Kennedy’s transmittal letter, 
and the fireworks began.  On a dour note, Frank Bane, Chairman of the Federal Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, wrote in a letter that he reluctantly 
endorsed DUAH, but wanted a definition of “urban” which included “most everything.”  
He also believed the secretary should act as a coordinator only and ended by criticizing 
the declaration.94   
      Clark started testimony with an eloquent appeal.  He spoke of the need for cities to be 
represented at the cabinet table “as the farmers had with their department (Agriculture) 
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and the westerners theirs (Interior).”  He spoke of how the “structure of the U.S. 
Government needs be reoriented to reflect the physical transformation of a Nation.”  
Then he began to wander.  He spoke endlessly about the importance of massive federal 
urban spending, and concluded with how much more valuable urban land was “acre for 
acre” than “farmland.”95  However, thirty miles from Little Rock, Arkansas where John 
L. McClellan grew up, in the rural North Carolina of Sam Irvin (D-NC), and on the 
agricultural prairies of Karl Mundt’s (R-SD) South Dakota, “this dog won’t hunt.”96
      BOB’s Dave Bell followed by giving his House presentation again, but emphasizing 
how small towns would be included in DUAH.97  This was not good enough for Mundt, 
and in a heated exchange, he instructed Bell to provide a written definition of urban. 
Weaver wrote it and for the “purpose of the Act...an ‘urban area’ and ‘urban community’ 
are intended to include all communities regardless of size, whether incorporated or 
unincorporated.”98  This was a meaningless definition, but pleased Mundt.  Mundt asked 
for a complete list of organizations supporting DUAH, which he later used to try to kill it, 
by showing DUAH lacked broad appeal.  Mundt also wanted the name of the department 
changed but was overruled.99
      Other administration heavyweights followed that afternoon.  Benjamin A. Smith (D-
MA), Harrison A. Williams, Jr. (D-NJ), and a number of city officials spoke, as did the 
National Urban League, American Municipal Association, the National Housing 
Conference and even the United Presbyterian Church.100  
      Opposition voices abounded as well.  Many considered DUAH a “Rube Goldberg” 
fix to urban affairs. The American Farm Bureau Federation said it would repress 
farmers.101   The National Association of Manufacturers, the National Association of Real 
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Estates Boards, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the National Retail Lumber 
Dealers’  Association stood in opposition as did some county and municipal 
organizations.102  As in the House, missing was the strong support of the fifty State 
governors, with only nineteen supporting it at that time.103  
      On June 22, the administration sent its weak second team to testify.  The mayor of 
Nashville was followed by Mayors Richardson Dillworth (Philadelphia) and Richard Lee 
(New Haven).  Jacksonville’s mayor failed to show up.  The American Municipal 
Association’s John McLaughlin, although supporting the bill, still wanted the declaration 
reworded again.104
      Like the House, three fundamental issues divided the Senate regarding DUAH.  These 
were the “declaration,” the definition of “urban,” and the role of “assistant secretaries” 
regarding FHA.  Most thought the declaration represented a declaration of war on 
Congress rather than a declaration of policy on urban affairs.  Senator Muskie, amended 
it to a short statement of federal purpose rather than policy, “with respect to the necessity 
for sound development…of the nation’s urban communities.”105  Its thirty five lines were 
replaced by a shorter, weaker premise emphasizing “a prosperous home building 
industry.”106    
      A second major amendment encouraged by Mundt, formally defined what 
“communities” were.  Based on the Weaver provision, Section 3(c) proclaimed “that 
nothing in the bill shall be construed to deny or limit the benefits of any program…of the 
Department to any community on the basis of its population.”107
      The most momentous fight though was over FHA.  The proud old agency rooted in 
the 1934 National Housing Act, and created on June 23, 1938 had many supporters.  
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Phillip S. Hughes, BOB’s assistant director for legislative reference, wrote Lee White 
that “the harmless change regarding the designation of Assistant Secretaries…opened 
quite a can of worms.”108  Senator Muskie inadvertently started the fight under pressure 
from the National Association of Home Builders.  NAHB proclaimed FHA “should be 
transferred to the new Department, intact and with all its functions, powers and duties…” 
and that a presidentially appointed under secretary should head FHA as “Undersecretary 
for Housing.”109  That recommendation was voted down and NAHB threatened to 
withdraw its support.  NAHB feared any agency consolidation of federal power at FHA’s 
expense.  FHA retained authority to independently issue several kinds of home loans 
under old titles (sections of previous Acts).  These benefited suburban and semi-rural 
contractors who had developed a comfortable relationship with FHA over the years and 
NAHB represented these contractors. 
      Muskie, to appease NAHB, offered to designate one of the three “lesser” assistant 
secretaries as “Assistant Secretary Housing” and another as “Assistant Secretary Urban 
Development.”  That enraged Mundt who angrily proposed an amendment, that the third 
one be “Assistant Secretary Small Communities.”  Heated discussion ensued with both 
NAHB and Mundt loosing.  Final debate transferred FHA to DUAH preserving its 
identity, but gave the new DUAH secretary full authority over all FHA programs and 
functions the new “Secretary of Urban Affairs” could also later transfer some of those 
functions to other DUAH units.110  NAHB prepared to withdraw its support, and would 
do that formally in January 1962.   
      After being reported on July 24 to the full Senate GOC, that body only slightly 
ameliorated the problem by voting that the FHA commissioner could carry out the 
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“functions, powers and duties of the FHA” but under the “direction of the Secretary of 
the Department.”111  This language stood as an olive branch to NAHB and the southerners 
but still gave the secretary authority over FHA.112  On August 11, the Senate GOC voted 
5-2 that S. 1633 as amended could be reported to the full Senate.  However, since the 
Senate has no rules committee, chairs had the power not to release legislation. Senator 
McClellan in voting against reporting the bill said he would not release it and additionally 
he, Senators Ervin (D-NC), Mundt, and Carl T. Curtis (D-NE) published a scathing 
minority report.   
      The minority report encompassing seven pages said as the bill tried to make “our 
population dependent on the Federal system,” was not inclusive because it failed to cover 
VA home loan and Federal Home Loan Bank Board housing programs, and should be 
rejected in favor of further Congressional study.113  McClellean stated “that he hoped the 
committee would not try to bring the bill up this session.”114  Southerners rushed to side 
with McClellan.  A. Willis Robertson (D-AL), Chairman of the Senate Banking and 
Currency Committee let it be known he sided with McClellan as did several others. In the 
fall of 1961, the Senate bill was finally “stuck in committee.”  Lee White suggested to 
Kennedy that as a last resort only his phone calls might move McClellan, but hinted that 
the open housing order and appointment of Weaver might be the real source of trouble.   
      Kennedy however chose not to fight with the southern Democrats but to bring out his 
alternate plan.  Reflecting on his chances of getting anything from Congress, he decided 
to fight with the Republicans and concocted a bizarre scheme using a legislative 
reorganization plan and the  simultaneous nomination of Weaver, to bring out the worst 
in the GOP.  He wanted to publicly embarrass Republicans into a favorable vote.  If this 
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failed, he would then blame them and use it to his advantage in the 1962 and 1964 
elections.  Jack Bell wrote in an AP wire “Kennedy has passed the word to party 
legislative leaders he is going to come back fighting in January for the programs laid 
aside this year…[ such as] the establishment of a cabinet department of urban affairs.”  
He continued, “The creation of the department of urban affairs involves the matter of 
Kennedy’s obvious intention to name Robert C. Weaver, Housing Administrator and a 
Negro, to the cabinet post if it is set up.”115  The battle lines were drawn. 
      The administration researched what would become Reorganization Plan One of 1962 
to overkill, to assure Kennedy it was legal and within his authority.  JFK had seen 
reorganization plans used when he was in the House and Senate GOCs and in fact had 
sent several plans to Congress in 1961, passing two.  But this one would be very 
controversial and of course he was very cautious.   
      Creating DUAH by executive order versus legislative reorganization plan constituted 
Kennedy’s dilemma.  During his presidency he issued 214 executive orders.  Many 
shaped domestic reform including those creating presidential committees, councils, 
commissions and boards on labor disputes, surplus food distribution, labor policy, equal 
employment opportunity, the status of women, juvenile delinquency and youth crime, 
aging, campaign reform, employment of the handicapped, elimination of obstruction of 
justice in Alabama and Mississippi and eventually open housing.  But DUAH would have 
to come by legislative reorganization because Kennedy’s changes went beyond 
reorganizing or slightly expanding an existing agency, which he could accomplish by 
executive order, to creating a fully new department.116       
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      By January 1962, the reorganization plan represented one extraordinarily hot issue 
which both sides wanted to win.  It also brought into question the extent of the powers of 
delegation by an executive reorganization.  Under law, reorganization plans could not be 
amended by Congress, but Kennedy also had prescribed limits on what he could 
reorganize and “force” Congress to approve or disapprove.  Once submitted, Congress 
had 60 days to act on an reorganization plan or it became law.  Reorganization plans 
could be defeated easier than legislation, requiring only a simple majority vote in either 
chamber, making the idea doubly dangerous.117  Under the 1949 Reorganization Act as 
amended in 1957 and still in effect, only 218 Representatives and/or 51 Senators could 
kill Kennedy’s plan.118
      According to James M. Landis of BOB’s legislative reference service and his boss 
Dave Bell, Kennedy had the right to delegate authority to or away from agency heads 
under the plan while simultaneously creating a new organization.  This meant Kennedy 
could restructure FHA as well as who would control it.119  BOB’s research validated that 
executive power from the Constitution allowed substantial revision an existing agency 
while also creating a new one from it under reorganization.  Research of the creation of 
H.E.W. under Eisenhower abounded with examples.120  Kennedy had until June 1, 1963 
to submit his plan to Congress, when on that date the current Reorganization Act 
expired.121  He was warned to wait until after the 1962 elections, before submitting a 
reorganization plan but in his eagerness for a fight with the Republicans, he rejected this 
advice.122   
      Kennedy’s preference for the plan over legislation sprang from the fact that a 
reorganization plan could not be bottled up in committees but rather had to be voted up or 
 199
down within sixty days.  On the other hand Bell, in extensive correspondence came to the 
disturbing conclusion  that only the legislation not the plan, stood any chance of passage.   
Bell believed the legislation avoided a Senatorial fight over “prerogatives” and 
“executive authority.”  To him, submitting a reorganization plan while both bills were “in 
mid-stream in their consideration by the Congress” seemed very unwise.  Neither the 
silence of the HCOR nor McClellan’s delays had actually killed any legislation.123  
Further Bell thought it unwise to submit the plan before June 1, using that interim time to 
improve its base of support.  He recommended that key members of Congress receive 
copies of any draft reorganization plan so they could revise it and make a contribution, as 
they had with the bills.  He warned against submitting “unmodifiable” proposals quickly, 
citing the successful yet four year long fight Truman and Eisenhower waged to create 
H.E.W. by reorganization plan.124  
      But Kennedy would hear none of it.  This approach was recommended to Kennedy by 
Ted Sorensen and his group at the White House.  It also attempted to “flush out” New 
York Republican Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller who some considered a strong G.O.P. 
presidential possibility in 1964.  “Rocky” was already actively engaging JFK in the press 
and on television over DUAH.  With the 1962 elections on the horizon, Kennedy was 
willing to attack the Republicans but was not ready to strike out against the southern 
Democrats because he feared their party power and wanted their support on his tariff 
proposals (GATT).125    
      On January 11, 1962 Kennedy commenced the war.  In his State of the Union Address 
he said “…both equity and common sense require that our Nation’s urban areas…sit as 
equals at the Cabinet table.  I urge a new Department of Urban Affairs and Housing.”126  
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Prompted by this and other events, on January 24 the HCOR voted 9-6 not to grant a rule 
on the departmental status bill and Kennedy, instead of working the Committee, boldly 
stated “I am going to send it to Congress as a reorganization plan and give every member 
of the House and Senate an opportunity to give their view and work their will on this.”  In 
his subsequent press conference, he blamed the five HCOR Republicans for its defeat, 
instead of the four Democrats who voted with them.  Then in a surprise to all except his 
close political advisors, he further announced that Weaver would be his nominee for 
secretary of the new department.127       
      A week later, on January 30, the “plan” hit Congress.  It called for establishing the 
department, with a secretary, under secretary, three assistant secretaries and a general 
counsel.  URA, CFA, and PHA fell directly under the new secretary.  FHA was 
transferred as “an entity” with the FHA Commissioner being appointed by the president 
and approved by the Senate. However, that Commissioner would then work “under the 
supervision and direction of the Secretary.”  No changes were made to FNMA’s 
organization and functions.128  
      After all his bellicose rhetoric, in his transmittal message for the plan Kennedy still 
tried to mollify Congress. He wrote “the establishment of this department does not 
connote any bypassing or reduction in the Constitutional powers and responsibilities of 
the states under our Federal system of government.”129  HHFA’s Milt Semer 
recommended adding “the plan in no way adds to Federal functions and in no way 
detracts from the functions of the States and localities,” but Kennedy did not want to go 
that far.130  Annual salary increases in relation to the legislation, lessened by $12,600, 
which Kennedy hoped would appease conservatives.131  Nicely prepared information 
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packets about the plan were provided to each Member of Congress but unfortunately, 
many of the leading quotes were from Chicago’s Mayor Daley, not the best way to woo 
rural Congressmen.132 
      The plan lost for two reasons.  It clearly looked like a big city message.  It, like the 
bill, was written as if everybody was an urbanite. The administration never shook the 
view that this was a big city measure because, frankly put, it was one.  A Washington 
D.C. weekly newsletter for business executives defined the fight over the plan as one 
which the president initiated because “big city mayors are pressing Kennedy.”  It 
continued that “opponents of the Urban Affairs proposals see the new department 
inevitably mushrooming…even though it will start with no more functions than the 
present housing agencies.”133
      The other reason it failed stemmed from the fact that Weaver was African-American.  
The Plan’s Section 7 provided that “the president may authorize any person who 
immediately prior to the effective date of this reorganization plan holds any office in the 
Housing and Home Finance Agency…to hold any public office established by this 
reorganization plan.”134    Coupled with his January 24   announcement of Weaver, the 
message was clear.  Kennedy had been warned not to do this by Larry O’Brian and his 
legislative liaison team.  He was told “There is the consideration of racial overtones to the 
whole thing.”135
      So why did he?  Noted New York Times columnist Arthur Krock believed he did it 
clearly for political reasons.  According to Krock, Kennedy nominated Weaver so “the 
Republicans if they voted against the plan were put in the position, not only of being 
against city folk, but of seeming to be against the first Negro Cabinet member.”136  It 
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should be noted here this was clearly a political rather than civil rights initiative which 
Kennedy launched.  Civil Rights was not that important to Jack Kennedy in 1961-1962.  
Weaver’s nomination would simply place detractors, particularly Republicans, in a bad 
light with African-American northern voters.  
      Kennedy, according to Louisville Times scored first.  He put the mid-western 
Republicans in a position where a vote “against the reorganization plan will be a vote 
against urban American population centers and against minority groups as well.”  The 
Times continued, pinpointing what remained dear to Kennedy, that conversely, “the 
president will have made his own position clear in the populous states that control major 
delegations to the national party conventions and big blocks of electoral votes.”137  Initial 
reports from the Senate showed Republican support for the Plan shifting markedly as a 
result of Kennedy’s gamble.  Senators Clifford P. Case (R-NJ), Jacob K. Javits (R-NY), 
Kenneth B. Keating (R-NY), Thomas H. Kuchell (R-CA), Prescott Bush (R-CT), and 
Hugh Scott (R-PA) all shifted to “favorable” and others were about to follow.138
      But Kennedy’s political maneuver backfired.  Milt Semer, when asked why the 
reorganization plan did not pass, stated flatly, “What made that impossible was the fact 
we had a Negro.  The vote on that was just like a vote on open occupancy.”  By making 
race an issue, Kennedy changed the nature of the topic from an urban matter to a civil 
rights issue.  Using a football analogy according to Semer, he created “a sudden death 
reorganization bill.”139  This concerned Weaver, not housing and urban affairs. 
      When Kennedy made his announcement it brought out the worst among southern 
Democrats as well.  He immediately lost Senator John Sparkman  (D-AL)  and Senator 
James Eastland (D-MS) and other southern Democrats.140  Even the Pittsburgh Courier, 
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an African-American newspaper noted, “If the President just would say that Robert C. 
Weaver, who happens to be a Negro, would not be the secretary of the new department, 
there would be no trouble creating the new department.”141
      On January 30, 1962 a game of cat and mouse began on the Hill over the plan, 
designated HR 530 and S. 288 respectively.  If the votes of only one Congressional 
chamber could kill the plan, and the expectation was both could, neither wanted to be the 
first.  McClellan initially delayed hearings and when they started he declared he would 
“continue Senate committee hearings for three weeks…[making it]…very difficult to get 
a vote in the Senate before the House vote.”141   In the Senate, the Majority Leader Mike 
Mansfield (D- MT), who replaced Lyndon B. Johnson, wistfully watched Senator 
McClellan, who was also sitting on S. 1633 continue his delay of initial hearings until 
February 14th and only then did he slowly start three weeks of hearings.  The House 
scheduled hearings to begin on February 6th and McClellan hoped the House would 
debate, vote, and kill the plan before he had to take any action.  Many were eager for the 
fight, but few wanted to vote first.143
      Kennedy’s poor legislative strategy grew worse.  All preliminary counts showed there 
was only a very slim chance for Senate passage and no realistic chance in the House, 
unless Kennedy’s racial gamble paid dividends with the fifty GOP big city 
Congressmen.144  Simultaneously, it became clear the Republicans planned some kind of 
a gamble on their own.  So Kennedy adjusted his legislative strategy to obtaining simply 
a “close vote,” “making a good showing,” and avoiding a humiliating defeat, rather than 
winning.  He would then blame the Republicans for being anti-urban in upcoming 
elections and the Senate stood as the best chamber for getting that close vote.   
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      When this became apparent, Senators Joe Clark and Edmund Muskie were stunned 
and they said so publicly.  Johnson’s old aide Bobby Baker, openly lamented that the 
plan was doomed and prefaced his vote counting to Members with “You are not going to 
vote for the plan are you?”145  Even John W. McCormack (D-MA) the new Speaker of 
the House, when the plan was only 30 or so votes behind, openly walked around saying it 
was dead.146   When the Senate GOC started hearings, the discussion was not about the 
value of the plan but rather the wording of the Senate Resolution of Disapproval.147
      The Republicans launched their counter attack on February 19 which led to the plan’s 
defeat.  As McClellan continued to retard progress in Senate hearings, House 
Republicans in the GOC, while listening to Albert C. Cole discuss how DUAH would 
bring special aid to small communities, suddenly and with no warning, called from the 
floor for an end to debate and a vote on the reorganization plan.148  Many Congressmen, 
as John W. Byrnes (R-WI) who previously spoke out against Kennedy’s “raw effort to 
enlist…American Negroes in an effort to confuse the real issues,” led the charge to 
humiliate Kennedy.149
      This set the legislative liaison team under O’Brien into a frenzy to prevent the House 
vote, and to substitute a “more favorable loss” in the Senate.  Senate Majority Leader 
Mike Mansfield quickly drafted a resolution, introduced Senator Jennings Randolph (D-
WV) to discharge the plan from the slumbering McClellan committee and get it 
immediately to a Senate vote.  According to Weaver, this was “going around the 
committee” and constituted “the great tactical mistake.”150  It looked like “a grab for 
power” from the aggressive, brazen, young, Kennedyites, and the old established 
leadership of the Senate quickly turned against the White House.  
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      When the Senate voted on Randolph’s motion, everybody came back including some 
who might have paired a vote or have “gone fishing” to help Kennedy.  The senior 
leadership was mad. By a vote of 58 to 42, the Senate voted on February 20, not to 
discharge the plan from the GOC, leaving the House clear to vote the next day as the 
chamber that would kill the plan.151   That the House did 264 to 150 on February 21, 
1962, with 414 of 435 members present, many now saying that since the Senate voted the 
discharge down, they were only going through the motions.152  The Senate got away with 
only voting on a discharge and House members used the prior Senate vote as an excuse.  
Few were branded either racist or anti-urban and the real loser was Kennedy.  
      Significant fallout came from the death of DUAH.  Many blamed Mansfield, some 
saying it was a very serious mistake to take LBJ out of the Senate and rely on the weaker 
Montana Democrat.  However, it was Kennedy’s mishandling of the legislation, not 
Mansfield, which doomed DUAH.  Lee White called it “a crushing defeat.”  Concerning 
Weaver, White thought Kennedy should have responded when asked, with “we never 
build agencies before we have them” and “we never give names for jobs that have yet to 
be created,” but Kennedy did not.153  Others felt the racial issue was so overwhelming, 
that unless Kennedy took a series of steps to clarify and attack the problem straight 
forward, making civil rights a moral issue, his whole legislative program “will go down 
the drain.”154 
      Kennedy shouldered most of the blame saying, “I played it too cute.” and “It was so 
obvious it made them mad.”  Later at a press conference, he said “There isn’t going to be 
one now, [an urban department] but there’s going to be sooner or later…[we] will get 
along all right; it is the people in the cities who have been defeated.”155  Privately, 
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Kennedy told his brother Robert that it had not been well handled.156  He blamed the 
party leadership.  Yet in his role as party leader, he failed to bring the Democratic 
dissidents in line and in the words of William E. Leuchtenburg was “much too easily 
awed by them, too unwilling to risk his prestige.”157  Kennedy remained a timid prisoner 
of his own ego regarding Democrats in Congress. 
      Several members of HHFA considered leaving, prepared to leave, or left as a result of 
DUAH’s defeat.  Neil J. Hardy prepared to leave as FHA Commissioner and would do 
so, for a job with the Ford Foundation.  He would be replaced by Phillip N. 
Brownstein.158  After DUAH’s defeat, Jack Conway began to dust off his resume and 
when he eventually left, that significantly hurt HHFA.159   Regarding urban issues, some 
of Kennedy’s staff cynically remarked he had achieved the maximum political mileage 
with African-Americans by making Weaver the HHFA administrator and DUAH 
nominee.160
      On the other hand, Kennedy was not quite ready to concede DUAH.  He wanted to 
see what the 1962 off-year elections would bring and as late as mid summer 1962, 
Sorensen was asking him what kind of legislative priority DUAH should receive.161  
Enjoying immense personal popularity with voters, by late October Kennedy wanted to 
translate that into the fall victories.  However, that popular support came from his 
perceived strong leadership during the Cuban missile crisis, and the fact that Americans 
had not been blown to bits in a nuclear exchange, rather than on the strength of his 
domestic program.  
      Hopes were high in early November 1962.  Ted Sorensen worked up a nice matrix 
which he sent to the press, putting a bright spin to any electoral outcome.  His figures 
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revealed that in the Senate since World War I, the party in power had lost an average of 
7.5 Senate seats in every mid term election except 1934.162  All polling data indicated the 
Democrats would do better than that and Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall closely 
watching local polls, wrote to Kennedy that he expected the Democrats to gain one or 
two Senate seats and twelve to sixteen House.163  Democratic pollster Louis Harris 
rejoiced “in the change in the voters temper and mood” since Labor Day164 to sizeable 
Kennedy majorities in most voting categories.165 
      Twenty “swing” districts in the House were key and Kennedy hammered the 
Republicans, but not the maverick Democrats, for their votes on DUAH.166  The White 
House also continued to bombard the press with reams of documentation on how well 
Kennedy had done with the 87th Congress.167  All this had some effect, because when the 
voting took place, Kennedy picked up four Senate seats and lost only two House ones.  
The 88th Congress would have 258 House Democrats to 176 Republicans, and 68 Senate 
Democrats to 32 Republicans.168
      But Kennedy’s strategy not to punish the dissident Democrats, left too many of them 
in office for DUAH.  In the Senate, fifty who voted against the reorganization plan 
remained as did thirty-seven who voted for it, with thirteen new members joining.  Of 
those thirteen, only nine could be considered favorable toward DUAH.  By the best 
House count, the administration still fell 47 votes short.  Remaining were 236 who had 
opposed the plan, plus 27 fresh House members who entered with “attitudes generally 
unfavorable to such legislation.”  This meant that only 170 members of the House could 
be considered favorable to DUAH.  The death knell for the urban department under JFK 
had sounded. 
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      As a result of DUAH’s demise and from continuous civil rights group pressure after 
the election and Congressional adjournment, very quietly one evening over Thanksgiving 
1962, Kennedy issued a limited executive order banning racial discrimination in housing, 
which will be discussed later.  Doing that, “in view of the Southern reaction…any 
significant volume of [Southern] support would be highly unlikely.”169 
      But clearly, Kennedy intended to bring DUAH up again in 1964.  The matter was kept 
visible in Congress and in early 1963, H.R. 5955 was introduced, to create a Department 
of Urban Development and Housing and went to Congressman Dawson’s House GOC.170 
  Another bill, H.R. 4067, to establish a Department of Urban Affairs was introduced and 
after reading, went there as well.171  In January 1963, Senator Muskie held hearings with 
Weaver testifying on the government’s role in addressing urban problems and concluded 
an urban department was needed.172
      In anticipation of a second Kennedy term, strong initiatives were prepared to create 
an urban department.  In “a New Basis for Action in 1964” Kennedy proposed “a general 
housing and urban bill that would in itself command broad support….”  The 1964 
Democratic platform and State of the Union Address were prepared to support an urban 
department.  Kennedy proposed holding a White House Conference on urban affairs in 
1963 to showcase the subject173 and the administration also intended to generate interest 
very directly.  One suggested idea consisted of “each Cabinet Officer and Key Agency 
Head” designating a “top assistant to be available to work - 100% of the time if necessary 
- on political programs.”  This meant “the individual selected must be relieved from other 
duties so as to be completely free for this purpose.”  So much for the Hatch Act.  In urban 
matters, selected “Housing and Cabinet Officers [were asked] to hit up to forty cities this 
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Fall (1963) to talk on programs for each city and the suburban areas,” and “to push the 
cause of the President and the Administration.”174  But for Kennedy, the trip to Dallas 
would end this.  
      Two years later on August 10, 1965 in the White House Rose Garden, President 
Lyndon B. Johnson signed Public Law 89-117, the Housing and Urban Development Act 
of 1965 that created the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).  In a 
very well attended ceremony involving 150 guests as well as Senator Sparkman and 
Congressman Rains, LBJ accomplished what Kennedy had been unable to do, saying, 
“this legislation represents the single most important breakthrough in the last forty 
years.”175  One reason Johnson succeeded came from his 1964 landslide and his coalition 
building.  LBJ’s coalition was so strong he even had Congress put the “declaration” back 
into the HUD bill.176  The other came from how carefully he handled Weaver’s 
appointment.  Although he treated Weaver with little compassion or courtesy in the 
process, nonetheless he did appoint him the first HUD Secretary but not until January 18, 
1966.177    
      What Johnson signed in August 1965 was not the same as DUAH.  He built a 
cohesive department, with activities regrouped on a problem solving basis, centralizing 
everything, while preserving FHA’s name, and earmarked by quicker field level decision 
making with improved intra and inter agency relations.  This HUD organization would 
work more effectively than DUAH because success would come from the 
undersecretaries who ran programs and not specific agencies.  Johnson was unafraid to 
propose sweeping departmental changes and had the savvy and IOUs to get it past 
Congress.  He even got the name right.178
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      During the same week as Johnson signed HUD into law, at Arlington National 
Cemetery, final plans were completed to change Kennedy’s gravesite into a permanent 
memorial, marked by an edifice and the eternal flame.  On the one hand, America’s cities 
finally had a seat at the cabinet table.  On the other, the president who came closest to 
getting one but did not, would have his memorial.  That week in 1965 was thus one of 
contrast, between triumph and tragedy, for a nation about to witness so much more before 
the 1960s receded into the pages of history.
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CHAPTER VI 
THE BUDGET WARS AND HHFA 
JFK “…you’d hate to shoot this budget and then find that 
            you didn’t get the tax bill.” 
                          Dillon “…then you’d have to come in with a great supplemental.”   
                                                                                       JFK “Yeah.  That’s no good.
1 
      Dichotomies filled John F. Kennedy’s “economic policy” for his urban program. 
Kennedy’s approach to a national macro economic policy stands as example of how to 
inch piecemeal through a complicated issue without quite succeeding.  He came to office 
with neither a sophisticated nor systematic concept of compensatory fiscal policy.2  
Although accomplishing some of his basic goals he left victims behind, not the least of 
which was the Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA). 
      Victim implies several things.  A gap developed between what Kennedy presented as 
his vision for urban America, versus what he intended to fund.  This became particularly 
poignant when considering his clear 1960 campaign pledge to find a “workable solution 
to the problems of urban America.”  Secondly, JFK funded popular programs heavily but 
left some of the controversial ones, like low-income housing and low-income housing 
demonstration programs to nearly expire.  Thirdly, as Weaver saw it, HHFA’s operating 
budget and funding for certain “poverty related” programs, always remained short of 
requirements, except in FY 64 which was an election year.  Kennedy also failed to 
synchronize budget policy to HHFA’s needs, particularly when HHFA required 
significant operating increases to overcome backlogs.  Because by then, JFK’s interest 
had drifted toward attempting to balance the budget to appease a skeptical Congress, so 
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he could obtain a tax cut in 1963, to please voters in 1964.  HHFA became a victim 
and so did the cities. 
      Kennedy came to office relatively unprepared for bold economic leadership.  The 
new president demonstrated significant naivete, stating he wanted to reduce 
unemployment from 8.1% to 4% through government spending while still balancing the 
budget, a requirement for obtaining his tax cut.  This would be extremely hard to 
accomplish and could only be done by growing the GNP.   
      To grow the GNP, potential output had to be converted into real output.3   Kennedy’s 
Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) believed annual production stood about $50 billion 
short of what would be needed to grow the GNP and Kennedy had to do four things.4  
Through robust government spending he hoped to foster like kind private investment, 
increasing both production and demand.5  Reducing unemployment should improve the 
economic quality of life for the middle class.6  Thirdly, he needed programs that actually 
reduced poverty.  Lastly, Kennedy sought to increase trade and along with some budget 
and tax moves, to reduce serious “fiscal drag” on the economy.7  
      Kennedy started slowly, initially simply continuing Ike’s programs and rapidly 
spending the former president’s carry over money.  Later, prompted by his advisors, he 
simultaneously increased spending for both military and “human resources.”  Yet his 
effort remained piecemeal and he imposed constraints, within each budget year on the 
“domestic” side.  In “Social” programs, the resulting financial “New Frontier” actually 
differed little from Eisenhower’s regarding domestic spending.  Kennedy’s overall 
budget increases during his three fiscal years 1961-1964 amounted to $17.3 billion, 
resulting in a huge $12.6 billion covering defense and the space programs plus interest, 
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and $4.7 billion earmarked for all remaining domestic programs.  In comparison, in 
Ike’s last three fiscal years 1958-1961, his overall budget increases totaled $10.0 billion, 
with $5.3 billion for defense, space and interest, and $4.8 billion for all remaining 
programs.  Thus, Eisenhower’s increases were slightly more for all domestic programs in 
his last three years than JFK’s were in his only three.8  Kennedy targeted most of his 
money for the “urban renewal” portion of his domestic urban program, elevating the 
national debt along the way, but this did not do much to improve the problems of the 
“social city.” 
      Continued deficit budgets since World War II began to accelerate in the 1960s as 
“presidents and Congresses, cheered on by fashionable economists of the hour…made 
deliberate decisions to accumulate vast national debt.”  Continuing this would cause a 
problem later when the debt grew faster than the GNP, and the cost of servicing the debt 
expanded more rapidly than federal income.9  Further, excessive government borrowing 
to finance the national debt eventually meant higher interest rates and lower private 
profits, prompting higher prices and inflation.   
      Regarding Kennedy’s monetary policy, he became a captive of the past and did little 
to move beyond it.  The United States accumulated most of the world’s supply of gold 
during World War II but paid the price for that in the 1960s.  The 1944 Bretton Woods 
agreement created a 44 nation gold exchange standard among major countries with the 
dollar as the international currency reserve.  Convertible to gold upon demand at $35 an 
ounce, by 1960, many nations began converting surplus dollars into gold that at home 
became known as the “gold drain.”10  Many countries also feared Kennedy would 
become a “soft money” president.  
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      Kennedy wanted to boost trust among foreign leaders in the American economy, 
in part to cause them to stop converting dollars.  To do this, he held firm on not devaluing 
the dollar, which placated “soft money” fears in some foreign capitols, but did not slow 
the “gold drain.”11   In his attempt to stabilize the dollar, he refused to reduce short-term 
interest rates, reducing long term ones instead as a “growth” measure.  However, this did 
not help “grow” the cities in the human dimension.  He also advanced a weak plan to 
reform the international monetary system, but this would only be accomplished well after 
his administration ended.12
      In early spring 1962, Kennedy’s CEA released a plan to “stabilize” the domestic 
economy.   JFK implemented weak voluntary wage-price guideposts as an anti-
inflationary step to show he was “serious” about controlling inflation at home.13  Sadly, 
the guideposts did little to stabilize prices and wages, particularly in the big domestic 
housing construction market, and by publicly singling out some steel producers as 
violators, he only further irritated big business.  
      Another aspect of JFK’s plan for strengthening the American economy was expanded 
trade.  His Trade Expansion Act (TEA) finally passed Congress in 1962, but contributed 
only slightly to economic growth.  Under Kennedy and TEA, the American economy 
slowly grew, only expanding exports from 5% of the GNP in 1960 to 6.2% of the GNP 
by 1965, while imports remained constant during the same period at 4%.14  His advisors 
had hoped for bigger numbers. 
      To understand the importance of Kennedy’s economic advisors, two points must be 
considered.  First, JFK and his advisors were apostles of John Maynard Keynes, 
celebrated British economist, who wrote The General Theory of Employment, Interest 
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 in 1936.  They were called “neo-Keynesianists” because they selectively 
borrowed from Keynes what they wanted.15  Most of Kennedy’s economic advisors had 
been “mesmerized” by Keynes and represented a solid “group think.”16     
      Since JFK ran the White House through Theodore C. Sorensen, but without a formal 
chief of staff and held few cabinet meetings, his economic advisors were doubly 
important.17  They not only shaped economic policy but also were critical to the success 
of his entire presidency as they collectively spread their influence to all three executive 
levels--- the cabinet, sub-cabinet and executive staffs of the informal Kennedy White 
House. 
      C. Douglas Dillon, filling the position of secretary of the treasury, became a pillar of 
support for Kennedy and a great departmental in-fighter for his wishes.18  Selected to 
appease Humphrey Democrats, Walter Heller as chair of the CEA served as the second 
most influential appointee from Minnesota.  As secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman 
remained the first.  David E. Bell, one of fourteen Harvard graduates in important jobs, 
headed the bureau of the budget (BOB).  Kennedy considered Bell a confidant, which 
later hurt Weaver and HHFA.  Yet in Bell’s defense he was always a strong Weaver 
supporter, possessed unquestionable competence, and maintained good relations with the 
HHFA chief even after Bell left the bureau in 1963 to head the agency for international 
development (AID).  He also served as a close personal advisor to Weaver on the DUAH 
legislation.19  But as will be discussed, Bell had to implement some serious restrictions on 
HHFA’s budget, and did so. 
      Dillon, Heller and Bell formed Kennedy’s “troika” of closest economic influencers, 
with Bell being extremely important regarding urban America.  When the conservative 
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William McChesney Martin, chairman of the federal reserve joined as a fourth, this 
group became known as the “quadriad.”  Over time, the more liberal under secretary of 
the treasury Robert V. Roosa, Kennedy’s link to the federal reserve, replaced Martin.   
      Within Heller’s CEA, Kennedy most frequently listened to James Tobin, Kermit 
Gordon and Charles Schultze.  John Kenneth Galbraith of Harvard, Seymour Harris of 
Harvard and Paul Samuelson of MIT stood next in providing economic advice.20  
Politically, Congressman Wilbur Mills (D-AK) regularly joined the inner circle and 
uniquely, Roger Blough, CEO of United States Steel, met with the president regularly 
after the “steel crisis.”21  Blough further served as an unwitting prop for JFK’s public 
relations campaign to court big business.  The president also tried but failed to get other 
business people to join through his “ad hoc” Business Advisory Council, formed within 
the Department of Commerce.  Yet Blough continued to visit the White House 
regularly.22  Secretary of labor Arthur Goldberg, attorney general Robert Kennedy, 
secretary of health, education and welfare Abraham Ribicoff and secretary of commerce 
Luther Hodges occasionally joined Kennedy’s economic inner circle.  Advising over 
budget issues constituted their most consistent duties, and housing and urban affairs 
became a regular topic. 
      Regarding budget, Kennedy and his advisors wanted one “balanced in prosperity out 
of a growing yield.”  All budget matters were thus tightly controlled and had to be 
reviewed through two major conduits.  The executive office of the president - bureau of 
the budget, referred to as “the bureau,” came first and posed the most problems for 
Weaver.  Failure to clear Bell meant an urban building measure went no further. 
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      Congressional appropriations committees stood as the other judges of Weaver’s 
budget hopes.23  Congressman Albert Thomas (D-TX) who chaired the independent 
offices subcommittee of the House committee on appropriations kept a close watch on 
HHFA’s business in the lower chamber.  Senator Warren Magnuson (D-MN) who 
managed the independent offices appropriations subcommittee of the Senate 
appropriations committee preformed similar duties in the other chamber.  These two 
committees could lessen amounts, change spending, adjust timelines, or all three.  Either 
could also greatly diminish an HHFA program because broad-based city money known as 
“general revenue sharing” (GRS) came only later.  Most budget requirements then 
received separate individual hearings, by “choice” of the administration, which will be 
discussed.24    
      Before examining the Kennedy urban budgets, there are several important 
generalizations regarding what he spent money for and why.  Foremost is that, Kennedy 
spent outrageous sums of money on housing and urban financing annually, and 
particularly in urban renewal.  But, only a portion of that was seen directly in the HHFA 
budget which contained most of the critical program money.  That was because two other 
funding sources, to be discussed, called “carry over money” and “public enterprise trust 
fund” money consumed huge amounts of the total “urban and housing investment.”  Both 
remained “outside” the annual HHFA budget.  Thus the real “sum” spent on housing and 
urban affairs in any one given year, equaled the budget, plus carry over and public 
enterprise trust fund money.   
      Carefully crafted Kennedy press releases stood as another nuance, which claimed 
“that nearly $2.5 billion for new urban activity would be spent in 1963…a third greater 
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than the $1.8 billion for the preceding fiscal year (1962).”  The assertions stood as 
fact because they included some monies from “roll over” trust financing and some “carry 
over” funding.25   
      As well, the huge amounts Kennedy actually spent for cities went to highly popular 
programs.  Many programs desperately needing financing to alleviate poverty in the 
enduring ghetto, received little or no support and Kennedy certainly did not pressure 
Congress to “legislate, appropriate and complete those programs.”  Yet it was late 
afternoon in the cities, many smoldering in anticipation of promised relief, and the flames 
would be seen during the Johnson years.  Kennedy also spent some of this money, simply 
to “grow” the cities out of recession. 
      Further, and this is important, within the HHFA budget, Kennedy and Bell had 
different funding priorities than Weaver and HHFA.  Kennedy’s top six funding 
preferences were: big developer urban renewal to stimulate the economy; expanded FHA 
programs particularly for middle-income voters; maintenance of FNMA growth as an 
economic stimulus; college housing; a greater emphasis on elderly housing due in part to 
his “public” concern over his own aging parents, and his unique but quizzical desire to 
fund urban open spaces (parks) to curb juvenile delinquency. 
      In contrast, Weaver’s funding priorities consisted of: more money for on-site urban 
renewal housing; increased funds for those displaced if “on-site” was not increased; 
expanded public housing; more staff money for the workable program for community 
improvement; increased public facility loans for poorer communities; quicker FHA 
processing through increased staff; and most importantly, broad-based “open housing,” 
which would cost additional money to properly enforce. 
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      Lastly, any study of the Kennedy urban budget must highlight that its design 
included a four-year term of office.  Regardless of internal budget planning, June 30, 
1961 through June 30, 1965 constituted what Kennedy had in mind, but his presidency 
ended on November 22, 1963.  Consequently, a reasonable assessment of Kennedy’s 
urban budget can be taken through FY 64 ending on June 30, 1964, because even though 
LBJ changed everything, he did not do so immediately and that FY belonged to JFK.  In 
budget terms, Johnson’s first six months of 1964 were much the same as Kennedy’s 
would have been.  But commencing with FY 65, Johnson’s financing reflected new 
directions, the creation of HUD, the war on poverty, model cities, and the great society.   
      Weaver’s budget issues began with Congress but concluded with Bell.  Normally 
Weaver would have confronted Bell first and Congress second, yet due to the large 
number of bills advanced early in 1961, Weaver addressed Congressional financing 
immediately.  In a spirited exchange in early 1961, Milt Semer urged him to gain control 
of the Congressional appropriations process.  Yet in declining, Weaver placed his faith 
instead in BOB.  He initially trusted BOB, particularly after being told the bureau had a 
cozy relationship with appropriations committees.26  This constituted his first mistake.   
      “Front door” versus “back door” financing remained “how” budget business 
transpired with Congress.  Front door financing meant that after legislation passed it went 
through annual Congressional appropriations committee review.  In this process, even 
long-term funding commitments received yearly review.  The ever popular college 
housing, public facility loans, and big developer urban renewal generally sailed through, 
sometimes with even more money than originally requested.  However, as a financing 
source, front door financing posed the greatest risk to controversial programs because of 
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its annual debate in open appropriations hearings.  New and controversial programs 
as mass transit, low income housing demonstration grants and public housing remained in 
jeopardy via this means.  The money to sustain them, even if legislated, was often subject 
to battles over “reappropriation” or “reauthorization,” frequently resulting in funding 
being cut or deferred to another year, in one form of “carry over” money or another.  The 
same applied to low-income housing, certain urban renewal programs and public 
housing.  Appropriations committees could also suspend payments.   
      “Back door” financing became Weaver’s favored methodology.  It meant that for 
certain kinds of programs to give them more long-term continuity, once a bill became 
law, “legislated and appropriated,” it did not have to return to an annual appropriations 
review, but was managed by the Congressional “legislative oversight” committee, with 
some Agency or Bureau help. Back door financing came in two versions.  In version one, 
after legislation passed, HHFA could enter into long-term contracts which bound the 
government to grants or contributions with no further review by appropriations 
committees.  Under the second, agencies were permitted to borrow directly from the 
Treasury for loan programs without appropriations committee review and with only 
oversight from the legislative committee.  In both “back door” methods, a federal agency 
could go forward without the dangers associated with annual appropriations committee 
appearances.  In either back door case, the parent agency, BOB, the Treasury, and the 
appropriate Congressional legislative committee all worked together to manage spending 
of the money, within the approved budget of the United States.27  The more shadowy 
back door method had been used previously for many urban programs, and as well 
remained the mainstay of most CIA, USIA, and AID financing.28  
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      The conflict over back door versus front door financing began with “administrative 
fees” and “non administrative fees,” and extended to regular programs as well.  Fees in 
HHFA’s case were used to manage associated costs for housing and urban programs from 
outside contracts, consultants and the like.29  Fees could be funded by either financing 
methodology, or a mixture.  But “front door” financing posed the greatest pork barrel 
potential, and “fees” represented huge sums of money.  Weaver did not want Congress 
adding “special interests” into housing and urban affairs fees through the “front door” 
and delaying programs via endless debate.  
      However Kennedy had the right to request the financing methodology he preferred, or 
leave that to the Congressional legislative committee or appropriations committee to 
decide.  Appropriations committees historically favored front door and wrote that into the 
legislative funding documents.  Legislative committees, however, normally favored back 
door financing and sometimes “violently” opposed appropriations committees’ attempts 
to force financing through the front door.  They considered this a violation of their 
"prerogative" and jurisdictional disputes, evoking great passion regularly followed, 
delaying bills.30    
      But unlike Eisenhower, Kennedy took no initial position on what financing 
methodology he wanted.  He was not interested enough in urban affairs and remained too 
timid to force an early dispute with Congress over the matter.31   Thus, Weaver who 
rejected Semer’s advice to take the committees on early, had to allow Congress to 
determine financing methodology since the administration through BOB took no initial 
stand.  For programs as the 1961 Housing Act, Weaver reluctantly only noted his funding 
preferences on the legislation, writing in back door financing for the more controversial 
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mass transportation grants, open space grants and low-income housing demonstration 
grants, to protect them and give them more continuity. 
      For fees, Weaver requested both chambers provide no front door restrictions on FHA 
administrative costs for appraisals, certifications, mortgage background examinations, 
and mortgage review costs from private agencies.  It was Weaver’s contention these 
should not be reviewed annually because they were on-going, plus FHA was supposed to 
make money for the government.  He believed annual review would interrupt and delay 
the programs.32  However, these fees ranging from $90 to $130 million annually 
represented large sums and caused regular conflict between Al Rains (D-AL) of the 
House legislative committee (banking and currency) and Al Thomas (D-TX) of the 
House appropriations committee (governmental appropriations). 
      Al Thomas repealed back door financing in the supplemental for the 1961 Housing 
Act for mass transportation loans, open space grants, low-income housing demonstration 
grants and all administrative fees, that Al Rains had written into the legislation.  Rains 
was astounded.  After meetings with Thomas failed to reach agreement, Rains called for a 
point of order then struck the Thomas’ provisions, returning back door financing to all 
the program loans and grants, but requiring administrative fees to go through front door 
appropriations.  Rains charged Thomas with “illegally rewriting the 1961 Act,” 
proclaiming only his legislative committee could write “legislation.” 
      To be provocative, Thomas then rewrote the entire appropriations bill, placing all 
funding for the Act through front door financing, and entirely eliminating money for 
administrative fees.  He cited as justification that Rains as well wrote illegal legislation.  
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The House sustained Thomas's points of order, due to the fact he pulled out all of his 
long-standing IOUs to win this turf battle.33    
      The Senate however intervened with their version and restored administrative fees to 
all programs, through back door financing.  In conference committee no resolution could 
be reached, and when it came to the House floor for full debate, Thomas offered an 
amendment again restoring administrative fee to all programs, but only through the “front 
door.”  Several Senators wanted to recall the entire package, but Thomas, after 
succeeding in getting a rule from the HCOR, rallied for and received a favorable House 
vote on his amendment.  The House then promptly adjourned for a recess and holiday.  
An embittered Senate grudgingly accepted the Thomas version, rather than loose the 
entire appropriations bill.34   Throughout all of this, Kennedy exerted no executive 
leadership whatsoever. 
      But having witnessed from the sideline this masterful display of political power, by 
late fall 1961, Kennedy proudly proclaimed his administration now had a position, 
favoring front door financing.  This appeased the Congressional majority whom Kennedy 
hoped to build a coalition with for political goals.  Weaver only learned of it after the fact 
through public announcements and he remained “deeply disappointed” believing HHFA 
“would gain nothing and lose much” by making itself party to “the annual internal 
disputes of the appropriation committees.”  In a bitter note to Bell he called the decision 
“true folly” and stated that if this remained the Kennedy position, he would be 
“compelled to ask the Administration to permit me to take a neutral position…in 
testimony for future legislation.”35  Bell exhausted great amounts of time attempting to 
placate Weaver, but the net result meant less money for cities.36    
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      As with other presidencies, Kennedy’s budget preparations followed a prescribed 
cycle.  A two-year biannual federal budget served as the base, and in the spring and fall 
of each calendar year, meetings took place, plus quarterly conferences.  Special staff for 
each agency worked full time on budget matters in concert with BOB staff and two 
formal budget reviews took place yearly for the current budget often resulting in 
“supplemental” reports.37   
      Four basic budgets were crafted simultaneously.  Through Bell, in April of 1961 JFK 
issued his annual budget guidance while the current year’s budget remained carefully 
monitored.   Secondly, the 1962 budget became finalized with the Housing Act 
supplementals, although most planning for it had taken place the previous year.  Thirdly 
the base document, the two-year lock-in budget which connected the past and to the 
future looked at 1963 and was very carefully planned.  Lastly, projections for three and 
four years out, 1964-1967, were also simultaneously prepared.38   
      In May 1961, Weaver joined the “executive office group,” an ad hoc committee of 
department and agency heads meeting six to eight times annually to discuss budget.  
Several themes came from those meetings.39  First, Weaver received only lukewarm 
administration support for supplemental funding for budget year 1961, and “restrained” 
support for 1962 and “very constrained” for 1963.40  For 1964, an election year, all 
initially agreed more money would be spent. 
      Overall, the HHFA budget and that of its five agencies constituted a splendid “game 
of numbers.”  Large bureaucracies are often captives of their past and HHFA stood as no 
exception. Kennedy’s budget consisted of financially packaging the past, as budget 
reform due to his fear of Congress, did not make his agenda nor did innovative new 
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budget programs.  Not withstanding, each annual HHFA budget came with the 
following disclaimer: “a considerable share of the financial requirement each year is met 
by repayment of loans or other receipts from assets acquired in earlier years.  Several of 
the most important programs have long lead times between initial obligation of funds and 
their eventual disbursements.”41   This statement spells out the complexity of HHFA 
funding and therefore, a short discussion about how the HHFA budget operated is 
essential.   
      The overall budget constituted “a program and financial plan for the coming fiscal 
year presented by the president to the Congress each January.”42  In the early 1960s it 
was a huge document, the size of an unabridged dictionary, and came in volumes each 
volume filling a 1000 pages and weighing five pounds.  In it approximately fifty federal 
departments and agencies had their annual financial futures addressed, and several terms 
are important.43
      “On budget” meant money for the current year.  “Off budget” represented for money 
carried over from previous years, for trust fund financing, and for other financing not in 
the current budget.44  Also funding under the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, the 
then current formula, created an “obligated based system.”  Immense sums were 
maintained in the annual budget, with the government working through an “obligations” 
formula of “revolving” money.  Two important categories, “obligated” and “unobligated” 
defined that funding.  Obligated funding meant at the start of the year a bill or specific 
contracted amount was presented as a statement. Unobligated meant that the cost was a 
very “good estimate,” and might be long-term, requiring money to be carried over from 
one year to another until a bill or statement came in.45  No budget year began with zero 
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amounts, but rather had specific monies committed from previous long-term, 
financing, and from anticipated receipts or from sums carried over from earlier years.46    
The annual “Table and Analysis of Unexpended Balances” managed this process as an 
important accounting reference. 
      The “table” as that became entitled, represented the entire financial picture at the 
beginning of a fiscal year.  The “table” included everything: the HHFA current budget, 
with the obligated and “on budget” money; carry over money both obligated and some 
unobligated that was “off budget” for the current year; and trust funds and revolving fund 
sums that were also “off” the current year’s budget.  This became the total “annual 
housing and urban investment” and requested quite substantial amounts, at times as much 
as twelve billion dollars of the then federal budget money, standing at $100 billion in 
expenditures (EXP) and $100 billion in new obligational authority (NOA).  These terms 
will be explained later. 
      However, three points are key.  A given HHFA annual budget covered only a portion 
of the total unexpended balances at the start of a year, with carry over and trust fund 
money being the rest of the investment.  Secondly, Congress managed the entire process, 
mostly through the front door, and made “adjustments” as the year progressed.  Since 
funds became carried over into future years, some authorized funding remained 
unobligated indefinitely, until the actual cost could be established.  The rule stood that if 
no “bill” was presented an expense constituted “uncompleted services” and carried over 
until a bill arrived or the program discontinued.  The Kennedy HHFA “table” looked as 
follows:   
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TABLE AND ANALYSIS OF UNEXPENDED BALANCES 
FISCAL          TOTAL UNEXPENDED   OBLIGATED MONEY  UNOBLIGATED MONEY 
YEAR          BALANCES AT YEAR’S  START  AT YEAR’S START      AT YEAR’S START  
FY 61  07/01/60-06/30/61       $  8,937,046,000.   $ 2,804,738,000.         $ 6,132,308,000. 
FY 62  07/01/61-06/30/62       $12,845,654,000.   $ 3,083,577,000.         $ 9,762,077,000. 
FY 63  07/01/62-06/30/63       $12,864,276,000.                         $ 3,581,727,000.         $ 9,282,549,000. 
FY 64  07/01/63-06/30/64       $12,497,079,000.                         $ 3,901,388,000.         $ 8,595,791,000. 47
 
      Trust funds as an important component of the total urban investment and “off budget” 
money came with a catch.  Public enterprise trust funds meant every HHFA constituent 
agency had something to sell or invest, from the public service it provided.  These “sales” 
ranged from mortgages, to property, debentures, and to securities.  For investments, some 
constituent agencies operated liquidating trusts involving government bonds and some 
stocks, through public and private sources, overseen by Congress.  Only on occasion, did 
these funds actually make money for the government, usually loosing small amounts.  
But the catch was the loss between gross trust fund expenditures and anticipated receipts 
came at budget closing from the current annual budget expenditure (EXP) money.  For 
FNMA that anticipated difference had to be estimated as it “revolved” through the 
government’s investment portfolios.  Doing this presented an exhausting and intimidating 
chore, and Kennedy’s funds looked as below. 
 
 
 
PUBLIC ENTERPRISE AND TRUST FUNDS
 
FISCAL                    EXPENDITURES FOR            RECEIPTS FOR                  DIFFERNECES BETWEEN 
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YEAR                        PUBLIC ENTERPRISE           PUBLIC ENTERPRISE     EXPENDITURES & 
RECEIPTS               FUNDS          FUNDS 
                                                                                                       
07/01/60-06/30/61      $2,150,422,000.                           $1,620,682,000.                      $ -529,740,000. 
07/01/61-06/30/62      $2,499,870,000.                           $1,789,956,000.                      $ -700,914,000. 
07/01/62-06/30/63      $2,680,559,000.                           $2,260,139,000.                      $ -420,420,000. 
07/01/63-06/30/64      $2,839,300,000.                           $2,548,562,000.                      $ -290,738,000.48 
 
 
      Other terms important are new obligational authority (NOA) and budget expenditures 
(EXP).  Most Congressional “spending” squabbles resulted from (NOA) disputes where 
financing disagreements arose when addressing budget expenditures (EXP), particularly 
including public enterprise trust funds.  NOA meant new spending authorized for the start 
of a budget year or for more than one year, on items as HHFA salaries, continuing some 
old programs with fresh money, and for new programs.  NOA was often referred to as the 
“spending” or “administrative” part of the budget and was dealt with “controlled 
program” money because Congress authorized that money as “eligible for direct 
management.”49  Conversely, EXP represented money spent at the conclusion of a year to 
cover fixed charges for certain programs, plus all trust fund differences.50  It was often 
called the “financing” or “funds” portion of the budget and was managed as 
“uncontrollable” program money, meaning it was fixed, “reoccurring” requirements 
money.51   
      For accounting purposes, at year’s end all sums from NOA as budgeted and spent, 
and EXP as spent, receipted, and netted were combined under the “consolidated budget” 
then finalized as net budget expenditures (NBE).52  This constituted when the 
administration determined if it really had a balanced budget or not.  EXP budget receipts 
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less budget expenditures, in relation to total NOA spent that year against NOA 
authorized, equaled a balanced budget (or not).  Kennedy’s HHFA budget model looked 
as follows 
    
       HHFA  BUDGET MODEL 
     
    BUDGET PROGRAM 
    CONTROLLABLE 
  
          1  Urban renewal fund              9  FNMA secondary market 
  2  Urban renewal grants            10  FNMA special assistance                
  3  College housing loans            11  OA salaries and expenses 
  4  Public facility loans            12  Urban studies & housing research 
  5  Public works planning grants           13  PHA administrative expenses  
  6  Housing for the elderly           14  Liquidating programs   
  7  Open space land                      15  Community disposition    
  8  Mass transportation loans           16  FHA operating expenses 
                                                                                17  Low-income housing 
                                                                                                      demonstration grants         
             UNCONTROLLABLE
   1  PHA low-rent housing fund 
        2  FNMA management and liquidation fund 
   3  FHA mortgage fund 
  4  URA liquidation contract fund 
                             5  Revolving fund53
 
      Kennedy’s actual budgets revealed consistent spending growth over his four budget 
years.  Yet several constraints laid hidden in these seemingly substantiated outlays, in 
HHFA operating expenses, plus some direct budget cuts to controversial programs.  
Constraints and cuts came to facilitate JFK’s attempt at a balanced budget for the tax cut.  
Thus, political expediency lay behind to some of JFK’s budget increases, particularly for 
programs favored by big developers and voters, and cuts came or constraints were 
applied to others. 
KENNEDY’S HHFA BUDGETS
FISCAL         BUDGET (EXP)           NOA               BUDGET                  1961 HOUSING ACT &        TOTAL 
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YEAR         EXPENDITURES        AMOUNTS                  (EXP & NOA)           NOA SUPPLEMENTALS     BUDGET   
  
07/01/60-         $309 million (E)       $813 million (E)      $1,123,000,000.      $+172,000,000.                $1,295,000,000. 
06/30/61         $502 million (K)       $793 million (K)                                  
 
07/01/61-         $545 million            $560,407,000.          $1,105,407,000.      $+300,593,000.                $1,406,000,000. 
06/30/62 
 
07/01/62-         $410 million            $785 million            $1,195,000,000.      $+325,411,000.                $1,520,411,000. 
06/30/63 
 
07/01/63- 
06/30/64         $328 million            $858 million            $1,186,000,000.      $+752,971,000.       $1,938,971,000. 
54 
      For HHFA Kennedy's increased by $172 million Ike’s existing 1961 budget using a 
supplemental.  Ike originally budgeted $309,065,000 in budget expenditures and 
$813,959,000 in NOA for a total of $1,123,024,000 through June 30, 1961.  Kennedy, 
because of the worsening economy, raised budget expenditures to $502 million to boost 
trust fund support, but pending passage of the 1961 Housing Act, decreased the NOA to 
$793 million.   The 1961 Housing Act due to being signed on June 30, 1961, created a 
temporary yet fictitious NOA for FY 61 of $4.5 billion which is not shown to avoid 
confusion.55  That $4.5 billion went against budget years FY 62 through FY 65. 
      Weaver’s most significant fight though was in the budget estimate process with Bell 
and began over salaries and management costs within the HHFA operating budget.  Each 
program had a separate administrative overhead plus Weaver’s far-flung FHA empire 
required millions of dollars in operations money.  Bell went after HHFA’s operating 
expenses because they were easy to trim and could be readily controlled.  Some “titled 
program” cost cutting followed.  Weaver believed this destroyed “balance” in his daily 
program management.56
      In the budget estimate process, differences between Weaver and Bell became 
pronounced, and began immediately and are shown as below. 
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FISCAL YEAR         WEAVER’S ESTIMATE  BELL’S ESTIMATE          TOTAL BUDGET  
07/01/60-06/30/61     $574,278,000. (EXP only)    $524,658,000. (EXP only)     $502,000,000. (EXP only)  
07/01/61-06/30/62     $1,152,900,000.           $878,000,000.                         $1,406,000,000. 
07/01/62-06/30/63     $1,718,900,000.                     $1,420,000,000.                $1,520,411,000. 
07/01/63-06/30/64       $2,300,500,000                    $1,713,615,000.   $1,938,971,000.57
 
The 1961 estimate reveals EXP funding only, showing Bell higher than Weaver in this 
instance because in 1961 NOA was the real battleground, which will be discussed later. 
      In actual budget years, 1961 brought no honeymoon for Weaver.  Throughout fiscal 
year 1961, Bell enforced two concepts: spend Eisenhower’s program and carry over 
money robustly to stimulate the economy and end the recession; and streamline HHFA.  
However “streamlining” HHFA would soon become painful. 
      With 1961 NOA “streamlining” began immediately.  Three days after the 
inauguration, while awaiting Weaver’s confirmation, the acting HHFA commissioner 
Lewis E. Williams, called for $150 million more in urban renewal funds to adequately 
carry the program through June 30 and additional $125 million for college housing.  
Further, $55 million was requested for improvements in health care facilities for the 
elderly and James B. Cash, acting FHA commissioner, needed yet another $2.4 million 
for FHA loan guarantees.  This totaled $354 million and after lengthy debates and 
disagreements, Bell approved a paltry $172 million as the HHFA NOA supplemental for 
the rest of FY 61.58  That is what went to Congress. 
      After Weaver’s lengthy and controversial confirmation, further cost cutting started 
immediately.  Operating budget “adjustments” came from Bell in the form of denial of 
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new furniture, a no “new” purchase rule for supplies, restrictions on long distance and 
local telephone usage, and severe cuts in travel and government car utilization.  Printing 
and reproduction costs for “Urban Renewal Notes,” and extra money for the 
“Quinquennial Census of Housing” became curtailed also.59     Invariably, personnel 
upgrades and new jobs within HHFA came to a virtual halt.  By mid-summer of 1961, 
Weaver was required to submit regular reports to Bell under the Bureau of the Budget 
Bulletin No. 61-11, “Financial Management Improvement Program,” regarding how he 
would tighten HHFA management practices to improve efficiency and reduce costs.60   
      Budget year 1962 produced $1,406,000,000 as the final funding figure for the HHFA 
budget, as the first year integrating Housing Act money into a budget already in progress.  
Both Bell and Congress carefully reviewed implementing the Act’s spending with the 
1962 budget, through meetings commencing in April and concluding in August.61  In 
these Weaver defended his 1962 funding request as “moderate and realistic” and publicly 
at least, expected them to be financed according to his projections.62   
      Initially, the rhetoric all sounded well and as the economy incrementally improved, 
Kennedy cheerfully announced in June, “that $350 million more would be spent on cities 
(in 1962) than Ike had proposed” and “that a strong case could be made for rapid 
increases in Federal participation in the joint effort to meet the demands and problems of 
community development.”63  Buoyed by the president’s remarks, Weaver told his staff he 
wanted to ambitiously expand programs with “imagination and vigor” including 
broadened public housing demonstration grants, the joint HHFA-Area Redevelopment 
Administration (ARA) cooperative program, and increased urban renewal on-site 
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housing.  Bell did not feel the same way though, and by late summer, Weaver’s 
exuberance and “realistic” budget goals withered with the Washington heat.64
      In implementing the 1962 budget package, which included 1961 Housing Act 
Programs, Bell took the first chop.  VA direct loans were to be capped at $350 million in 
comparison to a requested $432.5 million.  FNMA’s special assistance fund was reduced 
from one billion dollars to $715 million.  Bell trimmed public facility loans from $200 
million to $150 million, although Congress later replaced $2 million.65  Open space 
grants remained at $50 million.  Mass transit received only $35 million, and farm-
housing loans were cut by $25 million.  Elderly housing was reduced.  Slightly more than 
$5 million was taken from elderly housing.  Urban planning grants, middle-class housing, 
and open spaces received what the legislation called for.66      
      In Congressional hearings over the 1962 budget, from the four new grant programs 
Weaver worried about regarding front door financing---mass transportation 
demonstration grants, open space land grants, and low-income housing demonstration 
grants---Congress cut all of them.67  As well, HHFA’s overall request for operating 
increases to manage implementing the 1961 Act was also cut.  Weaver wanted 
$7,525,000 and received $6,750,000 and nobody in the executive branch backed his 
request to restore the cuts.68  Congress further reduced public housing expenditures and 
CFA’s public facility loans were funded at $750,000 out of a requested of $1.3 million.  
Planning assistance grants for urban renewal, requested for $26 million, were funded at 
$16.4 million.69  These latter reductions hindered the urban renewal on-site housing 
assistance program. 
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      But funding for urban renewal versus funding for housing presented a special 
dilemma for JFK in 1962.  He did not have the money for both, yet big developer urban 
renewal projects and the housing market constituted his two top priorities.  Thus for 
housing, FHA changes under the 1961 Act plus his “forthcoming” across the boards 
corporate and individual tax cut effort, represented his solution for that housing market.  
For urban renewal, some programs provided incentives for developers and some assisted 
poor people.  JFK had made it clear in his “special message” he planned to spend $2.5 
billion over four years to cover both. Yet this commitment was considerably weakened 
when in August 1962 Weaver’s request for $800 million in urban renewal capital grants 
was immediately, cut to $700 million by Bell.70   
      Then Congress weighed in on urban renewal with a funding debate that created 
headlines in housing circles.  The issue concerned Kennedy’s $2.5 billion pledge for four 
years, versus whether or not $2.0 billion over three years might replace it, how the money 
would be disbursed on a “priority timeline” or on a “first come first served” basis until it 
ran out, constituted the other half of the debate.  After spirited disagreement, Congress 
decided two billion dollars for three years using “first come…first served” would prevail.  
If more money had to be spent, Congress intended to borrow it from mass transportation 
planning grants.71  The administration offered no formal resistance.  The loss was $84 
million per year in urban renewal funds and by maintaining “first come…first served,” 
big urban developers with large professional staffs continued their advantage in gaining 
early, accurate and easily approved applications versus smaller of fledgling minority 
firms. 
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      The 1963 HHFA budget as finally approved stood at $1,520,411,000, but came 
from an original proposal of well over two billion dollars.  It truly represented a form of 
economic psychotherapy for the cities as it was large, but not enough to solve major 
urban problems, but looked good.  It also represented a reduction in what Weaver was 
“required” to support, as well as for what he “wanted” to support.  Weaver suffered a 
$688 million cut from “proposal to enactment” and 1963 became the most “restricted” of 
Kennedy four budgets.72  Uniquely Kennedy even had to trim some of his favorite 
programs.    
      For programs preferred by Kennedy’s, FNMA received his initial cut.  Bell reduced 
to $750 million FNMA’s secondary market purchasing authority from Weaver’s $1 
billion request.73  A larger shock came when FNMA’s special assistance fund for the 
221(d)(3) program which it financed, received a 25% reduction.  As one of the five new 
programs under the 1961 Act, Kennedy consistently gave it favored consideration in its 
brief FY 61 debut and special financial attention in FY 62, in his unsuccessful plan to use 
middle class housing to win over the middle class voters.   
      FHA received cuts below Weaver’s “bottom line” also.  In planning, Bell and his 
chief budget analyst agreed that 1.4 million new private housing starts would begin in FY 
63 and HHFA predicted 1.5 million.  Bell believed FHA would finance 22% of these new 
starts, yet HHFA estimated 24%.  FHA predicted an 80% increase in multi-family 
housing but Bell remained “exceptionally skeptical.”  BOB also made downward 
adjustments to HHFA’s estimate of elderly housing needs. Thus FHA was cut from its 
original estimates, in both NOA spending and EXP financing, from Weaver’s $674 
million request to Bell’s approved $462 million, the difference being $212 million.74   
 249
      Cuts of this magnitude worsened FHA growing backlog of unprocessed 
applications which will be discussed in chapter seven.   But for example, in 1963, 87,000 
mortgage applications were in a “severely delayed” status by year’s end.  Nearly the 
same number of multi-family housing applications became backlogged and the bureau 
simply “wrote these off,” by overestimating the “drop out rate” and then subsequently 
ignoring the problem.  Weaver was outraged over FNMA and FHA cuts and angrily wrote 
Bell “the question now is whether we are going to follow through on the President’s 
program or not.”  He openly stated reductions of this kind “raised serious questions in the 
Congress and elsewhere as to the Administration’s continued support of its own 
programs.”75  But as JFK told Democratic Senators and Representatives in 1962, “next 
year’s budget [1963] will be balanced.”  Weaver responded by calling for active “budget 
resistance,” but to little avail.76
      Three other Kennedy big-ticket items did not fare well in 1963 either.  Weaver 
wanted one billion dollars for urban renewal and stated publicly that a lesser amount 
“would be widely interpreted as the new administration’s drawing back from urban 
renewal and hence from an active concern for the pressing problems of urban 
communities.”   However, as had been planned by Congress, he received just over $700 
million.77  Bell also reduced the FY 63 open space land acquisition program by $15 
million and in a July 1962 meeting with Weaver, told him to begin rationing college 
housing loans.78
      Programs dear to Weaver received similar treatment.  The low-income housing 
demonstration program was cut to only $3 million.79   The workable program for 
community improvement (WPCI) which Weaver wanted to grow into a large national 
 250
effort, obtained only “minimal funding.”  Cuts also were PHA demonstration grants 
for improved public housing and public facility loans, particularly for smaller and poorer 
communities.80  Lastly, Weaver’s staffing for 1963 were under a “cost reduction through 
better management in the Federal government” program.  The bureau’s Bill Ross 
believed Weaver would adjust to this, once “digestibility” had settled in.  Ross had been 
“concerned about the…quantity of  [HHFA’s] publications” and after reducing them, 
turned his attention to staff cuts.81    
      Some of Weaver’s staffing increases had been placeholders since the start of the 
Kennedy years.  For example, PHA to that date had received no increases in five years 
and 1963 became the sixth.  Weaver said bitterly, “I feel I should point out…that the 
bureau has gone further than it is wise or prudent to go, if budget stringency be properly 
weighed against …the Government discharging its’ statutory responsibilities.”82  But for 
1963, Kennedy believed his “responsibilities” lay elsewhere. 
      Kennedy believed that in 1964, of course an election year, a strong economy would 
lead to strong voter support.  What he funded though  for “political” reasons will be 
briefly covered below and 1964 will be revisited again as a portion of Kennedy’s final 
“out year” budget projection package, through 1967.  Remembering that 1963 stood as 
his “balanced budget” year and if the tax cut could be implemented for 1964, JFK 
intended to spend some money on urban programs in just the right places.   
      FY 64 had been carefully planned to impact the economy favorably.  The only 
disagreements over FY 64 concerned what programs constituted strategic goals from the 
view of securing Congressional and voter support.  Headed by Bill Ross and three fellow 
 251
bureau members plus seven HHFA senior staff, preliminary groundwork for FY 64 
sprang from a series of meetings from June through October of 1962.83   
      For 1964, Kennedy finally approved a staffing increase for HHFA bringing total 
employment at the Agency to 15,037 starting July 1, 1963, well before the November 
1964 elections. When Weaver began as HHFA chief, 15,000 staff members had worked 
there.84   By the time Kennedy approved the increase, the Agency had dwindled to 14,235 
through attrition and unfilled jobs, with many vacancies being key FHA ones.  Kennedy 
also informed Weaver he would bring up the departmental issue for HHFA in the 1964 
campaign.85    
      FY64 big ticket NOA funding went smoothly, as Kennedy planned for his expected 
victory.  For HHFA’s NOA and EXP, a resounding budget total of $1,938,971,000 was 
approved.  The four popular big-ticket items for 1964, urban renewal, FNMA, elderly 
housing and college housing prospered.  Urban renewal received the regular $700 
million, but much larger sums came within the four-year plan through February 1967.  
FNMA obtained what it needed in public enterprise trust funding, elderly housing 
obtained $125 million, and college housing loans were funded at the $270 million level.  
Programs with less success were low-income housing demonstration receiving only $5 
million, urban planning assistance with $25 million, and public facility loans at $100 
million.  Weaver had requested twice these amounts.86     
       Kennedy’s four-year plan for housing and urban development funding through 1967 
was not as well developed, as were his 1964’s plans.  Yet examining these budget 
projections reveals where Kennedy placed his financial emphasis, had he lived and it 
begs two questions: would these have been adequate to prevent the greatest urban riots in 
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American history?  And did these programs constitute new departures or just fresh 
funding for old programs?  Bell, then Kermit Gordon who replaced him, clarified one 
point.  The administration intended to carefully control all aspects of urban funding for its 
second term stating, “the President and the executive office (the bureau) will make the 
determinations about the size and scope of the programs and budgets that the 
administration will support and these determinations will govern as maximums.”87     
      The generalization, is that after the 1964 election, JFK meant to “constrain” his 
housing and urban programs once again, and even though slowly spending more, for big 
ticket items.  Also, it would be for “physical” city rather than “social” city programs that 
prevailed.  For his budget goals through 1967, Weaver’s proposed twenty-nine programs 
emanating from twelve economic assumptions.88  Foremost, he concluded the economy 
would improve and the recession end in the first quarter of 1962 and that by December 
31, 1962 the GNP would be six percent higher than on July 1, 1961.89  This served as his 
foundation for future predictions through 1967.  He envisioned near full employment in 
1964 and solid growth in the private housing market with new “starts” achieving 
1,400,000 in 1963 and reaching 1,600,000 by 1967.  Interest rates were expected to rise 
slightly as the GNP expanded at 4.5% annually, with the $18 billion in new home starts 
in 1964 reaching $22 billion by 1967.90   
      However, Weaver missed in some of his assumptions.  He projected public housing 
starts to be 50,000 annually, with 35,000 for low-income public housing and the rest for 
military.  This woefully inadequate number failed to materialize.  He optimistically saw 
the FHA market expand from 19% in 1961 to 24% by 1967, which would also be an over 
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estimate.  For a number of reasons, the private housing industry took quite a lot of 
FHA business away from the Kennedy administration, which will be covered in chapter 
seven.   
      Further the HHFA chief believed the 221(d)(3) middle income program would 
eventually succeed, which it did not, because it was not well thought out nor well 
publicized.  By 1967, Weaver also saw urban renewal projects in 80% of American cities 
of 100,000, with stabilized “city-wide planning” rather than “scattered site” projects.  His 
percentages were high, his faith in the new methodology somewhat over estimated.91
      Importantly, Weaver projected two financial courses of action.  His more elaborate 
one cited the need for $10,112,000,000 over the four years or $2,528 billion annually.  
With the more austere plan, much more pleasing to Kennedy, Weaver sought 
$7,778,500,000 over four years averaging $1,944,622,223 per year.  All his projections 
though were rapidly compiled because the bureau pressured him for a quick response, 
which he roundly criticized with “I would hope that next year it might be possible to have 
a somewhat longer period of time available for the preliminary budget process.”92   In 
meetings Weaver attempted to sell the $10 billion plan by emphasizing that large 
amounts “would be invested in mortgage fund and asset growth,” which would be 
recovered.93    
      For the 1964 through 1967 package, urban renewal, college housing, FNMA, elderly 
housing and mass transit remained Kennedy’s preferred programs.  With urban renewal, 
Weaver wanted $3.2 billion and Bell/Gordon wanted $2.5 billion.  A compromise was 
reached using $600 million annually plus obligated carry-over money for a total of $3.1 
billion or $700 million for 1964, $800 million for 1965, $800 million for 1966 and $800 
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million in 1967.94   Most of this money would be for redeveloping the big central city 
cores, removing blight and making them more attractive.   
      However, in the $100 million lost supported a series of programs of high priority to 
Weaver.  Urban planning assistance was cut and urban studies and housing research was 
reduced back to 1962 levels.  Additionally, urban renewal grants were reduced from $200 
million to $125 million.95   The HHFA chief bitterly complained that some of these cuts 
were for “people programs which he “expected to place greater emphasis on…especially 
in more effective relocation, more timely disposition, swifter redevelopment of project 
land and completion of projects.”96  Weaver further objected that “essential domestic 
programs were not given proper consideration in relation to favorites.”97   
      As an aside, it must be explained that Weaver “was between a rock and a hard place.”  
Although a truly competent administrator and a “nice guy,” Weaver was truly “out 
gunned” by the “well connected” of the “New Frontier” at BOB, who often left him with 
no place to turn.  That was because in the nearly three years of the Kennedy presidency as 
previously mentioned, he only formally met with JFK once and that was on a legislative 
matter.  Kennedy literally took no interest in Weaver and urban affairs other than as a 
campaign issue and offered little support.  Weaver's close call at confirmation left him 
with little real support on the Hill and as the only African-American in a key position, 
JFK wanted him keep a low profile, as the volatile civil rights issue heated up. Weaver 
had no base from which to fight and he slowly retreated into what today’s “young Turks” 
might call “Uncle Tomism,” simply managing HHFA as best he could.  He remained 
nearly always beholding to JFK on the executive order and departmental status issues, 
which Kennedy consistently dangled in front of him, finally issuing a weak order over 
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Thanksgiving 1962 and never resolving “DUAH” before Dallas.  
       However, in what JFK would have funded had he lived, FNMA became a huge 
winner.  Including trust fund and public enterprise money, FNMA’s financial 
contribution to urban renewal alone was estimated at $923 million per year.  For the 
housing market, FNMA’s special assistance fund was projected to increase from $440 
million to $955 million per year.98  Another winner was FNMA’s involvement with the 
multi-family housing market which Bell liked, but Weaver remained skeptical about, as 
designed.99  Bell differed with Weaver on FNMA’s funding for “purchasing” in the 
mortgage market as well.100   Bell, and later Gordon won.101   
      CFA’s college housing program continued without controversy, and funding 
continued at the “net program reservation level or higher for 1964 through 1967.”  But 
the expected rise of the community college system projected by Weaver was written off 
by BOB as well.102   
      FHA became a winner but not quite in the way Weaver planned.  Funding for these 
out years remained sufficient, but it was based chiefly on expected FHA increase “asset 
sell off” to reduce EXP funding requirements.  For instance, FHA EXP funding declined 
through 1967, to be off set by the sale of more commissioner held mortgages at the rate 
of 10,000 mortgages in 1963 and up to 15,000 in 1967.  FHA debentures redemption was 
also predicted to result in a similar reduction of NOA over the same period.103  Adequate 
FHA funding would be available based chiefly on “adequate” sales and redemptions. 
      However, FHA operating expenses projected to increase from $80.7 million in 1963 
to $94.2 million in 1967 and herein a struggle ensued.104  In making his predictions, 
Weaver expressed concern that “a major (FHA) management problem…regarding the 
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acquisition of properties and mortgages…versus an increased volume of defaults and 
foreclosures,” will take place without enough staff management people to resolve it.105  
Kennedy through Bell then Gordon, continued to favor programs for the out years like 
FHA’s faltering 221(d)(3) middle income one, over increased FHA staffing needs.106  
Kennedy also began to court the conventional housing market with favorable FHA 
regulatory changes, planned for the out years.107     
      The elderly housing program remained well funded for 1964-1967.  Funding 
remained at full “net fund reservation levels,” ranging from $175 million in 1964 to $325 
million in 1967.  Weaver estimated the twenty-one million people age 62 or older in 1961 
would increase to about thirty-one million by 1980.  Both he and the bureau wanted to 
meet the requirements of these voters, although the program was miniscule in comparison 
to the need.108   
      Until its final legislative demise, federal mass transit continued to be protected for 
adequate funding.  For 1964 through 1967, it was expected to absorb $10 million in 
planning grants annually.  Had JFK’s legislation passed, $175 million in 1965 and $210 
million in 1966 would have been spent with more proposed for 1967.109
      In Congress however, several programs lost out in the four out year budget estimate. 
Without strong administrative support, Senate and House hearings cut HHFA staffing.  
For the HHFA headquarters’ operating budget, reduced management funds for Office of 
the Administrator (OA) programs headed that list.  Salary and operating increases for 
new jobs for equal housing opportunity for code compliance were cut.  Costs for these 
required an increase of $16 million and the entire package was disapproved by Congress.  
The result according to Weaver would be “no vacancies filled, no promotions, strict 
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control of travel…and the most strict management of the budgets of the five Agency 
activities.”110
      For 1964 through 1967 as well, Congress reduced open space grants by half and low-
income housing demonstration grants lost eighty percent of funding.  Public housing 
administration expenses were decreased as well. The small anti-juvenile delinquency 
program continued, but received only a miniscule increase.  Weaver chided these as  
“significant decreases, knowingly imposed.”  Even more confounding was the fact Bell 
scheduled Weaver for less than a week to testify about Senate cuts.  And with uniquely 
poor timing, Weaver’s testimony came just before the civil rights legislation.  Weaver 
received less than an hour for appeal.111    
      In conclusion, looking at these 1964-1967 out years, even if JFK had lived, funding 
documents reveal no new or bold adventures to save the cities.  Nothing leads to 
conclusion JFK could have avoided the forthcoming urban riots and disturbances.  As 
designed and funded his programs would not have eliminated the enduring ghetto but 
rather would have continued to build the suburbs and enhanced the urban core, as he was 
already doing.  Here, three points are noteworthy.  Funding at the levels approved would 
not have been enough to wage and win a “war on poverty,” as was finally being proposed 
in very late 1963.  At a minimum, doubling Weaver’s largest annual figure, regularly 
over four years would have only been a start.  Of Weaver’s two financial courses of 
action, neither passed under Kennedy due to the assassination, and the more austere 
revisions received the most attention, which barely covered existing programs plus 
inflation.112  Lastly, the real money proposed would go to the traditional big-ticket 
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developer projects as urban renewal, the FNMA secondary market, and some FHA 
programs.  Nothing new could be found here in the “New Frontier.” 
      Yet singularly the small anti-juvenile delinquency program to be chaired by Robert 
Kennedy, might have “taken off” and helped quell the upcoming urban crisis, but only if 
his brother really took interest and funded it heavily.  JFK’s interests though were in an 
attempt to balance the budget, gain a tax cut for the 1964 elections, and failing that, spend 
carefully available money on popular big ticket items for the election year.  Only late in 
his presidency did he notice and accept starting a “war on poverty,” that frankly, after 
some of the above intentions failed, he accepted simply because he needed a 
“showpiece.”  This is discussed in chapter ten.  
      It must be reinforced again that Kennedy's interest in domestic affairs were few.  
Civil rights jurisdictional disputes with certain governors, his meetings about 
Congressional legislation, and activities relating to the 1960, 1962, and 1964 campaigns 
and budget/tax cut matters “sum” his domestic interests.  JFK’s concern for other 
domestic matters remained almost completely non-existent.  He simply read reports, 
signed certain documents or letters and told Ted Sorensen what he wanted.  Most of his 
work with Weaver stayed as budget related and through Bell.  He held virtually no 
cabinet meetings and the ones he did chair, chiefly discussed defense matters or foreign 
policy, as did the "ex-com" meetings during the missile crisis.      
      His centerpiece in budget remained the tax reduction.  Using the advise of COA’s 
James Tobin from a previous New Republic article, Kennedy advanced his tax reduction 
effort as a means to foster economic growth, stimulate savings, and increase 
consumption, by returning money to the pockets of taxpayers and the coffers of 
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corporations.113   Kennedy launched it using a financial downturn in the economy as 
his pulpit. 
      On May 28, 1962 a large sell off on the big boards of Wall Street caused a significant 
contraction in consumer confidence, dropping monthly GNP growth and business 
investment over the last week of May.  This rather curious pothole on Kennedy’s road to 
recovery permitted him to step in swiftly with his tax cut idea.  On June 7, 1962 he called 
for an across the boards individual and corporate tax cut and coupled this with a 
subsequent promise to balance the 1963 budget. 
      Realizing that a tax reduction presented a political hazard with the Democratic party’s 
center and left, JFK followed with a speech at Yale University on June 11, 1962 where he 
repackaged his proposal with the catching title of “fiscal expansionism.”  He wanted to 
rally those who wanted something different, such as small reductions in interest rates and  
changes in the depletion allowance.  But the more liberal Keynesian wing led by Heller 
and Galbraith stood in opposition to a tax reduction of any kind.114  Uniquely they would 
be proven to be correct because although unparalleled economic prosperity returned from 
late 1963 through mid-1966, when under LBJ the Vietnam War began to dominate the 
economy, the tax cut which Johnson enacted had little to do with that continuing growth. 
      But the cut’s strongest supporters remained political conservatives not necessarily in 
Congress, who did not like Kennedy to begin with, yet keeping them involved frankly 
remained critical.  True right wing ones, many in Congress, wanted tax cuts solely as a 
way to inhibit government spending on programs they disliked.115  What they agreed on 
was no tax cut would become law without a decrease in government spending leading to a 
balanced budget.  They called that their “fiscal dividend.”  Chairman Wilbur Mills of the 
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House ways and means committee warned, “tax reduction must be accomplished by 
increased control on the rise of expenditures.”   But in the words of James Reston “no 
doubt the president will get his tax cut in the end, for both conservatives and liberals tend 
to like money more than they like theories.”116  
      Actually the idea for the tax reduction began in 1961 where Kennedy’s CEA 
proposed a $9.5 billion, then $10 billion tax reduction to generate up to $20 billion in 
GNP growth, yet JFK could not afford it then with the troubled economy and his 
continuing defense increases.  He also had a $7.2 billion budget deficit looming in 
1962.117    
      Once the tax cut announcement had been made, the final debate within the executive 
branch over the summer of 1962 concerned how much and how broad it would be.  
Ranges went from $8 billion to $10 billion.118  It was eventually agreed that $13.5 billion 
would be the figure with $3.5 billion recouped by the government in closed tax 
loopholes, making the cut worth about $10 billion overall.  The reduction coverrd both 
individuals and corporations and three strategies were set in motion for passage. 
      The first called for a balanced budget or “balanced budget attempt.”  George Will 
once quipped that “politics is akin to cotton candy, mostly hot air with a good deal of 
spun sugar,” which was what Kennedy used, to move the tax measure forward.  Key to 
obtaining Congressional approval, a balanced 1963 budget or the appearance of a 
balanced budget, remained the requirement should the measure be voted upon favorably 
at FY 63 year-end closing.119    Accordingly, discussions followed in several meetings on 
what would be useful in “making the situation” look good in 1963, when it already 
appeared both NOA and EXP would exceed the limit.120  A side bar to this was the hope 
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that tax relief might pass if the administration simply “came close” to balancing the 
budget. 
      Publicly JFK stated his budget balancing should be based on two things: favorable 
economic changes and trimming expenses in non-defense government programs.121  
Favorable economic changed required unemployment to drop from 6.7% in October 1961 
to 5.5% by the spring of 1962 and the stock market correcting itself by July 1962.   A 
CEA forecast and a Chamber of Commerce prediction about slow but consistent GNP 
growth provided Kennedy some solace.  Kennedy moved forward using these expected 
growth factors to convince his detractors the economy could sustain a reasonable tax cut.  
“Belt tightening” in non-defense programs would also help to create the illusion, if not a 
reality, that a robust attempt was being made to balance the 1963 budget.   
      To get a balanced budget, expenditures (EXP) and new obligated authority (NOA) 
both had to be restrained in FY 63.  Overall, Congress approved Kennedy for $100 
billion in 1963 NOA which did not have to be “balanced,” but rather could not be 
exceeded.  EXP was expected to cost another $100 billion, covering the differences 
between expenditures and receipts.  If EXP costs could be kept at around $98 billion and 
EXP revenues came in at a little more than one hundred billion, Kennedy had a balanced 
budget as long as he spent no more than $100 billion in NOA.  One of the old “tricks” 
however was to spend NOA to the limit, then “carry over” with a friendly Congressional 
committee, some program funding to another year.  Yet if you missed with EXP, you lost 
regardless of NOA and therefore, the critical emphasis had to be placed on EXP.   
      In Walter Heller’s words, EXP carried “the game.”  Heller emphasized that EXP 
money provided documentable economic impact or proof because it did not “roll over” 
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and if used as the basis for a tax reduction, “you’re surer of the economic 
impact…and if Congress is going to cut taxes…they’re going to want to make a showing 
of cutting your (EXP) expenditures…as part of the price of admission of the tax cut.  It 
also gives them the feeling that they have paid the price.”122   
      “Creative accounting” was also considered.  Total budget expenditures for 1963 
might be as low as $95 billion, if as JFK quipped we “change our method of budget - 
keeping as far as the repayable loans.”  Bell suggested “abandoning the administrative 
budget,” in favor of the “consolidated cash statement as the main presentation of federal 
receipts and expenditures.”  Although discussed, this was abandoned as it would have 
been visible to the wrong people on the right committees.123 
      Kennedy’s next step was to decide what constituted the “budget target.”  In an off the 
record meeting on October 2, 1962, he, Dillon, Bell, Heller and Sorensen discussed what 
their goals might be.  Kennedy said $98.5 billion in EXP remained his target, which 
would be hard to reach.  He also proclaimed $98.5 billion in 1964 as his other goal.124   
Discussions ensued recommending higher amounts and Sorensen finally posed the 
question, “I think the decision from you today is whether or not we want the budget in the 
neighborhood of $100.4 billion or $98.4 billion.”  When asked if he was sure he wanted 
less than $100 billion, Kennedy responded with a strong “That’s right.”125  This 
concluded the EXP discussions. 
      But Kennedy had another difficulty if he desired to roll over any NOA in 1963.  
Congressman Morris K. Udall (D, AZ) had co-sponsored H.R.7677 in 1961 to keep the 
federal debt at $298 billion in 1961.  As rapid government spending continued, this was 
usually elevated.  Yet the government came within $600 million of exceeding another 
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late 1962 cap of $305.6 billion on May 27, 1963, which caused a near panic at the 
Treasury Department and BOB.126  Congress reluctantly raised the debt ceiling to $309 
billion, reaching a House and Senate compromise, but good only through August 31, 
1963, for FY63 budget closings.127  Thus, Kennedy was also up against a federal debt 
ceiling as he continued to spend heavily for both defense and “domestic” programs and 
could not carry over much NOA without another full Congressional debate on raising the 
national debt.    
.     Kennedy had three strategies to obtain a tax cut.  First, he believed he could convince 
Congress his budget reductions constituted a “genuine effort” and obtain his tax cut.  But 
doing this without a close relationship with them posed the problem.   In the House, the 
ways and means and appropriations committees were crucial and sub-committees, 
chaired by Representatives Otto Passman (D, LA) and Clarence Cannon (D, MO) 
remained vitally important.  Yet, Kennedy mistakenly wooed some of the wrong people 
through his legislative liaison Henry H. Wilson, Jr.  He tried to charm Wilbur Mills (D, 
AK) and Joe Montoya (D, NM) yet should have spent more time with Cannon who 
greatly disliked Passman, a staunch LBJ Democrat, after a blowup about committee staff 
salaries.128 
      Kennedy was also naïve about the influences of big business in shaping 
committees.129  He failed to muster the business community behind his cut.  His own 
White House staff people reinforced he could not eliminate business and conservative 
hostility no matter what he did which might have been false.  In a confidential 
memorandum, Ted Sorensen warned “most big businessmen are, by 
connection…Republicans or Harry Bird Democrats inherently opposed to this 
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Administration and its policies.  Pro-business speeches and ever pro-business actions 
by the Administration are regarded with suspicion and no program could eliminate their 
opposition.”130 
      As a second strategy, Kennedy and his advisors prepared to set in motion a plan to 
blame conservative Republicans and Democrats if he lost his tax cut.  The tax measure 
came with a quiet Kennedy disclaimer that if conservatives killed it, he would blame 
them in 1964.  In private meetings with Wilbur Mills on August 6, 1962, JFK stated 
“come next winter we can get the bill but Harry Bird will screw us even if you put it 
through the House.”  But if he lost the bill JFK quipped, “the responsibility would be, uh, 
wouldn’t be ours.”131   
      The third strategy aimed at justifying the tax cut publicly as a means to strengthen the 
economy and avoid future recessions, as it became evident in private meetings in 
November 1962 that the gap was widening between expenditures and receipts so the 
“balanced budget” idea weakened.  Figures were prepared to justify the third strategy.  
Dillon planned to issue a series of press releases which started, it was “most important” to 
make it clear that the tax-rate reduction would help expand the economy which itself 
would eventually achieve a “balance of revenues and out go.”132  
      But in forging his effort to reduce spending, which as his first strategy topped the list, 
Kennedy in subsequent meetings proposed future “constraints” on NOA operating and 
program monies.  Initially, operating cuts for public works, education and research were 
planned.  Housing and public works cuts prepared and the postal budget would be cut by 
$750 million.  Three hundred million dollars could be saved in grain storage costs, and 
$600 million might be reduced by eliminating maintenance costs for obsolete weapons 
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systems.  McNamara told Kennedy that even with increased spending for new 
weapons, he could still cut $3 billion from Defense’s operating budget by forcing 
“efficiency,” but this was not executed. 133   Even the Small Business Administration 
volunteered to make some cuts which Bell readily accepted.134   
      Additional reductions were discussed for elementary and secondary education, to 
Native-American schools, oceanography, conservation, water fowl land acquisition, 
fisheries, and occupational safety research grants costing $6-$8 million annually.  
Nothing remained sacred except defense.  Regarding Native-American schools, Kennedy 
agreed $4-$5 million form that $15-$20 million annual budget would be cut, as long as a 
good speech could be prepared showing what the Administration had already 
accomplished, as these cuts had to be executed during the height of the 1962 off-year 
election campaign.135
      In EXP, Kennedy imposed some final restraints as well.  HHFA funds for urban 
renewal and mass transit grants were to be trimmed, NIH had its funding reduced and 
funding for some kinds of NASA research became temporarily curtailed and JFK had 
FNMA “sell” rather than spend.136  Kennedy approved eliminating the WWII VA direct 
home loan program by 1968, as it would save lending full VA housing money directly to 
veterans for 25,000 loans annually.  The regular VA mortgage guaranteeing program of 
course continued.137   In the words of Dillon “we didn’t need this mass transportation and 
aid to education, and all these other bills we know aren’t going to go through anyway.”138  
Other non-defense cuts continued in accelerated public works and area redevelopment. 
      As it turned out, FY 1963 became Kennedy’s only chance for a tax cut and it failed.  
By June 1963, the measure barely had life in the House and was dead in the Senate.  
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Early that fall, the House after extensive debate, passed it, but the Senate sat on it 
through Dallas and the end of Kennedy’s presidency.  Johnson of course passed it as part 
of the post-assassination honeymoon on February 26, 1964.139    
      Kennedy had tried hard to sell 1963 as a balanced budget year, similar to what 
Eisenhower had accomplished in 1956, 1957 and 1960.  In his 1963 Congressional 
budget message that January he had predicted “1963 thus shows a modest surplus of 
about $500 million,” with budget expenditures (EXP) estimated at $92.5 billion in fiscal 
1963 and budget receipts at $93 billion, thus the surplus.  NOA according to JFK was 
supposed to cost $99.3 billion.  He also expected “the public debt to be $294.9 billion.140  
None of this happened.  When final figures were tallied Kennedy was $11.316 billion 
over his respective $100 billion limits. Total budget receipts were $106,560 billion 
producing a deficit of (-)$4,756 billion.  Incredibly they missed it again in FY 64 as the 
budget deficit rose to (-)$5,915 billion.   
      Weaver of course continued managing housing and urban affairs with his constrained 
operating budget while Kennedy spent vast sums of money on traditional programs which 
were in the twilight of serving America’s urban needs.  The results would very shortly be 
seen under LBJ in Watts, Newark and Detroit, and in the many “long, hot summers” to 
come.  Nonetheless, Kennedy’s packaged public popularity continued.141   The real 
tragedy though, consisted of the fact that JFK was unable and unwilling to translate his 
popularity into congressional tax reduction votes, without cutting his housing and urban 
program.  The other clearly seen tragedy consisted of the fact he under-funded many of 
the truly needed urban programs out of lack of interest, and nobody measured the impact 
of that until the fires began. 
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CHAPTER VII 
“LITTLE PINK HOUSES:” 
THE KENNEDY HOUSING BOOM AND FHA 
                          To the extent possible, we want to meet these needs through 
                          private enterprise under the established FHA system....  I am  
                          recommending...40 year mortgages - now available only to 
                          families displaced by government action be broadened…and 
                          to make those mortgages more attractive to private investors.1
      Kennedy’s housing boom of the early 1960s continued Eisenhower’s wildly 
successful and precedent setting housing explosion of the 1950s.  This chapter examines 
JFK’s housing programs, looking at both what he maintained and changed, plus the 
critical roles of Robert Weaver and FHA in housing during “Camelot.”  However, before 
examining “New Frontier” housing, some generalizations need to be discussed to set the 
historical framework for “the thousand days” in housing. 
      The federal government had been very active in housing prior to JFK taking his oath 
of office on that very cold January morning in Washington of 1961.  It handed over to the 
new president many tools to use.  In 1940, only 43.6 percent of Americans lived in 
single-family homes but by 1979, less than 39 years later, 66.3 percent of Americans 
lived in single-family homes.2   Measured against the country’s massive population 
“boom,” this stood as no small accomplishment and the federal government played a 
leading role.  Support to financing institutions, making capital available, subsidies to 
homeowners, subsidies to renters, assistance to non-profit housing producers, tax 
incentives, regulatory changes, and land disposition schemes were a few of these.3  As 
well, Washington contributed to this impressive housing revolution by insuring millions 
of new homes under its FHA and VA long-term coverage.  Both FHA and VA remained 
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very important financial institutions, where by 1955, FHA and VA mortgage loans 
accounted for 52.1 % of the residential loan portfolios of commercial banks, 49.5% of 
life insurance companies, and 63.7% of mutual savings banks.  Yet, their popularity was 
about to wain.4 
      In building the suburbs three important variables were at work: federal housing 
policy; federal assistance to financing; and private sector development.  Federal policy 
and financing worked simultaneously and the results could be seen in four ways.  The 
first, indirect policy influences reflected actions manipulating housing production through 
policy changes.  Secondly, indirect financial influences constituted actions affecting the 
monetary, fiscal, and credit policies of housing money supply and financing guidelines.  
The third, direct housing subsidies, as aimed at moderate income and low-income 
families, and the fourth addressed actions that affected the structure of neighborhoods 
through community development.5  The objective of all these actions became increasing 
housing productivity that would in turn grow the economy.6
      Other generalizations from the recent past are important as well.  The federal 
government always viewed total housing production as a primary force behind the entire 
domestic economy.  Moreover, home ownership was looked upon as the preferred form 
of residence and middle-income families the target, certainly since Ike.  Federally 
financed housing and urban renewal strengthened the central city, but drove whites to the 
suburbs and both of these events hurt the very poor.  Directly subsidized low and 
moderate-income programs were not successful, nor was public housing, and the poor 
had to rely on “trickle-down” housing.7  Moreover, under Kennedy, nothing in his 
housing program reflected a radical change from Eisenhower’s policies.  And as public 
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funds were used to aid private developers in some fashion, over time, both government 
and business became cozy with the relationship.8 
      The federal government intervened in housing for many reasons, from jump-starting 
the economy, creating jobs, promoting social stability, protecting and stimulating the 
housing market, to truly benevolent ones.  Most of these federal initiatives operated with 
private builders performing the construction.9  States also became involved and across the 
country private investors were encouraged through tax credits to purchase tax exempt 
bonds sold by state housing finance agencies.  As well industrial development bonds and 
mortgage review bonds sold briskly in the early 1960s.10   In the large and prosperous 
states, major cities also benefited from these state programs. 
      Federal housing policy by definition evolved from regulatory to distributive and 
eventually to redistributive.11  FDR represented the regulatory aspects of federal housing 
policy, correcting known problems by creating new agencies and policies to manipulate 
them.  Truman continued this.  But Eisenhower on the other hand, subsidized certain 
sectors of the housing economy, and “distributed” specific monies, to grow these sectors.  
Kennedy for the most part continued that. LBJ tried to “redistribute” housing resources 
and create new ones, with both to be used to compensate the poor for past inequities.  
FDR and Truman worked in macroeconomic housing policy, Eisenhower and Kennedy in 
community development, and LBJ plus some of his successors in social welfare policy.12 
      Lastly, before discussing Kennedy and housing, it is key to remember that the 
foundation Eisenhower built for him, practically regarding the housing boom, was 
nothing short of spectacular. Eisenhower’s “community development policy,” also meant 
fusing the social interaction of neighborhood, community, municipality and public 
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services, into the responsibilities of home ownership.  Ike saw housing as “sinking roots” 
and as a significant symbol of order.13  He financed the market to grow that symbol. 
      Ike accomplished four very important milestones in housing.  As the masterpiece of 
his domestic presidency, Eisenhower created the longest, largest, and most impressive 
private sector housing expansion in American history, to date, overseeing the 
construction of between 10 to 12 million new homes depending upon who you read, from 
January 1953 through January 1961.  FHA insured 2,742,000 of those, worth 30 billion 
dollars, while guaranteeing 7 billion in other home property improvements.  This had a 
profound impact on American society at “mid-century.”  Secondly, his extraordinary 
1954 Housing Act rewrote FNMA’s charter providing it with the authority needed to 
stimulate a housing boom.  Kennedy aptly capitalized on this.  And in the 1954 Act, Ike 
also created the Workable Program for Community Development.14 
      Thirdly, Ike took HHFA into some new areas, one being the guaranteeing of college 
housing and nursing home housing, on a national scale for the first time in American 
history.  During his administration, 200,000 students, teachers and student nurses, lived in 
housing financed by thegovernment.15 
      Lastly, Eisenhower brought FHA directly into a new social compact and activism in 
housing.16  Under two sections of his 1954 Act, he financed and subsidized housing for 
the elderly and handicapped, some with children, as it had never been done before.  With 
modifications this program continues today, as a model of privately owned, non 
speculative, low-income housing for the elderly.17  Ike’s Section 221 of the 1954 Housing 
Act also established a new FHA program guaranteeing housing financing for those 
displaced by urban renewal.  No such relocation program had existed before 1954.18 
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      Kennedy therefore had a legacy to continue and indeed a marvelous opportunity to 
expand it.  The young president from Massachusetts had four announced objectives in 
housing.  One was to improve and stabilize the residential construction business and use 
it to bring the country out of recession.  To do this, the administration offered financing 
incentives to private industry to build more new homes annually.19  Secondly, using 
public subsidies Kennedy wanted to promote building houses for more lower and middle-
income families.  Here, JFK concocted a scheme using both direct and indirect 
government subsidies for the first time.20   Expanding public housing, urban renewal 
housing, plus the Workable Program for Community Improvement were also housing 
related goals that will be covered in later chapters. 
      Weaver, JFK’s key player for managing and executing the program, focused his 
energies on three major housing initiatives and three lesser ones.  For this, FHA was his 
lead agency with the five constituent, and FNMA for the other (or sixth).  First of course 
was to build more homes and increase private residential construction.   FHA played an 
important role.  Residential housing in the United States stood at $500 billion in 1961 and 
as the largest single component of national wealth.  Kennedy’s housing boom aimed 
directly at that component and the real success he achieved there came through a 
financing “revolution.”  FNMA with help from FHA, Treasury money, some legislation 
changes, and bureau of the budget actions, all orchestrated a marvelous series of home 
financing improvements in both policy and program development.  That preserved and 
tried to grow the Eisenhower housing boom.  Secondly, under FHA, Weaver attempted to 
successfully implement the new programs of the 1961 Housing Act, particularly the 
novel 221(d)(3) one, and to breathe new life into a new FHA home rehabilitation 
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program.  Three smaller FHA programs, low-income housing demonstration grants, FHA 
housing research, and the multi-family housing program, all with a few new changes, 
rounded out the FHA’s contribution to improved housing during the Kennedy years.21 
      In preparing to enact his housing programs, Weaver had to first address three pressing 
issues: personnel; gaining control over FHA; and improving the FHA decision making 
process regarding housing programs.  First, Weaver had to carefully utilize and apportion 
his dwindling staff, which would be a major irritation throughout his tenure and would 
eventually damage his program.  Under Bell’s ruthless pressure to keep expenses down, 
for the balanced budget to gain the tax cut, Weaver continued to lose personnel without 
replacements.22  As of January 1, 1963, HHFA had only 13,626 employees remaining 
from the 15,001 it began with in 1961.  In constant dollars, even though Kennedy spent 
an average of 1.4 percent more from 1961-1963 than Eisenhower did from 1958-1960, 
that was not for HHFA staffing and personnel.23 
      Three key staff also departed HHFA in early 1963, and with these losses, that really 
impaired the program’s progress.  All left after defeat of the departmental status bill, 
which may have contributed to some of their choices, but other reasons prevailed 
publicly.  The significant loss became Jack T. Conway, Walter Reuther’s man, who 
resigned as HHFA deputy administrator on January 23, 1963.  As a tough, seasoned, and 
competent administrator had Conway stayed through Johnson, he could have become 
under secretary of HUD.  Officially, Conway’s well publicized exit was for “political 
reasons,” to supposedly help the Democratic ticket in 1964 with the labor vote.  As 
framed, Conway, one pensive evening after the 1962 elections, decided to return to the 
influential industrial union department of the AFL-CIO and “start building a base for 
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1964.”24   But, Conway remained deeply troubled over Kennedy’s lackluster interest in 
civil rights, particularly open housing, and that contributed to his exit. Conway reflected, 
“I was concerned...[ over]...the stroke of the pen that was never taken.  And this was a 
disillusioning thing for me.  I really came to the conclusion that John Kennedy was afraid 
of this, that he wasn’t as much for it, as his speeches had indicated in the campaign.”25 
      Conway served at the compelling force behind many of the HHFA’s successes under 
Weaver and worked well with the Harvard trained economist.  He mastered both the 
HHFA infrastructure and the unique political architecture of the Hill.  He became quite 
adapt at shaping public money into financial capital for housing and urban development, 
and played a role in FNMA’s financing revolution which supported Kennedy’s 
residential housing boom.  After his departure, HHFA went into a “maintenance” period, 
with only one new initiative before Dallas.  Milt Semer filled his position, as both deputy 
administrator and general counsel.26 
      Weaver also had to fire some people.  CFA Commissioner Sidney Woolner from 
Detroit had “been given to him” by the “President’s people” as a reward to Michigan’s 
Governor G. Mennen Williams, whose state put Kennedy over the top in November 
1960.27  Increasingly Woolner had difficulty managing the large CFA programs, 
particularly accelerated public works, that reached its zenith in late 1962 and early 1963.  
Conway served as a “buffer” for Woolner, but as soon as Conway left, Woolner was fair 
game.28  According to Weaver, Woolner “lost control of his constituency” and was asked 
to leave in early 1963.  The now overworked Milt Semer managed CFA with some help 
from Hugh Mields until a new commissioner could be appointed.29 
      Neal J. Hardy left FHA in mid-January 1963 because of a “difficult divorce problem” 
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and returned to his native New York to work for the Ford Foundation.30  Rumors 
abounded though that he was having problems with private business developers over “the 
President’s order on open occupancy.”31  Hardy, a proponent of a strong executive order, 
conflicted with Kennedy who wanted a weak one, limited one, as did the developers.32   
Moreover, some of the criticism for FHA’s applications processing nightmare was came 
directly at Hardy although he did not have the staff to effectively fight back As well most 
of FHA’s new programs had not succeeded as expected.  In Weaver’s words about 
Hardy, “He was a person for whom many in FHA had affection and most had some 
confidence.”  This was not an overwhelming endorsement.  Phil Bronstein came over 
from VA housing and replaced Hardy.33 
      Beyond personnel shortages that would be ongoing, Weaver’s second major issue 
became gaining control of FHA.  “Organizational resistance” to HHFA abounded within 
FHA that had been strongly influenced by the construction business for years.34  Weaver 
complained that FHA had “more or less been seduced into belief…that it wasn’t really 
part of Government.”  This view sprang from the independence granted FHA in its 
original 1934 enabling legislation, and roundly supported by the construction industry, 
FHA felt comfortable with its “independence.”  Moreover, depending on the budget year, 
FHA sometimes reached near self-sufficiency, which further inflated egos.  Many within 
FHA plus most builders believed it should have been separated from HHFA long ago.  
FHA “for so long had operated as a free-wheeling entity,” that the FHA commissioner 
routinely paid no attention to what the HHFA administrator said.35
      Weaver used four means to leverage FHA back o fold.  Key appointments loyal to 
him were scattered throughout FHA, in influential places.  Conway’s thoughtful but 
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intense efforts also helped.36  In the large FHA regional offices and particularly in the big 
local insuring offices, Conway “mastered the techniques of transfer...promotions, [and] 
manipulation of the civil service selective system,” to create a loyal base.37   Secondly, a 
new memorandum requiring all FHA legislation to come through the HHFA central 
office worked well.  Thirdly, Weaver reserved important decisions for himself, such as 
centralized budget preparation.  And since he was reforming some of HHFA’s decision 
making procedures from the bottom up, he started with FHA.38  Slowly, these cumulative 
effects returned FHA to a level of acceptable accountability.  Weaver’s last issue, HHFA 
“decision routing,” addressed the significant role the central office would play regarding 
housing decisions.  Through his Office of Administration (OA), he kept a constant 
pressure on the regional offices of the four housing constituents (FHA, PHA, URA and 
FNMA) to “push up” the important issues to the central office for decisions.  Many FHA 
“regionals” responded to the political pressures of their city or their regional 
administrator, and sometimes made too many independent decisions.39  Weaver still was 
not receiving the right mix.40   He compared decision-making to a popular metaphor of 
the era, noting “if you are a mouse you will be Weaver’s man, if you are a man you’ll be 
your man, and tell Weaver to go to hell.”  He mused “...there is always the issue of a 
power struggle and the fighting for position and fighting for autonomy which goes on in 
every organization.”41  
      To improve management housing programs, Weaver created the Office of 
Metropolitan Development (OMD) within the HHFA central office.  Weaver wanted 
urban development to take place along orderly lines and address all the needs of 
community housing.  After the defeat of DUAH he thought he could capture some of its 
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lost impact with OMD, which would serve as an advisory headquarters for federal 
assistance to overall community development.  It “coordinated” everything from open 
spaces and mass transit to CFA initiatives and served a “clearing house.”  But due to 
statutory restrictions, it could not make FHA, URA, and PHA do anything they did not 
wish to do.42   Weaver also took steps to correct FHA’s and URA’s strained decision 
making process.  URA had been precluding FHA from its planning and project approval 
meetings.  Yet both directly or indirectly managed housing programs “inside of or outside 
of urban renewal areas.”  Conversely FHA, with its rather “vain” self image, preferred 
building houses in the suburbs rather than “downtown.”  Weaver obtained cooperation. 
      Weaver had Hardy appoint an assistant commissioner for FHA multifamily housing, 
to bring FHA closer to OMD, and to manage the large FHA multifamily housing 
program.43  He further appointed Nathan Glazier, a Harvard sociologist to his staff who 
would later would co-author with Daniel Patrick Moynihan, numerous books on 
community planning for the poor.44 
      Weaver wanted to locate HHFA into one building in DC as well, which would be the 
new HHFA central office building.  Spread out in 26 separate locations in DC, HHFA 
required geographic consolidation to be truly effective, particularly with housing 
programs.  Weaver received the go ahead from Kennedy and Bell because he judiciously 
crafted a position paper, proclaiming that between $200,000 and $300,000 would be 
saved in administrative costs annually through consolidation.  Additionally, the 
“bonding” could be rolled over into several budget out years.  In his paper Weaver cited 
that many of the administrative expenses associated with driving back and forth to DC 
meetings, in DC, telephone and telegram charges, parking costs, mail, package expenses, 
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computer hook up, and HHFA staff disruption would be curtailed, producing savings.  
Weaver received a favorable nod from Congressman Al Thomas’ committee but the 
building, as with many Kennedy ventures was not completed until the Johnson years.45  
Proudly but sadly, this big HUD building in DC recently bears Weaver’s name. 
      Lastly, Weaver also had to keep the housing program free from scandals, in those 
times of swift change and big money for cities, and he did.  Huge sums of money were 
being spent by the bureau of roads and the new department of transportation, as highways 
began to crisscross America’s cities, along with massive urban development already 
under way.  This was ripe for graft.  Through his improved centralized control, strict 
professional rules for conduct, and staff selection, Weaver kept HHFA and the housing 
programs out of the headlines.46 
      In actually launching the “New Frontier” housing program, Weaver’s first actions 
were implementing JFK’s massive anti-recession package.  This directly impacted FHA.  
Kennedy’s anti-recession and accelerated public works program placed a tremendous 
“strain” on the Agency.  They forced Weaver and his staff to move huge sums of money 
quickly while dramatically accelerating housing programs, all under somewhat relaxed 
government standards due to the recession.  As mentioned, during the second week of 
February 1961 to keep “tabs” on HHFA’s progress, Kennedy asked Weaver through Bell, 
to commence sending weekly reports to him on his progress.  Of course, these were 
reviewed by aides.47 
      Three major categories of anti-recession actions increased FHA’s workload.  To 
accelerate construction activity and employment, FHA began issuing more rapid 
“commitments” for building and financing during the first five months of 1961.  Also, 
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struck by a backlog of applications coming out of the Eisenhower years, the anti-
recession workload placed FHA in a precarious position, and with “current business” plus 
new initiatives, at a disadvantage it would never overcome before the end of “Camelot.”48 
      A second area of the anti-recession plan aimed at redeveloping “distressed areas.”  
FHA relaxed hiring standards for contracted employees to “give relief to those 
temporarily unemployed,” yet still qualified for FHA contracting.  Thirdly FHA’s interest 
rate reductions to stimulate the economy in the spring and early summer of 1961 caused a 
ripple effect of paperwork and new business throughout the Agency. 
      Next on Weaver’s housing agenda was executing the 1961 Housing Act.  It had only 
a few new housing measures but these were complicated ones, and implementation had to 
be clearly understood in the field.  Weaver held regional “clinics” across the country to 
discuss how to manage these new programs and sent HHFA officials to twelve major 
cities to assist with implementation.49 
      The “new” housing programs of the 1961 Housing Act were the most important ones 
for Kennedy’s housing legacy.  Previous ones remained but the new designs received 
priority plus increased public notice.  Six new housing programs, three significant ones 
and three lesser by degree, constituted the changes.  The first one dealt with one of 
FHA’s primary contributions to the Eisenhower/Kennedy housing boom.  Title I of the 
1961 Act now authorized FHA coverage for 35 years at low mortgage interest loan rates 
for moderate-income families to buy new homes, and up to 40 years for others.  FNMA’s 
close work with FHA in offering financing improvements made this successful. 
      Other new Title I changes were with Section 221.  This Section was actually a family 
of “improvements” headed by the soon to be infamous Section 221(d)(3) plan.  Its 
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counterparts were Section 221(d)(2) and Section 221(d)(4) which were not new, but 
(d)(3) certainly was novel.  In sum, these provided 30 and in some cases 40 year 
mortgages, plus rental and lease options, for both lower-income and middle-income 
families, both in and outside of urban renewal areas, for houses or apartments.  Under a 
unique financing arrangement, 221(d)(3) covered both property construction and the 
mortgage at below interest market rates (BMIR).  Also contained in Title I were new 
home improvement and rehabilitation programs were under Section 203(k) and Section 
220(h) that increased home rehabilitation loan amounts and lengthened repayment 
schedules for properties both inside and outside urban renewal areas.  This rounded out 
the major changes.  Lesser changes for housing encouraged new low-income housing 
demonstration grants and FHA housing research as well as increased funding and 
changes in the big multifamily housing program. These will be discussed later.50
      Kennedy’s chief contribution to continuing the suburban housing “boom,” lay in 
creating a “moderate” but significant mortgage financing “revolution” which helped grow 
it.  He provided more incentives in the mortgage financing market, made additional 
capital available, and increased consumer financing protection.  The four means he used 
involved FHA policy and interest rate changes, consumer protection improvements, 
Treasury money, new laws, and a spate of new FNMA changes.  He continued 
Eisenhower’s trend of befriending big business through a series of incentives and 
favorable policies despite Sorenson’s criticism that “most big businessmen are by 
commitment, habit and association…inherently opposed to this Administration and its 
policies.”51 
      FHA policy and interest rate changes started the process.  FHA’s financing improved 
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by the liberalization of mortgage terms, and the interest rate reductions he initiated.52  
Key to the economy from an FHA perspective would be raising the “value” of homes and 
the volume of homes, while maintaining the quality of homes while keeping prices down.  
JFK dropped the FHA prime lending rate causing the private market to respond 
accordingly.  On February 2, 1961 he reduced rates, from five and three quarter percent 
to five and one half percent and again on May 29, from five and one half percent to five 
and one quarter percent.  Kennedy also asked Weaver to increase the size of FHA’s 
housing market analysis section to provide improved market forecasting, to dramatically 
increase public awareness of FHA programs and options.  Press releases and 
National financial information were printed in both English and Spanish for the first 
time.53 
      Kennedy’s second initiative created the Consumer Interest and Protection Council 
and he appointed a special assistant for consumer affairs to oversee this.  HHFA brought 
private consumer protection for housing to this newly appointed council in an advisory 
capacity.  Low income, middle income, and elderly housing changes represented the most 
visible financing moves.  Quicker mortgage credit analysis, impartial property appraisals, 
and enforcement of minimum property standards in the private sector expanded.  Stepped 
up consumer financing education took place.  One suggestion consisted of all new homes, 
regardless of the means of finance, coming with warranties.54  JFK also initiated tax 
incentives for the sale homes.  These included a substantial “write off’ on the profit from 
the sale, if that profit went into another house.55 
      In March of 1962, the president asked the secretary of the treasury, in another 
important step, and the chairman of the council of economic advisors, and chairman of 
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the board of governors of the federal reserve system, to form a committee on federal 
credit programs.  They did and quickly saw that to grow the housing boom, significant 
increases in the flow and availability of mortgage credit were needed.  Chaired by Robert 
V. Roosa, under secretary of treasury, federal revolving trust fund amounts gradually 
increased to accommodate this in 1962 and 1963.56  This became critical to continuing 
suburban housing growth, coming out of the sharp recession. 
      Kennedy further passed important housing finance legislation.  Four kinds of 
financial institutions n 1961 held 80% of residential mortgages.  Savings and loan 
associations topped the list covering 35.47% of the private mortgage market and 
investing $704 million annually or 75% of the total assets.  Life insurance companies 
came next, holding mortgages worth $265 million or 20% of the insurance industry’s 
assets and 17.71 % of the total mortgage market.  Commercial banks followed holding 
$224 million worth of mortgages which amounted to 47% of their worth for a 12.55% 
market share.  Mutual savings banks held $233 million representing 48% of their total 
assets or 14.98% of the market.57
      JFK and his economic advisors passed Public Law 87-210 on September 8, 1961 that 
reduced S & L payments to the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) 
from 2% to 1% of the net annual increase on insured accounts.  This produced $2 billion 
in additional mortgage money, or roughly 10% more available for financing.58  Public 
Law 87-779 of October 9, 1962 encouraged the S & Ls to invest further in multi-family 
housing (apartments) by raising the cap they could lend to 15% of their assets.59   These 
changes became indispensable to sustaining continued housing growth.  Kennedy passed 
five other laws with bipartisan support, from May 25, 1961 through October 5, 1962 
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increasing what FHA could lend.  Public Law 87-38 increased the revolving fund 
authorization by an additional $1 billion for FHA insurance coverage and made favorable 
changes in defense housing.  The fifth separate measure, PL 87-717 of September 1962, 
permitted national banks to lend up to 70% of time/savings deposits for long term 
residential and farm buildings.60 
      Uniquely but not by design, one of Kennedy’s major pieces of housing finance 
legislation turned out to be the Revenue Act of 1962.  It issued revisions to the existing 
federal tax system in three areas.  As written, it did not aim at giving S & Ls breaks, but 
rather to discipline them into halting practices the administration considered risky, 
thereby strengthening the financing market.  As passed on October 16, 1962 the Revenue 
Act though stimulated the mortgage market.  It required S & Ls to pay higher taxes on 
“bad debts” and punished them in like kind for “writing off bad debts.”  Under the Act, 
offending S & Ls lost tax exemptions they previously enjoyed, from paying excise taxes 
on communications stock, transportation stocks, and stock “document” stamps for 
certificates of indebtedness.  In addition, all S & Ls were now more closely scrutinized 
by the department of the treasury and were required to send in reports with greater 
frequency.  Further changes were made to stockholders’ tax schedules in Savings and 
Loans.61
      Yet in a strange twist of irony, the Revenue Act became a “boom” for real estate 
speculation, as both Bob Weaver and Mort Schussheim later woefully explained to 
Kermit Gordon.  The Revenue Act “encouraged” speculative financing for the 
construction of apartments (multi-family housing), planned suburbs, office buildings, 
shopping centers, strip malls. The trick was to buy, then quickly sell, not becoming stuck 
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with a “bad write-off.”  If careful, a financier or builder could quickly write off a 
substantial portion of the original cost of a project, and then sell it to another party, 
paying taxes only on the transaction, and that, at the then fairly low and politically 
untouchable capital gains rate.  Speculation in suburban land and its development 
followed.  Buy, hold it just long enough to depreciate it, then quickly sell it.  This in fact 
encouraged S & Ls into venture capitalism.62    
      In September 1963, Kennedy simplified the election and appointment of officers to 
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.  This move, favored by housing financiers, also 
helped continue the housing boom.63  Through legislation, the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board (FHLBB) as the sanctioning body for chartering savings and loan associations 
under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Savings and 
Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), received more members and obtained more 
latitude.  These moves produced additional quality S & Ls nationally with stronger 
charters.  Lastly, Kennedy at his death, had several bills pending to broaden insurance 
coverage for S & Ls deposits.64 
     JFK further provided federal assistance for refinancing numerous small construction 
supply businesses that suffered economic injury as a result of federal projects.65   
Specifically, businesses displaced by urban renewal, CFA public works projects, FHA 
elderly housing, and PHA public housing most frequently requested and received 
assistance.66   A revolving fund of $300 million under Area Redevelopment, in part, 
helped these firms.67
      Kennedy’s FNMA though was the real key and dominant player in improving private 
sector financing.  FNMA had three long-term financing objectives.  The first was to use 
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its powers to stabilize and expand the fiscal and monetary “soundness” of the economy.  
The second consisted of reducing regional yield differences on mortgages.  The third 
consisted of being a selective buyer and seller of quality mortgages.68  FNMA did this 
under three programs known as the “special assistance fund,” “regular secondary market” 
and “special market facilities programs.”  FNMA purchased strictly FHA/VA mortgages 
at the start of JFK’s presidency but gradually expanded into purchasing mortgages on 
urban renewal housing, cooperative housing, elderly housing, military housing, and. 
disaster housing mortgages.69  Under the special assistance program, the president could 
authorize FNMA to energetically purchase mortgages in economically troubled locations.  
Both Kennedy and Johnson had so much success with FNMA, as a model, it later caused 
the creation of the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA or Ginnie Mae) 
in 1968 and a subsequently the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) 
in 1970, both under Nixon. 
      FNMA’s three programs worked well together in the housing market.  Its generally 
prosperous and usually timely “secondary market” activities often stimulated the entire 
housing market.  In purchasing government mortgages “in packages,” FNMA provided 
exciting portfolios of low interest and fully guaranteed mortgages to anxious buyers.  
Buying these mortgages freed originators to make additional loans and selling mortgages 
stimulated the entire market.  FNMA controlled the timing.  In each of Kennedy’s three 
years, FNMA bought $624 million worth of mortgages in 1961, $547 million in 1962, 
and $181 million in 1963.70  FNMA’s third major operation, the “special market 
facilities” program sold its own stocks, bonds, financial notes, and debentures (foreclosed 
mortgages).  Kennedy in his first eighteen months, increased FNMA’s available common 
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stock by $40 million and added $475 million over his three years to special assistance.71  
This solidified FNMA stock. 
      Working together FNMA and FHA proved solutions for financiers and helped grow a 
new form of financier called the “mortgage investment banker.”  As created mortgage 
banking institutions did not take deposits, but rather purchased both FNMA and 
conventional mortgages, held them only briefly, and then sold them to the “highest 
bidder.”  FHA and VA guaranteed mortgages bought at low rates proved to be an 
outstanding investment, because of their minimum “mortgage servicing” costs.  The 
federal government literally helped create these speculators, and the speculators helped 
expand the market and created more capital.72 
      Under Kennedy and as chaired directed by the stoic but eccentric, J. Stanley 
Baughman, who often refused to send items to Weaver for the weekly reports FNMA 
contributed directly to Kennedy’s housing financing revolution in four important ways. 
First, as it slowly reduced the fees it charged to a buyer to sell a mortgage to FNMA or to 
buy a mortgage from FNMA, it stimulated the market.  By reducing the buyer’s cash 
contribution of FNMA “stock” in 1961 from 2% to 1 % of the worth of the transaction, 
vast sums of money became freed for other housing transactions.73  Secondly, its massive 
research division predicted the most advantageous timing for release of numerous 
financial instruments for market stimulus.  FNMA as the largest single home mortgage 
buyer in the United States could readily predict effective timing and published a list of 
home purchase prices, which the private sector called the “auto blue book” of 
mortgages.74  Weaver called FNMA “a useful, selective, counter-veiling force ... for the 
economy as a whole.”75   
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      Thirdly, FNMA influenced price and prices influenced housing availability.76   
FNMA purchased most mortgages at “par” and in some special assistance cases, at below 
par.  Based on the value or worth of its own capital stock, it could then sell these at varied 
prices, up or down by 3% and making a profit depended upon the intent of the sale.  
FNMA could also “dump” mortgages on the market to drive prices down77 and thus 
accomplish a series of major market manipulations. Moreover, mortgages were purchased 
by “type” and geographic location.  Type meant FHA/VA prime interest rate as 5 ¾% 
“type” mortgages and 5 ½% ones, down to 5 ¼% ones.  FNMA selected the type based 
on national market conditions and then varied its sale price from $100 worth of the price 
it paid against $100 worth of the value of the property, down to the $96 level for both. 
This permitted market manipulation geographically as certain mortgage types popular 
with lenders in different sections.  For example, to get the housing economy moving 
again, between February 3 and May 29, 1961, FNMA changed both the “type” of 
mortgage it bought and the “price” it charged a total of five times.78 
      Two caveats are important though. FNMA paralleled both the Mortgage Bankers 
Association of America and the American Bankers Association guidelines.79  Secondly, 
FNMA heeded caution to ensure it made money by manipulating the price of its 
debentures, stocks and bonds.80  Here, in May of 1961, FNMA offered $150 million in 
twelve year issues at 4 ½% to stimulate interest during the sluggish economy.81 
      As FNMA continued to work its magic however, an ugly problem developed 
nationally as the economy inched along toward recovery.  When FHA went to 5 ¼% 
mortgages to attract more home buyers with less money, lenders began changing higher 
“discount points” to off set their loss on long term interest.  Conway called the problem 
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to Weaver’s attention in the summer of 1961.  Weaver, Bell, Hardy, Heller, and others 
then conducted a series of regional conferences with S and Ls to try to coerce them into 
reducing discount points.  Weaver simply informed some of them in western states 
that FHA and FNMA would cease to insure and purchase mortgages there, if the trend 
continued.82  He also hinted FNMA might begin a mortgage “sell off” program and flood 
their secondary market.  But Weaver only gained limited success, and discount points 
haunted FHA throughout the Kennedy years.83 
      In the fall of 1961, “spot” shortages developed in available mortgage money in some 
areas of the country.  Baughman noted that money normally available was being used to 
finance commercial construction, with heavy discount points this compounded driving 
customers away from 5¼% mortgages.  Never shy with words, Baughman told Kennedy 
in one weekly report that the 5 ¼% rate was “unrealistic” and should be withdrawn.84  He 
also took steps to correct the problem on his own. If the 5 ¼% mortgages would not sell, 
he targeted the 5 ½% and 5 ¾% mortgages and began buying them at low prices thus 
freeing capital.85  Additionally, in November to protect FNMA, he offered $225 million 
worth of secondary market long-term debentures, while also increasing the interest yield 
on short term discounts notes.86  These measures stabilized mortgage funds for the 
remainder of 1961. 
      Baughman’s bold moves “primed the pump” for 1962 as well causing a 
commensurate increase in the interest rates and dividend rates for commercial banks and 
S and Ls.  Business in FNMA’s secondary market portfolio continued to improve and 
mortgages of the right type began to flow in.87 As a result, FNMA began a sell off in its 
secondary mortgage holdings in February 1962, liquidating over $6 billion in mortgages, 
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which then constituted the world’s largest portfolio.  Truly, 1962 stood as a very good 
year for FNMA.88 
      FNMA took additional steps to insure housing finance prospered in 1963 as well.  To 
ensure the Association remained a strong economic force and with the expected FHA 
“drop off’ after the executive order, as a hedge to inflation Baughman “cooled off’ the 
sale of mortgages.  In early February 1963, he increased by one half-point FNMA’s 
selling price.  In an attempt to stimulate now somewhat lackluster, 1963 FHA market, 
FNMA increased by a 1/2 point what it would pay for FHA/VA mortgages.  Bell, Dillon, 
Weaver, and FNMA successfully resisted Congressional pressure for a 5% mortgage, 
which would not have sold, and fiscal year 1963 ending on July 1, produced a twenty-
five year record for FNMA mortgage sales.89  Based on this performance, the market for 
1964 looked strong as well.  JFK’s chief contribution to the housing boom worked. 
      Yet FHA helped foster the suburban housing boom of the early 1960s as well.  It was 
“only yesterday” when an American family could not get a long-term home mortgage on 
a house.  Uniquely, “long-term” before the New Deal consisted of three to five years, as 
conservative bankers of the depression era were exceptionally reluctant to loan large 
sums on a private home for long periods of time.90  Then, families had to rent and live in 
flats (apartments) until they amassed huge savings, enough to pay half down for the cost 
of a home, and the remainder in large installments over only three to five years.  Lengthy 
mortgages on private homes were simply unthinkable.  FHA changed all of that and 
literally financed the middle class into the suburbs.”91 
      Throughout the 1950s, FHA serviced its traditional constituents with sustained 
growth.  In 1960 FHA wrote 373,261 home mortgage guarantees, provided coverage for 
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49,101 multifamily units, and insured 1,011,858 home improvement projects.  FHA as 
well maintained a small cooperative housing program insuring 7,803 units that year, and 
a small rental-housing program of 19,447 units while guaranteeing 16,567 elderly 
housing units.  This represented 21.5% of the overall housing market in 1960, down only 
slightly from the 22.2% it had in 1959.92 
      Under Kennedy, though, FHA would expand programs but lose market share at the 
same time, a first in history to date.  One of FHA’s first initiatives when Kennedy took 
over involved planning “suburban towns.” Planned suburban towns with federal 
assistance dated back to the New Deal, then called “greenbelt cities.”  FHA provided 
planning assistance in creating Reston, VA, Columbia, MD, and Irvine, CA. For Reston, 
the master plan of 1962 consisted of high-density corridors of apartments and 
townhouses, with a village center, parks, and a small number of single-family homes.  
Columbia, MD, as designed in 1963 by architect James Rouse, offered a rural escape 
between Baltimore and Washington. Target population was 100,000 and the town had 
separate villages within it, each of 12,000 people, with the r own parks, schools, and 
centers.  Irvine, CA was to be 120,000 acres of prime California land designed for up to 
400,000 residents around the new University of California at Irvine campus.  Single and 
multiple family housing encircled this with parks, schools, and shopping centers.93  All 
three succeeded only by degree and not as originally designed with Reston coming 
closest to the basic goal.94  However, Kennedy flirted with expanding this idea through to 
the end of his presidency, with plans for 1964 including a new “suburban townhouse” 
plans.95  FHA discussed a new “black suburbs” program for that year as well.96 
      It should be noted before examining the “houses and homes” of the Kennedy housing 
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boom, that personally JFK put very little effort into this beyond approving financing 
changes and encouraging FHA to expand.  The National Association of Home Builders 
tried repeatedly to meet with him about suburban growth, but he refused.  Other groups 
as the National Association of Real Estate Boards received the same treatment.  The 
Houston Home Builders Association offered seven free homes to the Mercury astronauts, 
but Kennedy declined and the project died.97  Kennedy never responded to any major 
ideas from private housing groups that wrote to him, leaving that exclusively for aides.98 
However, he did make speeches about the subject, and when things went well he quickly 
took the credit.  And suburban expansion went very well. 
      The housing explosion under Kennedy followed the same path as Eisenhower’s.  The 
working class suburbs of the 1920s, mostly around industrial cities, had become the 
“trickle down” neighborhoods of the 1950s, as minorities and the poor replaced the 
previous owners, with a few elderly remaining.  But around the country, outside the cities 
the suburbs boomed and changed America forever.99  FHA helped initiate this mass 
production housing boom, offering its long-term mortgage coverage for very specific 
kinds of homes, creating what later would be called “little pink houses.”  This program 
required three percent down on the first $13,500 and ten percent down on the next 
$13,500 up to $27,000, and the government guaranteed $15,000 of that total.  Happily a 
family could buy a nice new home in June of 1961 for $13,500 and if more was needed 
the federal government had a list of “referred” lenders for finance.  For proven hardship 
cases, a forty year mortgage could be approved and down-payment costs would be 
financed into it.  As an ingenious form of government intervention, FHA offered the 
plans, performed the construction inspections, and screened the prospective buyers.100  By 
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the millions, buyers flocked to own these “little pink houses” in the new suburbs. 
      These suburbs held many advantages, the first conceptual, and the second physical.  
As Kenneth Jackson wrote in his seminal work, Crabgrass Frontier, higher income 
suburban neighborhoods created higher status.  Suburbia represented a whole new middle 
class, giving a sense of residential community to a complete class of people.101  That also 
applied to anyone who could “get into” a new suburb, even with a lower priced “FHA.” 
A new home in the suburbs not only provided status, but also glorified “individualism” in 
that an “individual” house became yours rather than a flat, row-house or double.  The 
new suburban sprawl of the early 1960s reinforced the reality of space, a concept so 
important to the American psychic, according to historians David Potter, Daniel Boorstin 
and others.102  Families of the Eisenhower/Kennedy housing boom were more than 
willing to overlook the fact these suburban homes were monotonous little boxes, 
generally on flat land, in favor of the idea these indeed expressed “the American 
dream.”103  The suburbs were the “Tunerian” safety valve of the 1960s.  Crime also 
dropped in new suburbs at least initially, which constituted a further reason to move.  But 
the suburbs had as much to do with community income equity as with geography.104
      Yet as the suburban “home” constituted the key to “freedom” from the city proper, 
the model suburban home of the Eisenhower/Kennedy housing boom also glorified 
sameness.  Lewis Mumford characterized that sameness as “uniform, unidentifiable 
houses lined up ... at uniform distances, on uniform roads ... inhabited by people of the 
same income ... witnessing the same television programs and conforming ... to a common 
mold.”105 Nonetheless, these “little boxes” sprang up on slabs around the big cities by the 
hundreds of thousands.  On an average, they were 900 hundred square feet with two 
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bedrooms and a carport, and they resolutely stood as the American ideal.  They stood for 
freedom, and Americans loved their little boxes.  If it had two stories and two more 
bedrooms upstairs, plus a small hallway, the total became 1,100 square feet and the 
dream “had wings.” 
      Regardless of the “sameness,” home buyers of forty years ago truly adored these 
small homes. Several variations captured and kept that affection.  Karsin prefabricated 
homes had a three bedroom model in five different styles and colors, one of them being 
pink, still at 900 square feet, but available with the optional garage, for $10,000 to 
$15,000.  Cape Cod and ranch houses became immensely popular with some including 
fireplaces.  One version of these came as a miniature colonial and all had 1,000 square 
feet for a low cost of $11,500 to $14,500. 
      Smaller homes abounded also.106  FHA had one of 650 square feet and Worden and 
Associates of South Bend had a 720 square foot home, both of which sold well.  Others 
frequently appeared with 800 to 855 square feet and in the early 1960s, several varieties 
of these homes could be purchased for under $10,000, with payments of $100 per month 
for longtime.  Economy Portable Housing of Chicago concocted a summer cottage that 
sold as an all-year home, known as the “stream liner,” and a few of the small linear 
homes of the period actually took their original design from poultry houses.107  Homes 
with a “wonderfully modern” or modular look caused buyers to take notice, ranging from 
891 square feet for $14,500 through $17,500 for more space.108  And prices only slowly 
inched up during the Kennedy years.  At the end of 1963, 69% of al FHA and VA 
guaranteed homes sold for under $17,000.109  Yet by 1965 home prices jumped as new 
buyers demanded more space and absolutely required a fully attached garage.  By early 
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1966, as the inflation of the Vietnam War began to settle in, prices would never be the 
same.  At year’s end in 1965, the average was 1,500 square feet and the cost was 
$20,000.110
      Suburbs of the Eisenhower/Kennedy housing boom created not just a new culture, but 
a series of new rituals, perhaps a separate culture.  On the positive side, images of “Leave 
It to Beaver” and “Father Knows Best” were touted in the Saturday Evening Post, 
McCalls, and Life and on television, praising suburbs as great places to live.  Parents’ 
Magazine and books as Women Today, Building a Successful Marriage, and even Dr. 
Benjamin Spock’s Common Sense Book of Baby and Child Care, alluded to the 
advantages of suburbia.  But conformity had its critics as well as seen in The 
Organization Man which told of dissatisfied businessmen retreating at the end of a day to 
suburbs where they had to conform further.  David Reisman’s The Lonely Crowd 
captured suburban isolationism.  Herbert J. Gans, The Levitowns while defending 
suburbs, exposed the boredom and loneliness of being cut off from both city and 
countryside.  John Keat’s in his bitter novel The Crack in the Picture Window simply 
called suburbs a true catastrophe.111
      Yet suburban statistics remained impressive.  In 1960, 119,595,000 people of 
179,323,175 in the United States lived in or around cities accounting for 66.7% of the 
population. Of that 66.7%, 45.9% or nearly 55 million lived in the suburbs.  By 1970, 
54.2% of the 76 million people who lived in or around cities, resided in the land of 
“Ozzie and Harriet.”112   From 1959 to 1968 the nation completed 14,510,000 new houses 
and the Eisenhower/Kennedy “housing boom” was the chief contributor. 
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NEW HOUSING STARTS 
YEAR   TOTAL
Eisenhower  
 
1953   1,438,000                  
1954   1,551,000                 
1955    1,646,000                
1956          1,349,000 
1957    1,224,000                  
1958    1,382,000     
1959                           1,531,000 
1960              1,274,000  
 
Kennedy 
1961              1,337,000 
1962                  1,469,000 
1963                  1,613,000 
 
The above figures are from HUD using Census data.113  It is interesting to note that one 
can obtain three “sets” of figures, one from Weaver’s writings, one from HHFA, and one 
using Census data. However, the facts were clear.114  This was a housing “boom” and it 
continued through Johnson and into the early Nixon years as well.  Conventional, 
FHA/VA mortgage guarantees produced this massive shift in both living and life style.  
As a theme, JFK remained slightly behind Ike in new housing numbers, as he was in most 
housing categories, even with FNMA’s financial wizardry.  But had he not stimulated 
that market, he could have been even further behind due to his forthcoming disasters with 
FHA. 
      Yet five other success stories are part of the tale of the suburbs as well.  First, suburbs 
encouraged the growth of strip malls, then shopping centers and finally massive 
consumer malls.  The early strip malls or shopping plazas entailed conglomerates of 
stores with parking along roads leading to the new suburbs.  Shopping malls, enclosed 
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shopping centers, and consumer malls constituting a larger version of the same, sprang up 
usually under one developer/owner.115  These malls and their adjacent suburbs established 
a new set of community rituals and customs, glorifying excess.  Suburbanites flocked to 
shopping centers on weekends, to recapture the socialization of urban life lost in the 
suburbs.  Malls and shopping centers “captured the best of the central city” and brought it 
to suburbia.  In a way they offered Leo Marx’s “middle landscape” between the city and 
country, in human interaction.116  And the government actually helped create them, 
beginning in 1954 where federal tax policy permitted “accelerated depreciation.”  This 
allowed commercial developers to rapidly write off construction of new business 
buildings and claim any initial losses against unrelated income.117 
      Secondly, shopping plazas and their adjacent suburbs of the Kennedy years advanced 
the growth of the automobile culture.118  As the population increased by a stunning 35% 
from 1945 through 1965, automobile registrations jumped by an astounding 180% and by 
1963, eighty percent of all eligible Americans had a car.119  Thirdly, both suburbs and 
malls began to attract nearby business as “satellite centers” to the large cities.  This of 
courses caused the now famous drop in city business and population.  From 1953 to 
1965, businesses in Detroit’s central business district dropped 22%, Chicago’s 25%, 
while conversely Philadelphia’s new suburban merchants increased their sales by 64%.120 
      Suburbs and shopping centers also influenced the expansion of the young interstate 
highway system and the call for mass transit.  In the south in 1963, I-185 around 
Charlotte NC was specifically designed to accommodate the Cortland and the Groton 
Avenue Shopping Plaza and its adjacent suburbs.  In the north as well in 1960, I-81 
around Scranton and Wilkes-Bierre, PA curved sharply to accommodate major shopping 
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complexes and suburbs.  FHA provided free planning guidance for these projects from its 
research division.  In 1962, 44 large regional shopping centers were built which set a 
record to that date and Specialized Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) sprang up 
across the country to finance these malls.121  In 1945 only around 400 shopping plazas 
existed, but by the end of 1963, over 7,100 were open to customers. This was a massive 
change in how society did business. 
      Lastly, new sunbelt cities sprang up as a result of Kennedy’s suburbs. Six in 
California alone, plus Phoenix, Atlanta, and Miami grew energetically.  Three towns in 
Texas appeared overnight. These warm burgeoning cities welcomed northerners and mid-
westerners away from the cold rust belt towns and the migration was on, much of it 
spurred by the suburbs.  Yet painfully, as will be discussed in chapter nine, virtually 
every means was used in the early 1960s to keep the new suburbs fully segregated.122  
This constituted their major drawback as they heightened racial tensions and began to 
create two different societies. 
      Beyond the “housing boom,” FHA had some other programs for improving housing 
in America. But unfortunately the “wheels fell off the New Frontier’s housing wagon” 
with most of them and none were as successful as his housing boom.  In order of priority, 
FHA emphasized two new “showcase” programs during the Kennedy years and three 
new smaller ones.  The most emphasis was placed on the new 221(d)(3) middle income 
and lower income plan followed by the new home rehabilitation program.  The three new 
but lesser FHA programs were: FHA housing demonstration grants; multifamily housing; 
and the FHA housing research program. 
      The new 221(d)(3) home owner and renter options looked very attractive on paper.  
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They sprang from the 221 “family” of programs for middle and lower-income families.  
The aim of the new 221(d)(3) plan was to deliver affordable housing, with few 
constraints, to lower middle-income families, and upper lower-income ones, plus those 
displaced by urban renewal.  This would further multifamily units.  The latter were 
connected units ranging from two in number to “row homes” and also apartments. 
      Financing for this program remained complex.  Independent construction firms 
interested in building 221(d)(3), or departments of larger construction firms formed 
“limited dividend corporations.”  The new limited dividend corporation received a 
mortgage guarantee from the government covering 90% of the cost of building these 
properties, with only a 10% equity investment down, up front.  As well, application fees 
and other FHA fees could be deducted from the 10% equity requirement.  Moreover, the 
government guaranteed 90% of the mortgage at “below market interest rates” or BMIR as 
this program came to be known.  Nationally BMIR interest rate varied from 3.25% to 
3.0% by FHA region, as BMIR tailored itself to local markets.  The “corporation” could 
also sell shares of its 90% investment or the whole mortgage to anyone, but usually 
mortgage companies purchased the entire project.  Thereby the “active” costs could be 
limited to only a 10% investment and if it sold soon after completion, the corporation had 
their mortgage paid off and kept the profits.  The difference between the prime 
conventional interest rate and the BMIR rate was “absorbed” by the government.  
Further, these projects offered “tax shelter” opportunities through accelerated 
depreciations which allowed the developer to “write off’ 20% of the 10% investment 
(including fees), over the first ten years of the project, provided the original mortgage 
remained.123  And due to the lower overall cost of construction and financing, the new 
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homeowner or renter could expect lower monthly payments. On paper, this appeared to 
be quite attractive plan.  Weaver placed the 221(d)(3) program under FHA, but not the 
financing.124  In July 1961, FNMA created a new special assistance fund for 221(d)(3) to 
take “risk” away from FHA and it was expected business would soon flood into the 
program.125  However, the waters moved slowly as many in construction hoped 221(d)(3) 
financing might fall as low as 1%, which the National Housing Conference had 
recommended, but the administration soundly rejected.126
      Regarding that mortgage financing, Treasury, the bureau of the budget, HHFA and 
Congress all consistently reviewed it.  From June 30, 1961 through November 22, 1963, 
it hovered around 3%, sometimes went up to 3 1/8%, and for a few months stood at 3¼%. 
But as this program offered a 40 year government guaranteed mortgage, the secretary of 
the treasury and the FHA commissioner both believed a 1% rate was too risky.127  Yet 
unfortunately, 3% was not low enough to attract the kind of business expected, which 
constituted one reason the 221(d)(3) program failed. 
      Additionally, BMIR was designed to close the gap housing-wise, between those 
eligible for regular FHA guaranteed loans and those in need of public housing.128  Weaver 
called it a program for families with incomes that “do not permit home ownership at 
current construction costs and market interest rates because their incomes are ... too low 
for decent privately financed housing ... yet are too high to permit occupying low-rent 
public housing.”129  To be eligible for 221(d)(3), a family had to have an annual income 
below 95% of the median incomes in the area of the country where they lived.130  Then, 
middle income meant $4000 - $7,000 per year and low income was $2,500 - $3,999.  
Poverty was below $2,500 per year.131  However, income would always be a disputed 
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issue as many families moved into or out of a category several times, some even as their 
BMIR house was being built. That represented the second major flaw in the program. 
      The third issue was the entire cost of each BMIR house or project had to be front 
loaded, or cash reserved “up front,” in each years HHFA operating budget.  That was 
internal to HHFA, but committed vast sums that could not be “rolled over” to other years 
or used for other projects.132 Businessmen knew this.  And since smaller 221(d)(3) 
projects cost less, they “seemed” to gain quicker approval, thereby locking in money 
early, which prompted a hot letter to President Kennedy from Senator Sparkman.  He 
accused FHA of having a political “ceiling” on 221(d)(3) commitments, in favor of 
saving money even though each project remained at a reasonable cost.  This of course 
was roundly denied by all the aides who responded to Sparkman.133    
      The first BMIR project began on October 10, 1961, as a rental, multifamily housing 
apartments complex in Baltimore.  Initially it provided housing for 320 families but also 
established two unfortunate trends.134  Initially it signaled a vast majority of this housing 
would be rental, as the primary means of reaching low-income people who felt 
uncomfortable with mortgages.  Secondly, a vast majority would become apartments.  
Neither of these represented what the middle class wanted and that became the most 
severe problem for 221(d)(3). 
      As well other difficulties loomed early.  The 221(d)(3) program had a troubling 
design flaw.  Each developer received all the government guarantees as mentioned, but in 
reality had to initially finance their 10% at the start of construction at whatever rate they 
could get, and then the 3% government rate locked in, with all advantages as mentioned 
for the rest of the project.  This burdened some firms.  Further, 221(d)(3) cities, towns, 
 311
and municipalities could approve the location of this federally subsidized housing, and it 
was hoped many would group it into Workable Program for Community Improvement 
(WPCI) application.135  But community desires for this program remained weak as they 
represented a legendary host of political minefields.136 
      In the rural south, 221(d)(3) projects quickly became either all low-income white or 
African-American low-income units and fully segregated, usually resided on the fringes 
of towns or in very obscure locations.137  Many were simply scandals.  One in Mobile, 
AL for African-Americans was 12 miles from the city limits, had no public 
transportation, no strip malls, no nearby schools and the construction was so shoddy it 
represented a blight upon the community even before it was completed.138  Two other 
notable 221(d)(3) projects, known as the Marshall-Terrace Sub-Division in Plant City, FL 
which covered a 300 acre site, and the large site in Stanford-Darien, CT, both 
immediately ran into racial difficulties and caused absolute furors locally.139  But 
maintaining concern for future projects, the administration countered by trying to obtain 
sponsorship agreements in advance from each city.140  HHFA also attempted to solicit a 
genuinely interested 221(d)(3) mortgage lenders list and nourished a list of construction 
companies by region as well.141  Then in June of 1962, in a foolish move to secure 
advance agreements, FHA mandated that no 221(d)(3) house could be built unless it was 
“pre-sold,” which further contributed to the demise of the program.142 
      Professional developers watched all this with intense fascination.  Witty and eloquent 
wise-cracks about this program abounded.  Letters came in from many professional 
organizations as the National Association of Real Estate Boards condemning the whole 
idea.  Feature articles in leading building trade magazines as House and Home failed to 
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agree with the administration that 221(d)(3) represented a good means of housing middle 
and lower income families.143  Then the sobering statistics became public.  By the end of 
1961, only one major project was completed, and by the end of 1962, nationwide, only 
4,200 units of any kind had been constructed.  In 1963, a meager 8,700 units were added.  
Across the entire country, for the Kennedy years a total of only 13,000 units of any kind 
were built under this program.144  The minimum goal of the administration had been 
30,000 units in 1961, 35,000 in 1962, and 37,500 in 1963. 
      Lastly, the 221(d)(3) program also failed to gain broad-based union support in an era 
where unions still prevailed.  Most unions disliked it because of its delays and associated 
“red tape.”145  And that summed it up best.  “Packaging the bureaucracy” put the nail in 
the coffin as Weaver lamented, “many of the non-profit groups do not have the know-
how to put a 221(d)(3) program together.”146  Unfortunately, 221(d)(3) became a dismal 
failure.  Yet Kennedy would not give up on his “show-case” middle-income program and 
in 1963 authorized $130 million for it while requesting from a very reluctant Congress to 
extend its life to July 1, 1965, which they did.147  However as designed, it died under 
LBJ. 
      As an aside, other sections of the 221 family with new changes faired only a little 
better.  Title I’s Section 221(d)(2), dear to Weaver, represented liberalization of financing 
rules and longer mortgage coverage for families displaced by urban renewal.  It aimed at 
providing help for purchasing a new home.  But since most of its clientele held very low 
income, it received little business and a complicated applications process compounded 
life span, and with its own sophisticated funding formula.  For the poor the program 
remained hard to understand.  And that was truly unfortunate, because with a 40 year no 
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down payment mortgage on a $15,000 house at exceptionally low interest rates, it 
presented good options.  Most really poor families though simply could not afford the 
monthly mortgage payments.148
      Title I’s Section 221(d)(4) provided assistance to low-income families displaced by 
urban renewal, for rental housing.  The section was similar to the 221(d)(3) in most 
aspects, but happily included “for profit builders” under its construction umbrella.  The 
catch in this program though, consisted of the fact that everything fell under the existing 
local market interest rates and thus it had only limited impact as well. 
      FHA’s third major emphasis beyond the housing boom and 221(d)(3), focused on 
expanding the existing home rehabilitation program with two new initiatives, one for 
inside and the other outside of urban renewal areas.  The Home Improvement Council in 
1960, estimated that forty million houses in America needed repairs and eleven million of 
these fell into “substandard” categories.  In the early 1960s, total real estate value in 
America stood at $500 billion and the property improvement portion of this at $20 billion 
annually.  Over 60% of all Americans qualified as home owners but the 1960 census 
revealed that 14.7% of homes lacked some or all plumbing, 4.6% “needed major repairs,” 
and 3.8% were overcrowded with 1.5 people per room.149  Since 1934 under Title I, 
Section 2, the federal government had been making loans to qualified families up to 
$3,500 to repair an existing house, for five years at the FHA/VA prevailing interest 
rate.150   Cumulatively these loans had been worth $1.5 billion and had assisted 24 million 
families to date.151  Under Kennedy, to his credit this traditional Title I, Section 2 
program continued to do well.  As usual he remained slightly behind Eisenhower’s pace, 
lending $854,582,000 in 1961, $834,460,000 in 1962, and $803,700,000 in 1963.  Ike 
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averaged $950 million over his last three years.  In addition, both JFK and Ike ran a small 
urban renewal housing rehabilitation program. 
      Kennedy and FHA hoped to accomplish two things with the new rehabilitation 
program. FHA hoped to avoid “disinvestment displacement,” where entire blocks of 
“under-maintained” houses, were withdrawn from financing consideration.  In 1961, 
Boston, Pittsburgh, Miami, Milwaukee, New York, Los Angles, Chicago, Philadelphia, 
and DC had many neighborhoods suffering this fate.  A new program with broader 
coverage was needed because the maximum $3,500 for home rehabilitation with 
payments over five years, was simply not keeping pace with housing costs.152
      What Kennedy’s FHA implemented, as the two new programs were both designed to 
broaden eligibility, for home improvement loans, increase lending amounts, and extend 
the length of the guarantee.  Both plans allowed a homeowner to now borrow up to 
$10,000 for 20 years at 6% interest against the appraised equity of the home.  The new 
Section 203(k) was geographically for anywhere in the country and Section 220(h) 
covered homes in urban renewal areas.  FHA had a future plan for 1964, to rehabilitate 
houses and then directly offer that same house for sale.  This was not signed into law 
before Kennedy went to Dallas.153 
      However, these new FHA rehabilitation loan programs had many huge flaws.  Here 
as with 221(d)(3), the administration misread its clientele and wrote the initial legislation 
too quickly. For home repairs, if an “owner” had good credit, solid employment, and 
lived in a low-risk neighborhood, he or she generally did not need FHA.  So FHA worked 
chiefly with risky homeowners in risky neighborhoods.  The key became getting a private 
lender to make the loan so FHA could guarantee it.154  But the formula remained 
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seriously flawed because $10,000 against a dilapidated house in 1961 was more than 
many of those houses were worth. 
      Then FHA “red tape” settled in.  Processing backlogs due to FHA delays plagued the 
program. Moreover, a lack of willing lenders led Weaver to complain in August 1962 
that, “there has been practically no activity to date.”  Then Section 203(k) had only 706 
houses across the country being rehabilitated and Section 220(h), had two.  Weaver 
offered hopefully that “new FHA programs have traditionally taken considerable time to 
gain momentum, as lenders, builders, and the FHA become familiar with them.”155  But 
statistics overall remained truly grim.  By the end of 1961, a scant 429 applications had 
been received for 203(k) and only 2 for 220(h).  In 1962 nationwide, only 551 more 
homes were improved under 203(k) and 2 more under 220(h).  In 1963, 690 loans were 
made under Section 203(k) and a resounding 4 under Section 220(h).156    The new 
program simply never took off. 
      The new FHA smaller programs though were expected to succeed.  Kennedy’s low-
income housing demonstration grants program approved from the 1961 Housing Act, 
provided $5 million for public agencies and private firms to produce new methods, 
techniques and means of improving housing conditions and housing environments for 
poor families.157  Kennedy’s FHA would approve more “social” low-income housing 
demonstration grants than previous administrations. 
      Every grant as approved, after meeting a demanding set of screening requirements 
and maneuvering through a mountain of paperwork, entered into a contract with FHA.158 
Demonstration grants traditionally were for experimental housing, experiments with new 
home improvements, for new ways to finance low-income housing, and for new “social 
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programs” to better accommodate ‘low-income families.  The new grants even caught the 
attention of speculators.  A developer from Orlando, Florida, and after learning of the 
program from a newspaper story, applied for the entire five million in a letter directly to 
Weaver.159  He of course, was politely turned down. 
      Successful demonstration grants of $30,000 went to Midland, Texas to study new and 
improved social services for low rent housing tenants.  In Cincinnati, Ohio, $142,268 was 
approved to improve the conduct of children in fatherless families and to combat juvenile 
delinquency.  Through the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials 
(NAHRO) and the Ford Foundation, $200,000 became available as a matching grant for 
better counseling and readjustment services to elderly families displaced by urban 
renewal.  Under FHA, many Local Housing Authorities of PHA, in St. Louis in 
particular, received grants to improve conditions of senior citizens. 
      Applications to renovate apartments and older homes, using new construction 
techniques and materials came into FHA as well.  The National Capitol Housing 
Authority and the city of Detroit both received grants to renovate older homes for low-
income families and then “lease them.”160  New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco and 
Toledo, received a grants to develop low rent housing for the physically handicapped.161 
      Yet as with many FHA programs, emerging applications backlogs countered the 
program’s success.  As late as the end of September 1961, Weaver told one applicant that 
the policies were “still in the formative stage and regulations are in the process of being 
drafted.”162  Additionally, it was not a well publicized program and to try and promote it, 
Mort Schussheim traveled across the country on a tour to sell it at all the housing and 
urban development “watering holes.”  Speaking at NAHRO, he called America “an 
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unfinished society,” citing this and other FHA programs as some of the ways to complete 
it.163  However, by June 30, 1962 only $1,372,000 of the five million dollars had been 
committed and by Dallas all the money had not yet been spent. 
      FHA’s own housing research program was another smaller but important one. 
Increased funding under the 1961 Act constituted the chief new aspect, providing FHA 
with funds for several kinds of housing research, advancing many new ideas.  In its 
primary program, research, money, and effort went into pre-fabricated housing and cheap 
pre-built homes to accommodate the poor and lower-income.164  Yet these never captured 
the imagination of anyone willing to make them a trend.  Additionally, FHA conducted 
extensive housing research on issues dear to the consumers and voters.  Suburbs again 
topped that list and the categories were new home sales which included the nice to know 
data, as the sale prices and information on refrigerators, stoves, dishwashers, washers, 
dryers, and heating/air systems.  The FHA’s “consumer statistics” program became a first 
for this kind of data and accompanying it, FHA also offered the public prizes for new 
ideas on residential housing design, known around the central office as the “good 
housekeeping” award.  As well, HHFA and FHA explored how other countries produced 
housing low-income housing.  Weaver established a small Office of International 
Housing within HHFA, headed by Robert Dodge, who in turn worked closely with the 
international housing committee of the National Association of Home Builders 
(NAHB).165  Weaver, Dodge, and others made numerous trips to Denmark, Holland, and 
several South American countries working closely with the International Council for 
Building Research Studies.166  Several trips to South America produced some new low-
income housing alternatives.  But the chief result was a sharp, yet short lived dispute with 
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Whitney Young of the National Urban League over why more minorities were not invited 
to go on these trips.  Weaver told Young he would take action to correct the matter, but 
nothing happened.167
      Nationally, the big multifamily housing program stood as an Eisenhower success 
story and one that Kennedy wanted to keep growing.  It stood as his last FHA initiative 
and he created some new programs and reserved increased sums for it in his Housing Act.  
Multifamily housing consisted of all “rentals,” designed for poor people particularly in 
cities, and for the most part came as apartments of eight units or more.  In a few instances 
row houses or single story houses “hooked” together fell under this program.  Monthly 
rent was low because the government subsidized either the contractor who built it, the 
lender who financed it, or the landlord who ran it, or all three.  It came in three versions, 
rental housing apartments, low cost rental housing, and cooperative housing.  The latter 
were apartments where the tenants pooled their efforts in maintenance and ground care, 
for further reductions in rent. “Low cost rental housing” helped America’s very poor, just 
above public housing poverty line.  This program was managed under three Sections of 
the Housing Act, 207, 213, and 220 and uniquely four government agencies had 
simultaneous programs, FHA, URA, PHA, and the Department of Defense.  FHA’s 
remained the largest.168 
      In 1961, multifamily housing mortgages totaled $928 million on 59,367 projects 
nationally. This represented a 20% increase over 1960, but the figure was deceptive as 
many of these were Eisenhower carryovers.169  Overall in 1962 “rental housing 
apartments” soared to a one year record high of $485 million covering 28,079 units, but 
cooperative housing and low cost rental housing numbers dropped substantially.170  As 
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well, the 1962 figures showed, growth but not in relation to demand.171  Additionally, 
projections for government multifamily housing in 1963 looked grim.  The total volume 
of multifamily mortgage insurance dropped 17% from 1962, while simultaneously over 
90,000 applications were choked up in horrible processing delays, which stood as the 
very real problem for FHA.172  This caused great panic in the Kennedy inner circles. 
      In August of 1962, with “doom and gloom” on the horizon due to multifamily 
housing processing delays, the new FHA deputy commissioner for this program created a 
“blue ribbon” panel to study the matter and correct the problem.  Comprised of fourteen 
public and private housing celebrities plus Ike’s former HHFA chief Albert C. Cole, the 
able Jack Conway, actually headed it up.  The final report of this “Cole Committee” as it 
became entitled addressed FHA delays in very harsh language.  The committee 
pinpointed the obvious, citing delays in the multifamily application process due to a lack 
of staff. It estimated that a staggering 200,000 applications were in some form of “delay” 
in an enormous national backlog across the country.  These applications represented $2.5 
billion in construction and 800 million man hours of work.  It further scolded FHA of 
taking 25 months on average, from application to construction, for starting each 
multifamily government project.173 
      The committee further found that “many of the present methods of processing 
applications are obsolete and do not fit the new housing programs.”  Specific 
recommendations were that multifamily housing insuring offices be established by zone 
in the five major metropolitan areas, separate from the FHA offices there, which had been 
successfully done in New York City.  The committee called for the new deputy 
commissioner for multifamily housing to expand his staff, to include numerous, new, 
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technical and underwriting professionals to hasten application’s review.  These should be 
located in the “zone” offices.  The committee asked the directors of these new zone 
offices to report directly to the deputy commissioner and strongly called for more 
oversight of the program from bureau of the budget and Congress. 
      Bureau of the budget had also been pressuring Weaver to improve multifamily 
application processing.  Weaver responded himself by appointing his own HHFA internal 
review committee chaired by ex-Ike FHA Commissioner Raymond M. Foley, along with 
three former FHA commissioners. Foley’s recommendations paralleled the Cole’s 
committee and uniquely, both committees were headed by Eisenhower’s appointees.174 
      Yet unhappily, major changes required significant increases in personnel that simply 
were not going to be forthcoming with Kennedy’s budget trimming for his election year 
tax cut.  FHA received some personnel by virtue of HHFA taking slots from other 
agencies, and some contractors hired on to help break the backlog, which they did not.  
Weaver also had to send detailed reports to Congress and Conway had to travel up the 
Hill to testify.  Slowly the multifamily housing backlog broke, but not entirely, and the 
damage to FHA’s reputation among builders and lenders was “permanent” for the 
Kennedy year.175 
      The real tragedy for FHA though under Kennedy remained its stunning market share 
drop.  HHFA fell under JFK from 24% market shareat the end of 1960 to 17% at the end 
of 1963.  This hurt all those who for years had been helped by FHA and became an 
embarrassment for HHFA.  Reasons abounded.  In concept, Kennedy had become 
perceived as a liberal by many conservative builders and they were very concerned about  
FHA direction.  Kennedy’s 221(d)(3) program definitely was thought to be too radical 
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and coupled with his endlessly threatening to issue an executive order on open housing, 
all of this created a further climate of mistrust. 
      Two other factors injured FHA.  A lesser one, complaints, caused some loss of 
business, but the severe processing backlogs under Kennedy, severely hurt the proud old 
Agency.  “Complaints” although fewer than during other administrations, often received 
more publicity particularly regarding racism in federal housing, due to Kennedy’s 
promises, and these will be discussed in chapter nine.  In fact though, Weaver managed a 
very “clean” program overall, but there were a few grumbling. 
      “Zoning” complaints continued during the Kennedy housing boom and often the 
Federal government was asked to resolve them, but usually it could not.  Great variations 
in residential zoning had always existed across the country, yet during these years rapid 
housing growth, these variations soared to new levels.  The rights of local boards to set 
their own zoning though, often politically engineered, traveled as high as the Supreme 
Court which found in a number of cases in favor of the local ordinances.176  Zoning also 
remained a well publicized means of racial exclusion in the early 1960s. 
      Complaints over the standardization and enforcements of building codes came next.  
Across the country municipal building code enforcement varied as widely as did housing 
codes themselves, particularly regarding low-income family projects.  Many cities used 
housing codes as a means of governmental intervention into the homes and lives of the 
poor and some cities used them along with zoning, to move the poor off valuable urban 
land.177  Further, most codes were “antiquated and confusing” in comparison to the needs 
of the changing 1960s and a lack of uniformity remained the chief issue.  No minimal 
acceptable national housing codes ever existed, except for FHA and VA, and many of 
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those needed revision.  Moreover, even local codes became symbolic of government 
meddling and “social engineering.”178  In a bold move, Weaver sought to correct this by 
forming a coalition with private developers to review standardization of national building 
codes.  This was noble indeed, but when it could not be arranged, FHA received some of 
the blame. 
      Assessments, construction standards, and foreclosures rounded out the issues people 
remained upset with FHA over.  Assessments and FHA’s property value “judgment” for 
underwriting constituted another area. The Government Accounting Office (GAO) 
regularly audited this, and in fact FHA did well.179 However, spot criticisms from an 
occasional lender, buyer, of public agency, plus on occasional small technical errors 
gained notoriety.180  Also a small number of law suits distinguished themselves in the 
press on the subject.181
      Foreclosures and evictions from FHA properties caused an actual flurry of public 
complaints, and regularly FHA handled these poorly.182  The percentages of foreclosures, 
evictions, and vacancies in FHA property were always questioned by the press and by 
builders.  FHA gradually received the blame for excessive delays in the foreclosure 
process that resulted in unneeded burdens on both the home owner and lender.  Speed 
equated to fairness in foreclosing, particularly if litigation involved extensive tenant legal 
expenses.  GAO cited FHA in 1962 and again in 1963 for having a “weakness” regarding 
timely foreclosures and several telegrams and letters were sent to Kennedy from the 
evicted home owners or tenants.183  Aides responded. 
      Construction standards constituted the final concern of FHA’s constituents.  FHA 
devoted thousands of man hours annually to inspect compliance with its minimum 
 323
building standards. Occasionally, a contractor “went broke” in the middle of a project, 
requiring FHA to quickly locate another builder or write off the project.  “Low income” 
programs and minority related housing “went broke” most often.184  On occasion FHA 
found itself testifying before Congress over property construction standards, which did 
not help its image.185 
      But the very sobering problem that brought about FHA’s decline under Kennedy, 
remained FHA’s persistent and intimidating backlog.  The applications processing 
backlog cast a pall of doom over all FHA programs and was felt throughout all FHA 
regions.  Historically FHA’s percentage of market share was on the decline anyway, but 
Kennedy’s backlogs hastened it.  In the 1930s, FHA maintained 33% to 35% of the 
market which briefly shot up right after World War II, but fell into the low 30% again by 
the early 1950s.  It further dwindled under Ike, to the mid 20% and by the end of 1960, 
stood at nearly 24% when Kennedy moved into the White House.  Under Kennedy, it 
slipped slowly to 23%, then to 22% and in1963 to 17% of the market.  On the good side 
though and as a footnote, in the forty years from 1934-1974, FHA wrote $190 billion in 
mortgage guarantees, marking it as the largest single mortgage insurance operation in the 
history of the world.186  But under Kennedy, FHA’s market share “broke 20% and stayed 
there.” 
      Initially Weaver tried to defended the decline, first blaming the small VA portion of 
the housing market, saying “the need for the use of the VA program by veterans has 
reached its ebb tide,” and then blaming private lending institutions for liberalizing 
financing which stole FHA business.  When that did not work he lambasted S and Ls and 
commercial banks for no longer robustly financing FHA as they once did.  Of course he 
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remained “politically correct.”  Later after Kennedy’s death, Weaver blamed the handling 
of the executive order saying, “a slight shift away from FHA/VA financing [occurred] 
since ... the 1962 Executive Order on Equal Opportunity in Housing.”187  But builders 
knew this would be a weak order, and Kennedy’s carrying FHA into the “social realm” 
which was also cited, had already been done first by Eisenhower who simply did a better 
job of selling it.188 
      The severe processing turbulence caused by the backlog remained the central blame.  
In his weekly reports to the president, Weaver revealed a frightening story.  New FHA 
home applications rose at the start of the New Frontier by 9% over Ike’s last month, and 
19% on existing homes.189  FNMA money remained abundant.  Yet quickly FHA fell 
behind in the important multifamily housing program, and some of Weaver’s dwindling 
staff had to be transferred to work there, while home applications began to pile up.  When 
Kennedy hit FHA with the anti-recession package, followed quickly by the 1961 Housing 
Act, FHA never recovered. By March, 1961, Weaver wrote to Kennedy “We are still 
harassed by lack of personnel.”190  Of course the administration’s response was the now 
famous “belt-tightening” memorandum.  Mayors began to haunt the administration with 
comments about processing speed.191  Weaver asked for additional supplemental money 
for more staff.192  He said “unless we receive supplemental funds at an early date, we can 
make no progress toward reducing backlogs which are continuing to develop in every 
office” and in every FHA program and in every FHA region.193
      By June 1961, Weaver began to report the backlog numbers directly to Kennedy in 
the weekly reports.  For the first week of June 1961, 49,427 applications were on file that 
had not been acted upon for a long time.194  Weaver projected that at full effort with 
 325
existing staff, they might be able to overcome this by mid-October.195  The backlog 
reached 52,485 by Independence Day 1961 and this grew to 55,462 cases by the 21st of 
July, and was compounded by over 1,600 new applications each week.196  By the end of 
August, FHA was 55,208 applications behind schedule on new homes and some had not 
been touched since Kennedy took office.197 
      With the supplemental funds, Weaver hired contracted appraisers, which temporarily 
turned the tide, dropping to 53,603 cases by September 1, 1961.198  A total of 50,655 
cases by mid-September and 43,660 cases behind by early October.199  At the end of 1961 
the backlog was around 30,000. 
      But the damage had been done.  The National Association of Real Estate Boards met 
in Miami and in an article in Barron’s on November 6, criticized Kennedy’s FHA 
program as “insuring risky mortgages, as means of furthering social objectives, and that 
FHA as a result is suffering from a rising tide of foreclosures and defaults.”200  The 
backlog was also referenced as “delays.”201  House and Home picked up on this as did the 
Wall Street Journal.  Congress got involved and Conway had to testify about the 
backlog.202
      Many builders now viewed FHA as an agency that could not process its business in a 
timely fashion and might have a hidden social agenda.  To overcome bad press, in the late 
spring of 1962 FHA began releasing statistics and stories on how well it was doing with 
the applications it did process.203  By then the backlog was hovering around 30,000.204
      But over the summer of 1962, the National Association of Home Builders and House 
and Home magazine got into a hot, open, debate with the NAACP over Kennedy’s 
forthcoming executive order, and so did the Journal of Housing, questioning the 
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reliability of HHFA’s and FHA’s research on the order’s impact on housing growth.205  
The Kennedy position was the order would have little impact, and the National 
Association of Home Builders and many businessmen stated it would destroy housing, 
with most contractors supporting NAHB.  Both were wrong.  But along with the now 
infamous delays, FHA’s credibility over the order stood as another reason to do business 
“elsewhere.”  That autumn, new FHA applications began to dwindle in number, but the 
backlog was never corrected before Dallas.  After the executive order, it received second 
priority in the press.206 
      However, financing “elsewhere” sprang up nationally with one quickly emerging in 
Wisconsin. Believing FHA’s “red tape” resulted in slow service, Wisconsin mortgage 
market investors formed a coalition.  Their purpose was to pool financial resources to 
undercut FHA’s low lending rate, but poor services, and they succeeded.  Securing state 
enabling legislation for their new endeavor, this group of private investment bankers 
created the Mortgage Guarantee Insurance Corporation (MGIC or “Magic”).  MGIC 
focused on getting Wisconsin savings and loan investors to pool liquidity, offering lower 
down payments and lower mortgage rates than FHA and then directly targeted its 
business.  The idea became an instant success, and spread to other states where, using the 
MGIC model, coalitions formed providing a private mortgage insurance network across 
the country, based on FHA underwriting criteria with quicker turn around and better 
service.207  Nationally, this would eventually lead to a huge attrition FHA’s business. 
      Yet the FHA market decline under Kennedy symbolized greater problems.  Kennedy 
continued Eisenhower’s suburban housing boom with slightly lower numbers and 
maintained some of the traditional FHA programs with slightly fewer results.  But unlike 
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Ike, JFK’s not so well thought out new housing initiatives failed, as did his maintaining 
FHA’s market share.  Kennedy’s belt- tightening for his politically driven tax cut, came 
at the wrong time in American urban history.  In his haste to get the 1961 Housing Act to 
the Hill early, needed details were left out of many programs.  His executive order on 
open housing helped few but angered many and Kennedy suffered from a “housing trust 
factor,” while FHA paid the price. 
      Yet the real tragedy was FHA had always been the way out for many of the poor and 
“nearly poor” regarding housing, and FHA’s market share under JFK contracted severely. 
The little pink houses that abounded in the Eisenhower/Kennedy housing boom, did little 
for these Americans, but did solidify the middle class.   It would have been refreshing if 
the poor and minorities could have been financed into the suburbs by FHA programs as 
some previous generations had been.  Ironically, as private lenders began to quit FHA, 
FNMA and Treasury made them even more sound and stronger during Camelot.  
Kennedy of course, remained oblivious to these problems, maintaining his popularity, 
while secretly sustaining his image through numerous pills and cortisone shots.208   But 
trouble was brewing.  As the little pink houses began to cover the recently vacated 
farmland, with their newly developed color televisions seen glimmering through their 
new windows, and with green, carefully manicured lawns they also symbolized barriers 
to those who could not afford them, or were not permitted to buy them.  Resentment was 
building in the ominous dark regions of the great cities, where chances to escape to the 
suburbs had not been at all improved for many, many residents, and the future would be 
very stormy indeed. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
PUBLIC HOUSING AND URBAN RENEWAL  
IN THE EARLY 1960’S: 
POVERTY VERSUS AFFLUENCE IN AMERICA’S CITIES 
                          I wish that those who are pressing [against] the fight against 
    low-rent pubic housing – especially those who are sincere  
    about it – would come with me down the side streets of Fulton  
    and Nostrand Avenues in Brooklyn, off Beach Drive in the  
    Far Rockaways, and off Lexington and Park Avenues in 
    East Harlem…and see the houses that are being lived in 
    by fellow Americans including children.1 
 
      John Kennedy’s continuation of Eisenhower’s housing boom broadened suburbs and 
created new ones around American cities.  But the real measure of the federal 
government’s commitment to America’s cities lay what it did to rebuild crumbling 
downtown infrastructures and in providing adequate housing for its urban poor.2   This 
chapter examines those two goals.   
      Urban renewal and public housing supposedly worked “hand in hand;” one “renewing 
and demolishing” and the other “housing” the displaced.  They also supposedly formed a 
partnership under the Workable Program for Community Improvement (WPCI).  But 
unfortunately for America’s cities this did not happen.  Public housing failed even with 
extremely dedicated and dynamic leaders, while urban renewal succeeded in some cases 
at public housing’s expense.  How well the “poor” fared when “displaced” from their 
original housing is also analyzed in this chapter as is public housing construction in urban 
renewal areas.  Three generalizations are important in commencing this story.       
      JFK remained unwilling to take the political risk required to launch a successful 
public housing program, but, conversely, also remained eager to spend record amounts, 
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on the more popular urban renewal.  Both aspects of this policy hurt the very poor in 
urban America and would later lead to long hot summers in the mid and late 1960s.  
Weaver, his loyal “steward of the cities” managed both these programs, but did so with a 
dwindling staff, to accommodate Kennedy’s desires for a balanced budget leading to the 
tax cut effort.  And as urban renewal brightened numerous downtowns and returned them 
to vibrant centers of trade, business and expensive housing, wide-ranging human 
suffering broadened, with its involuntary relocation and consistent lack of low cost public 
housing for the poor.   
      In the first of these two important programs, public housing, some generalizations are 
significant. Public housing “divided” along a critical abyss between “family units” and 
“elderly units.”  Slowly public housing “family units” became increasingly unpopular, 
while elderly public housing gradually became acceptable.  No politician in the early 
1960s wanted to test the voters with a dramatic expansion of “family unit” public housing 
and also most public housing in 1960 remained segregated. 
      Public housing has a fascinating past.  Congress and a couple of previous presidents 
tried to create reasonably large programs, but when local resistance stiffened, plans 
quickly dissolved and a “take what you can get” mentally settled in.  To improve public 
housing’s image, it became temporarily linked first to urban renewal, and later to mass 
transit, but both relationships quickly ended.  It always remained a “second class” 
endeavor, as it never gained the proper mix of supporters.  Local decision makers, who 
politically influenced public housing, were genuinely negative and public housing’s 
clientele, often minorities, had little influence.  Lastly, the somewhat racist private 
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developers with their usually white clientele, did not want to see a huge public housing 
program develop.3   
      Collectively, this caused public housing clearly appear to be a troubled and “agitated” 
program that became socially and politically “expensive” for a community to implement.  
Even the poor who spent huge proportions of their incomes on shelter, preferred “trickle 
down” housing in “transitional” neighborhoods to huge high-rise public housing 
projects.4   So public housing had no comprehensive support network, yet came with a 
sharp and well established opposition.  
      The federal government slowly and reluctantly increased its presence with public 
housing and in 1932 when Congress passed the Emergency Relief and Reconstruction 
Act which provided federal loans to corporations to construct low-income family 
housing.  Under the “New Deal’s” National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933 and its 1935 
Emergency Relief Appropriations Act, public housing expanded.  The 1937 Housing Act, 
also called the “National Act,” created the program as it is known today, plus the United 
States Housing Authority, the predecessor to HHFA and HUD.  HHFA provided loans 
and annual contributions to Local Housing Authorities (LHA’s), that were chartered by 
states to manage public housing at the “grass roots level.”  Significantly the 1937 Act also 
mandated “equivalent elimination,” one slum home comes down and one public housing 
home goes up.  Quickly this formula drew serious criticism, and Eisenhower willingly 
modified it.  Kennedy further weakened it to a point where it had virtually no impact.5   
      Truman with his 1949 Housing Act took a bold step by authorizing 135,000 new 
public housing units per year for a total of 810,000 over the next six years through 1955.  
Yet that goal was never reached under Truman, Eisenhower, or Kennedy.  From 1950 to 
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1963, only 371,000 “brand new” units were actually built and the key to understanding 
the math is two-fold.6  Statistics vary by source, but the “official” ones presented to 
Congress conflict with other “authoritative” ones given to the press.  Secondly, the phrase 
“new units built” is misleading because government, through subsidies, rehabilitation, 
and other means, provided an additional 210,000 public housing units during the same 
period, bringing the grand total to 581,000 from 1950 to 1963.7  But public housing 
became so unpopular that in 1952, Congress decided to limit what it would fund to 
50,000 units per year and by late 1954, that number had dwindled to between 25,000 to 
35,000 new units annually. 
      Regarding the number of new public housing units built, Eisenhower’s and 
Kennedy’s “statistics” are about the same for any three-year period, with Ike having the 
advantage “on average.”  But the number of public housing units completed and ready for 
occupancy under Eisenhower slowly fell, as his administration placed its emphasis 
elsewhere and serious resistance grew.  The 35,000 new units heralded as “a great 
Republican start,” in 1953 fell to 16,401 annually in 1960.8  Kennedy should have easily 
improved on these numbers, but regrettably he did not.  The Kerner Commission reported 
in 1968 that six million units of low-income and moderate-income housing would be 
required over the next ten years, but by 1970 only somewhat less than a million public 
housing units had actually been built since 1937.9     
      Below is a comparison of the number of new public housing units built under 
Eisenhower from 1953 through 1960 and with Kennedy from 1961 through 1963. 
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   Year  Number   
   1953  35,000     
   1954  18,700        
   1955  19,400        
   1956  24,200        
   1957  49,100        
   1958  67,800        
   1959  36,700        
   1960  16,401        
   1961  19,797       
   1962  28,633       
   1963  25,00010      
 
How many would be built was an issue of profound debate and Ike reached an unspoken 
political equilibrium during his second term of no more than 25,000 per year which 
Kennedy seemed comfortable with as well.11  By the end of 1963 Kennedy “completed” 
just under 72,000 new low rent public housing units, in both urban and rural areas, 
averaging around 24,000 per year.  By December 31, 1963, just over two million poor 
were residing in the just over 500,000 units that remained.12   
      But the Kennedy administration produced the most outrageous statistics.  The White 
House stated in one of the many “accomplishments documents” that from 1961 through 
1963 PHA made reservations “for 112,000 new public housing units,” which simply was 
not true.  They cited Ike as only having produced 77,000 units which also was false.  The 
administration further touted that by the end of 1963 “approximately 100,000 additional 
public housing units…had been placed under reservation,” thus giving the impression 
that a hundred thousand happy folks were soon going to be in new public housing thanks 
to JFK.13  That remained false as well.  Further the press, charmed by Kennedy, 
impressed with his poll numbers, and somewhat disinterested in public housing did not 
dig into these particular statistics. 
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      In my opinion, the administration deliberately presented duplicitous public housing 
figures.  Statistics were always cited cumulatively from 1937 forward, presenting the idea 
to the casual reader that Kennedy was responsible for them.  At the urging of the White 
House,  HHFA’s Fred Forbes provided Kenneth O’Donnell a press release in August 
1962 showing that since the passage of the 1961 Housing Act, 140 new communities had 
made “reservations” for public housing, “bringing to 1,700 nationally” the number of 
participating communities.  But, reservations did not mean new units sprang up, rather it 
noted that a town reserved the right to start planning.  “Seventeen hundred communities” 
constituted the cumulative total since 1937 that had even participated in the program and 
many towns either did not build the housing or simply remained “reserved forever.”  
Forbes further revealed that “511,000 standard dwellings for low-income families 
existed, with an additional 160,000 in the pipeline.”14  But, according to Ms. Marie C. 
McGuire, Administrator of the Public Housing Administration (PHA), one month later, 
1,400 communities were participating in the program and the “cumulative” total since 
1937 for public housing stood at 500,000, “not 511,000.”15  While noting that nearly two 
million people resided in these half million units, she cited that “100,000 (not 160,000) 
were…in various stages of … planning and design.”16
      In studying public housing, the three key leaders, Kennedy, Weaver, and McGuire all 
had different goals.  What JFK wanted for his rather small, expensive, and controversial 
program remains a bit of an enigma as he always stayed on the periphery of public 
housing and his interest remained shallow.  JFK also failed to confront the stiff anti-
public housing opposition and as Robert Weaver politely noted, “many people who 
worked in the administration probably felt that there was an over cautiousness on the part 
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of the President,” which under-lied his relative silence on the issue.17  However, Kennedy 
did champion some aspects of the politically safer and more popular elderly housing but 
not public housing.  His staff proudly told the press that his concern for his elderly 
parents extended to all senior citizens, who should not be overlooked, but as well voted in 
large numbers.  
      Weaver had specific goals for public housing.  Nationally, he wanted to increase its 
availability and rescue it from its near “phasing out” during Ike’s last year.  He also 
wanted more money for demonstration grants to find improved ways to house America’s 
very poor.  The government supporting Local Housing Authorities (LHAs) to rent 
moderately priced private sector housing and re-lease it to low-income families, stood as 
one of the ideas he wanted to expand.  Weaver wished further to relax public housing’s 
eviction rules for over income tenants, successfully incorporating all of this into the 1961 
Housing Act.18  He remained uniquely optimistic about the program, perhaps more than 
he should have, and his future budget reservations called for program level funding at a 
rate of 30,000 new units per year for 1962, 35,000 for 1963, and 35,000 for 1964.19  
“Reservations” for 1965 through 1968 had even higher projections at 40,000 annually.  
      Marie McGuire, Weaver’s PHA’s Commissioner, had her own set of objectives.  
McGuire was Vice-President Johnson’s choice for Commissioner of Public Housing, and 
thus Weaver’s as well.  She was well known as an excellent “public houser,” coming to 
DC as the former director of the San Antonio (TX) public housing program.  Full of 
energy and good ideas, she became Weaver’s true bright spot among the five HHFA 
constituent administrators and also was the highest ranking female appointee in the male 
dominated Kennedy administration.   
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      McGuire, who just recently passed away, offered novel ideas for her time which will 
be discussed later.  In general she wanted to provide more appealing designs for public 
housing and hired top architects nationally to do so.20  Rehabilitation of existing homes 
for public housing became her goal, and she championed “scattering” them throughout a 
city, which was another new idea.  Ms. McGuire advocated elderly “congregate housing” 
and wanted to make the ill-designed 221(d)(3) program work.  Locating and 
implementing more flexible financing formulas stood as an additional priority, as did 
expanding Ike’s self help housing.21  And she wanted social programs to accompany 
public housing, which was truly a radical idea, in the 1960s, but one that Eleanor 
Roosevelt had advocated.  Lastly, she championed a new initiative allowing local 
builders and architects to develop entire public housing projects, from designing the 
buildings, selecting the site, to constructing the building, and then “turning over the key” 
to an LHA when completed.  Neighborhood and clientele participation in planning was to 
be included.  Later, under other presidents, this became the “turn key” program, but 
unfortunately without neighborhood planning participation envisioned by McGuire.    
      McGuire began by successfully stewarding the 1961 Housing Act through Congress, 
which supposedly improved both the quantity and quality of existing public housing.  It 
called for renewed action in six critical areas.  LHAs could receive more direct federal 
loans and guarantees of private lenders’ loans.  Secondly, PHA assistance continued to 
LHAs for bond payments, their chief means of their permanent financing.  Thirdly, the 
Act gave priority placement for public housing to families displaced by urban renewal, 
and reduced some income restrictions along the way.  Elderly and Native American 
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housing expanded as well and McGuire increased lastly, money for demonstration 
programs.22   
      Regarding money, the 1961 Act approved building the remaining 100,000 units 
“authorized” by the 1949 Housing Act and not yet completed.  That meant getting 
“preliminary agreement by a community” for some kind of public housing, whether new, 
rehabilitated, or subsidized.  It authorized $5 million in grants to public and private 
investors for new and improved means of providing public housing for low-income 
families and for the elderly.  Payments of up to $120 per year were approved at $10.00 
monthly for direct rent subsidies to older Americans.23  A new generation of 
organizations, agencies, and cooperatives were included under the title “builder,” for the 
100% guaranteed loans to construct elderly housing.  Direct loan amounts were increased 
from 50 million to 125 million dollars overall for elderly housing and on July 11, 1961, 
McGuire held a series of meetings to discuss implementation of the changes embodied in 
the 1961 Housing Act and issued a series of policies.  Her initial thrust was to use Section 
207 for rehabilitating existing homes for low rent public housing.24   
      However, before she could really get her program moving she ran headlong into six 
serious problems.  First, a unique dispute was ongoing between PHA and URA over 
URA’s urban land use.  In 1961, PHAs managed programs in over 3,000 cities, towns, 
and villages and URA “worked” many of these same locations through their Local Public 
Authorities (LPAs).  URA relied on PHA as a relocation resource for displaced families 
but the two agencies lost “synchronization.”  URA moved so slowly, taking an average of 
five to ten years to complete projects that PHA could not contract and build housing in 
support of URA with any consistency.  Yet PHA never provided URA with enough 
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public housing and thus relations were so strained that both agencies precluded the other 
from their planning meetings.25   McGuire resolved this through a series of joint 
memorandums of agreement in executive meetings. 
      Second on the difficulties list, stood the distasteful community battle over the location 
of public housing projects.  Public housing brought four controversial issues to a 
community: site selection, finding the “acceptable” target population, local financing, and 
project design.26  Opposing “forces” fought bitterly and openly over each category.  
Middle class neighborhoods were not about to warmly greet public housing and some 
cities placed public housing on referendums, which routinely lost.  When approved, local 
pressure often forced new units into areas already occupied by poor people, thus 
concentrating them, and generally in high rises. 
      Third, income ceilings for remaining in public housing constituted a lightening rod 
issue.  Eisenhower’s 1959 Housing Act removed some income restrictions, allowing 
LHAs to set their own guidelines.  However, numerous LHAs in the deep south used this 
to discriminate and some LHAs had such a strict income ceiling, that just slightly 
exceeding it led to swift eviction.  Squabbles broke out in the press over these evictions.27  
New York used sophisticated schemes to out-maneuver income ceilings allowing a $600 
exception against the income cap for each working family member.  In fairness to the 
overall PHA program, Weaver and McGuire had to “adjust” that to an $800 maximum 
deduction for all older working children.28  New York countered by raising maximum 
family income level to $8,112 annually, whereas nationally it was $3,132.00 and PHA 
negotiated that down to $5,112 for a family.29  But overall, McGuire raised the cap, 
which was beneficial.  She issued a series of policy and regulatory changes and  McGuire 
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relaxed the “over income” rule, allowing around 2,500 more families per year to remain 
in public housing.  By the end of the Kennedy administration, she required every region 
to “adjust their caps” so public housing families could stay with slightly higher income 
rates than under Eisenhower.   
     Inconsistencies and disagreements over the quality of public housing design 
constituted a fourth problem for McGuire.  Liberals wanted numerous design and 
“luxury” improvements, and conservatives “constraints” or “Spartan” surroundings.  Cost 
cutting for conservatives in public housing included elevators that stopped on every other 
floor, small, cramped apartments, toilets without seats, cabinets and closets without 
doors, and no recreational facilities on the property.30  Unfortunately, in most cases, 
“conservatives” prevailed and the lack of value placed on the project sent a clear message 
and immediate to the residents about their own value.   
      Money was always a problem.  Congress regularly “under funded” public housing 
appropriations thus preventing the construction of enough new units to meet the demand.  
Moreover, as with all HHFA constituent agencies, each year McGuire requested New 
Obligational Authority (NOA) and Net Budget Expenditures (NBE) greater than what she 
received.  Yet her cuts were consistently deeper than expected.  For example, projections 
for Kennedy’s second term continued this trend as in1965 McGuire requested $17.4 
million in “administrative” expenses and the Bureau allowed $16.6 million.31
      Staffing for McGuire’s Agency encountered the same problems FHA dealt with.  
McGuire’s request for adequate new staff to support the 1961 Housing Act was not 
approved.  She received a couple of administrative slots such as “assistant PHA 
commissioner for development” but across her Agency, she had “the few doing more for 
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the many.”32  The impact of the Director of the Bureau of the Budget David C. Bell’s belt 
tightening, hit PHA by the fall of 1961 Ms. McGuire was required to eliminate forty 
personnel from the central office in mid-November.  Sadly, she asked Weaver if he could 
place some of those dismissed in other agencies and some were, but most had to be “let 
go.”33  
      As she was required to, McGuire instituted numerous savings in public housing to 
conserve budget money for Kennedy’s political goals.  Forcing more efficient public 
housing management at the local level commenced the effort and she trimmed $2.75 
million from PHA to help the president balance his budget.  She accomplished this 
through some voluntary savings like eliminating 200 telephones and lines.34 Other 
savings came from the “operations budget,” such as making arrangements for 
refrigerators with longer life spans, and for improved yet cheaper paint removal 
solutions.35  She instituted “Total Development Costs” analysis using indicators supplied 
by Boeckhs and F. W. Dodge, to find the cheapest yet best supplies for public housing by 
region.36       
      In overcoming the above problems and budget issues, McGuire set five goals, one 
short term and the other four long term as management objectives.37   First of all and 
“close to home” was to get control over the LHAs.  LHAs were key in public housing 
management.  LHAs managed from one unit of federally assisted public housing to 
hundreds, depending upon city size.  Each LHA had a five-person board, which held 
legal and discretionary authority and was usually appointed by a city mayor.  The board 
served as a local public housing policy-making body and one board member was always 
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appointed the “commissioner,” who set the basic rules for local policy and assumed fiscal 
responsibility, while providing personal leadership.38  
      LHA commissioners were a “strange breed” of public servant, sort of a throw back to 
the good government era of the turn of the century progressives.  They were volunteers 
and in most cases were paid little or nothing.  They were to a person, male, white, middle 
or upper income, and were well educated in a stark contrast to their clientele.  No women 
served nationally as LHA commissioners in the early 1960s, yet 26% of all public 
housing families were headed by women.  Only 6% of commissioners were non-white, 
but 55% of public housing residents under Kennedy were non-white.  Only 11 % had 
incomes near the median public housing resident rate of $3,132 annually with the median 
annual commissioner’s income being $11,700 and only 3% of commissioners ever lived 
in public housing.39  These huge differences led to serious problems over time, because 
providing “vision” for something you have never experienced is always problematic.  To 
preserve their little fiefdoms, commissioners formed an association called the National 
Committee of Housing Authorities (NCHA) which also protected LHAs’s in financial 
difficulty.40   
      Uniquely, some “commissioners” even disliked public housing and many regularly 
agreed with their adversaries, that the number of public housing units for a specific town 
was “just about right,” when of course it was not.  Moreover, commissioners did little to 
abate neighborhood hostility toward public housing and only 5% spent ten hours or more 
weekly performing their honorary job, but not surprisingly worse, 42% of them felt 
segregation in public housing was just fine.41  Currently then, their views, their 
conservative association, and their management style eroded the political base public 
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housing should have enjoyed, causing it to carry on without its intellectual, union, or 
even liberal support, and without any broad demand from the electorate either.42     
      PHA provided financial assistance to LHAs through annual contributions and 
subsidies to maintain them.  LHAs received temporary loans from PHA to meet their 
obligations, and in turn sold notes and bonds, to investors to pay off their debts.  These 
notes and bonds, some good for up to 40 years, were further secured by PHA and were a 
big business in themselves.43  For example, in March 1961, LHAs sold almost $205 
million worth nationally.44   On the negative side, complete defaults of entire LPAs were 
rare, so when that occurred PHA “consumed” the entire loss.  Big cities seldom 
defaulted, leaving that distinction to small towns and midsize cities yet the federal 
government lost about $5 million annually in this kind of write-off.45   
      Auditing LPAs fell behind and needed immediate central office attention.  To 
improve LHA administration, McGuire revised several PHA auditing policies.  Also, she 
placed “development” of new LHAs in additional cities as a priority and since public 
housing management costs had increased between 1954 and 1968 by 50%, primarily 
because of wage and salary increases, LHA rent “schedules” needed adjustments.46 
Through a series of memorandums, and by direct regional meetings, McGuire swiftly 
streamlined these procedures and made these adjustments.47  
      A second goal for PHA was to successfully “accelerate” public housing spending to 
help the administration get the country out of the 1961 recession.  McGuire complied by 
giving special attention to the processing of applications from communities with high 
unemployment.  In the 100 highest unemployment areas, PHA accelerated or began 
construction in 46 of them by the end a April 1961.48  Construction contracts worth $43 
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million were quickly awarded in sixteen such communities for 3,600 units and annual 
construction contracts were swiftly signed for 38 more locales with similar high 
unemployment, for 8,250 units worth $120 million.49  From January 1 to March 31, 1961, 
16,174 units were “approved for construction” worth $70,396,589 and in February 1961, 
PHA processed an annual contributions contract for Dearborn, MI worth $1,093,295 in 
the record time of one week.50  The cost of public housing averaged $9,906.53 per unit, 
which was fairly expensive if one considers these were chiefly apartments and a buyer 
could get a completely new home during the Kennedy years for $13,000 to $23,000.51  As 
well, the cost per room under Kennedy was $2,000 to $3,900, which was also high.52  In 
total for fiscal year 1961, PHA contracted for 37,000 public housing units worth $70 
million and for 1962, 33,600 units worth $340 million, and around the same for 1963.53  
But the key to successfully bringing these contracts to completion constituted another 
matter.  
      Thirdly, McGuire’s real legacy came from her new ideas in public housing 
architecture, location, and program offerings.  She was the first “public houser” to blend 
new architecture with old, establishing a viable “decentralized” public housing program, 
while still maintaining the “traditional high-rises.”  McGuire wanted to make public 
housing “less public,” less stigmatized, more attractive, and more livable.  To do this, she 
hired good, local architects to make public housing more pleasing and blend it with 
neighborhood housing, thus giving the resident a sense of pride.  Uniquely, McGuire did 
this so well some members of Congress criticized her efforts saying she made public 
housing “look too good.”  But her efforts paid off and this new program called “vest 
pocket” public housing succeeded in many of the “3,000 towns, cities, and counties,” 
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often quoted by the administration as the cumulative community count, which were 
managed by 2,000 LHAs.  Vest pocket public housing “fit right” into a locality like the 
“vest pocket” of a suit, as architects designed the homes to fit the style of an existing 
neighborhood.  San Antonio, St. Paul, Omaha, and Minneapolis adopted this form of 
public housing which “took the edge” out of the anti-public housing argument.54  
However as a national success, LHAs, although encouraged to hire the best local 
architects to achieve vest pocket standards “of imaginative design,” usually caved in to 
public pressure to only pay for cheap designs.55  
      As mentioned, another ingredient in her renovations concerned “scattered site” 
housing, where public housing became placed “around the town geographically,” rather 
than concentrated in the meanest neighborhoods.  This often used existing housing and 
worked well in some cities, generally mid-sized ones, where the political influences were 
not as deeply rooted or race based.  However in some towns, scattered sites met with stiff 
resistance and only 87,000 individual scattered site units ever became completed from the 
start of the program through 1991.  Some communities stood so openly against it they 
bombarded PHA and the White House with letters challenging the Constitutional 
authority for spending government money for this kind of public housing.  They were 
unhappily assured that the matter had already been resolved by the Supreme Court in 
1945 in Cleveland v. United States (323 US.829).56  If pressed for scattered site, cities 
often simply withdrew from the federal program and Baltimore, Boston, Cleveland, and 
Detroit, built no new federally assisted public housing between 1962 and 1964.  So 
scattered site remained predominately a good idea, on the books only.  
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       McGuire succeeded though with several other projects.  Congregate housing, or 
elderly public housing with rooms having baths, plus food services and limited medical 
and recreational facilities, was developed and well received in some cities.57   An 
additional innovation of Ms. McGuire’s was “self help” housing, where qualified tenants 
assisted in the initial construction, maintenance and repair of the public housing they 
occupied.  This was especially helpful for Native Americans.58   
      McGuire played a leading role in fielding a bold, new “flexible financial formula.”  
Her idea became akin to variable rate mortgages by “group.”  PHA now permitted “group 
financing” where several LHAs issued notes under a larger single housing authority, 
which could sell them easier.  This became important for rural communities.59   “Group 
financing” also encouraged small housing authorities to ban together to issue obligations 
under a “general agent,” obtaining lower interest rates.  LHAs also marketed local 
authority bonds in new ways and amounts were raised from $1,000 to $5,000 each.  This 
encouraged an aggregate of $7.1 million in the sale of temporary notes and $6.4 million 
from bond sales, with most LHAs making a profit from 1961 through the end of fiscal 
year 1964.60   
      McGuire also enticed FHA to venture into public housing, financing a joint 
PHA/FHA operation in New York City which was worth $20,000,000 and covered a four 
block development.  Low-income PHA families could move into FHA middle income 
housing when their circumstances improved, and middle income families falling on hard 
times could move into public housing the previous households vacated, in the same 
development.  This was truly an innovative idea that worked well, yet it came nowhere 
near meeting the housing demand.61   
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      However, her most important and lasting achievement sprang from expanding public 
housing’s scope into the social the social realm, which was new and emerging territory in 
the early 1960s.  In a joint PHA/HEW venture she provided public housing families with 
“on the spot” counseling and “on call” social services through a series of grants to states 
and cities and this significantly strengthened community services in low-income 
neighborhoods.62  McGuire actually tried to transform public housing into an effective 
form of social welfare with model youth programs, demonstration programs, and family 
service centers.   
      PHA initiatives with HEW improved coordination of federal activities serving low-
income Americans and both agencies shared legislative agendas and coordinated 
demonstration programs in an attempt to “tie together” public housing, elderly housing, 
and juvenile delinquency.63   PHA and HEW proudly proclaimed that the “public housing 
program “should contribute to the social and economic advancement of its tenants,” 
which though not entirely new, was a pivotal vision then.64  PHA joined the Veterans 
Administration as well in joint low-income housing for disabled veterans, using 
rehabilitated homes and PHA-HEW established a joint task force to examine how 
demonstration programs could be improved.65  In Saint Louis in the spring of 1962, they 
examined how welfare and housing services together could be provide “on site” 
counseling for low-income families.66  The task force traveled to several locations across 
the country, Detroit, St. Louis, New Haven, Pittsburg, and Boston, and receiving first 
hand testimony.  Some of these ideas will discussed in Chapter ten.67   
      McGuire worked hard to promote PHA’s new social agenda.  On the advice of 
Gordon M. Sessions, she proposed a “President’s Public Housing Advisory Committee” 
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to connect business to social reform in public housing but this went nowhere as Kennedy 
did not wish to associate his office with the effort.68  Some of McGuire’s larger public 
housing projects came with contracted personnel for home-making advise, job placement, 
counseling and day care, and this later would be a chief ingredient in LBJ’s “model 
cities” public housing program.  Unfortunately, LBJ did not effectively apply the 
McGuire client participation formula to planning.69   
      Demonstration programs constituted a further important McGuire focus and PHA 
managed  extensive, and innovative ones.  However funds as originally mandated 
allowed only for research on improving shelter, so “innovation” was used.  The 
demonstration grants program provided $5 million for research and each approved grant 
was to attract other funding usually private sector for implementation.70
      Novel ground was broken by PHA and HEW through this demonstration program.  In 
March, 1962, PHA and HEW instituted a joint memorandum to research “stimulating 
local communities to provide intensive and readily available assistance” for placing low-
income and welfare families into a self supporting status.71  Four proposals followed:  
$30,000 to the National Federation of Settlements and Neighborhoods to evaluate how to 
improve social behavior in low-income families; $142,268 to the Cincinnati Housing 
Authority to combat juvenile delinquency; NAHRO received for $200,000 from the Ford 
Foundation and PHA, to ease elderly displacement due to urban renewal; and the St. 
Louis Housing Authority received a grant to rehabilitate project residents.72   Even the 
Miami Housing Authority was funded and came up with a novel idea of educating its 
low-income residents through classes at the University of Miami.73  Weaver provided 
McGuire with a $194,470 to the National Capital Housing Authority on June 8, 1962, to 
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“demonstrate” how existing housing could be used for families displaced by urban 
renewal, through a mammoth “finder, locator, and deposit” program using “current 
stock” housing.74  By August 1, 1962, twenty-five grants pending worth just over $2 
million were authorized and by June 30, 1963, twenty-three had been approved.75
      Demonstration grants to small towns and mid-size cities, produced some good ideas 
as well.  Some of the more innovative ones were the purchase of private dwellings for 
subsidized low-income rental housing; the purchase of existing hotel structures; the 
purchase of existing apartment buildings for conversion to public housing; short-term and 
long term lease arrangements; grants to low-income families to purchase a home in lieu 
of subsidies; the purchase of FHA mortgages for low-income families; and a host of self 
participation and self help mortgage, lease, and rental options plus “gradual” ownership 
measures followed.76  Glassboro, New Jersey had the most innovative one, proposing that 
a family about to be displaced be allowed to use the equity in their substandard home as a 
down payment for a new home in a local public housing cooperative subdivision.  
However, this was too close to FHA’s powerful 203 series program to compete 
nationally.77 
      Yet real success eluded the demonstration grants program.  McGuire moved public 
housing toward a complete environment for the poor rather than just shelter, which had 
never been done before and White House was not going in that direction.78  From June 3, 
1961 through June 30, 1963, only $3.8 million of the $5 million in demonstration grants 
money had been spent, as national backing and broad exposure for the program were 
missing.  It remains dubious as well that the $10 million figure would have been 
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approved.  Public housing simply was not popular enough either in the White House or 
“on the streets.” to draw a large “research” clientele.79 
      Lastly, McGuire had to confront the problems of housing located on urban renewal 
sites which will be discussed later.  Ike’s “predominately residual clause,” specified that 
substantial housing of some kind had to accompany urban renewal site development 
plans.  The 1961 Housing Act relaxed that requirement, allowing “local determination.”  
Consequently, stores, connecting cluster shopping centers, entertainment complexes and 
businesses dominated urban renewal sites, with less and less standard and public 
housing.80   
      McGuire and her staff also spent vast amounts of time managing public relations due 
to the volatility of her program.  Ms. McGuire traveled across the country to “sell” public 
housing at ceremonies ranging from ground breaking of the first unit of Beaver, 
Pennsylvania public housing in the spring 1961 through to the construction in 
Washington DC 500,000 [cumulative] public housing unit in late March 1962.81 
      In the story public housing, the program posed several severe problems it never could 
overcome.  In America, heading that list was the “high-rise syndrome,” which built 
housing truly unsuitable for family living, that became an invitation to vandalism, crime, 
and social disorders, and that quickly turned into slums because many who lived there 
lacked job and transportation access, the keys to success elsewhere as in post WWII 
Europe.82  St. Louis’s Pruitt-Igoe was a good example though at the start, it provided 
2,740 individual apartments and was thought to be ideal in 1957.  It had to be destroyed 
in 1974 because it became unlivable and in the process, the St. Louis Housing Authority 
became the largest slum landlord in the city.83  However, conditions for the poor were not 
 364
improved by Pruitt-Igoe, as “problem families” were concentrated in one location, and 
racially were completely segregated.  Blacks were placed into the massive Pruitt-Igoe 
complex, that “…became a potent symbol for all that was wrong with public housing.”84  
In Philadelphia, the housing authority reported “dope peddlers, prostitutes, rapists, 
thieves, alcoholics, unmarried mothers with two or more children, “tuberculars,” 
compulsive gamblers, and families guilty of extremely poor housekeeping,” comprised 
their high-rise clientele.85  Philadelphia’s public housing (PHA) built both high-rises and 
subsidized row houses.  It was pressured by the Citizen Committee on City Planning 
(CCCP) to maintain anything but high-rise solutions, yet that did not always work.86 
      But the high-rises eventually prevailed nationally.  Many urban public housing 
settlements simply became high-rise, armed, encampments.  Without restricted access, 
the lobbies and corridors were vandalized and filled with trash.  Lights were beaten out, 
then replaced under metal cages, only to be poked out or sprayed black.  Without 
maintenance, elevators broke down and staircases became garbage dumps, roofs leaked, 
and broken windows abounded.  Without babysitters, single mothers, often stranded in 
apartments with babies, had to allow their other children to roam unsupervised sixteen 
floors below.87  These problems brought cries for new social engineering, but McGuire’s 
reforms became thwarted by disinterest and politics.88   
      Big city urban bosses favored high-rises since they concentrated the poor on one site, 
and served as a means of containment, and big urban developers liked the “high-rises” 
because they took up less valuable urban land and were profitable to build.  
Unfortunately, land acquisition costs were so high in cities, many were forced to go 
“high-rise” even while knowing it was a “social” disaster.  Malcolm Peabody deplored 
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the problem as “we knew it was a ghastly mistake to erect monster public housing 
projects like Pruitt-Igoe, Columbia Heights in Boston, and the Taylor Homes in 
Chicago….  Experience proved…that packing multi-problem families together was like 
packing oily rags, risking spontaneous combustion.”89   
      High-rises and their problems gave public housing a stigma that slowly grew worse 
under Kennedy.  Known as “slums,” “tenants,” and “projects” public housing became 
synonymous with high-rises and high-rises with trouble.  Time magazine reported on 
“200 person” buildings in Chicago, housing instead 1000 people, and where reporters 
could meet “pig face,” a young boy whose nose had been chewed off by a rat.  Chicago’s 
Mayor Richard J. Daily approved the massive Robert Taylor Homes, a project for 28,000 
predominately African-Americans, of which 20,000 were children, on 31 individual high-
rise slabs.  It was called the “perpetual ghetto.”90  The Robert Taylor Homes symbolized 
the failure of high-rise public housing in the 1960s as Pruitt-Igoe later would in the 
1970s.  But the great failure of the 1980s, known as Cabrini-Green, had its roots in the 
1960s as well.91  
      Chicago managed this great catastrophe, also the most “notorious” high-rise in the 
country.  Rising ominously out of an older Italian-American slum of the great depression, 
the Francis Cabrini Homes named after a soon to be canonized Catholic nun of the poor, 
expanded, gaining the name of a local labor leader William Green.92  Commencing with 
600 dwellings, by the end of 1962 the Cabrini-Green homes encompassed fifty acres with 
23 separate building of slab construction each rising 10 to 19 stories.  This became the 
“Urban Olduvai Gorge of American public housing,” something everyone could point to 
and use as a baseline for social commentary.93
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      Boston maintained a large public housing population as well, in virtual geographic 
segregation.  The Boston Redevelopment Authority kept the Irish and Italian poor in one 
part of the city North end, and the African-American poor in the other (Roxbury) in 
higher buildings, and worked hard to ensure it stayed that way.  In Miami, high-rises 
would be the start of housing related riots in the mid 1960s.  The city established Liberty 
Square during the New Deal and then expanded it under Kennedy.  A neighboring 
development in Overtown received substantial funding under Eisenhower, but by the 
mid-1960s, the I-95 corridor “transferred” numerous Overtown residents to Liberty 
Square, which quickly exceeded its capacity and it also would later be known for its 
bloody riots.94 
      New York City as well had trouble with high-rises.  The 1960 census showed that 
350,000 New Yorkers lived in substandard housing, and that did not include the homeless 
who could not be adequately counted.  Democratic Mayor Robert Wagner issued the 
“Panuch Report” in March 1960 stating housing shortages had worsened in the 1950s 
rather than improved.95  That would eventually lead to a decline of non-elderly housing in 
and around Harlem, and the expansion of the troubled Robert Taft and Mitchell-Lama 
high-rises to compensate.96  McGuire to her credit wanted to get control of the high-rise 
problem, but was unable to do so during her tenure.  But she did “lobby” to have them 
banned as a form of new construction, except for the more benign elderly program and 
the 1968 Housing Act did just that.97  This ban was in part a reflection of her dedicated 
effort.   
      But New York City led a small list of a few important cities that tried to do something 
to correct the high-rise problem.  New York City had by far the Nation’s largest public 
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housing program, and slowly transformed its program direction to apartments in 
established medium height buildings.98   The New York City Housing Authority by the 
end of 1962 managed 107 separate developments consisting of 494 buildings that 
provided housing for 120,465 families, including 474,600 children.  The New York 
Housing Authority remained “landlord” for a population then larger than Delaware, 
Vermont, Wyoming, Nevada, or Alaska.  It also housed more people than lived in Jersey 
City, Columbus, Louisville, or Phoenix and the Housing Authority’s police force was the 
24th largest in the country, numbering 755 officers, surpassing municipal forces in 
Minneapolis, Atlanta, and Louisville.99   In twenty years, by the end of 1982 it had grown 
to a $3 billion public corporation which managed the largest “real estate” holding in the 
United States, and used more electricity annually than the entire state of Utah.100  New 
York still remained a city of contrasts, but it did make an effort. 
      Milwaukee and San Antonio stood as examples of cities with more successful, 
smaller public housing programs as well as a few high-rises.   Additionally, some 
California towns along the Mexican National Border maintained small, but successful 
public housing programs in cooperation with the Mexican government in an urban 
planning cooperation agreement.  Puerto Rico managed another smaller program.101
      McGuire dealt with a host of other matters in program enforcement and performed 
well.  She clearly ran a clean program and controlled corruption.  PHA in making its 
substantial annual contributions to LHA’s, varied the amount according to region.  This 
“local variation” left room for fraud because in some areas of the country, political 
pressure was exerted to raise federal contributions.  A. Willis Robertson of the House 
Committee on Banking and Currency investigated all of Eisenhower’s local contracts 
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from 1954 through 1961, and found nothing particularly illegal, but sent a stern warning 
to Kennedy to be careful.102  And then there was the on-going federal investigation 
targeting Billie Sol Estes in 1962 for purchasing over 500 homes in the late 1950s from 
the surplus defense public housing programs called the Lanham Act.  Those were in 
Texas, and Estes “literally” purchased the land on which the buildings stood that gave 
him the right to purchase the buildings by “negotiations” with the government as the 
“land owner” rather than by the competitive bid system.  The homes were sold to real 
estate operators who in turn remodeled them and sold them as single family homes or 
moved them to a more profitable new locations.  Some were even insured by FHA.103  
Estes made a handsome profit, but he was LBJs secretarial assistant when Johnson sat in 
the Senator, not McGuire’s.  McGuire kept tight control and ran an honest program.   
      “Administrative costs” stimulated a protracted dispute between PHA and GAO which 
she readily resolved as well.  With public housing, bigger was better (less expensive by 
volume) for unit costs and GAO wanted a set rate for facilities and utilities, and 
demanded small towns or cities with the smaller and more expensive projects to pay the 
difference.  PHA and GAO hosted heated Congressional debates over this, and finally 
Senator John Sparkman reached an agreement through McGuire’s intervention, for a 
“barter system” where the small towns made payments in lieu of taxes to the state, with 
the state receiving less PHA’s money overall.104   
      Maintaining minimum housing standards to code created a consistent problem which 
Ms. McGuire tried to resolved as well.  New York City had a system where thousands of 
poor lived in leased “public” housing through the city, from “building owners” who made 
few repairs yet could not be shut down by the city.  If they were closed, the poor had no 
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place else to go and everybody knew that.  These owners were true “slum lords.”  As 
well, Detroit had code compliance problems with builders, inspectors, housing authority, 
and tenants all at the same time.105  The tenants revolt movement, in its infancy under 
JFK, began over code violations and then spread to rent withholding.106  McGuire 
proposed a “national public housing policy” in August 1962 to correct these code 
problems, but that was still being debated by the end of the Kennedy administration.107  
      However she took direct and successful action over rent increases.  Sporadic rent 
increases in public housing always stirred negative debate.  PHA used a percentage of 
income ratio which varied nationally from of 21.8% to 23.0%.  But rents were a local 
determination and usually caused much spirited public debate.  McGuire simply 
publicized the ratio and explained how it worked, and “proved” nationally it was fair.  
She kept this “schedule of rents” consistent with local economies.108         
      Then there was the political side of public housing, which Kennedy did use to his 
advantage. From the 6,000 letters received daily at the White House, JFK intervened 
annually in couple of public housing “crisis.”  Around Christmas of 1962, according to 
Fred Forbes in a note to Pierre Salinger, “I try to get a good Christmas angle for the Boss.  
Last year we worked it through you on the Negro family about to lose their housing in 
Chicago.  Last night I was able to get this one in Philadelphia for this year.”  In 1961, 
Kennedy’s personal intervention in battling the eviction of Mrs. David Franklin from a 
Chicago public housing project, constituted what Salinger splashed all over the press that 
December 25th, as her husband a Reservist had been mobilized for the Berlin Crisis.109  
JFK intervened just in the nick of time against “dark, malevolent forces lacking 
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comparison” and saved them from eviction.  Kennedy gained excellent national press 
over the matter.110    
      From Chicago to Philadelphia to Kenosha, WI, the “helpful” hand of the president 
could occasionally be seen directly aiding the poor.  For them this became akin to 
winning the lottery.  In Kenosha in 1962, Kennedy intervened just in time to delay the 
eviction of a family threatened with being placed onto the streets because their home was 
being demolished but the new public housing they were scheduled for was not yet ready. 
Further, American Motors Corporation (AMC) had planned a parking lot for the current 
property, and JFK in high drama, sent telegrams to the mayor of Kenosha and Kenosha 
Public Housing Authority and requested help from AMC as well.  He also ordered 
HHFA/PHA to speed up construction of the new property.111  The press remained 
overjoyed. 
      In the otherwise grim business of “public” housing, elderly and “Indian” housing 
constituted a few bright spots.  In elderly housing, Ike’s 1956 Act created federal elderly 
public housing, and his 1959 Act authorized further direct assistance.  Kennedy’s Task 
Force Report on Housing and Urban Affairs recommended much more money and 
numerous changes to the program plus the 1961 Housing Act liberalized eligibility for 
building and managing elderly housing.  Kennedy appropriated $125 million for the 
program and provided elderly families direct rent subsidies.112  Using McGuire’s careful 
legislative drafting, JFK signed into law the Senior Citizens Housing Act of 1962 that 
raised the federal government’s elderly housing spending from $125 million to $225 
million and covered both urban and rural elderly.  Since 1962 had off-year elections, a 
pleased White House had little trouble sailing this through an equally cooperative 
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Congress.  In October 1963, Congress added another $50 million to Kennedy’s 
program.113
      Unfortunately elderly housing had four parents and some serious duplications.  PHA, 
FHA, CFA, and the Farmers’ Home Loan Administration (FHLA) each had a competing 
and parallel program which lead to waste.  But no agency intended to “give-up” this voter 
friendly issue and which agency managed the program depended on where the elderly 
housing was physically located, what financed it, who built it, and what managed it.  
FHA ran Section 231 mortgage insurance, Section 232 for the rehabilitation of nursing 
homes, and the famous  Section 221(d)(3) that had an elderly program.  Section 202 
belonged to CFA, that offered a popular direct loan program for senior citizens.  PHA ran 
a large elderly housing program through LPAs as well, and the Farmers’ Home Loan 
Administration (FHLA) had the rural one connected to agriculture.114 
      By the end of 1961, 3,472 units for senior citizens were “under management” by 
LPAs and 8,471 units were under construction with 28,740 units in “planning” stages, at 
389 locations nationwide.115  By the end of 1963, PHA authorized 58,519 units for the 
elderly, and another 14,126 were under reservation with CFA, plus FHA insured an 
additional 25,133 units under Section 231.  Uniquely even though small in number, the 
Kennedy years accounted for 70% of all elderly public housing funded to the end of 
1963.  Cumulatively, units occupied by senior citizens stood at 135,000 nationally by the 
time JFK left for Dallas.116  Johnson however, really grew the program as by 1969 there 
were 239,624 elderly units and LBJ exceeded Kennedy’s percentages and numbers.117    
      Lastly, in elderly public housing, McGuire and Weaver established a joint HHFA- 
HEW task force to improve services available to federally assisted elderly.118   Weaver 
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wanted a “national policy for the housing of senior citizens,” but it did not happen under 
Kennedy.  A new HHFA office for senior citizen’s housing was created though with 
Sidney Spector appointed as the manager.119  And in a manner of speaking, Kennedy’s 
President’s Commission on Aging managed elderly policy.120  In creating it, plus 
Weaver’s advisory committee on senior citizen housing, Kennedy said on February 21, 
1963 in his “special message on aging,” that he was aiding “the 17.5 million people age 
65 years or older.”121  Though his commission was chiefly for political impact, it did give 
the impression to the 17.5 million elderly voters that JFK remained involved in their 
concerns, beyond his small elderly housing program.122  Kennedy wanted another $120 
million for the elderly in the election year of 1964, for his second term.123  Uniquely, 
Weaver spoke about elderly housing on Friday on November 22, 1963 when news came 
over the wires and radio about gunshots in Dallas near the presidential motorcade.  He 
did not speak again in publicly until December 11 of that year.124
      McGuire ran a small programs for Native Americans also.  This was an off-shoot of 
the 1937 United States Housing Act yet remained an exceptionally limited venture.  Only 
about 3,600 units per year, either rental or for purchase, were completed.  Kennedy called 
the plight of Native Americans “a National Shame” in his 1960 campaign, but he was 
slow to respond and it was not until March 1962 that PHA offered any new coverage for 
Native Americans.  In October 1962, the Ogala - Sioux Authority dedicated their first low 
rent housing program and another in Pine Ridge, South Dakota quickly followed.125  
However, as with many of Kennedy’s domestic programs, this was well intended 
program remained much too small to have any measurable impact.  The population of 
Native Americans in 1960 stood at 523,591 and the 3,600 units per year did next to 
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nothing to alleviate their housing shortages.126  Native Americans public housing 
paralleled the regular program and ran on annual contribution contracts, but the federal 
government also paid the difference between what a Native American family could afford 
and the basic rent.  Instead of being managed through LPAs, it was handled by tribal 
based Indian Housing Authorities, under the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the Department 
of the Interior.  HHFA remained the lead federal agency for housing matters though.127  
One interesting program McGuire initiated was “mutual self help” where Native 
Americans, under a complicated formula, could build and maintain the home they lived 
in and receive significant discounts.128
      In conclusion on public housing, a few some bright spots highlight in the story.  A 
California LPA in Marin City joyfully hosted Mrs. Catherine “Mother” Washington’s 
100th birthday on March 1, 1961, with most of the residents of the 360 unit low-income 
project in attendance plus the press.  “Mother” Washington the daughter of freed salves 
from Calvert, MD and when younger she and her husband had worked as missionaries in 
Africa.  She became the first tenant to move into the “bright new project.”  Her last 
remaining child, an adopted daughter in her seventies, who had been purchased on an 
Ethiopian slave market as a baby for $2.50, attended as well.129  And public housing had 
a baseball connection.  The New York City Housing Authority complex stood adjacent to 
the New York “Giants” Polo Grounds Stadium in New York, and when the Giants moved 
to San Francisco’s new Municipal Stadium, it was adjacent to the San Francisco Public 
Housing Complex.  When the Brooklyn Dodgers left Ebbets Field in New York City to 
go to Los Angeles, the “Field” became a low and middle-income housing project and the 
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Dodgers’ new stadium at Chavez Ravine, was on a former public housing site in Los 
Angeles, that had been “urban renewed.”130   
      Urban renewal, the other half of direct federal intervention into the urban core of 
American cities, was one of the federal government’s true success stories and the 
antithesis of public housing.  It stood as the “charmed” one of the two programs, the one 
favored by the administration and big business as well.  Federal urban renewal money 
funded four activities: urban renewal projects; urban planning assistance; urban renewal 
relocation payments; and the urban renewal demonstration grants.  Likewise, the Urban 
Renewal Agency (URA) managed three additional endeavors; housing in urban renewal 
areas, with FHA and PHA; the open space land program; and “community” planning 
programs placing URA into a community’s most intimate rehabilitation plans.  
Community planning also came in four varieties: the Workable Programs for Community 
Improvement (WPCI); URA and Area Redevelopment Agency (ARA) cooperative 
programs; URA’s General Neighborhood Redevelopment Program (GNRP); and the 
Community Redevelopment Plan (CRP).  
      In the 1961 Housing Act, Congress graciously authorized $2 billion for urban renewal 
for Kennedy’s first term, and seriously considered a half billion more, before 
“temporarily” saying no.  This doubled the total single amount record authorized for 
urban renewal and Kennedy spent more on urban renewal in his three years than Ike did 
in his eight.131   Under the able leadership of William Slayton, the URA administrator, the 
federal government paid 75% of the cost of urban renewal projects and programs for 
small towns and cities, and 66 2/3% for large ones.132   Costs were for surveying, 
planning activities, feasibility studies, general neighborhood renewal plans, and money 
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for project execution such as land acquisition, the temporary operation of “acquired 
properties,” demolition work, installation of public improvements, and site preparation 
costs for the land’s sale.  “City-wide” long range urban renewal planning was funded 
through urban planning assistance grants and even states could receive up to 50% of 
“statewide” urban renewal planning help for their cities.  As well, demonstration grants 
were routinely provided to develop, test, and demonstrate new methods of slum 
preservation in urban renewal areas.133  Local Public Agencies (LPAs) acted in urban 
renewal cities representing URA similar to the PHAs Local Housing Agencies (LHAs).  
      Kennedy and Weaver had different priorities with urban renewal.  Both wanted 
“brand new downtowns.”  But effectively relocating families displaced by urban renewal 
remained very important to Weaver, while open spaces was very significant to Kennedy.  
Both men valued the orderly redevelopment and rehabilitation of cities.  Yet, Weaver was 
concerned with the “social” city and how it functioned for human beings and JFK’s 
concern was more with the “physical” city and how it performed, looked, and appealed to 
the voter.  Parks were attractive to that clientele as were immense entertainment and 
business complexes.  Robert Kennedy would later try to connect the social city to the 
physical city under PCJD-OJD discussed in chapter ten. 
      Urban renewal operated in two cycles, the “property cycle” and the “financing” one.  
The property one had six phases: land acquisition; relocation of what used to be there; 
site clearance; site improvement; supporting facilities construction; and land disposition.  
The financing cycle began with the planning grants, followed by loans or development 
grants; project execution money; redevelopment assistance; and project completion aid. 
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      Overall urban renewal had several really major problems, which will be discussed in 
detail later.  Briefly though, significant delays were the first difficulty.  From the initial 
“plans” phase to execution, these delays lasted for years.  Nasty relocation squabbles 
constituted the second difficulty, many with serious racial overtones, and that 
overshadowed everything urban renewal did with relocation.134  These two difficulties 
gave urban renewal a poor reputation somewhat akin to public housing.  Yet spending 
huge sums of money helped ease this concern for “average city voters.”   
      William Slayton managed URA very effectively and a few points about his work are 
important.  He catered to Kennedy’s desires to please the big urban redevelopers, if not 
always with policy, generally in program management.  Slayton had been an official in 
NAHRO, and was a former associate of William Zeckendorf, then the country’s largest 
urban developer.  The 1961 Housing Act provided incentives for big business to invest in 
urban renewal and firms as Alcoa, U.S. Steel, and General Electric did so with record 
sums.135  Huge developers as Baird and Warner of Chicago, Adam Kates of Atlanta, 
Moore and Company of Denver, met in New York in July of 1961 to discuss how to cash 
in on the 1961 Housing Act’s generous pot of money.136  
      Weaver and Slayton wanted to make specific improvements in urban renewal.  They 
took URA down a new path, but only incrementally, while spending their record sums.  
Reconstituting URA from just a slum clearance operation into a vehicle of “economic 
and social regeneration” was their collective goal.  But Kennedy’s general lack of interest 
in urban affairs precluded him from pushing too hard on Congress for social reform 
measures in the 1961 Act.137  Thus Weaver and Slayton improved “community 
development” through policy.  They moved city planning  away from “separate” projects 
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to “all inclusive” ones and they made slight progress in improving the effectiveness and 
quality of rehabilitation.138
      Uniquely under Kennedy, the social city took a step backwards.  Easing Eisenhower’s 
previous  policy that new urban renewal construction had to build “predominately 
residential” construction (51% to 49%) on the site, Kennedy rewrote and weakened this 
clause in the 1961 Act, allowing local determination, so that more business investment 
could take place.139  This hurt the poor by decreasing the availability of housing on and 
adjacent to urban renewal sites.     
      Determined to maintain his newly found popularity after the inauguration, Kennedy 
intended to spend mammoth and quite visible sums in America’s cities.  From World 
War II to the present, JFK was the most popular president, maintaining on average a 70% 
rating in the polls.140  In enacting his big urban renewal program, speed in implementation 
would also be critical to maintaining his political momentum.  In “spending the Country 
out of the recession,” two billion plus in urban renewal funds was be a huge first step.  
Kennedy sent his March 2, 1961 telegrams to the mayors of 284 cities, asking them to 
accelerate their “relocation,” so that urban renewal could “kick in.”  As well over 500 
LPAs received letters from URA asking them to be prepared to rapidly expand 
business.141    
      A key element to the delivery of effective urban renewal was national conformity to 
building codes, or at least minimal uniformity by region, which facilitated quicker 
application processing.   Weaver and Slayton both tried to bring this about.  They had to 
convince state urban renewal directors that similarity in codes was in their best interest, 
and would facilitate project approval.  Weaver and Slayton appeared before numerous 
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conferences of elected state officials soliciting their support.142  By late 1962 some 
progress was made here, but overall, as with public housing codes, total success eluded 
them.   
      Weaver and Slayton wanted to build new capacity for cities to undertake and 
complete entire urban renewal programs quickly.  They realized this was the programs’ 
public Achilles heal.  Cities that had been slow marginal performers had their new plans 
disapproved, until with URA’s help, timelines were written into the program.  Cities 
updated in writing how they would correct their delinquent ways, and were thereby 
“pardoned.”  URA sent cities numerous recommendations covering new designs in city 
planning, all aimed at speeding up project completion.  In approving city plans, Weaver 
and Slayton considered the ability of cities to easily “digest” urban renewal funds, and 
they developed a national “digestibility” list, that left a few urban centers without 
funding.143 
      Yet Slayton suffered from staff restrictions that hindered URA’s ability to move 
applications.  Beyond a few “super grade” changes to be detailed later, Kennedy provided 
Weaver with no new URA staff.  Instead, JFK called for “more conscientious 
management and more effective manpower utilization, leading to increased productivity 
for the funds expended.”144  Slayton himself a tireless worker, accommodated this 
workload by having half of his professional staff work every Saturday.145
      Urban renewal aimed its focus and fortune directly at America’s aging downtowns.  
By 1960, none had been spared the “doom and gloom” of outdated infrastructures, some 
without any major renovations since before World War II.  Pollution was rampant, 
transportation systems lacked speed and safety, and numerous other problems abounded.  
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For example, the Buffalo City Planning Commission reported that, “Unless some 
dramatic program to recapture the Downtown’s past appeal is initiated, economic 
collapse may well face the Central Business District.”  In New York, Chicago, 
Philadelphia, Detroit, Baltimore, Cleveland, Saint Louis, Pittsburgh, Buffalo, 
Minneapolis, and Cincinnati, downtown retail sales dropped yearly, decreasing from 
2.2% in New York, to 17.7% in Saint Louis to 23.5% in Buffalo.  Eleven of the top 
fifteen cities had business losses downtown.  Some cities maintained consistent double-
digit unemployment figures “in downtown areas” throughout all the late 1950s and early 
1960s.  Many northern cities lost population and were losing their ability to replace 
resources vanishing resources.146  Suburban strip malls stores continued to out pace 
central business ones and downtown hotel occupancy rates plummeted across the 
country.  From a high of 93% just after World War II rates dipped to 61% in 1963.  
Cleveland’s large downtown hotels operated throughout the entire year of 1961 at 55% 
occupancy, the worst since 1933.147
      Urban renewal in downtowns required massive improvements to buildings and 
infrastructure that simultaneously supported business, finance, retailing, hospitality, and 
housing.  To be successful, non-existent transportation also had to accompany renewal 
and housing had to be returned to downtowns.  These were expensive issues. 
      Solutions began under Truman and Ike, with their respective 1949 and 1954 Housing 
Acts   and Kennedy’s continued with his 1961 Act.  Specifically, Chicago’s “Loop and 
Financial District,” Boston’s “Garden and Financial Center,” Philadelphia’s “Washington 
Square Center” and “Independence Mall,” Pittsburgh’s “Golden Triangle,” Baltimore’s 
“One Charles Place,” Cincinnati’s “River Front Renovation,” Philadelphia’s “Eastwick 
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area,” and “The Flats” of Cleveland, constituted success stories for urban renewal under 
these three presidents.  Renewed city life and spirit gradually returned to these towns. 
      To facilitate this renewal, a new breed of mayor met the challenge, willing to go 
beyond the past perimeters and gamble on their future, placing their leadership squarely 
behind downtown rehabilitation.  Richard Dilworth led Philadelphia’s revival, Robert 
Wagner produced resounding changes in New York, Richard Daley did the same in 
Chicago, Jerome Cavanaugh in Detroit, and Harold Grady steered the “rudderless ship of 
Baltimore” into safer waters.148
      In studying 1960s urban renewal, it is important to commence with what became 
designated the “overall” community development program for the era.  Known as the 
“Workable Program for Community Development” (WPFCD) under Eisenhower in 1954, 
Kennedy’s plan changed the “Development” to “Improvement.”  This will be discussed 
more in Chapter ten, but in short and in my opinion, it did little, yet it could have been a 
visionary program had there been greater leadership from the White House.  The WPFCI  
centrally managed in HHFA, came under a new “Assistant Administrator.” 
      The WPFCI placed all aspects of a community’s evolution under one roof; urban 
renewal, public works, utilities, business, relocation, housing, roads, transportation, etc.  
In many cities it involved all five HHFA constituent agencies.  The “workable program” 
established a written framework where a community could articulate with one complete 
plan, how it intended to use federal and local resources: to eliminate and prevent “slums;” 
redevelop itself; renew its downtown; and expand its commerce.  The idea was to 
abandon the “project mentality” in favor of an overall “plan.”  Communities were 
certified, then recertified annually.  Cities and towns used a seven-step process to develop 
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their WPFCI: they reviewed all codes and ordinances; initialed comprehensive planning; 
commenced detailed neighborhood analysis; set forth administrative ordinances; detailed 
financing arrangements; planned for the re-housing of displaced families; and most 
importantly included citizen participation in planning and relocation.  That last 
requirement of involving citizen participation in planning was very significant, but 
unfortunately, received decreasing importance later under LBJ. 
      But the WPFCI had no “teeth.”  Cities could write in “vagaries” and still get approved 
and once certified for the first year, few were actually decertified.  Cities as small as West 
Palm Beach, FLA and as large as New York City applied and unless their application had 
poor design or timing, it was readily approved.  The key was to produce a “satisfying 
environment.”149  Moreover, since nearly two years of Kennedy’s almost three, passed 
without even a limited executive order on open housing, segregation became quietly 
formulated into many plans.150  Some communities even used federal urban renewal 
policy money to avoid the WPFCI and due to exemptions, got away with it.  A few 
applications even preceded Ike’s presidency, and due to pronounced delays in urban 
renewal, became finalized under Kennedy. 
      Using the WPFCI, cities submitted a comprehensive set of urban renewal plans, 
depending on the “scope” of their specific renewal.  A General Neighborhood Renewal 
Program (GNRP) became required for large projects with multiple phases running for 
several years, and a Community Neighborhood Program (CNP) facilitated a single 
community’s renewal project for a shorter time (less than 10 years).  Some CNPs could 
be “exempted” from the Workable program and in 1963 the CRP program expanded 
allowing county applications.151   
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      In financing urban renewal, massive amounts became allocated by Kennedy and 
committed quickly, which created banner local headlines.  Los Angles, under Mayor Sam 
Yorty, received millions and the mayor made that well known to the press in headlines 
reading “Big Federal Fund…Green Light for 50 Blocks.”  Other cities as New York, 
Philadelphia, St. Louis, and Detroit proudly announced huge federal contributions in 
urban renewal money.153  And all this looked good for the administration with the voters.  
      Financing came in three varieties.  “Advances” covering surveys, plans and designs 
for a project came first.  These advances could be repaid from future receipts when LPAs 
sold the property.  Planning advances usually were for very large projects, up to ten years 
in length, that in themselves required a “general neighborhood renewal plan” (GNRP), 
under the Workable Program for Community Improvement Plan (WPFCI).215  
      Loans, the second kind of financing, placed URA working capital into a city, through 
LPAs.  These were completely repayable, bore low interest, and were in two categories - 
temporary and definitive.  Temporary ones were short-term, and definitive ones longer 
and covering up to 40 years the on capital value of an urban renewal project which was to 
be leased for redevelopment, rather than sold at a profit. 
      Grants defrayed the “net difference” in project costs.  Similar to loans, grants 
provided significant sums to cover the difference between a project’s total cost and an 
LPA’s total return on the sale of the land and the 1961 Act graciously increased the 
percentage covered for cities and towns.  Whether advances, loans, or grants, cities spent 
the money in three broad categories: urban renewal projects; community renewal 
programs; and demonstration contracts.154 
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      Regarding urban renewal money spent, Slayton often stated that from 1949 through 
December 1960, two billion dollars had been spent for urban renewal and in 1961, 1962, 
and 1963, Kennedy allocated two billion more.  Slayton’s figures did not quite agree with 
official statistics, showing 3.7 billion dollars was spent from 1949 to 1961, but Kennedy 
certainly set the one, two, and three year cumulative records to that date.155  Kennedy was 
spending so robustly that in 1962 Weaver tried to get an increase on capital grants money 
because he was running “low.”  From January 1961 through December 1963, Kennedy 
“allocated or approved” $2,360,000,000, which was a very significant investment.  Under 
Ike, it took Ike eight years to authorize $1.6 billion in specific “Title I grants” and 
Slayton did that in two years.156  Had Kennedy concluded his first full term, $3 billion 
would have been spent including carry over money.  This was a big program and the 
chart below compares Eisenhower’s and Kennedy’s spending. 
            Dollar Value of Cumulative
 Reservations Outstanding   Contracts Authorized 
 1953  348,540,408   1953  1,743 
 1954  377,170,988   1954  2,882 
 1955  553,665,661   1955  5,982 
 1956  826,684,732   1956  9,821 
 1957          1,019,294,714   1957  6,024 
 1958          1,324,478,054   1958  9,901 
 1959          1,388,647,765   1959  5,375 
 1960          1,866,160,059   1960           15,389 
 1961          2,467,631,512   1961           19,802 
 1962          3,014,314,096   1962           24,926 
 1963          3,680,603,368    1963           30,534 157  
Weaver also kept rates low for URA loans, at around 4% for the duration of the 
administration, which helped stimulate  business.  
      Private investment also matched Kennedy’s expenditures creating an immense 
“boom” in downtown renovation.  Uniquely, LPAs often never spent the actual money 
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but used the guarantee and low fixed rates as a notice of solvency to lure private 
investment into their land disposition program.158  Weaver and Slayton projected urban 
renewal would grow significantly in their out year budgets, along with large matching 
private investment.159   
      One of the most popular grants was the Section 701 urban renewal planning grant, 
simply called 701.  Kennedy increased its total spending from $30 million to $75 million 
and LBJ in 1964 to $150 million.  Cities paid from 25% to one-third of the cost of 
planning based on size and the 701 paid the rest and the 702 Planning grant was a 
variation of this for public works planning.   These grants could be used for urban 
renewal, mass transportation, and open space planning as well, and could also be used for 
“metropolitan planning” to get a community “positioned” for membership in the WPFCI.  
Planning at municipal, county, regional, and state levels were authorized for cities to use 
“professional planning as the means to achieve its finest hour of public service.”160  
Between 1954 and 1981 this very successful grants program allocated over one billion 
dollars for community planning. 
      In my opinion the 701 grant became the “metropolitan area planning grant” that could 
have been used with a visionary WPFCI to become the workable solution to urban 
problems.  It would have combined urban renewal and a viable poverty program but that 
was never tried.161  The 701 grant allowed URA to provide technical assistance to a 
community in planning and to obtain a URA Section 314 demonstration grant for each 
problem a community had.  The difficulty in making this work effectively as the 
“workable solution to urban problems” Kennedy promised in 1960, will be discussed in 
chapter ten.  But simply put, it never accomplished this because the White House never 
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placed the emphasis behind it to make that happen.  Weaver tried to connect the two but 
never reached “a broad statutory definition of comprehensive planning.”162  Under 701 in 
1961, $22.3 million was spent in this program, in 1962, $42 million, and in 1963, $18 
million.163  Kennedy requested another $75 million for future years, yet with no vision.164  
Neighborhood participation in planning could have been included, but when LBJ did this, 
it was done in “name” only. 
      Small towns played a key role in urban renewal and to meet their increasing needs, 
Weaver instituted important changes.  LPAs were allowed to hire local appraisers to 
make initial land and property appraisals, rather than waiting for HHFA ones.  
Additionally, urban renewal project audits were standardized, to “speed up” efficiency, 
and small town applications were quickly reviewed by region.  Slayton provided direct 
technical assistance to small town planners in applications and planning, as they had 
fewer and less “competent” professional staff.165  
      URA also inherited the strange “open spaces” program which proved to be a “bust” 
even though it came with Kennedy’s rare backing.  By the end of FY 1961, only two 
grants had been approved.  The year 1962 saw 26 grants worth just over $4 million 
processed and in 1963, 95 grants were made.  In Kennedy’s the three years, only $18 
million was spent of the authorized $50 million.166 Yet, at the end of his presidency, JFK 
was requesting $100 million for 1964 which simply baffled both HHFA and Congress.167  
It was his “pet urban project,” yet it was flawed in design, as few cities wished to turn 
prime urban redevelopment land into parks and the ones with “troubled” downtowns 
could not afford to do so. 
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      Urban renewal housing was a serious problem.  PHA and FHA both had housing 
programs in  urban renewal zones and FHA’s was placed under the now “famous” 
assistant commissioner for multi-family housing, Franklin Daniels, who oversaw all the 
FHA delays.  FHA’s huge processing backlog in multi-family housing applications 
included many from urban renewal area housing sites.  Housing in urban renewal zones 
fell under Section 220 of the 1961 Act and encompassed one-family homes up to eleven 
“family” row houses, using a complicated financing formula and some apartments were 
authorized as well.  In 1961, mortgages were insured on 27 federally assisted housing 
projects in urban renewal areas totaling 5,375 units and worth $88.4 million.168  But by 
the end of 1963, only 48,000 units of any kind of federally assisted housing in urban 
renewal areas had been built and only about 50,000 had been rehabilitated in these areas.  
A total of 107,000 more were “identified” for rehabilitation.169  This was an absolute 
national disgrace in relation to the number of homes destroyed by urban renewal and the 
highway program in these “zones.”   
      Financing housing in urban renewal areas was always a significant issue.  In rather 
rude language, FHA proclaimed it did not finance homes in slums.170  But under 
Kennedy, URA, FHA and PHA were forced to work together to frame a set of rules for a 
small, joint program.  By the end of 1963, PHA had 22,000 units of public housing 
planned for urban renewal areas in 24 states and FHA had 18,000 of its moderate income 
units planned on urban renewal sites under Section 221(d)(3).  Private construction of 
course had thousands of expensive homes, apartment buildings, and condominiums as 
well.  For each dollar of federal money, six dollars worth of private investment was 
generated.  But the poor were not helped by this process as they were carefully and 
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systematically excluded from urban renewal sites nationally, except for a token 
presence.171   
      Feeling the heat from Congress about this, Weaver in 1963 held a series of meetings 
to find out why the FHA and PHA housing in urban renewal zones was so meager.  
McGuire, Slayton, and Hardy cited exceptionally archaic “minimum property standards” 
nationally and outdated building codes that halted building homes in urban renewal areas 
for poor people, caused huge delays and in some cases, complete project cancellations.  
FHA drafted and implemented a separate set of minimum property standards for 
rehabilitated housing in urban renewal areas to combat this and with the support of the 
National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB), produced a workable model.  In 
July of 1961, only 886 communities had any building codes and most varied but by July 
1963 under the new plan, 1,054 communities had codes and 80% conformed to 
HHFA/NAREB model for urban renewal housing.172
      Other changes were planned to grow housing in urban renewal areas.  New direct, 
low interest loans for rehabilitation were established under Kennedy’s never enacted 
1964 Housing Act.  To eliminate backlogs, URA allowed regional offices to send 
approvals directly to the Office of the Administrator (Weaver’s office) without going 
through numerous internal certifications.  Along with the previous local appraiser change, 
it was thought these changes in urban renewal housing would be valuable.173  PHA and 
URA further issued a joint memorandum of agreement, signaling that a PHA “contract” 
would not be delayed because of URA’s processing problems.174  Weaver stressed that, 
“one agency delays the other.”175  But all this, in my opinion, cloaked the real problem.  
The poor continued to be excluded from new urban renewal neighborhoods because 
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nobody wanted them there, and no one including JFK was willing to make a stand to get 
them there. 
      Where this could have been reversed was seen in mid-October 1963, where URA and 
FHA completed a truly significant “not-for-publication” study for extensively improving 
the 221(d)(3) program in urban renewal housing.  It was done in conjunction with PHA 
and the President’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency (PCJD).  Encompassing 105 
legal size pages, this study ventured into areas where the Kennedy administration and no 
other administration to date had ventured, at least publicly.  It called for a more effective 
URA-PHA-and FHA partnership, insisting that urban renewal completely reorient itself 
to include a number of social issues in its planning.  Nathan Glazier provided numerous 
ideas to Slayton for the study.  It recommended urban renewal venture into special 
education, child care services, welfare services, housekeeping assistance, vocational 
counseling, relief of homelessness, relocation and even unemployment and college 
counseling.  Citizen participation was to be maximized in planning, and numerous 
demonstration projects were to be commenced immediately.  A comprehensive planning 
package for a whole new generation of proposed federal assistance to improve orderly 
urban growth and the development of new communities was proposed, along with 
appropriate budgets.  Planned communities with services were suggested to replace 
patchwork projects, using a solid mix of private developer funds, and public money.  
Detailed guidelines for communities of 30,000 each, on 1,600 acres covering 2.5 square 
miles, with full services, including high schools, were offered at $23,290,000 per 
development.  A comprehensive index of “demonstration programs dealing with human 
problems related to urban renewal and housing” discussed how low-income housing and 
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social programs could work.  “Fellowships” for urban planners were offered and all of 
this was to be included in Kennedy’s “Housing and Community Development Act of 
1964.”  As a final aside, this study established a “National Institute on Urban Problems” 
to serve as a think tank for advice and management of the program.176  This will be 
discussed further in chapter ten.    
      Kennedy never implemented the study.  What he did, Section 107, only permitted the 
resale of land in urban renewal areas and allowed a tax “write off” if the land was reused 
for low and moderate-income family housing.  An attempt to establish a new 
“Redevelopment Area Industrial Mortgage Association” specifically for urban renewal 
housing became “tabled” for the Johnson years.177  Without encouragement from the 
White House, the study unfortunately sat on the shelf. 
      But urban renewal program itself had several reoccurring and very serious problems: 
relocation, demolition of existing homes, massive delays, segregation, and fraud.  
Topping the list was the truly ineffective relocation of those displaced by urban renewal.  
Statistics offered by the administration in my opinion are inaccurate and misleading, yet 
were presented by the HHFA to Congress, and embraced by the White House.  The 
administration repeatedly cited relocation as a minor problem in urban renewal but most 
others involved with it considered it a major issue.  Every indicator pointed to a profound 
problem and relocation had a continued negative human impact, particularly on elderly 
families who after generations had lived on “a new urban renewal site,” were forcedly 
removed by law.  Moreover, minorities by the hundreds of thousands were displaced in 
every large city.  Some simply faded away never to be “heard from” again.  The most 
serious anecdotes of human suffering came from this displacement, more than any other 
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domestic program of the federal government.  The process was unceremoniously referred 
to as “the Federal Bulldozer,” “Negro removal” or “slum clearance.”178 
      The statistics were telling.  Section 105 of the National Housing Act provided the 
authority for relocation but many states, cities and some incorporated towns exercised the 
power of eminent domain without the jury of necessity.179  For example, the building of 
the University of Illinois, Chicago Circle, was an absolute scandal regarding the removal 
poor people.  Law suits abounded and the university was created on prime urban housing 
land.180  
      Relocation had formal steps.  A family received “notification” and then “counseling,” 
followed by “information” on the city’s private housing stock.  Instructions along with 
public housing information were printed both in English and Spanish, starting in 
November 1962. FHA then attempted to finance the family into another home if they 
qualified, and VA stepped in for eligible veterans.  Public housing lists were then 
provided, but usually projects were found to be full.  Finally families were offered 
relocation payments ranging from $200 and to $500 and told to move.181
      The Kennedy administration reported that from January 20, 1961 through July 1, 
1963, 87% of displaced families “reported” back to URA after their move, which meant 
they could be located, and of that 87%, 92% were relocated to adequate housing.  But 
under closer examination of 100% total displaced families, almost 21% did not report 
back or were moved to substandard housing.  That percentage is huge in looking at the 
aggregate numbers involved nationally.182  The administration did make an effort to 
subsequently fix the substandard housing, but not all of that was corrected.  
 391
      Yet what many moved into was often much worse than what they had left.  Eighty to 
eighty-five percent of those displaced had a rent increase.183  The National Defense 
Highway Act of 1954 cut “great new swaths of freeways through and around central 
cities,” displacing tens of thousands184  For instance in Saint Louis, two-thirds of the 
entire central city population was actually displaced.185  Simultaneously URA and FHA 
worked feverously to take urban land for airports.186  By March of 1961, only 28,000 new 
dwellings had been built nationally in urban renewal areas which low and middle income 
could actually use.  In some cities, 90% of African-Americans were moved out and to be 
replaced in the same location by almost 70% white.187  GAO criticized URA for its 1963 
Cleveland project called “Erieview” which committed most of these sins publicly and 
without any regrets. 
      To improve relocation, Weaver created the position of assistant commissioner for 
relocation and James Banks first filled that post.  Banks, who later succeeded Slayton as 
the URA’s chief, performed similar functions in Washington DC.188  He had a positive 
impact.  He kept the percentage of “unaccounted for,” low.  And he also reduced the 
percentage of those relocated to substandard housing to about the same as Eisenhower’s; 
and Kennedy had a much larger program.   
      Banks pressured LPAs to improve relocation.  He wanted real guarantees from the 
WPFCI that more low-income housing would be built and he forced LPA involvement in 
social services planning.  Banks traveled the country meeting with LPA and citizen 
groups to spread this message.  In a rare break with tradition, staff increases were given 
to Banks’ office for relocation, and Banks actively sponsored public interest group 
meetings on relocation while establishing an interagency program with FHA’s Neil 
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Hardy for converting existing homes into “relocation houses.”189  As well, Slayton and 
Banks established a “short-term” housing program for displaced families and several 
large cities followed their lead.  Chicago set up a central “relocation office” which had 
both short-term and long term “rehousing.”190  Banks final contribution was an attempted 
to require LPAs to submit a complete “relocation plan” for families prior to a URA 
Regional Office’s certification, which failed.191  
      Weaver intervened to help correct the relocation problem as well.  He called for more 
“comprehensive” housing, under a new seven point program, where PHA must admit 
relocated families first; verification of new urban renewal housing was required for each 
site; LPAs must share relocation information more effectively; LPAs must “speed up” 
fixing substandard housing; LPAs must address real solutions to minority problems, not 
just information; site selection requests were to be improved; and final written reports on 
relocation performance would go directly to himself.  He also requested Slayton and 
Banks to draft a “national relocation policy,” but that was not implemented under 
Kennedy.  However, rent subsidies for relocation and other forms of assistance came 
from his efforts, and were placed into Johnson’s 1964 and 1968 Acts.  
      But problems with relocation continued in greater number than solutions.  The 
Reverend Walter E. Fauntroy, then of the Interdenominational Ministers Alliance and 
later a leader in the civil rights movement with King, woke up Congress in pointed 
testimony by calling for a new five-point plan for urban renewal relocation.  He called 
for: full and effective citizen participation; adequate and humane solutions to relocation; 
improved “reuse” plans for urban renewal property, creating more middle-income 
housing on urban renewal sites rather than luxury apartments; neighborhood 
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rehabilitation through public participation and a private citizen partnership; and 
effectively mixing public and private money for creating a suitable living environment.192  
These were valuable points, carefully listened to, but never implemented.  Congress did 
step into the relocation quagmire, as did the bureau of the budget, under Dave Bell, but 
the only tangible result was a new “reporting” system so the disposed could be located 
easier, using the new RCA computer at HHFA.193
      Another massive problem with urban renewal was the demolition of existing homes, 
which were seldom replaced.  Between 1950 and 1960, an estimated “six million sub-
standard dwellings disappeared”194 and through to the end of Kennedy’s presidency, 
urban renewal destroyed 1,054,000 of them.195  Kennedy promised that the 1961 Housing 
Act would preserve 128,000 substandard houses, plus 235,000 older, but “to code” homes 
on urban renewal sites, yet it did not.196  Kennedy developed 22,000 acres of prime urban 
land across the country from January 1, 1961 through June 30, 1963, and as he increased 
land acquisition, the number of “on site” homes increased as well.  At the start of 1961, 
on the 626 cumulative stood 307,900 homes.  A total of 244,000 of those were sub-
standard, housing 239,400 families and “countless” single people.197  In 1961, 178,000 
dwelling units were destroyed on urban renewal sites, 218,000 in 1962, and 260,000 were 
destroyed in 1963.198  In total only 28,000 new homes replaced in 1961 and around 
30,000 in 1962 and the same in 1963 as well.199  Many of those came with inflated rental 
or mortgage rates, excluding the very poor.  Highways contributed to this displacement as 
well which accounted for numerous additional demolitions.200  My view is some of this 
was needed, to renew decaying downtowns, but most of it could have been avoided with 
effective neighborhood planning and rehabilitation.  However, URA continued to paint a 
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rosy picture calling this, “clearing blight.”  By the time Kennedy’s four -year term ended, 
$3 billion had been spent on federal urban renewal, but low cost housing on these sites 
remained virtually non-existent.201 
     Numerous articles and publications roundly attacked urban renewal for this.  Even the 
comic strip “Little [Litl] Orphan Annie” complained about urban renewal, in a strip on 
January 22, 1963.202  On NBC Evening News on November 6, 1963, the usually favorable 
Chet Huntley and David Brinkley both criticized relocation.203  Jan Jacobs, in The Death 
and Life of Great American Cities, recommended not “disturbing urban neighborhoods,” 
and Martin Anderson’s, The Federal Bulldozer, blamed urban renewal for most city 
problems, even though under Kennedy it was his only real domestic success.204  Other 
books focused on African-Americans’ problems, as Kenneth Clark’s, The Dark Ghetto 
and Daniel Moynihan’s The Negro Family.205  But Peter Marris, A Report On Urban 
Renewal, specifically criticized the conduct of Kennedy’s relocation program, and 
angered Slayton.  Marris stated URA’s relocation program “provided only marginally 
better housing, in very similar neighborhoods, at higher rents, and has done as much to 
worsen as to solve the social problems of the families displaced.”  He said URA created a 
“culture of the slums” and reported that the renovation of one blighted area, through 
relocation usually accelerated the decay of others adjacent to it, causing new slums.  
Slayton personally rebutted Marris in speeches and in the press, citing URA’s official 
statistics.206  Yet uniquely and in contrast, the relocation of small and mid-size businesses 
from urban renewal areas went very well, but not for the people.207
      Additionally, extensive delays plagued the urban renewal program, which constituted 
a third significant problem.  Federal project money did not “reach the streets” or the 
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“constituents,” for years after it became approved.  According to HUD own statistics, the 
urban renewal  “time lag completion,” using Baltimore, as an example, was 51.70% of all 
urban renewal projects from inception took from 6 - 12 years to complete, and 10.70% 
from 12 - 15 years.  Only 9.40% were completed within 3 years, and the remainder fell in 
between.208  For Chicago, the statistics were equally grim.  There, 40.10% of urban 
renewal projects took 6 - 12 years to complete and only 30% were completed in 3 - 6 
years.209  Nationally, urban renewal completion delays are noted in the chart below.  The 
chart covers the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson years.  Eisenhower’s urban renewal 
projects during his second term, were completed under Kennedy, and many of JFK’s 
under Johnson or Nixon. 
TIME NEEDED TO CARRY OUT URBAN RENEWAL PROJECT ACTIVITIES
Number of months required to accomplish major urban 
   _____________renewal project activities__________ 
 
  Land Acuqi- Reloca- Demoli- Site Impro- Land Dis- 
  sition 1 tion 1  tion 2  vements 3 position 4 
________________________________________________________________________
Percentage of Activi- 
ties completed:    months months months months months 
 10%…… 48  54  54  126  132 
 75%…… 32  35  36    80  122 
 50%…… 16  26  27    52    75 
 25%…… 10  15  19    42    57 
________________________________________________________________________
 1.  Land acquisition and relocation began during the first month reported. 
 2.  Demolition began during the 6th month reported. 
 3.  Site improvements began during the 17th month reported. 
 4.  Land disposition began during the 30th month reported.210   
      Delays were so frequent that one study suggested the “average” project actually took 
twelve years to complete.211  Locally, this had a tremendous impact, as Weaver noted, 
“because the mayor who took all the heat [over urban renewal and public 
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housing]…often by the time any of the goodies came, his successor got all the credit and 
he had caught all the hell for it.”212  JFK accelerated urban renewal as a means to end the 
recession and grow the cities, and “committed” most of his over two billion dollars in 
three record breaking years, much to the glee of the big urban redevelopers.  Yet delays 
continued to plague his program.  Program delays often were for the most obnoxious 
reasons.  In one case, the Illinois Development Authority took 20 months to decide 
whether or not Dearborn Park needed an environmental impact study.213   
      Weaver and Slayton tried to correct these problems through various means: they 
formed committees to study the issue; they accelerated relocation planning; they sped up 
the site clearance; they brought the Bureau of Public Roads into direct consultation with 
URA; and in the summer of 1962, they literally “rewrote” the Urban Renewal Manual 
providing fifteen changes, to improve program performance.214  Yet none of this 
succeeded.  By the end of 1962, URA had an “unprocessed (on hand) backlog worth 
nearly $450 million.”215   
      A fourth problem urban renewal had was that it encouraged segregation, which will 
be covered in the next chapter, but needs to be briefly mentioned here.  In the south, 
relocation increased segregation and in the central business districts (CBD) of big cities, a 
six stage urban renewal model worked very effectively to exclude minorities.  Plans were 
conceived, and zones for renewal designated.  With the inception of that plan, exclusion 
of the population could be traced by race through a number of tools.  The population was 
“rehoused” outside the urban renewal district, as expansion of the exclusion zones were 
finalized.  In most cases, the “rule of thumb” was “similar cost of living conditions” 
should be found for the displaced, and only in certain sectors of the city could that be 
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located.  Those areas were already heavily populated with minorities and the cycle was 
now complete.  Then, as redevelopment took place in the district, the fate of those few 
remaining was often sealed, with one segregated zone being the outcome.216  In 
Baltimore, Cleveland, Saint Louis, Hartford, Boston, and even in little Austin, Texas, this 
system worked perfectly, producing its desired product, segregation.  In Cincinnati, 
28,000 African-Americans were housed in a 400 acre area called “Over the Rhine.”  
Other renewals “cleared and cleaned” an area, but on the fringes were public housing and 
there the “ghetto” abounded and grew.217  Weaver tried in vain to correct this by using 
meetings and commissions on “inter-group relations,” but received no help from the 
White House until the executive order of Thanksgiving of 1962.  By then Kennedy had 
less than a year left in office.  These practices in the words of Boston’s mayor, greatly 
increased “the agitation of Negroes,” and that would be expressed very, very shortly.218  
      Fraud plagued the program a bit, but not as it did in some later administrations.  
Under Kennedy and Weaver, the multi-family housing program in urban renewal areas 
had trouble properly reporting statistics.  This was a form of fraud because the numbers 
represented money.  The Bureau of the Budget regularly disagreed with figures reported 
by HHFA on the latter’s accomplishments, and several redevelopment authorities were 
sued over false claims.219  Complaints were numerous particularly in Los Angeles and 
San Francisco.  Additionally as mentioned, the FHA rehabilitation housing program in an 
urban renewal area never got off the ground because banks routinely would not lend to 
rehabilitate older homes in “the slums.”  Everyone knew that, but some of the banks that 
did lend, did so with huge irregularities, all favoring the lender.  A few LPAs defaulted 
due to mismanagement and GAO regularly, found minor problems with program 
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administration.220  One major urban developer in New Jersey and New York, the Lipkin-
Kahn Company, was under a federal investigation by the FBI for possible bribery in the 
awarding of contracts.  As well, Weaver had to regularly “suspend favorable action” on a 
few LPAs while investigations were conducted and one LPA in East Saint Louis, spent 
federal money to buy “non existent houses.”  Milt Semer, HHFA Counsel, regularly 
handled a portfolio of pending law suites.221  But given the size, scope, and speed of the 
program, it remained relatively “clean” to Weaver’s and Stayton’s credit. 
      For the future 1964-1968, urban renewal planned to spend even more money.  
Weaver’s out year budgets proposed through 1968, looked to $900 to a billion or more 
annually for urban renewal.  More rehabilitation of existing homes was planned as well 
as an expansion of the 221(d)(3) program into urban renewal areas, even though it had 
not yet worked.  This was done to “keep that famous middle class” program at least on 
the books for the voters to consider.  Mass Transit, PHA and URA hoped to link under 
the new program.  But it was proposed that the percentage of new residential housing in 
an urban renewal areas be dropped even further, which would have additionally hurt the 
poor.  Increases for relocation grants came as part of the package as were demonstration 
grants and all this was carefully planned in the context of the 1964 election year.222   
      In conclusion, it should be noted that urban renewal under Kennedy stood as a 
success based on its stated goals.  In the 1950s urban renewal tore down slums and 
produced some infrastructure changes.  In the 1960s, it cleared slums to rebuild the urban 
core and central business district. Towering office buildings, stadiums, civic centers, 
exclusive stores, and expressways became Kennedy’s legacy.   New York, Chicago, 
Cleveland, and Houston all had new office buildings, each with over one million square 
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feet built during this period.223  By the end of calendar year 1963 the Urban Renewal 
Administration was managing a cumulative 1,400 projects in 682 cities.224    
      Kennedy developed a successful urban renewal program at the expense of a 
successful public housing program and also redeveloped cities at a time when the “youth 
culture,” which flocked to them, produced more vibrant downtowns.225  But the price to 
be paid later would be terrible.  Kennedy’s changes, as well intended as they may have 
been, were designated to save “the city of affluence” rather than improve “the city of 
poverty,” and that gap widened until the mid-1960s.  Then the city of poverty called 
attention to itself with the flames.226
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CHAPTER IX 
 
THE EXECUTIVE ORDER ON OPEN HOUSING: 
 
THE STROKE OF A PEN 
 
  “…the president kidded Ted Sorensen about writing the speech.  Ted 
  Sorensen claimed he didn’t have anything to do with the speech, and  
  the president remarked that nobody wrote it or something like that. 
  But ‘the stroke of a pen,’ the president kept muttering that phrase:  
  ‘Who put those words in my mouth….’”1
 
      While suburbs exploded around America’s cities and urban renewal rapidly changed 
metropolitan landscapes, and while public housing indiscreetly rose skyward and the 
baby boom generation was in high school, it must also be recalled that any excursion into 
the early 1960s finds the dark, yet immense specter of deeply rooted, and vituperative 
racism.  Soon this would explode openly into all American domestic life, and would lead 
to the deaths of national leaders and hundreds of “every day” citizens in the turbulent 
springs and long hot summers. 
      This chapter studies an attempt to preempt that, and the interactive dynamics that 
caused it not to meet its objective.  I refer to the “Executive Order On Open Housing,” 
subsequently to be called “the order,” that John F. Kennedy openly pledged to issue in his 
1960 campaign.  According to the candidate, he could easily remake America’s social 
compact with its housing, by the single “stroke of a pen.”  In August 1960 JFK criticized 
Eisenhower for not ending racial discrimination in federally assisted housing by the use 
of his executive authority and for not placing pen to paper to change how America 
housed itself.2  However, Kennedy would be elected on November 7, 1960, was 
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inaugurated January 20, 1961, and his order was not issued until November 20, 1962.  By 
any benchmark, this was almost two years in the offing. 
      Several generalizations are important in framing the issue and the setting.  Kennedy’s 
order was not retroactive and was limited in coverage, both of which were significant “let 
downs” for its supporters and constituted significant challenges to the moral equality of 
housing in this country.   
      Secondly, Kennedy himself caused repeated delays in issuing the order, due to his 
political agenda.  JFK was more afraid of Congress than he was losing his newly found 
African-American constituency.  Committees run by “shrewd old tyrants” as Carl Haden 
(D, AZ) of Appropriations, who had been a sheriff in the Arizona Territory before it 
entered the Union, and Democrats Richard Russell of Georgia, Robert Byrd of West 
Virginia, Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, Robert Kerr of Oklahoma, William 
Fulbright of Arkansas, John Stennis of Mississippi, and Russell Long of Louisiana were 
striking examples of racists with power, who had little use for “greenhorns” and the 
Senate’s “playboy,” John Kennedy in particular.  They distrusted him as a lightweight 
who had been there for eight years and had never applied himself.  After JFK was 
elected, the Senate they quoted, “was by God and by Madison [and] not created to mouth 
lines scripted in the White House.”3   According to Senator Joseph S. Clark (D, PA) the 
problem with the Senate was, “the rural states are much over represented.  Nothing can 
be done about it, but they have the Jeffersonian point of view towards cities as the haven 
of all evil.”  He further lamented, “You ought to sit in the Senate day after day.”4 
       Thirdly, Kennedy played the “executive order” issue with extreme caution.  Ted 
Sorensen advised JFK to “keep moving but move slowly” and cautioned, him to go in 
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“graduated steps.”  He further counseled JFK to avoid situations where he would be 
placed into a “matrix,” that he could “neither evade nor answer directly.”5  
      Additionally, the order attendant with its delays underscores that Kennedy was also 
afraid to interrupt the established pattern of post World War II housing growth, which 
was the backbone of the domestic economy.6  His biggest fear in my view was that an 
economic contraction would hurt his poll numbers, and the subsequent decline in 
government revenues would lead to his inability to balance the budget and get his tax cut.  
I believe Kennedy fully understood that the desegregation of housing led to the 
desegregation of schools and many other public facilities, which was key to forming a 
truly integrated society, but was extremely unpopular at the time.7  Pollsters revealed that 
70 percent of (white) Americans were opposed to “substantial numbers of blacks moving 
into their neighborhoods,”8 JFK was not about to quickly upset that 70% even if it was 
the “right” thing to do. 
      Further, Kennedy also had issues with the order’s coverage and its legality and 
wanted to balance its release against Weaver’s successful appointment as the 
administration’s top-ranking African-American, and the Departmental states bill, plus his 
trade legislation.9   But uniquely Kennedy so mishandled sequencing the order’s release 
that he nearly compromised his middle of the road strategy.  As mentioned in chapter 
eight, JFK’s FHA/VA housing market percentage continued to drop, in relation to his 
indecision and delays over the executive order, to a point where he was slowly putting 
that program out of business.  He did not have a huge FHA/VA “fall off” after releasing 
the order, because he had already lost large market percentages to conventional financing, 
with his two year “void” before its issue.  Finally, Kennedy’s delays and indecisions 
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began to wear on his African-American supporters and as Roy Williams angrily wrote, 
“…at no time were the responsible Negro civil rights leaders called in and told formally 
what the administration planned to do.”10  
      The last generalization is that the greatest drawback to repeated delays in issuing the 
order fell into the human dimension for those openly, roundly, and consistently 
discriminated against in housing, and by not issuing a comprehensive order, Kennedy’s 
mistakes had to later be corrected in the 1964 and 1968 Civil Rights Acts.   
      The story begins with a look at discrimination that made the order in any form, 
necessary. Government at all levels had a sordid history of housing discrimination.  The 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA), Public Housing Administration (PHA), and 
Urban Renewal Administration (URA), and then the lesser agencies as the Communities 
Facilities Administration (CFA) and Federal National Mortgage Administration (FNMA) 
headed the list of “discriminating” Federal agencies.  When Kennedy took office 
“Complaints of Racial Discrimination in Housing” poured into HHFA daily and monthly, 
and by the thousands into its various agencies, and to the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) 
Civil Rights Division as well.   
      Moreover, when Kennedy arrived, ten southern states and Oklahoma, plus several 
large southern cities had laws or codes compelling racial segregation.11  A primary 
requirement of the federal government should have been to quickly remedy this, but 
rather than do that, FHA routinely went along with these “local situations,” both in the 
South and in some northern states.  The local situation of course constituted segregation.  
The FHA underwriting manual written in 1934, but used until late 1948, encouraged 
racial segregation by establishing a model private agreement between buyer and seller, 
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keeping “neighborhoods homogeneous.”  This agreement, achieved the status of law over 
time through the enforcement of state laws governing private contracts.12  It was later 
found discriminatory by the Supreme Court in Shelley v. Kramer in 1948, yet by then, 
many FHA and VA restricted housing developments by race, had already been built 
around the country.13   
      FHA also discriminated in a host of other ways.  In 1958 the Commission on Race 
and Housing, an independent citizens group published, Where Shall We Live, which 
offered “the Federal mortgage loan insurance program…continues to lend loans for 
builders, developers, towns and others…who openly plan to, and do exclude Negroes.”  
The 1959 Report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights concluded the same.14  
The National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing (NCDH) revealed in 1961, 
that “there is massive evidence that the Federal Government is actually promoting and 
strengthening nationwide patterns of residential segregation” citing FHA and VA for 
continuing “to underwrite racially exclusive suburbs where…less than 2% of new FHA 
homes are available to non white families.”15    
      And into the Kennedy years, FHA discriminated with newfound techniques.  It used: 
credit reports that favored specified groups of lenders and brokers who were 
discriminatory; a real estate system that “showed” certain homes to particular racial 
groups only; it designated certain areas for “nonwhite mortgage coverage;” and it 
encouraged the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) to grant charters to certain 
financial associations, but not others.  Additionally, FHA paid very close attention to the 
mortgage payment schedules of “Negro civil rights advocates,” particularly in the South.  
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There as well, FHA monitored “guests” who were colored regarding how long they 
visited the houses of white FHA homeowners.16  
      Moreover, the South headed the list of locales that openly discriminated and 
Washington DC topped it.  DOJ’s Burke Marshall held a scathing report that headlined, 
“Housing and real estate discrimination based on race, color, religion, ancestry, 
nationality, or natural origin constitutes a major obstacle to achieving the goal of a decent 
home and suitable living environment, for every individual and family living within the 
District of Columbia.”  The report concluded, “Discriminatory practices exist in every 
phase of the sale, rental, hiring, financing, advertising, brokerage, and availability…of 
housing and real estate within the District of Columbia.”17  In DC, black diplomats from 
African and Latin countries were openly segregated.  Similar complaints about 
segregation came from Oak Ridge (TN), Dallas (TX), Waco (TX), Clarksville (TN), and 
Birmingham (AL).18  In northeast Mississippi, complaints were so prevalent and severe, 
they resulted in ten northern counties transferring from FHA’s Memphis office to the less 
discriminatory Jackson (MS) one.  This became a “hot potato” which went all the way to 
Henry Wilson at the White House to be resolved.19  
      But in many northern cities FHA discriminated as well.  Chicago (IL) headed that list 
under Mayor Richard J. Daily who truly favored minority groups, as long as they were 
Irish, Italian, or Southern European.20 Baltimore (MD), Carbondale (IL), River Rouge 
(MI), Seattle (WA), several towns in New York and New York City, plus Saint Louis 
were but a few northern cities where FHA openly discriminated. 
      The Public Housing Administration (PHA) discriminated even more effectively than 
FHA.  Segregation in public housing occurred when distribution patterns of racial 
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occupancy were geographically established, separating the tenants by race.  However, a 
cover for doing this was called “income” segregation, which meant building public 
housing only where low-income minorities could occupy them.  This was the “cover” 
most commonly used leading to direct racial segregation.21  The NCDH reported in 
September 1961 “80.5% of all public housing is segregated.”22  Bitter and public disputes 
and landmark legal cases highlighted PHA’s legacy.  In Portland (OR), one notable 
dispute called the Northwest Tower went to the White House for resolution, after the 
press exposed open, serious discrimination.  In places as far flung as Omaha (NE), public 
housing was found to be discriminating and Maryland abounded with examples, as did 
New York.23   But not to be outdone, Chicago again managed the most rigorous public 
housing discrimination. 
      In 1966, Dorothy Gautreaux and six other plaintiffs filed a suit against the Chicago 
Housing Authority under the due process clause of the 14th Amendment, charging race-
based discrimination in public housing site selection.  They also sued HUD and 
eventually won a portion of their suit in 1976, before the U.S. Supreme Court.24  Their 
case was instrumental in bringing segregated public housing into the national spotlight. 
      In city after city, segregation in public housing continued unchecked.  Atlanta’s 
public housing by 1967 was 83% African-American and fully concentrated on the city’s 
west side.  No public housing was ever built in the upscale, white neighborhoods of 
northeast Atlanta.25  In Philadelphia, 71% of its public housing was fully segregated.26  
Nashville (TN), Quincy (IL), and a host of lesser towns with large public housing 
programs, maintained similar discriminatory practices.  Ms. McGuire to her credit tried, 
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but in vain to correct this disgrace.  But broad based executive leadership would be 
required, and that was not forthcoming.27  
      URA practiced both discrimination and segregation very efficiently and often 
simultaneously.  Seventy percent of families displaced by urban renewal were African-
American and URA regularly “looked in the other direction” when approving segregated 
urban renewal plans.  As well, racial restrictions found in local urban renewal plans 
favoring white owned businesses and white entertainment complexes, were routinely 
approved.28  Not using new renewal sites for public housing was a de facto “given.”29  It 
was not until August 1962 that HHFA “clamped down” on discriminatory and segregated 
“workable plans” and it was not until late June 1963 that HHFA invalidated workable 
plans that included discriminatory businesses.  It took Federal Court action in Smith v. 
Holidays Inns of America to effect that change.30  Urban renewal also missed several 
opportunities to “employ Negroes,” and some noteworthy complaints went as far as the 
White House.  “Low” appraised value offers to “Negro Families” in urban renewal 
eminent domain acquisitions in Newburgh (NY) drew the President’s attention, but 
nothing was done.  URA refused to invalidate clearly discriminatory local programs in 
Wilmington (DE), Baltimore (MD), Long Beach (NJ), Chicago (IL), and Bloomington 
(IN), the latter over the building of the Dyer Elementary School in 1961, Trenton (NJ), 
Tampa (FL), and River Rouge (MI).31   
      Lastly, the federal contribution to housing discrimination concluded with the lesser 
agencies as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, Comptroller of the Currency, and Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board.  These entities were quizzed in September 1962 over one simple question, and 
 426
found to be lacking: “Does you agency have a policy to deny benefits to private lenders 
who use race in real estate loans?”  All of the above responded with “no.”  These 
agencies did not regularly enforce anti-discriminatory lending policies, unless a particular 
case became extremely ugly or quite noticeable in the press.32
      But when it came to discrimination and segregation, none did it with greater relish 
and success than the private sector.  At the end of World War I with the “push/pull” 
factor, an estimated 700,000 to 1,000,000 African-Americans left the South for northern 
cities expecting a better life.  However by 1969, fifty years later, 81% of all residential 
neighborhoods around major northern cities were fully segregated.33  Housing 
segregation widened racial inequities in education, employment, and income and the 
private sector aimed to maintain this.38  The private sector had been producing around a 
million new homes per year from 1948 through 1962.  Yet only 3% of these were 
available for non-white occupancy.34 
      To maintain this national system of housing apartheid, the private sector followed 
time-tested and deliberate patterns.  Re-segregation flourished, which entailed entire 
neighborhoods being sold when one minority household moved in.  “Segregation, 
integration and re-segregation” worked very effectively for years in and around Chicago 
and Cleveland, protected by restrictive zoning laws.35  Regarding that, The National 
Commission on Urban Problems identified in 1968, that exclusionary zoning, and the 
continuation of “red lining,” was rampant in and around all major American cities 
through 1965.  Zoning had been declared “constitutional” in 1926 by the Supreme Court 
in Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., as a form of broad based “police power” to define “good 
neighborhoods,” protect property values, to “segregate” different types of land use and to 
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“protect public safety.”36  In some communities, zoning was used in unique ways to force 
African-Americans out.  Also, financing became successfully used by the private sector 
to keep blacks out of white suburbs.  Lenders often used land installment contracts with 
African-American home “owners,” but this form of financing was not used in white 
suburbs.  Land installment contracts were themselves risky as in one “earning squeeze” 
i.e. being late with one payment, all could be lost, and these “take back” mortgages 
became concentrated predominately in minority neighborhoods.  In large cities, Chicago 
used this practice most frequently.37   Trickle down housing also was carefully maintained 
by race.  “Up the down elevator” was a system where blacks bought into a white 
neighborhood “high” yet when this occurred, whites began to sell at market price and the 
blacks were “trapped” there due to their above par purchase.  Boston topped the list of 
cities where real estate agents knew these trends and worked this system effectively.38   
Credit reporting for minorities also was often a significant issue, and if arrested for 
demonstrating about a civil rights matter, that went on your credit report.  Sometimes 
land contracts were called in when negative credit reports were “pulled,” showing civil 
rights activity.  In other cases in the South, denying a home loan because of a “civil 
rights” credit report was common.39   
      Segregation in private housing varied not only by race but also by occupation.  
Minority “laborers” became segregated in “laborer neighborhoods,” whereas service 
workers and professionals were segregated in like kind neighborhoods.  Thus over a wide 
expanse, a city could appear integrated with a patchwork of “black” and “white,” yet in 
reality have distinct areas of income segregation, each with their own “racial zones.”40  
The production of new suburban housing generally had little effect on minorities in this 
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kind of situation.41  This also stood as one reason some cities failed to develop true 
“black” middle class neighborhood system, even though the market was there.  The 
National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) proudly proclaimed that, “the home 
building industry did not create the attitudes and prejudices which give rise to 
discrimination,” but the home building industry certainly knew how to capitalize on this 
unfortunate American dilemma.  In Florida, home builders even sold swampland to 
unsuspecting African-Americans for a proposed suburban development to be called the 
Hampton-Collier Acres.42   
      An additional familiar real estate practice was using a number of schemes to 
deliberately plan houses with such large square footage, that their price tag easily 
precluded most minorities.43   These tactics were used to isolate certain neighborhoods 
and under Chicago’s Mayor Richard J. Daley’s South Deering, Trumbull Park, and 
Deerfield.44     
      Another popular scheme was waiting until a perspective home buyer or apartment 
renter could be actually met, then if a minority, presenting them with evidence of a long 
waiting list of prior bidders.  Complaints of this nature made their way to the White 
House.45  Yet bargaining effectively with the average real estate agent or landlord in a 
“shelter scarce” low-income housing economy required more “knowledge and clout” than 
the average minority had in the early 1960s.46  Lastly, in the private sector in the late 
1950s and early 1960s, it was not just housing that segregated, but everything that 
supported housing as well, businesses, hospitals, clubs, restaurants, and most forms of 
transportation.47   
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      However, to say that government did nothing about this until JFK’s weak executive 
order in late 1962 would be untrue.  The “open housing” efforts of the federal 
government before JFK’s order fell into five areas, indeed helping set the stage for his 
order.  These stemmed from the actions to end housing discrimination by individual 
federal entities, as the Sub-Cabinet Group on Civil Rights, the Civil Rights Commission, 
the President’s Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity (CEEO), and actions by 
Federal Court system.    
      Individual federal agencies led the fight for open housing before the executive order.  
Even Weaver from HHFA’s central office proposed a program to the White House 
offering that if home owners sign an FHA agreement that when selling they would not 
discriminate, FHA would pay 90% of any loss they might incur.  This did not go very 
far.48   Nonetheless, FHA produced a national “open listing” of properties, by region, 
where the sellers proclaimed they would not discriminate.  Unfortunately the National 
Association of Real Estate Boards opposed this stating, “salesmen will not work as 
industriously to sell open listed properties,” and criticized the list as hurting the work 
ethic.49  But FHA under Weaver’s direction slowly expanded the list.50  In August 1962, 
HHFA voluntarily published open housing guidelines for urban renewal relocation, and 
in its guide for the Workable Program for Community Improvement (WPCI), “without 
regard to race.”51   
      Several other federal agencies used their “good offices” and “negotiation” to help end 
discrimination.  In DC realtors were continually pressured by HHFA to end 
discrimination in the housing of African diplomats.52  As well, voluntary open housing 
compliance notices were often posted in federal offices and the Department of Defense 
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and Atomic Energy Commission internally tracked open housing complaints and took 
direct action to correct them.53   
      Other federal agencies voluntarily formed “inter-group and/or interagency relations” 
committees designed to resolve open housing issues.  Admittedly, the authority of these 
committees remained weak, but the message they sent stood as critical: “we are watching 
what you do, and we may find or soon have the means to take action.”  The PHA, 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), and HHFA’s central office became leaders 
here.54   
      The second of the formal entities that helped improve open housing before the order 
was the Sub-Cabinet Group on Civil Rights.  Meeting monthly, starting on April 14, 
1961, Harris Wofford chaired it as special assistant to the president for civil rights, and it 
stood staffed by the “number two or three” officials from each cabinet level department.  
Burke Marshall of the attorney general’s office and HHFA representatives, rounded out 
its membership.  Fred Dutton of the White House staff also joined.  Originally designed 
to discuss implementation issues for the “forthcoming” executive order, the Group 
nonetheless began to directly attack racial problems.  It set up a special task force, from 
within the administration’s second tier of managers to study civil rights issues, like 
evictions of Tennessee African-American tenant farmers for participating in an economic 
boycott over voter registration.55   
      Moreover, the Sub-Cabinet Group studied and reported to the president about 
minority government employment.  In a way it thus began paralleling the work of the 
president’s Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity (CEEO), to be discussed later.  
It tracked up notices in federal work places, on non- discrimination and publicized 
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newsletters about success stories.56  It also published regular reports on civil rights 
progress, “from across the Administration,” as agencies “crawled” along on the non-
binding, non-legal road to ending centuries of discrimination.57  Importantly, the Group 
served as a pressure point to keep Kennedy’s “head in the game” regarding civil rights 
legislation and the executive order. 
      From the Group, Wofford expressed his extreme disappointment over Kennedy’s 
delays and JFK’s lack of interest in open housing.  Kennedy responded by trying to keep 
Wofford “under wraps,” as the “civil rights” issue faltered in the polls, and Wofford was 
cautioned to restrain himself.  He would of course leave his post over such matters.58  
Wofford’s final gesture before leaving was to propose a “Federal Commission to Mediate 
Civil Rights Disputes,” to be formed from inside the Administration.59 
      The Civil Rights Commission itself, the third federal entity working open housing 
matters before the order, closely paralleled what the Civil Rights Division of the 
Department of Justice was doing, as the Sub-Cabinet Civil Rights Group paralleled the 
President’s Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity (CEEO).  But the Civil 
Rights Commission was “outside” of the administration directly, and headed by the 
aggressive and very liberal, John Hanah.  It also included the fiery future chair, Father 
Theodore Hesburgh of Notre Dame who was Harris Wofford’s mentor.  Kennedy 
appointed Berl Bernhard to the Commission, to keep “an eye on the Commission’s 
activities” as it was truly liberal in comparison to Kennedy.  Chiefly the Commission 
investigated voting rights violations, but where retribution in certain instances led to 
evictions, housing matters became discussed.  Integration, a second subject area of the 
Commission, included neighborhood design and college housing.  Created under Ike, in 
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1959, the Commission’s charter was to be reviewed by Congress, generally every four 
years, which always turned into a huge fight.  Kennedy in his 1960 platform, pledged to 
make the Civil Rights Commission stronger and permanent.60  But by late 1963, three 
bills were still pending in Congress: one to make the Commission permanent; one to 
extend it for another four years; and the last to extend it two more years.61   The 1964 
Civil Rights Act finally extended it to January 31, 1968.62  
      From many sources, the Commission repeatedly “heard” about the need for an 
executive order.  As early as October 1961, the National Committee Against 
Discrimination in Housing (NCDH) testified before the Commission and provided a draft 
executive order.63  From this, from hearings, and from research, the Commission itself 
published its own report called “The Emergence of a Policy,” on October 6, 1961 which 
was an absolute “bombshell.”  In short, that Report provided extensive legal justification 
to Kennedy to proceed immediately, with a broad and comprehensive executive order on 
open housing.  It caught the administration off guard regarding the depth and quality of 
legal research.  The Commission said JFK should issue the housing order “now,” because 
it would directly help between 14 and 18 million people.64  However, Kennedy not only 
abandoned their advice, but in the words of Lee White, nearly abandoned the 
Commission as well.   
      Kennedy according to White, had John Hannah of Michigan State University replaced 
as chair because he kept “giving the president problems.”  Uniquely, Hannah’s 
replacement, a Republican, Dean Erwin Griswald of the Harvard Law School, gave 
Kennedy “fits” as well.65 These fits were about helping minority Americans with equality 
in housing.  Incidentally, the Commission itself after releasing its landmark study, 
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accomplished yeomen’s work in directly assaulting housing discrimination against 
African diplomats in DC.66  
      On March 6, 1961 by Executive Order 10925, Kennedy established the President’s 
Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity (CEEO), the fourth active federal “open 
housing” entity before the order, placing Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson at the helm.  
Powerful in authority and far reaching in scope, CEEO combined the President’s 
Committee on Government Contracts with the President’s Committee on Employment 
Policy, into a single comprehensive committee with increased authority.67  Its purpose 
was to review the employment practices of the federal government regarding race and to 
make recommendations for improvement.  It also reviewed government contracts to weed 
out discrimination and if found, would withhold the “awarding” of contracts.  This 
differentiated it from the Civil Rights Commission and Sub-Cabinet Group as it had some 
real power.  The Committee in the conduct of its business established anti-discrimination 
rules for contractors, including some in the big housing industry.  Its authority covered 
over twenty million workers in all trades that supplied “things” to the government.68  
Under CEEO’s urging, 115 companies employing more than five and one half million 
workers, plus 117 AFL/CIO union affiliates representing thirteen million persons signed 
what would later be known as affirmative action agreements.69  
      However the CEEO sometimes exaggerated or over stated its impact.  Robert 
Kennedy and Lee White argued often, with LBJ and Hobart Taylor of the CEEO, about 
its reporting and the accuracy of its statistics in arresting job discrimination.  RFK and 
White questioned the veracity and the authenticity of the information LBJ presented.70  
Nonetheless one loop-hole was located that required a follow-on Executive Order, 11114, 
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“Equal Employment Opportunity,” on June 28, 1963. That forbad construction 
contractors from discriminating in employment and it spelled the beginning of the end of 
open job discrimination in the building trades, as the unions got behind both the 
Commission and the Executive Order 11114, some even calling for stronger measures.71    
Since this order dealt with federal “financial assistance,” provisions of a similar nature 
would find themselves into the National Defense Education Act.72  In the early fall of 
1961, in one of the CEEO’s major  and important “motions,” it called for JFK to sign a 
comprehensive executive order on open housing as soon as possible.73   
      Lastly, the Federal Courts began to take action to end housing discrimination and 
were the final federal entity involved, beyond the executive order and subsequent civil 
rights acts.  In 1961, in Monroe v. Pope the Supreme Court broadened the “domain of 
nationally defined rights,” and placed the federal court system in the immediate reach of 
plaintiffs as a “front-line” remedy.  This was for citizens who felt they had been 
discriminated against by a government agency at any level, because of race.  In 1962, in 
Baker v. Carr and following in 1964 with Reynolds v. Sims, respectively known as “the 
apportionment cases,” new guidelines for broadened protection under the 14th 
Amendment were mandated for voting appointment, which happily affected 
“neighborhood design as well.”74   From 1960 to 1970, suburbs around America’s big 
cities grew in total population of nearly 13.5 million, yet only 800,000 African-
Americans lived there.75  Drawing voting district lines based on racial housing patterns 
received a fatal blow.76  On the  appointment cases, Justices Warren, Black, Douglas, and 
Brennan were also swayed by powerful yet legally accurate arguments coming from 
lower courts, Congress, state legislatures, and civil rights groups.77  
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      Thus collectively, these five federal entities resolved some housing discrimination 
matters on their own but could not overcome the void in executive action, for eliminating 
racial discrimination, that JFK had promised by executive order.  They kept both direct 
and indirect pressure on Kennedy to take action.  And private organizations did so as 
well, which constitutes a superb story.  This was the time of a “cry for action” that would 
not be silenced by Kennedy’s “calls for restraint.”       
      Private organizations advocating public policy inundated the White House and HHFA 
with “the call for action” on the executive order, some championing well-grounded and 
sophisticated arguments.  The National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing 
(NCDH) kept the most pressure on Kennedy.  On September 27, 1961, NCDH issued a 
detailed press release calling on, “President Kennedy to issue without further delay his 
promised Executive Order barring discrimination in all Federal housing activities.”  
NCDH touted that thirty-three major religious, civil rights, labor, and civic groups backed 
them which of course caught the attention of White House and was quickly responded to 
with, “It is his [Kennedy’s] firm intention to issue the order at the appropriate time.”78  
NCDH consistently sent the president informed position papers that revealed no negative 
effects would be felt in the housing industry should the housing order he issued.  
Regularly, Charles Abrams one of America’s great “housers” and director of the NCDH 
petitioned JFK for meetings about the order, and much to his great chagrin, was told that 
“the President’s schedule is such that it is not possible [to meet] in the immediate future.”  
All he gained was a brief discussion with the Attorney General, which so greatly angered 
Abrams that he began writing individually to members of the White House staff, Burke 
Marshall, Ken O’Donnell, Lee White, and Arthur Schlesinger.  In unveiled language he 
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wrote that delays in issuing the order were uncalled for and would have negative political 
connotations should “Republican quarters choose to make the delay an issue.”79  Kennedy 
though remained unyielding. 
      From October 16th through 19th of 1962, a major conference was held in Princeton 
(NJ) as an “off the record” meeting sponsored by the Ford Foundation, the National 
Housing Center (NHC), and the National Association of Intergroup Relations Officials 
(NAIRO) to discuss how to bring about open housing, without throwing the home 
building industry into chaos, and how to get the open housing order issued.  Members 
representing forty different organizations concluded that open housing could be achieved, 
carefully, without destroying the market and that the key to doing so was “educating” 
citizens and the building industry on its merits.80  The Conference offered as proof, three 
case studies on the advantages of racially mixed housing: Prairie Shores (IL); Sunny Hills 
(CA); and Sacramento (CA), each championing successful fair housing programs.81  In 
the Conference as well, HHFA’s Mort Schussheim presented a gripping account of the 
results of housing discrimination, citing that only 10% of non-whites lived in any suburb 
at all, and minorities had an overcrowding rate double that of whites.  As well, fifty 
percent of non-white renters lived in substandard housing and so did two-fifths of non-
white homeowners.  Only 10% of non-whites had a relatively new home, built since 1955 
and the non-white’s home median value was $7,800, whereas whites had $13,100.82  And 
the bad news continued as in another report by the National Association of Intergroup 
Relations Officials (NAIRO), which Harris Wofford and URA’s James Banks both 
belonged, that said the executive order must be issued now to avoid needless suffering.  
This mirrored the U.S. Civil Rights Commission’s “position.”83  
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      Religious groups bombarded Kennedy with requests for action, such as the American 
Jewish Committee, the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, northern Protestant 
church associations and a few Catholic ones, plus the United Church Women of America, 
and the National Council of Churches.    Labor groups inundated the White House with 
demands that the order he issued, with the United Steel Workers of America in annual 
convention in Miami, calling for immediate action by Kennedy on the executive order, as 
did many of their locals.84  Walter Ruther of the United Auto Workers followed suit as 
did many of his AFL/CIO “locals.”85  
      Civil Rights groups “bothered” Kennedy the most though, and bordered on livid with 
his delays.  Roy Wilkins, A. Phillip Randolph, and Martin Luther King, Jr., “pushed” 
Kennedy.86  The Congress on Racial Equality (CORE) wrote letters, sent telegrams, and 
asked for meetings.  Wilkins’ National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP) produced excellent position papers, informational letters and telegrams, 
as did the National Urban League (NUL) under Henry Steiger and Whitney M. Young, 
Jr.87   Suburban Action, and the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law of the 
ACLU also pressured him.88  Howard University held a conference that called for a 
comprehensive order, and predicted that the entire civil rights movement, which had been 
focused on integration of interstate transportation and desegregation of schools, would 
shift its emphasis toward open housing.  The White House received hundreds of letters 
from African-Americans pleading for assistance, as one from a thirteen year old girl in 
South Carolina who wrote for help “because the Negro in South Carolina is grounded.”89   
      Lastly, government agencies from all levels pressed Kennedy for action on the 
executive order.  Mayor Richardson Dilworth of Philadelphia remained a consistent voice 
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on the issue as did equal rights councils in Pennsylvania.  Congressmen Robert 
Kastenmeir (D, WI) cogently explained how the order would improve housing and 
Senator Ken Keating (R, NY) openly called Kennedy “timid and reluctant.”  Stanley 
Mosk of Kennedy’s own Department of Justice wrote his president calling for an 
executive order to end the “particularly obdurate” housing discrimination.  And the Civil 
Rights Commission, using its 1961 Report as a baseline document, simply hounded 
Kennedy.90
      Yet not all the pressure Kennedy received about a possible executive order favored it.  
Many members of Congress particularly from the South openly criticized the idea.  
Albert Rains (D, AL) telegraphed the president that an executive order “will be disastrous 
to our housing programs and will mean finish to housing legislation which can be enacted 
by the Congress.”  John Sparkman (D, AL) urged Kennedy not to sign “such as order,” as 
it would “cripple badly the home building industry.”  In other telegrams he told Kennedy 
the order would, “cripple housing…in the north as well.”  Not to be outdone, Sam J. 
Ervin, Jr. (D, NC) wrote Kennedy that an order would curtail existing housing programs 
and as well, “would constitute an invasion of the legislative field…of the Congress.”  J. 
W. Fulbright (D, AK) warned Kennedy in a lengthy correspondence, “I believe such an 
order would be intolerable in the South and ineffective elsewhere.”  And Congressman 
James C. Davis (D, GA) said the order would “effectively prevent accomplishment of 
many improvements and facilities needed by both the white and colored races.”91   
      But Congresswoman Martha W. Griffith’s (D, MI) letter to Larry O’Brien took the 
prize.  She observed that “No Democratic Congressman from suburbia believes he is in 
danger of losing colored votes, but…in case the counsel of those seated less close to the 
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fire than I am prevails…and I lose this election, would you mind asking the President if I 
can have the next Supreme Court vacancy….” She “P.S.ed” her letter, on official House 
stationary, with a not so candid observation that if the order is going to be issued, “Maybe 
the Order should be preceded by a little series of lectures on: 1. Beer parties will be held 
in the back yard.  The front lawn is for grass.  2. Knifings will be confined to your 
immediate family.  3. Loud talk, television, and horn blowing will cease at 11:00 P.M. 
and not be resumed until 8:00 A.M.”92   
      Mayors of cities large and small also petitioned Kennedy not to release an executive 
order.  John Arrington of Palatka (FL) wrote “our officials have made it quite clear that 
our local housing program will be immediately terminated if the threat of forced racial 
integration is forced upon them.” William B. Hartsfield of Atlanta was no less adamant, 
holding that “such an Executive Order would at this time be unwise.”93  
      But the building trades industry became the most vocal of the professional groups in 
opposition to the order.  Businesses’ leading publication, The Wall Street Journal, noted 
in an “opinion editorial” piece in October 1961 about the Civil Rights Commission’s 
Report that, “However well-intentioned, this is a thoughtless approach.”94  The Wall 
Street Journal also predicted “a serious drop in housing starts,” as a direct result of the 
issuance of an executive order.  Many other trade publications reflected the same themes 
as well, particularly in the South.95  The “Statement of Policy” for 1962 of the National 
Association of Home Builders blasted the possible order and its president, Leonard L. 
Frank, repeatedly requested meetings with JFK.  He released voluminous press releases 
and sent out all kind of reports, most showing astounding negative outcomes in the 
housing market should an order be issued.  The U.S. Chamber of Commerce held its 
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convention in 1961 in Miami as well, and with a host of other, lesser, associations 
present, while not condemning the order outright, officially questioned its “legislative 
morality.”  To their credit though, they did reluctantly state that if an order was to be 
issued, it should be a comprehensive one in nature.96   
      Yet the private hate mail was the most vicious and vituperative.  Telegrams came into 
the White House from small construction companies in bold language urging that the 
order not be issued.  “Concerned” citizen letters about supposed NAACP activities where 
“anti-white” literature was being circulated, which in fact was most likely Klu Klux Klan 
inspired, were sent to the White House.  And the hate mail poured in, as one from H. L. 
Pemberton of Huntington (WVA) addressed to “John Kennedy c/o Luther King, the 
White (?) House, Washington D.C.,” stating, “Mr. Ex-President, Grab the Nigger vote, 
you just lost mine.”  It was signed, “Ex-Democrat.”97 
      Overall, delays issuing the executive order covered nearly two years and in total, 
there were three specific delays, constituted Kennedy’s “strategy.”  But Kennedy never 
publicly stated he would not issue the executive order.  Rather, he kept delaying it “until 
the timing was right,” which meant he had exhausted all his “I.O.U.s” with Congress and 
certain other “constituencies” he had been appeasing, and had nothing left to lose.  In 
between, he did get the Weaver nomination, the 1961 Housing Act, and certain trade 
agreements, but was finally being forced by public pressure not to begin 1963 without an 
order.  So he finally issued it.  
      Four themes behind his slow evolution in releasing the order are noteworthy.  
Kennedy was simply “timid” with Congress.  The hearings confirming Weaver in 
February 1961 had been sharp and bitter and his House Committee on Rules fight over 
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minimum wage, divisive.  In my opinion, this produced a deep sense of caution in 
Kennedy about confronting Congress and he remained most concerned with the Senate.  
Harris Wofford stated, “Kennedy overreacted to the Senate…with a touch of 
insecurity…and it came again even more vividly on the question of the executive order 
on housing.”98  Secondly, Kennedy remained uncomfortable over having an African-
American heading enforcement of an open housing order, particularly in the South.  He 
briefly flirted with moving Weaver to HEW Secretary to remove him from the open 
housing firing line.  But as Congress debated over Cuba, Castro, Khrushchev, and 
Mississippi, JFK’s interest in the order also wained.99  And there is no doubt he did not 
want to throw the housing economy into a tail spin, causing voter unrest, which he was 
too “timid” with as well.  Lastly, political appeasement of big business was still going 
forward at the expense of poor African-Americans seeking improved housing.  This 
reveals a president with a weak moral compass, but with a strong political agenda.   
       Regarding the actual delays in issuing the order, Kennedy had the first rough draft of 
several available and on his desk by late summer 1961.  Then according to Wofford came 
the Berlin Crisis, which caused him to withdraw from domestic actions.100  Yet pressure 
mounted for action as the NCDH study of September 22, 1961 provided Kennedy with a 
working copy of a comprehensive order, plus extensive legal briefs to support it.  Of 
course the landmark “Report,” by the Civil Rights Commission on October 6, 1961, did 
the same thing.101   Yet these were not the specific reasons for the three delays, as they 
had to do with Kennedy’s domestic political agenda. 
      Kennedy huddled over Thanksgiving 1961 at Hyannis Port with his closest advisors 
and established domestic strategy for the upcoming year.  Burke Marshall, Ted Sorensen, 
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Kenneth O’Donnell, Larry O’Brien, Robert Kennedy and other lesser staff met there.  
Bobby spent most of his time playing flag football in a light rain with his children.102  But 
some in the press thought this gathering signaled release of the order and in anticipation, 
using a “leak,” Peter Braestrup of The New York Times published a story over the 
Thanksgiving holiday of 1961 that the order was about to be issued.103  Nothing though, 
could have been further from the truth and this constituted Kennedy’s first delay. 
      The meeting in Hyannis actually laid out ideas for the future domestic legislative 
program to include the Departmental status bill in January 1962, and the strategy for the 
1962 primary and Congressional elections.  From this meeting, Kennedy initially told 
Harris Wofford and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. the he would release the order after the 
1962 primary elections were over and the “Democrats were safe.”104   When confronted 
about releasing the order immediately or delaying it, Kennedy said it was one of many 
difficult decisions and asked Marshall, “Why doesn’t someone bring me an easy one?”  
But JFK left his options open.  He decided to emphasize foreign policy in his State of the 
Union speech, to have the Department of Urban Affairs and Housing (DUAH) approved 
before the order, and kept to himself that fact that he “might” not issue the order until late 
summer or early fall of 1962, after Congress had adjourned.105  This was regardless of his 
“after the primaries” comments.  Weaver though, who was not at the meeting, strongly 
emphasized to Kennedy that the executive order was more important than the 
Departmental status bill, but that went unheeded.106   
      In January 1962, after Kennedy delivered the State of the Union, he was often 
questioned about the “order” in his press conferences.  Kennedy regularly quipped, “I 
said I would issue that order when I considered it to be in the public interest.  I am fully 
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conscious of the statement to which you [the press] refer and yet plan to meet my 
responsibilities in regard to this matter.”  He implied the order would be given more 
consideration after his legislative program was underway.  But by late February when 
DUAH died in Congress and his legislative program was bogged down, pens were mailed 
to Kennedy by the hundreds, and packages of ink arrived as well, so that he could now 
execute his famous “stroke of the pen.”107 
      Yet the spring “primaries” for the off-year elections, another Kennedy benchmark, 
came and went with no order.  In another Hyannis Port meeting in the spring of 1962, 
Kennedy considered it, and for a second time, delayed issuing the order.  This was right 
after the spring primary season concluded.108  This time he said he was concerned about 
saving his legislative program in Congress and “appeasement” was to be the tactic.   By 
late summer 1962, 83% of Kennedy’s legislative proposals had been to the floor, but only 
43% passed both Houses.  Kennedy was now adamantly appeasing Senator Lister Hill 
(D, AL), Senator John Sparkman (D, AL), and Congressman Al Rains (D, AL) and no 
order was about to be issued.109  “Ink for Jack” continued to flow into the White 
House.110   
      As Congress debated, so did the pro and anti- order forces.  Dr. Martin Luther King 
urged JFK to issue the order now.111  But the National Association of Home Builders 
(NAHB) publicized an alarming little report, boldly proclaiming that the executive order 
would cut new housing starts nationally by 33%.  Called the C.E.I.R. report for the 
research firm NAHB hired to survey builders, it caused quite a stir at HHFA and in the 
White House.  Kennedy at his July 5, 1962 press conference when questioned about 
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housing issues stated, “I will announce it [release the order] when we think it would be a 
useful and appropriate time.”112    
      Yet, NCDH’s analysis of the C.E.I.R. report showed bias in the response, because 
only 38% of builders responded, and many of these were southern.  HHFA’s Office of 
Program Policy also noted that the other 62% of builders were apparently content not to 
reply, and many were already happily building in states with non-discrimination laws 
much tougher than any Kennedy proposed.113
      Congress finally adjourned for the fall 1962 elections, failing to enact most of 
Kennedy’s key measures.  In his marked displeasure with that body, Kennedy flirted with 
abandoning appeasement and releasing the order then,114 and according to Harris 
Wofford, indicated he would do so.115   An eager David Braaten, speculated in the 
Washington Star that Kennedy would sign the order on the 100th Anniversary of 
Lincoln’s signing of the Emancipation Proclamation, September 22, 1962.116  But all that 
changed rather quickly, and that became JFK’s third delay.   
      Kennedy “disturbing” received pleas from many Democrat in Congress, not to issue 
the order before the Congressional off-year elections, scheduled for the end of the first 
week of November 1962.  Several Southern Democrats, plus those from Missouri, and 
some northern ones virtually “begged” Kennedy.117  Congresswoman Martha Griffith 
called Larry O’Brien, “absolutely screaming to Larry saying the President just couldn’t 
issue that order before the election or she would be dead politically.”  Congressman 
James G. O’Hara of Michigan told O’Brien the same thing, as did Congresswoman 
Lenore K. Sullivan of Missouri.118  
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      In an administration “leak” designed to placate these worried politicians, the press 
reported over the weekend of October 20-21, 1962, there would be no executive order 
before the Tuesday November 6 elections, but there would be one thereafter.119  Here, for 
the first time JFK prescribed a timeline.  Kennedy had been influenced to do this by an 
advance copy of House and Home, warning that with all the executive order “yo-yoing,”  
“builders and lenders were very much at sea about what they should do,” and this “doubt” 
was upsetting the housing economy.120  But, civil rights groups were unhappy with this 
timeline, with one handout reading “What Happens While the President Waits?” It 
answered this rhetorical question with “less than 2% of new FHA and VA homes are 
open to African-Americans” in new all white suburbs and, “that 70% of all displaced 
urban renewal families are non-white,” with little good housing available, plus “80% of 
all Public Housing remained segregated.”121  
      As Kennedy prepared to finally issue the executive order, a deeply divisive argument 
over the scope or coverage long simmering within the administration, came to the 
surface.  Three matters relative to the order’s scope caused significant debate over: its 
overall comprehensiveness; its impact on business; and its relationship to state non-
discrimination programs.  These matters were of great concern for policy drafters, and 
two schools of thought emerged.  One wanted a comprehensive order covering all 
housing, fully eliminating housing discrimination.  The other, desired a limited order 
covering only federally assisted housing, which had little impact on the racist private 
housing market.   
      The “scope” issue went to the order’s very heart and was hotly contested.  
“Comprehensive” had two varieties: one covered “savings and loans” associations only, 
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which amounted to 55 to 69% of the total housing market, under the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation 
(FSLIC).  The other version added the commercial banks under FDIC to the Savings and 
Loans covering around 80% of the market.  Both of these fell under the Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB).  Of course, federally assisted housing such as FHA/VA, 
urban renewal housing, public housing, defense housing, NASA housing, and 
Community Facilities (CFA) housing accounted for the other 20% of the market.  That 
was included without debate under comprehensive order, and also constituted what the 
narrow order covered.122
      The narrow order eliminated discrimination in federally assisted housing, on paper 
20% of the “overall” market, but in reality, not even that much.  That was because the 
FHA/VA market share continued to shrink under Kennedy as he delayed the order, 
dropping from 24% in 1960 to 20% in 1962, and to 17% by the end of 1963.  Moreover, 
neither the comprehensive nor narrow order was “retroactive,” which constituted a 
fascinating flaw.  Using the narrow version as an example, only housing built or sold 
after the date of the order was covered.  But uniquely 80% of the then current FHA/VA 
market  in November 1962 was actually in “existing” FHA/VA housing which was not 
covered.  So what the narrow order covered when actually signed, was 20% of a 17% 
market share, which was only 2.50% of the total U.S. housing market.  This would slowly 
increase as time passed and more FHA/VA homes were built or sold post order’s date, 
but the narrow version on examination, was a disgrace.  
      So the two schools, “comprehensive” versus “narrow” aligned themselves for the 
fight, but most work was done on the legalities of a “comprehensive” one.  Weaver began 
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in 1961 after his confirmation to prepare information for an executive order and ideas 
were garnered by looking at Canadian non-discrimination regulations.  HHFA had 
“proposals for executive action” drawn up as early as July 1961, and Jack Conway, 
Robert Weaver, and Mort Schussheim produced a lucid report on July 10 calling for a 
“full, broad order with enforcement more feasible, the wider the coverage…including all 
commercial banks and mutual savings banks.” HHFA’s Milt Semer and URA’s Fred 
Hayes later important in OEO’s poverty program, helped.123  Then on October 6th, the 
Civil Rights Commission issued its hard-hitting report calling for the same, and it seemed 
the comprehensive order was well on its way.  Norbert Schlei and DOJ’s Nicholas deB 
Katzenbach lent their support and advice to the comprehensive one as well.  Thus, by the 
end of October 1961, Kennedy had approval for a comprehensive order from HHFA, the 
U.S. Civil Rights Commission, and the DOJ.124   
      But fearing the worst, Kennedy had Weaver quietly conduct further research on a 
comprehensive housing order’s impact.  Weaver estimated that an 8% to 16% drop in 
new starts “might” occur, ranging from 100,000 to 200,000 units annually, “depending on 
the scope, content, and timing of an order.”125   To ensure no leaks occurred, Fred Dutton 
of the White House wrote his “chief,” Ted Sorensen: “there is much loose flapping going 
on within the ‘family’ at the moment, with prospects of even more,” and he urged a 
meeting to quell it.126  Yet the “comprehensive” order held its own in drafting and 
preparation, at least conceptually, through the late fall of 1961. 
      Then Kennedy’s Congressional legislative team hit him in mid-November 1961 with 
some curt analysis that a comprehensive order, covering the FDIC might have legal 
problems.  They wrote that “there is some question of legal authority to go this far, and 
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without it, 75% [actually 80%] of all home loans would [not] be covered.  “Then they 
provided the real issue,” Sen. Sparkman and Cong. Rains are…strongly opposed to any 
Housing order, as quite clearly the bill to create Dept. of Urban Affairs would be lost if 
an order issued.”127
      In 1962, Kennedy asked DOJ to research further the legality of a presidential 
executive order requiring compliance from commercial banks and private savings and 
loan associations.  The issue focused on “executive” versus “legislative” (Congressional) 
when it came to forcing commercial banks and savings and loans to do something.  The 
possibilities of being tied up in court for a long period of time was also a concern.  
Norbert Schlei at DOJ and Jack Conway of HHFA concluded that an approval by the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) for compliance with a comprehensive 
executive order was all that would be required.  Conway further suggested there was a 
vacancy on the Board, which Kennedy could easily “pack,” so that would give the 
administration a favorable vote.128  Yet Lee White was not so sure.129  White asked 
Norbert Schlei to carefully reconsider Conway’s suggestions, as White researched his 
own solutions.  As he toiled, Schlei called the savings and loan matter “a terribly 
complex” one.130   
      The heart of that issue revolved around the extent the order would be “applicable” to 
the practices of privately owned financial institutions engaged in the business of making 
real estate loans in the private sector.  National banks fell under the Comptroller of the 
Currency and commercial banks, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and FDIC, and 
Savings and Loans, under FSLIC and FDIC.131  
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      Kennedy called for a meeting on November 13, 1962 to resolve the matter once and 
for all, as the election was now over.  Schlei completed his position paper and reduced it 
to two concise pages.  But the meeting was poorly organized and somehow the president 
had not received Schlei’s comments as a read ahead package, so Schlei had to brief him 
orally.  But his presentation was full of interruptions from others.132  Initially, Kennedy 
chose to exclude commercial banks from the order outright even though HHFA felt they 
could be included.  The final decision then, at the end of the meeting centered on the 
Savings and Loans.  Schlei, with help from Nicholas deB Katzenbach concluded the 
President had authority to cover the S and Ls.  However, the Chairman of the Board of 
Directors of the FDIC indicated to Kennedy by letter that he “does not believe the 
Corporation has the power to prohibit discrimination by insured banks.”  Bruce Marshall 
and Robert Kennedy agreed with the FDIC, and that was all JFK needed to scuttle the 
“comprehensive” order.133   Lee White, who by now had reversed himself on the matter, 
tried to change Kennedy’s mind on November 16, 1962 but to no avail.134   
      Kennedy made this decision in “cold blood.”  He rendered it without concern that for 
two years African-Americans had been discriminated against under his watch, while he 
pursued his political agenda, and that for the rest of his administration they would not be 
much better off than before an order was issued, if he went with the narrow one.  
Moreover, he was unwilling to challenge the political status quo for fear of offending it.  
He could have used the prestige, power, and leadership of his office to issue a broad order 
including banks and savings and loans under “equal protection” clauses of the 5th and 
14th Amendments.  And his “federal” authority over the FDIC and FHLBB was clear.   
 450
      Also at that November 13th meeting according to Fred Hayes, the decision was made 
to sign the order and release it with the least possible fanfare.135  In the year 1962 
Thanksgiving came early on Thursday, November 22 and Kennedy planned to sign and 
release the order, at a signing ceremony late in the afternoon of Tuesday, November 20.  
By design, newspapers had published their evening edition by then, so Wednesday, 
November 21 would be when the public would first learn of the order.  That was the day 
before Thanksgiving and many businesses and schools let out early.  With little fanfare 
and minimal press coverage, this is exactly what he did.  On November 22, the Green 
Bay Packers played the Detroit Lions as most citizens sat down to Thanksgiving dinner 
and the country was at peace, inflation was low, employment was up, and African-
Americans for the most part, were still in segregated housing.  Friday the 23rd was the 
busiest shopping day of the year and life went on, with Kennedy “low keying” the event.  
Uniquely when he signed the order he did not even have a copy of the narrow one on 
hand, so he signed a blank piece of paper.  After the Holidays on November 24th, the 
official instruments were executed.136
      What Kennedy finally “signed” late on November 20, 1962, Executive Order 11063, 
“Equal Opportunity in Housing” was a narrow or limited executive order.  It banned 
discrimination from that date forward, in the sale or lease of housing that received federal 
assistance.137  But as mentioned, this was only a small amount of the total market share.  
It also established the President’s Committee on Equal Opportunity in Housing 
(PCEOH), with JFK appointing ex-Pennsylvania Governor David L. Lawrence as 
chairman.138   
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      The order had four major sections: prevention of discrimination; implementation by 
departments and agencies; enforcement; establishment of the President’s Committee on 
Equal Opportunity in Housing (PCEOH); and miscellaneous data that included the 
signature.  Only FHA, PHA, URA, CFA, FNMA, Defense Housing, NASA Housing, and 
Agricultural Housing were actually covered. 
      For enforcement, “good offices” were to be used initially to stop discrimination.  
Then “conference, conciliation, and persuasion.”  If that failed, “we will have to invoke 
the sanctions as the withdrawal of federal assistance followed by litigation.”139  
Compliance was essentially enforced by the President’s Committee on Equal Opportunity 
in Housing (PCEOH), and then to each department and agency level.  Thirty days was 
given for each department or agency to produce enforcement policies.  The PCEOH 
could hold hearings, public and private, and the attorney general provided legal advice.  
The PCEOH’s eight members were to meet monthly and, included the secretaries of 
treasury, defense, agriculture, the attorney general, the HHFA administrator, VA 
administrator, chairman of the federal home loan bank board, and Governor Lawrence as 
chair representing JFK.  An “executive committee,” the chairman, plus two others, 
conducted business between the regular monthly meetings of the full PCEOH.140   
      Initially, most of the supporters of the order greeted its signing with exuberance.  
Publicly Weaver said “It is my hope and belief that this order, by removing artificial 
market restrictions, will permit demand to achieve its natural growth.  And I am confident 
that it will lead to even a more prosperous and healthy construction industry.”141  But 
Weaver, after Dallas, wrote in 1969, “The coverage was much too small.  You cannot 
take 2 per cent of the market and expect it to be effective.  It was symbolic.”142 Yet the 
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National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing (NCDH) proudly proclaimed, 
“VICTORY!  President Signs Housing Order,” and received they pens form the signing 
as did Weaver.  Of course, they later called the order, “far from complete.”143   
      The press reported it with mixed emotions generally either criticizing it for being too 
weak, or for being issued in the first place.  The New York Times blandly noted that most 
of Kennedy’s Civil Rights activities had to come from executive action.  The Atlanta 
Journal reported, “no immediate impact” whereas the Atlanta Constitution felt “Negroes 
would now be pressuring the mayor to desegregate local public housing.”  The 
Washington Daily News observed in the DC area that “this may mean less units available 
for colored,” and the Dallas News called issuing the order “100 percent politically 
inspired.”  Various HHFA press conferences were held in December 1962 solely for the 
purpose of taking some of the “sting” out of the order.144   
      However, many were truly less than impressed.  The Wall Street Journal bemoaned, 
“Worried Builders: Many See Drop After President Bans Housing Discrimination; They 
Fear Whites Won’t Buy if Negroes Move Nearby; Some Plan Cuts in Starts.”  On 
November 21, 1962 the Washington Post noted, “President Kennedy’s signing of the 
housing anti-discrimination order is belated but welcome…. [but] should have been a 
first order of Presidential business.”  Whitney Young (NUL), James Farmer (CORE), and 
Roy Wilkins (NAACP) “might have overlooked the law’s weaknesses if the spirit of the 
executive order had been aggressively promoted.”145  But it was issued with a dispassion 
and aloofness almost completely “reverse” from the volatile, uncertain, confused, and 
agitated times Kennedy had pledged to lead. 
 453
      The President’s Committee On Equal Opportunity, even that got off to a slow start.  
Original drafts of the order, had the PCEOH appointed under a separate executive 
mandate, as was the President’s Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity 
(Executive Order 10925) and the Executive Order 11114 that followed.  Most drafts were 
also designed to staff the PCEOH to cover a comprehensive executive order that would 
have included the secretary of labor, and more importantly the chairman of the FDIC, 
comptroller of the currency, and additional HHFA membership.146  Lastly, Governor 
Lawrence did not even want the job and had to be convinced by LBJ to take it.147  
      But the real delays were twofold.  Federal departments and agencies had thirty days 
to draft compliance rules, placing the PCEOH’s work up against Christmas 1962 and 
with the holidays and Congress not reconvening until the 3rd of January 1963, business 
did not begin until the next day.  JFK caused the other delay using his executive authority 
to pack the PCEOH with eight “public members,” which was his right and that equaled 
the official membership, to ensure things did not get out of hand.  Jack Conway sat as one 
of these eight, by then representing the AFL-CIO but the other seven had to be appointed 
which took time.  JFK filled these vacancies with members from the big housing 
financing and construction firms, and the United Steel Workers.148    
            Most of what the PCEOH adjudicated when it finally started business, constituted 
housing disputes between those discriminated against and those discriminating.  Many 
were with FHA/VA, some PHA and URA and a few were CFA cases.  Meeting formally 
once a month, they generally applied “leverage,” to resolve cases.  In a few instances, 
they refused to approve grants to towns such as Norling, North Carolina, that rerouted 
water and sewage so it did not service African-American neighborhoods.  But PCEOH 
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meetings, often were ruckus events, with up to 25 participants, as agencies and “public” 
members brought their associates, all of whom wanted to argue.  Yet regularly even 
Kennedy’s PCEOH concluded its meetings with “it was regularly moved, seconded and 
unanimously agreed …that a broadening of the order to include all institutions…be 
accomplished.”149  
      Initially the PCOEH felt that to be effective, Savings and Loans also should be 
included, increasing market coverage up to at least 60%.  But Kennedy would hear none 
of it.  Later, they eventually recommended coverage for banks which would total 80% of 
the market, but Kennedy would not consider that either.150  Overall, they recommended a 
dramatic “expansion of the order” while noting “the timing of any expansion is a 
consideration within the President’s determination,” and concluded their final report to 
Kennedy in the fall of 1962 with, “It [the PCEOH] urges that serious consideration be 
given to achieve this coverage [broader] by amending Executive Order 11063 and 
broadening its scope to the widest degree possible.”  Kennedy had a year left in both his 
life and in his administration to correct this flaw, but replied when asked about it in the 
late fall of 1963 that, “The order we now have is the one we plan to stand on.”151  That 
Fall, after Birmingham, JFK was concerned with Vietnam, and problems with the 
Democratic party in Texas, but not with the executive order’s expansion.152   
      Department and Agency compliance with the order began slowly as well.  Weaver 
even had to reorganize some of his staff functions in HHFA to accommodate the order 
and had to request additional funds for implementation and enforcement, some going 
through the irascible and racist Senator Richard Russell (D, GA), prompting long 
delays.153  CFA spent significant time insuring its college housing loan and elderly 
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housing met the requirements of the order.  For example, the University of Kentucky 
wanted to find out if the order covered federally assisted fraternity and sorority 
construction and was informed it did.154  Ms. McGuire in PHA readily complied but she 
wanted the order made retroactive.155  And what a case there was for that, as 500,000 
older PHA “non-covered” units existed but Kennedy was building only about 24,000 new 
covered ones yearly.156  FHA followed by URA had the most difficult time establishing 
compliance programs, as both “worked” under six titles of the Housing Act and had to 
placate their “builder friends” under each title.157   
      However, some departments complied swiftly.  Defense housing readily acted.  The 
VA, often known in the past for its discriminatory policies, sent telegrams out to its 
centers across the country, “to quickly comply.”158  The Federal Reserve and FDIC said 
they would comply when renting new facilities, but this of course had no bearing on their 
customers.159  To facilitate communication and information, HHFA published a set of “Q 
and A” manuals for interpretation of the executive order.  HHFA and FHA even proposed 
an “education program for the executive order,” with one suggestion being to hold a 
series of national, then regional conferences about it.160   
      But in actual enforcement, FHA topped the list of agencies experiencing difficulties.  
The first area of FHA problems was determining which committee to send contractor 
compliance issues to for adjudication.  In building FHA homes, a fine line existed 
between discrimination in employment and discrimination in housing.  These matters 
went to either the CEEO or the PCEOH for resolution.  Sometimes the location of the 
property meant it was already discriminatory, and that had to be sorted out.161  Also with 
the order, it now took longer to sell a FHA/VA house, as “non-discrimination” must be 
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proven.  The “percentage” of FHA homes taking over 60 days to sell “grew” by around 
8% in all price categories.  Delays and “defaults” also drove some FHA properties into 
receivership, with some converting into low-rent public housing, causing agency 
“jurisdictional” disputes.162  
      A second FHA problem was called “hang over,” where a commitment had been made 
or in some cases 99% completed prior to November 20, 1962, but with the order on a 
“new start,” FHA now had a discriminatory issue, with lawyers on both sides.  The 
Order’s Section 102 called the “good offices” section, called for “case by case” handling, 
to obtain a “clean hands solution.”  That meant the lender, builder, broker or contractor 
either complied with the order, or “washed his hands” of past practices in writing and 
agreed to comply on the next sale forward.  Otherwise federal assistance would be 
withdrawn.163  Then there were problems tracking FHA “insuring office compliance,” 
where no regular reporting system was in place to determine race (later called affirmative 
action).  HHFA’s “Intergroup Relations” spot checks represented all that could be 
used.164 
      In noteworthy housing cases publicized in the press and called to the attention of the 
White House, quick resolution ensued.  The Omaha Urban League swiftly broke up 
segregated off base housing around Offutt Air Force Base, with the support of Secretary 
of Defense Robert S. McNamara.  Several Florida towns had their discriminatory 
practices curtailed by the PCEOH as well after significant publicity.165   In another 
notable case in Baltimore, Major James Caldwell an African-American stationed at Fort 
George G. Meade (MD) tried to buy a FHA insured home in Laurel, and was turned 
down in November 1963, a year after the order, based on race.  This went to the PCOEH 
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and was resolved quickly, as it had been all over the local press.  FHA also swiftly levied 
sanctions, particularly when forced to do so through negative publicity on “hot potato” 
cases, one being the first written denial of a FHA approval against a discriminating 
Orlando (FL) builder in late July 1963.166 
      URA had enormous problems as well.  Many of its Workable Program for 
Community Improvement (WPCI) Plans came with extensive “hang over,” meaning pre-
November 20, 1962 discrimination built in, but arrived after the order.  Several 
communities as Independence (MO) began to withdraw from urban renewal rather than 
reverse their plans.  Los Angeles had to rewrite several WPCIs, as did Cincinnati which 
fought the outcome to no avail.  Numerous southern owns had to rewrite their plans.  One 
urban renewal site had “integrated plans,” but when inspected was found to have 
segregated toilet facilities on the construction site.167  However, like PHA under 
McGuire, URA enforced compliance rather readily when it could.168   
      Nonetheless, our nation’s capital consistently could not get it right.  African 
diplomats were still discriminated against and FHA/VA suburbs surrounding the city 
such as Bel Air (MD), and Laurel (MD), had to “join voluntarily in an agreement to 
abandon discriminatory procedures,” on a case-by-case basis.  Weaver did not actually 
have the time, the staff, or the budget for all the local complaints, so in some cases, 
Congressional staffers and investigators serving on “the District’s House Committee, 
were required to do the “dirty work.”169  
      What a mess Kennedy made of this by not issuing a comprehensive order and letting 
that be adjudicated in the courts if need be.  Because he remained timid with Congress, 
his lack of fortitude produced loss of housing opportunity for millions of Americans for 
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years.  It would take until the 1964 and 1968 Civil Rights Acts to correct the matter.  Yet 
Kennedy began preparing to take credit with African-American voters for this executive 
order in the 1964 elections, and it remained high on his list of accomplishments.  Yet, as 
Weaver said, it remained an illusion and only “symbolic” in nature. 
      Once the “scope” of the order became clearly understood by groups watching the 
performance of this administration, criticism mounted.  The first expressions of 
dissatisfaction came through “channels.”  The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 
petitioned Kennedy’s “good offices” to expand the order into a new and comprehensive 
one.  The PCOH itself agreed with the ACLU and stated so in writing.  Even LBJ 
proposed “a bill of rights representing agreements between the President and the Negro 
community as to those things which the Negroes are legitimately entitled…as… equal 
opportunity in housing.”170   The NAACP joined the ACLU to request HHFA make the 
order retroactive, and the NAACP, and CORE, plus the Friends Service Committee 
(Quakers) did the same.  The administration responded contritely that the “matter that is 
under study.”171   
      Then civil rights groups took to the streets.  In May 1963, CORE picketed HHFA in 
DC.  Sign carrying protesters hoisted placards reading, “Extend Executive Order to Cover 
the Whole Housing Market,” “Enforce Executive Order in Existing Projects” and “Make 
Public, Lists of New HHFA Communities.”  This latter one referred to “desegregated” 
housing locations nationally.  CORE also picketed the Department of Justice in late May 
1963, over housing discrimination in Deerfield (IL).172  The unlikely Wall Street Journal 
even predicted massive demonstrations in 1963 about “housing segregation” and from 
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May 20 through May 31, 1963 for example, demonstrations took place in 31 cities.173  
Things were heating up for John Kennedy and his weak commitment to open housing. 
      Conversely, the “other side” wanted even the weak order repealed.  Big business 
involved in housing fought back, even against the weak order.  The Wall Street Journal 
wrote that the Negro groups remained “concentrated” in segregated neighborhoods after 
the order, suggesting African-Americans did not want integrated housing.  The Journal 
quipped, “It must be more fun to march.”  Leonard Frank of the National Association of 
Home Builders desperately desired to “meet with the president” about the order, to no 
avail.  And “businessmen” avidly continued to find ways to “out wit” it, by working 
properties with no restrictions initially, than the new “integrated” ones second.  Yet the 
most disturbing backlash remained the movement to repeal the executive order sponsored 
by several real estate banks in California and New York State, and others as Chicago, 
Tacoma, Seattle, and Omaha.  “Right wing” radio stations over 1,000 strong, and 
championed by the exocentric H. L. Hunt, along with the John Birch Society, quickly 
condemned the order.  The right wing Americans for Constitutional Action even drew 
new membership from the open housing debate.174   
      Whereas Kennedy would take no further action regarding open housing, fortunately 
several cities did.  On July 29, 1957, New York City executed its first comprehensive fair 
housing law and Weaver had a role in that.  Pittsburgh and Philadelphia followed and 
Dave Lawrence helped there, and some smaller towns as Toledo (OH) voluntarily 
“opened up” as did Schenectady, (NY).  In DC, the “Good Neighborhood Pledge Card” 
system became a voluntary “be nice at resale” method of doing business, and all who 
lived in DC were supposed to sign the card, including Kennedy.  Lee White wrote back 
 460
without identifying whether or not JFK had signed his card.175   Fair Housing Committees 
of some kind were also formed in most major cities.  By Kennedy’s death, 49 cities had 
some form of fair housing statute.177  As well, three hundred cities and towns had fair 
housing committees.178
      Moreover, many state governments also began to expand open housing as well.176   By 
late November of 1962, HHFA and the Washington Post counted 19 states that had some 
form of open housing laws on the books restricting discrimination in “government 
assisted housing.”  In the fall of 1963, the state of California enacted laws requiring fair 
practices in all private housing across the state.    Weaver at HHFA privately maintained 
complete lists of towns, cities, and states where “racial progress,” could be made with 
just a little “nudge” in the right direction.  These lists were extensive, running for 
pages.179  Conversely, he also maintained similar lists where only a comprehensive 
federal order would end housing segregation and discrimination. 
      Regarding that, it was gradually assumed that “education” about open housing would 
lessen discrimination.  Thus a series of conferences educating the public about the matter 
and urban issues in general, were suggested to be held, culminating in a proposed 
“National” White House Conference on Community Development in Washington DC for 
December 1963.  The National Housing Conference, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, and 
the American Institute of Architects originally advanced this idea in 1960 when JFK was 
elected and others later joined the crusade.180   While Kennedy remained ambivalent 
about it, pressure mounted yearly, for a national conference on urban matters covering 
open housing and all aspects of community development. 
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      As a model for such a conference, the CEEO regularly traveled and met around the 
country, holding meetings for example in Atlanta on July 10, 1961, as did the U.S. Civil 
Rights Commission.181  African-American leaders had been pressing JFK for a similar 
“White House Conference.”  Roy Wilkins of the NAACP, while being kind to Kennedy 
publicly, strongly urged him in print to hold such an event.  Kennedy by Executive Order 
10934 on April 13, 1961 established the Administrative Conference of the United States, 
“to improve federal administration and procedures nationally and to allow private citizens 
to meet with government officials from across the country, to discuss federal 
management.”182  Additionally, Kennedy began his “White House Regional 
Conferences” in November, 1961, and it was thought the “urban” conference might 
parallel these.  The latter were held in twelve cities across the country and were 
opportunities for “a federal town meeting” over “full employment, opportunities for 
cities, senior citizen problems, and youth, agriculture and conservation matters.”  Vice-
President Lyndon B. Johnson, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Secretary of the 
Interior Stewart L. Udall, Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of 
Commerce Luther H. Hodges, Secretary of Labor Arthur J. Goldberg, HEW Secretary 
Abraham A. Ribicoff, Housing Administrator Robert C. Weaver, Chair of the Council of 
Economic Advisors Walter W. Heller, and Small Business Administration John E. Horne 
left their stuffy Washington offices and met with over 50,000 average citizens to discuss  
domestic concerns in these forums.183     
      A White House Conference on Urban Affairs was designed to be a “catch all” forum 
for city problems.  It was supposed to highlight the importance the president placed on 
urban matters giving the White House “sanction” for discussing major city issues.  The 
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American Council to Improve Neighborhoods (ACTION), and the American Municipal 
Association (AMA) joined other groups endorsing the idea.184  George O’Gorman of 
Kennedy’s inner circle and the White House staff was tasked to establish a possible 
national urban conference along with a commission.  Richard Lee, Mayor of New Haven 
(CT), and the United States Conference of Mayors and James Rouse, a prominent 
mortgage banker and “traveler” in urban affairs provided encourageadvice.185
      Sensing that the White House Regional Conferences went well, at worst with critics 
calling them “publicity shows for the Administration,” the proposed urban conference 
and commission idea gathered momentum.186 A time line was established in 1962 for a 
“White House Conference on Urban Problems” and for the National Association of 
Housing and Redevelopment Officials (NAHRO) and National Governors’ Conference 
(NGC) lent their strong public support.187  The National Housing Center (NHC) and the 
National Association of Intergroup Relations (NAIRO) also backed the idea at the 
Princeton Conference in the fall of 1962.  The National Association of Home Builders 
(NAHB) also believed a conference of this nature had merit and planned to offer their 
support as well.  Only the General Accounting Office (GAO) warned the planners that 
strict rules governed spending money for federal conferences.188  
      In March 1963, Lee White asked Robert Weaver to prepare a prospectus for a “White 
House Conference on Urban Problems” and within it the appointment of a “National 
Commission on Urban Problems.”  O’Gorman would continue to work administrative 
matters.  But later that month, LBJ in one of his regular “Study Group” meetings openly 
questioned the value of such a conference, as later so did Weaver.  I believe both wanted 
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to ensure this proposed conference would be allowed to address the really substantive 
issues and not be simply symbolic, but their position placed the matter in jeopardy189   
      But planning went ahead without a firm commitment and without a firm date.  An 
executive order was drafted to create the “National Commission on Urban Problems” to 
be given life at the conference, and in that draft order Weaver would be chairman.  As 
chair, Weaver’s “commission” would include the attorney general, secretary of 
commerce, secretary of labor, HEW secretary, “and other members as the president shall 
appoint.”  They would study the “problems and needs” of the cities and be publicly 
introduced at the White House Conference on Urban Problems.  The 9th and 10th of 
December 1963 were selected as good conference dates.190  From 25 to 37 public 
members would be named to the proposed commission, depending on whose viewpoints 
won, and Larry O’Brien jumped in to help George O’Gorman with select some of the 
nominees.191  Wayne Phillips worked as HHFA’s “volunteer” on the conference and 
established the Sheraton-Park Hotel in DC for its location while setting the tentative 
itinerary.  Viewed as potentially disturbing the political right, to soften its impact, the 
conference was formally renamed by Larry O’Brien as the “White House Conference on 
Community Development, with the “National Commission” receiving the same name.  
Terms as “Issues and Problems” were taken out of both.  On July 14, the New York 
Times published an enthusiastic article about the now expected conference and 
commission, and a tentative budget was also established.192  
      Then a ticklish little difficulty arose.  In early August a dispute over proposed 
“hearings” regarding the commission took place.  After much discussion, the 
administration decided hearings might become a publicity nightmare, so they were killed 
 464
that, and quietly and privately key organizations desiring them were so informed.  Even 
without the hearings, the conference and commission would cost around $16,000 to 
establish and the commission would need $185,500 from which to operate.  All details 
were completed by the end of the first week of August.193   
      Then, on August 15, Larry O’Brien wrote “I understand that there will not be any 
executive order establishing such a Commission; however a White House Conference is 
planned.”  Yet on September 19, 1963 the administration began to back peddle about 
holding the conference at all, even though planning continued until October 25th.  Now 
salvaging the conference itself became an issue.  Telegrams urging that the conference be 
held did no good, and by mid-November 1963 it was dead.  The “party line” was that in 
1963, there is “not sufficient time for such a conference….” Milton Semer offered Lee 
White “alternatives” as “the President meet personally with representatives of 
organizations concerned with the Nation’s problems of housing and community 
development.”194  But the matter went no further.  
      The demise of the conference and commission was attributed formally to the concern 
that “civil rights activists” might use it as a “forum” for their agenda.195  But the political 
problems in Birmingham in the fall of 1963 probably dissuaded Kenney from going 
forward.  He had been carefully watching the southern reaction to the executive order, 
“gauging it,” as he used to quip.  In my opinion, Kennedy was really not in favor of 
holding and endorsing an urban conference, while he appeased and courted Senators and 
Congressmen from southern rural states.  Moreover, he did not want to give center stage 
to possible civil rights issues like open housing, with the discussions revealing in a 
national forum the weaknesses of his executive order. 
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      With no further change in the executive order and no conference or commission 
forthcoming, the impact of the executive order could thus be singularly measured, in the 
last year of JFK’s presidency through to the end of 1963.  The executive order turned out 
to be so weak that new starts did not fall, because financiers and contractors had already 
shifted away from the FHA/VA market to the conventional one, during Kennedy’s two 
years of delay on the issue.196  But, after the order, the FHA/VA market slowly continued 
to drop.  A further slight downward shift began in FHA/VA and in April 1963 and by 
July, FHA business was 14% below the volume of a year ago in 1962, and by the late fall 
of 1963, FHA/VA ran around 4% below the fall of 1962, seasonally adjusted.197  Weaver 
though tried to be polite, reporting “that a small shift has occurred in the proportion of 
total starts from FHA and VA.”198  As mentioned, FHA/VA under Kennedy by the end 
1963 captured only 17% of the overall housing market.  Conversely in the first six 
months under the executive order, private new housing starts, conventionally financed by 
banks and S & Ls, soared to the highest number since 1959.  Big business knew how to 
avoid the order.   
      Nonetheless, the order produced some limited changes.  By the spring of 1963 FHA 
homes in previously all segregated neighborhoods in Detroit, Houston, Dallas, and Gary 
(IN) and in several towns in Ohio were now multi-racial.199  “Open for occupancy 
regardless of race, creed, or color,” signs appeared throughout all federal projects that 
built housing.200   
      But, minorities continued to suffer housing discrimination, and the demonstrations 
increased.  Later, under LBJ, Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act enlarged coverage, 
making housing “discrimination” retroactively illegal in all federal activity.  But still, the 
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conventional market escaped for a few more years.  Due to demonstrations and the rage 
of the long hot summers, finally in 1968, Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act 
prohibited “discrimination on account of race, color, religion, or national origin in private 
real estate,” for almost all kinds of housing everywhere.201  
      The cycle was now complete.  If national “legal reform” was the answer to resolving 
racial strife in housing, then by 1968 measurable progress had been made.202  The 1964 
and 1968 Acts affirmed rights only “implied” by Kennedy.  But many have implied that 
Kennedy’s assassination paved the way for easy passage of the 1964 Act and Dr. Martin 
Luther King’s and Robert Kennedy’s deaths for the passage of the 1968 Act.203  The 
gunfire it took to facilitate these changes was itself tragic but symbolic of the fact that the 
racial chasm had not been closed under JFK.  In open housing, Kennedy does not receive 
high marks for setting the climate that would heal those wounds.  “Climate” and 
leadership were important, as even the Supreme Court  itself had a change of “climate.”  
Two months after passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer (392 
US 409) the Court reaffirmed that long ago, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, “precludes all 
discrimination on the basis of race in the sale of real property, however private the 
transaction.”204  What a change Kennedy might have been able to foster so much earlier 
had he been bolder and willing and the courts probably would have backed him.  Those 
possibilities though remain clouded and lost in the gunfire, smoke, and ashes of our cities 
of the years in between.
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CHAPTER X 
 
FRAGMENTS: 
POVERTY AND THE ELUSIVE WORKABLE SOLUTION 
TO URBAN PROBLEMS 
 
                           Kennedy stood up and paced, saying, “It really is true that    
                           foreign affairs is the only important issue for a President 
     to handle….  I mean who gives a shit if the minimum wage is  
     $1.15 or $1.25, in comparison to something like this.”1 
 
      If he chose to make the effort, John Kennedy had one last chance to find the 
“workable solution to urban problems.”  Part of this came from a fascinating source, a 
small committee and office investigating the causes of juvenile delinquency, staffed by 
his “reformers,” which in the process, stumbled across some ideas about the origins of 
poverty.  This chapter studies that and spells out what could have become Kennedy’s 
“workable solution to urban problems.”  Highlighted is the fact that Kennedy placed no 
real urgency on finding, “combining” and implementing that solution and left it in 
“fragments” when he flew off to Dallas’ Love Field.2  It is also implied that with 
emphasis a workable solution could have been “on the streets” in 1963 or early 1964, 
which really might have helped the poor and could have averted some of the forthcoming 
bloodshed.  Johnson, inept in urban planning, receives the blame for the fires, but 
Kennedy shares in some of the responsibility. 
      In the first eight chapters, this dissertation focused on JFK’s urban “policy” -- his 
campaign, message, program, immediate staff and HHFA organization, as well as his 
“urban politics” involved with the Weaver nomination, the 1961 Housing Act, DUAH, 
the budget wars and tax cut proposal.  It analyzed “physical city” issues -- those programs 
that build things in and around cities -- as Kennedy’s suburban housing boom, open 
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spaces, public housing and urban renewal, and a few social issues were touched upon 
along the way.  Chapter Nine began a look at “social city” issues -- “people” programs in 
an urban environment -- such as the executive order on open housing and anti- 
discrimination in housing.  This chapter concludes “social city” issues, delving deeply 
into juvenile delinquency planning, poverty eradication programs, and the early “war on 
poverty.”   
      As well, the workable solution to urban problems itself is discussed in thirteen 
specific measures, plus a timeline is presented showing how Kennedy could have much 
earlier than thought, found and implemented this workable solution to urban problems.  
JFK’s legacy regarding the workable solution to urban problems and his place in recent 
American urban history concludes this chapter and indeed this dissertation. 
      Five overall generalizations about the “workable solution” to urban problems begin 
this discussion.  An “a priori” assumption is that one could be found, and if applied as a 
model to “like kind” neighborhoods, in similar “type” cities, could have worked at least 
to eliminate the most profound poverty. Studies support that, and in urban affairs, 
Kennedy ran on that concept in 1960.  Secondly, JFK always needed a “social city” piece 
combined with his existing physical city programs in order to succeed with a workable 
solution but he never attempted to integrate these.  In the “social piece” “maximum 
feasible participation” and “community action” were essential and will be discussed later. 
      Thirdly, a unique subset of additional social measures will be described, needed to 
complete the workable solution.  Ranging from usable social services, to efficient “people 
oriented” mass transit, to an effective jobs program, these along with selected physical 
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city programs constituted the workable solution.  From “across the administration,” 
Kennedy had access to all of this in pieces or “fragments.” 
      Fourthly, JFK did not care enough to try to combine these into a comprehensive and 
workable plan.  He would not place compassion over politics, risking public opinion and 
Congressional heat in trying and only in late 1963 is there evidence he gave the matter 
any real consideration.   
      Lastly and an indictment -- if he had organized, synchronized, focused and funded an 
early solution, America’s cities might not have burned as they did because Kennedy 
created a time lag of inaction in anything “usable in hitting the street,” which Johnson 
inherited.  Only eight months after JFK’s death, in July 1964 the fires began and 
America’s cities burned every summer for the rest of the decade.  In JFK’s unexpectedly 
short presidency, the solution remained as “fragments” when the inept LBJ abruptly took 
over, who promptly wasted billions of dollars rushing an incomplete program into the 
“action phase.”  Coupled with his own “short-sighted” changes, LBJ quickly executed a 
full-blown and untested national urban policy, spending huge sums with minimal results. 
      In looking specifically at JFK’s social city programs six generalizations are 
important.  First, JFK had to have both an “urban” and “rural” piece in a poverty program 
politically to get it by Congress.  Thus, when discussing a “war on poverty” while 
emphasizing the urban programs, nonetheless “rural” aspects are touched upon as well.  
Secondly, JFK created a small group of urban social planners, initially charted to 
investigate juvenile delinquency, but on their own they began studying the elimination of 
poverty.  Called the “reformers” they are discussed later.  Yet their work was being 
duplicated in parallel fashion across Kennedy’s administration, and he neither cared 
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enough to find out, or when it became apparent, took no steps to combine these efforts.  
Specifically, White House offices as the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) and 
Bureau of the Budget (BOB) and more importantly agencies as HHFA, all pursued the 
same goals simultaneously, as did RFK’s “reformers.”  JFK never closed this gap.  
Moreover, the “reformers” worked on their own, reporting to RFK, while HHFA 
languished as a “bit” player on the sidelines. 
      Thirdly, “dependency politics,” where the poor “claimed a right to support, based on 
the injuries of the past,” as well as “the wounds of today,” was in its infancy under JFK, 
yet quickly emerging.  After years of “passive poverty” where the poor called no 
attention to their plight, this newer view fit nicely in with “community action” and 
“maximum feasible participation.”3  Dependency politics also shifted its focus under JFK 
from impoverished adults to youth but by January 1964 back to adults.  Yet with all age 
groups, the Kennedy reformers attempted to “sign” the government and the poor into a 
mutual agreement on the “social obligations of citizenship.”4
      In another concept although not novel, the “reformers” boldly proclaimed “how” the 
poor were treated stood as an equity test for American democracy.5  The reformers 
pledged that the “dark streets and dangerous alleys of ever growing ghettos” would not 
deepen into “permanent pockets of hopelessness and despair.”6  They considered their 
cause to be a national, moral obligation and were determined their ideas would gain 
center stage. 
 Fifth, Kennedy’s poverty program reformers shifted away from traditional jobs 
and training ideas to embracing concepts like “community competency.”  They also 
specifically targeted “poverty areas” in each city.  However, not blending some of jobs 
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programs into their solution would be a shortcoming.  They somewhat discounted entities 
as the Minimum Wage Act of 1961, the 1961 Area Redevelopment Act, and Manpower 
Development and Training Act of 1962 in favor of “newer” social theories.7     
      Lastly, the Kennedy poverty reformers were “pluralists,” adapting the pluralist 
philosophy with “its celebration of differences, its hostility to existing inequities, and its 
implicit reliance on an underlying harmony.”  That philosophy made them politically 
inclined to defend minority rights rather openly within their poverty program,  placing it 
in immediate jeopardy with the “moderate and cautious” Kennedy, who had exercised 
extreme foot dragging in this arena.8  Indeed, “true” liberals as most were they received 
little attention from JFK, who called liberals “honkers,” whatever that was supposed to 
mean.9  However, these liberals forced changes that represented the last flourish of 
American central government to try to reshape an entire domestic issue at the 
neighborhood level -- that being grinding poverty in the United States.10  Along with their 
“left out” counterparts in HHFA, they wanted to go nationwide with a workable solution 
even if the White House did not and they considered anything less than direct federal 
intervention at the neighborhood level to be a “Potemkin village.”11   
      In addition, poverty abounded in 1960.  Abraham Lincoln once said, “God must truly 
love poor people, because he created so many of them.”12  In 1960, the median family 
income was $5,700 annually.  However, 19% of whites and a staggering 46% of blacks 
had incomes of $3,000 or less, with poverty for a family of four hovering at $2,500.  
Moreover, of that forty-six percent of African-Americans, 13% had annual incomes of 
less than $1,000.13  In one estimate for 1962, nearly 32 million Americans were actually 
impoverished.14  Regarding race and poverty, only 20% of the poor were black, but over 
 494
40% of blacks were poor.15 The 1960 census counted an even higher 39 million poor, and 
Kennedy’s poverty planners estimated that between 25 to 35 million people were actually 
poor and needed help.16 A “permanent underclass” existed of around 18 to 19 million.17   
      In 1960, six large northern cities and a few big southern ones were the most 
impoverished and had the largest number of problems relating to poverty.  New York, 
Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, DC, Los Angeles, Baltimore, Cleveland, New Orleans, 
Houston, St. Louis, and Honolulu had the most poor.18  Homelessness abounded there as 
well and racism, crime, inadequate healthcare, disorganized neighborhood structures, 
vandalism and pathological social behavior, dominated daily life, plus high joblessness.19  
Slow but positive changes in civil rights occurring in the rural South, had little impact on 
urban poverty.  “City control” remained tightly held by the dominant “majority” political 
groups, most exclusively white and male, with city mayors and their machines creating 
subordinate groups of powerless poor people.  Social support agencies active in cities 
possessed hidden agendas connecting them to the powerful and racist city governments.21  
Old solutions as past doles used for “bribes” to the poor from established welfare 
organizations no longer worked.22  In addition, changes needed to be made to the social 
and economic structure of the ghetto, to bring the poor into the mainstream’s “pecuniary 
culture,” enabling them to climb out of poverty.23   
      Kennedy’s “reformers” entered the picture into an emerging landscape ready to 
accept them.  Gnunar Myrdal’s An American Dilemma provided necessary guilt for 
white America’s rather self-congratulatory complacency, as did David Riessman’s The 
Lonely Crowd and William S. Whyte’s The Organizational Man.24  Abraham Kardiner 
and Lionel Ovesey’s, Mark of Oppression took matters further, citing racial prejudice as 
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damaging minority psychics.  Kenneth Clark and E. Franklin Frazier studied how this 
hampered equality, as did other “Chicago School” writers as W. L. Warner and Kurt 
Lewin.  Hylan Lewis, Elliot Liebow and Elizabeth Herzog argued the poor shared normal 
values and possessed average character, but due to poverty were “unable to meet 
mainstream values.”  Frank Riessman, The Culturally Deprived Child addressed 
inadequate inner city education and Michael Harrington’s landmark, The Other America, 
which incidentally was almost not published, “popularized” poverty with the middle 
class.25  Dwight McDonald’s New Yorker article did the same in January of 1963 and 
exposes in Life and Look magazines, plus the electronic media began to increasingly 
“publicize” poverty.26  The “young” were considered the most vulnerable in poverty’s 
tragic cycle. 
      Regarding “failing” inner city youth, early public debate concentrated on determining 
what stood as most devastating, lack of employment or lack of education.  The National 
Educational Association’s (NEA), Education Aid to the Disadvantaged and James B. 
Conant’s Slums and Suburbs defended inner city schools, but NEA criticized “home life” 
in the ghetto.27  Conversely, later writers, as Francis Fox Pevin, Nathan Glazier, Daniel P. 
Moynihan and others, said neither school nor home caused these problems, rather a 
“community’s lack of opportunity.”28  Thus, Kennedy’s anti-poverty program began as 
an “anti-juvenile delinquency” effort, transitioned into a “community opportunity” one, 
and ended as an early “war on poverty.”  It consisted of two parallel organizations, a 
“Committee” and an “Office,” both operating simultaneously in separate locations.   
      Robert Kennedy asked Dave Hackett in early 1961 to organize a “Committee” to 
investigate how to resolve juvenile delinquency. As attorney general, RFK had an interest 
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in youth crime, but much more so in poverty after the assassination of his brother.29  
David Hackett a Milton Academy classmate of RFK’s came from the Kennedy campaign 
staff and had a profound influence in the poverty program.30  On March 16, 1961, 
Hackett convened a “conference of experts” to lay out what this “Committee” would 
do.31  At RFK’s urging, JFK formally established the Committee on May 11, 1961 as the 
“Presidential Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime” (known as PCJD).  
Moreover, on the same day, JFK sent to Congress a bill requesting approval for an actual 
anti-juvenile delinquency “Office” with a budget, program and staff to be called the 
Office of Juvenile Delinquency (OJD).32  
      JFK’s initial goal with this legislation concerned reducing unemployment in youth 
“between 16 and 23 years of age” chiefly by reducing juvenile delinquency.33  Testifying 
for the administration, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (D-MN) stated that in the past ten 
years there “has been an alarming increase in juvenile delinquency, and we face a 
dangerous acceleration of this trend unless we soon launch a broad national effort to 
control [it].”34   
      Congress without much dissent rather easily approved the “Office” bill over the 
summer of 1961 as it addressed a well known problem and asked for little money. 
Hollywood through the “Blackboard Jungle” and “West Side Story” and other films as 
“Rebel Without A Cause” openly criticized the situation many urban youth found 
themselves in, unable to survive except in gangs.  The “silver screen” did it so well that 
even rural Alabama Congressmen appreciated the problem.  Moreover, all three 
Secretaries soon to be involved, Justice, Labor and HEW spoke enthusiastically about the 
legislation.35  JFK in signing it as the Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Control Act of 
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September 22, 1961, highlighted it would “bring about a more effective coordination of 
Federal resources in this field,” hinting at government efficiencies dear to the 
conservative Congress, and OJD thus emerged.36   
      PCJD and OJD were separated at birth by four and a half months and geographically, 
with PCJD being in the Attorney General’s Office and OJD going to HEW, blocks apart 
in the congested, de-centralized Washington DC of 1961.  However, the two staffs 
quickly merged into a cohesive body, based on a similar “group think” regarding 
delinquency and poverty.  Collectively they became known as the “reformers” and 
discussing what they believed is very important to “the workable solution.” 
      The Kennedy PCJD and OJD reformers came from varied backgrounds but held 
similar views.  Dr. Leonard Cotrell emerged from the famous “Chicago School” of 
sociologists after recently heading the Russell Sage Foundation.  Using the “Chicago 
Area Project,” he wrote portions of Delinquency Areas, and in 1955 authored the 
influential Identity and Interpersonal Competence.  He served as Chairman of the 
National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), while overseeing the start of the 
Mobilization For Youth (MFY), a New York City based anti-juvenile delinquency effort, 
that growing out of Ike’s last few years importantly continued into the “New Frontier.”37  
      Cottrell frequently contributed to the Columbia University School of Social Work 
projects and encouraged four of his associates to join PCJD-OJD.  George Brager and 
David Hunter both MFY planners, came aboard, as did the Columbia School’s Dr. Lloyd 
Ohlin and Dr. Richard Cloward who wrote Delinquency and Opportunity, which 
established many program themes.38  Martin Rein of the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT), Kenneth Alart of the City College of New York, Paul Ylvisaker,  
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Richard (“Dick”) Boone of the Ford Foundation, and Francis Fox Pevin of Columbia who 
co-authored Regulating the Poor with Cloward, rounded out the academicians.39  Along 
with Hackett from the campaign, Adam Yarmolinsky, Robert S. MacNamara’s special 
assistant at Defense, found his way into delinquency and poverty via defense housing.  
James Sundquist, Sanford Kravitz, Seymour Wolfbein, and HHFA’s Jack Conway and 
Fred Hayes, both of whom should have played larger roles, completed the initial list of 
the government participants.  Playing very important roles later would be Walter Heller, 
Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), William Capron of the CEA and 
previously Bureau of the Budget (BOB), and William Cannon of BOB along with BOB’s 
second director under Kennedy, Kermit Gordon who replaced Dave Bell.40  David Austin 
joined the “reformers,” from Cleveland’s demonstration project, as did Henry Cohen, 
New York’s deputy city administrator and later of the New School of Social Research.41     
      Ironically, the membership of this group which would have such an impact on poor, 
urban, lower class, African-Americans and Hispanic-Americans, was all white, and 
except for Ms. Pevin all male, and in terms of education or ancestry all upper class. 
Neither HHFA’s Robert Weaver nor any leading African-American men and women 
received invitations to join.42  This was another mistake.     
      Yet these reformers left an extensive legacy in poverty planning, although they 
initially concentrated on correcting juvenile delinquency.  JFK in approving PCJD-OJD 
did so with an eye toward two new constituencies – the youth vote and the new 
“Democratic party imperative” to cultivate an alliance with urban black voters, “by 
extending a greater share of municipal services to them.”  Kennedy expected votes from 
both in 1964, and Johnson did as well in 1968 had he stayed in the race.43   
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      Chaired by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, the Secretary of HEW and of the 
Secretary of Labor, PCJD’s Board had big names but met only twice during JFK’s term, 
thus remaining chiefly symbolic.44   For HEW, Anthony J. Celebreeze replaced Abraham 
Ribbicoff on July 31, 1962 and Willard Wirtz replaced Arthur J. Goldberg of Labor on 
September 25, 1962.45  Twenty-one “notable and civic minded” individuals formed a 
Citizens Advisory Council (CAC) that made “policy and procedure” recommendations to 
the Board, but chaired by Dr. Leonard Cottrell, it  also functioned as only symbolic, 
meeting only twice during “Camelot.”  The CAC though maintained citizen involvement, 
so important to the PCJD-OJD concept, through a group of “local” Regional Advisors 
(RAs).46 
      Curtailing juvenile delinquency stood as PCJD’s mandate and stimulating 
experimentation while improving federal programs, plus involving state, county, city, and 
private “cooperation” constituted its “means.”47  PCJD played the major role in 
approving demonstration grnats.48  Additionally, PCJD staffers went to cities soliciting 
them to join and thus PCJD became a power broker.49         
      In conducting PCJD business, the Secretaries of HEW, Labor, and Justice each had a 
special assistant with staff conducting PCJD affairs, which did the work in each 
department.  However, Robert Kennedy’s Dave Hackett, held the most power and located 
himself in the Office of the Attorney General where he virtually really ran PCJD.50  In 
Justice, Hackett’s staff coordinated PCJD matters within the Bureau of Prisons, 
Investigative Services, the FBI, and the Board of Parole.51  HEW’s special assistant and 
staff conducted PCJD matters with education, rehabilitation, family services, and health, 
and Labor’s element employed standards, apprenticeship and statistics.52   
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      The Office of Juvenile Delinquency (OJD), the other half of the Kennedy overall 
effort, headed by Dr. Lloyd Ohlin, situated itself in HEW but maintained a strong 
allegiance to PCJD through Dave Hackett who recruited Ohlin.  Significantly, OJD 
handed out the money, $30 million over three years (ten million annually), after 
applications had been jointly approved.53  PCJD set application policy and made 
“recommendations on demonstration and training projects,” but applications went 
through OJD staff to its Technical Review Demonstration Projects Panel.  Then 
“technically” correct applications traveled to a full “Grants Committee” comprised of 
combined PCJD and OJD staff and finally to the three secretaries for “blessing.”54  Most 
became approved on merit, but two grants had “political overtones.” Houston’s implying 
an LBJ connection and New York’s Mobilization for Youth (MFY) were granted at the 
“White House level.”  MFY held significant publicity value with the press.55        
      Before discussing what constituted a successful grant, the unique “philosophy” of 
PCJD-OJD should be described.  Initially, delinquency stood viewed as singularly 
connected to high youth unemployment, with the overall national average in 1961 
standing at 7.7%, but for youth between 16 and 20, it averaged a staggering 16.8%.  Next 
came failing out of school, where 95% of seventeen year olds who were “ delinquents” 
had dropped out of school, 85% of sixteen year olds, and 50% of fifteen years olds.56   
      Yet PCJD-OJD’s concerns widened quickly when investigating “slum areas” with 
“the highest concentration of delinquency, unemployment, school drop-out, family 
inadequacies and cultural deficiencies.”  According to then prominent sociologist Dr. 
James B. Conant, slums created “social dynamite” and the reformers flocked to PCJD- 
 501
OJD to test theories to correct “slums,” and in the process delinquency, rather than visa-
versa.57  It was thought that to correct both of these problems, one needed a 
“comprehensive” program. 
      “Comprehensive” thus stood for three things: improving the responsiveness of local 
social servics; establishing organizational “competency” within a poor community; and 
providing ideas for planning how to create “opportunity.”58  Cottrell, the high priest of 
“community competency” believed social pathology evolved from a community’s failure 
to maintain control and the follow-on “disorganization” led to delinquency.  Richard 
Cloward, Llyod Ohlin, and George Brager added that “community competency” must be 
developed through “opportunity theory,” creating the desire for success.  “Opportunity 
theory” combined the best of Columbia’s School of Social Work with Saul Alinsky’s 
Chicago Industrial Areas Foundation into a model that New York’s Mobilization For 
Youth (MFY) would test.  To make all this work, Henry Cohen, Dick Boone and Dave 
Hackett supported “maximum feasible participation.”  This idea that the poor should 
participate significantly in shaping poverty policy affecting them, importantly became 
part of the theory as well.59  
      However, this “maximum feasible participation” as it collectively developed, 
addressed neighborhood solutions that threatened the “power” vested in old social 
agencies and thus it led to conflict.  It also implied some “power” going to the poor to 
resolve their own difficulties, which would not sit well with big city machines that 
controlled these social agencies as outreaches of their office.60  This very complex 
“maximum feasible participation,” the heart of the program never became adequately 
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resolved under JFK or LBJ because both they never fully understood it, but more 
importantly lacked the “political” will to take on powerful mayors.61 
      But “maximum feasible participation” itself had a problem because “maximum 
neighborhood participation” was needed to make it work.62  Henry Cohen cited that “to 
be very poor and degraded is a misery, and being poor creates people who are ill-adapted 
to being anything but poor.”63  However, providing them the opportunity to do something 
about their conditions remained critical and exactly who “spoke” for them within targeted 
neighborhoods would become a main issue.  In addition, the entire idea would be very 
hard to implement in the segregated South of the 1960s.64   
      Therefore, the initial program aimed at the “conditions” of deviant youth behavior, 
decided fairly early that the communities where they lived needed change to correct that 
behavior.  That would be a truly arduous task.  Peter Rossi, Zahava Blum, and Lloyd 
Warner noted, that long periods of unemployment, repetitive employment in the lowest 
paying jobs, exceptionally dysfunctional families, poor interpersonal relations, and an 
overriding philosophy of “helplessness” were hard to overcome.65   Another social issue 
requiring resolution questioned whether the poor were “really different, or simply people 
with less money?”66  PCJD-OJD pledged to address all of these problems.  
      PCJD launched a seven-step process for communities to achieve competence.  
“Commitment” by the community for change, followed by awareness of its special needs 
had to be clearly formatted into an overall plan.67  The successful plan needed to show 
full community agreement on the causes of delinquency and how it would be corrected 
and planning had to show evidence of “maximum feasible participation.”  Lastly all 
available community resources needed to be integrated into the plan.68   
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      PCJD-OJD though with little money, first began training “workers” in delinquency 
and poverty matters.  Under the Act, a Spartan $10 million per year was provided for all 
“pilot programs,” “training,” “study,” and “planning and demonstration.”69   However, 
this stood as the first federal support program to combat juvenile delinquency, after eight 
years of legislative attempts.70  In the “training” arena, PCJD-OJD created juvenile 
delinquency training sites at six universities, and curriculum development programs at 
twelve others, plus short term workshops at another eight.71  These programs were at 
colleges in states or near cities with “target poverty areas” and by the end of its first three  
years, 12,500 social workers trained to specifically prevent juvenile delinquency 
graduated from these courses.72  
      However, as Leonard Cotrell cited, the “demonstration grants program” stood as the 
heart of PCJD-OJD’s effort.73  Yet terminology must be explained carefully to reveal 
how it worked.  The demonstration grants program “had two phases” or two areas in 
which it operated: planning grants and action grants.  The “planning” phase could last up 
to two years with most cities averaging 18 months and included both “initial planning” 
and as well “full demonstration,” which later would turn out to be much too slow for 
LBJ.74  Within this phase, a city usually received a hundred thousand or two hundred 
thousand dollars to “initially plan,” using six months to a year and then would on average 
“demonstrate” for up to another year that their plan actually worked, using “maximum 
feasible participation.”75  Following, with PCJD-OJD’s direct help, plus other federal, 
state, city or private funds, communities would subsequently go into the “action” phase, 
actually “outright program execution.”  Under JFK, 16 grants comprised his program and 
some cities initially funded under the “demonstration program” for “planning,” failed to 
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meet the requirements for “action.”76   Yet ideas “kicked around” in this overall process, 
led to Kennedy’s unsuccessful attempt at a domestic peace corps, or National Youth 
Service Corps, which LBJ later passed as VISTA (Volunteers in Service to America).77  
The sixteen grants awarded during the Kennedy years went to: $155,000 to New Haven, 
$260,582 to Houston, $124,228 for Cleveland, $165,000 for Philadelphia, $252,906 for 
Los Angeles and $149,845 to Minneapolis, $202,200 for Detroit and $292,000 for 
Chicago.78  Portland’s Lane County Oregon received one as well for $129,579, Harlem of 
course received $230,000 for planning, and MFY obtained the only “action grant” of the 
Kennedy era, of $1,915,000 on May 31, 1962.79  Other amounts went to St. Louis for 
$134,012, Syracuse for $141,281, Charleston, (WVA) for $131,091, Boston for $159,400 
and DC for $100,767.80         
      Several of these Kennedy grants are worth discussing.  JFK’s most successful and 
easiest to implement PCJD grants went to smaller cities with relatively homogenous 
populations, as Minneapolis.81  But Dave Hackett noted, the Mobilization For Youth 
(MFY) on New York’s the lower east side, Harlem Youth Opportunities Unlimited – 
Associated Community Teams (HARYOU-ACT) simply called HARYOU, and RFK’s 
eventual Bedford-Stuyvesant project all in New York City, stood as the most significant.  
The Los Angeles program came next but the most notorious remained Cleveland’s, often 
cited for its many public shortcomings.  Tragically, most of the PCJD-OJD programs 
though were not successful, being too “immature” to be forced into “action” by the 
unaccomplished LBJ.  Yet even before Dallas others collapsed under their own weight 
receiving little help from the White House to salvage them. 
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      Los Angeles’ eventually fell apart because of unresolved disputes between the state, 
county, and city, about competing school systems.82  A weakness of the LA model was it 
regularly failed to meet jurisdictional “integration” standards.  Cleveland came apart on 
its own.  Cleveland’s agencies cooperated initially only out of self interest and when the 
real money hit, one million dollars worth of it, so did the intensely public and 
embarrassing fight.  The “Cleveland Debacle” came at the worst time, while 
Congresswoman Edith Green (D-OR) was reviewing the program’s viability, particularly 
the long-term “planning requirement,” and she concluded strongly that not all of a 
community’s agencies needed to be involved.  Curbing “maximum feasible participation” 
therefore became her near obsession.83  
      There were two programs in Harlem, Harlem Youth Opportunities (HARYOU), and 
Associated Community Teams (ACT), really a staff and training endeavor for HARYOU.  
Both had some initial success, yet for long term success, remained poorly structured.  
Unfortunately, New York’s Mayor Robert Wagner never fully understood HARYOU, the 
primary program, which lessoned its chance for success.  When representatives of 
HARYOU complained to Wagner their concerns were not resolved, and subsequently, 
their further concerns became a secondary luncheon topic at a gathering of Democratic 
women who really came to hear Eleanor Roosevelt. Wagner delegated their problems 
with no recommended solution to staffers who in turn offered none either.  The citizens 
involved with Harlem believed their “Board” that controlled the real power, to be “an 
imperialist, white colonist group.”84  
  In fact the Board as constituted, regardless of its mixed racial make-up which 
sometimes had a “predominately white, out-of-community membership,” rapidly 
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expanded from nine to 25 members. Emerging quickly, the real problem stemmed from 
all members directly assuming the right of “professional competence” to make decisions 
“for the people without their adequate participation,” and this greatly angered Harlem 
residents. 85  A confidential report released in 1964, criticized the Board further.  It 
delved deeply into its composition concluding it did not adequately represent the 
community, and an early majority of Board members firmly identified with several 
“social agencies” from the previously discredited Harlem Neighborhoods Association 
(HANA).  Of the nine HARYOU Board original appointments, seven were directly 
identified with those past “less than helpful” social agencies.  Only some Board members 
ever attended any youth functions or expressed interest in youth matters. Held against the 
Board remained the fact that, “for the most part, [many] did not seem sufficiently 
interested in these young people to attend their affairs.”  Specific African-American 
church leaders, who dominated Harlem’s religious, political, and social life and regularly 
attended youth functions failed to gain adequate Board membership or hold any real 
influence with the Board.  Representing churches on the Executive Committee of the 
Board, the four active clergymen all came from “white” dominated denominations.”86  
The views many of these brought to the table consisted of the “institutional” ideas of the 
white community.87   
      This translated into “derived” rather than “primary” political power meaning that 
“maximum feasible participation” became more a “representative republic concept” in 
Harlem than the desired “organized participatory democracy.”88  Thus when money 
arrived, the average Harlemite did not share significantly in decisions on its spending.89   
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      Moreover, when HARYOU money began to roll in, community social services 
thrived but the poor did not. Tampering with the community’s economic base also failed 
to produce any new businesses and only a few more jobs in small stores or service 
industries, most owned by whites.  Government aid left the community with really no 
good permanent jobs, and big labor in New York City, then quite racist, would not place 
union jobs in Harlem.  Congressman Adam Clayton Powell who emerged as a long time 
leader of this community said, “Beware of the Greeks bearing gifts, colored men looking 
for loans, and whites who understand the Negro.”  Renown African-American 
psychologist, sociologist, and historian Kenneth B. Clark in Dark Ghetto: Dilemmas of 
Social Power, researched at the time, criticized the political wrangling that brought his 
Harlem experiment to an early demise and even Malcolm X warned Harlem’s youth to be 
careful of images of yourself “created by others.”90  Finally, none of this helped correct 
juvenile delinquency or brought “community confidence,” leaving only deep resentment 
in its wake.91   
      The more long-lasting and somewhat more successful Mobilization for Youth (MFY), 
which many suggest gave birth to HARYOU anyway, also formed a link to the Bedford-
Stuyvesant story.  Subsidized by all the proper combinations, PCJD advice, OJD money, 
New York City funding, and later Ford Foundation grants, MFY initially focused on 
eliminating juvenile delinquency in one of New York’s toughest neighborhoods, the 
lower East Side, by way of improving the overall community.92  Filled with “positive” 
political overtones, JFK chose to highlight this first “action grant” in a Rose Garden 
speech, saying MFY would launch a many-faceted attack on juvenile delinquency, that if 
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“ we can work with services in New York…we can spread it across the country.”  Thus 
even JFK cited MFY as a potential model.93 
      However, program enactment constituted MFY’s initial flaw, then a hidden problem 
like HARYOUs’ with “Board” membership arose, both eventually undermining the 
program.  At the start, many of the old traditional support agencies needed to be “shaken 
up,” but MFY’s rent strikes, school boycotts, school board demonstrations, and picketing 
other social agencies, only angered rather than energized that much needed support.94 
From the traditional agencies, revenge rather than reform ensued. 
      In planning, MFY actually preceded PCJD, dating back to the old Henry Street 
Settlement House efforts and continued under Ike.  Under Kennedy, PCJD subsequently 
took MFY through Leonard Cottrell’s newly developed steps for successful community 
action thus making it a model for JFK’s years, until it fell from grace.  Specifically, 
MFY’s “community commitments” began with individual “community segments of 
responsibility” being assigned. Secondly, by design each contributed to an overall 
community goal.  Thirdly, “segment” awareness of what others did was roundly 
publicized internally.  Fourthly, the fabric holding MFY together consisted of building 
“harmony” into each segment’s activities. Fifthly, outside ideas were drawn in, and the 
last two points concerned blending all of this into a “community action plan” (CAP) 
using community participation. This should have spelled success.95  Thus this MFY 
model according to Dave Hackett, established guidelines for the future of delinquency 
planning.96   
      Unfortunately, from an organizational aspect MFY actually suffered as well from a 
lack of proper “Board” representation though not knowing it at the start.  All twenty-two 
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original Board members were white professionals and even though two were “traded off” 
for Whitney Young of the Urban League and a Hispanic-American representative, 
collectively the “Board” still truly represented “constituencies” not from the MFY target 
area.  As well, none of the Board members had “roots in the target area and none were 
poor” and the Board thus remained “ceremonial” in nature making decisions for the very 
poor without the very poor.  To correct this, eventually seven “impoverished” 
representatives later joined, but the split and animosity between the Board and the 
community had already been established, widened, and led to the demise of MFY.97   
      In tracing PCJD-OJD contributions through JFK’s nearly three years, a short 
chronological discussion of each year’s activities is helpful.  Nineteen hundred and sixty-
one consisted of organizing, defining guidelines, and processing.  MFY’s model was 
“tailored and honed” that year, and much effort went into it eventually receiving “action 
grant” funding for 1962.  Here, Lloyd Ohlin, Henry Cohen, George Brager, Richard 
Cloward, and Dave Hackett all helped.  Creating external publicity and recruiting cities 
for the program rounded out the year, and applications began to trickle in slowly.      
      In 1962, PCJD-OJD launched several new initiatives.  Based on previous 
“reservations,” Hackett sent select advance teams out to recruit new cities.  These visits 
provided a community with the opportunity for virtual “pre-approval” if it simply had the 
“harmony” needed to draw up a comprehensive plan using the guidelines.  Also the 
Citizens’ Advisory Council met for the first time and the PCJD Demonstration Panel met 
six times from January 1962 through June 1963 to review and approve applications.98 
      In addition, in 1962, PCJD-OJD received minor assistance from Bob Weaver and 
HHFA, yet much more should have been requested.   In their haste and perhaps elitism, 
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the “sociologists” of PCDJ-OJD gave the impression they seldom considered the old 
“housing” agency “avant guard” enough to lend much to their bold initiatives.  
Additionally, all had seen the distance JFK placed between himself and Weaver as an 
African-American, during the latter’s confrontation hearings and DUAH’s unsuccessful 
bid for Cabinet status.  As mentioned, then Kennedy thought briefly of having Weaver 
head HEW rather than manage America’s urban program as an African-American.  Also 
as discussed, Weaver seldom met with JFK nor found his name on the White House 
invitation list, and on several controversial issues, Weaver was asked to keep a low 
profile.  Not a racist, but rather pandering to a conservative Congress for political 
reasons, JFK consistently kept Weaver under wraps affecting his visibility and 
“acceptability” with the poverty planners.   Nonetheless, in 1962 Weaver through Jack 
Conway stimulated some UAW interest in PCJD-OJD activities.99  He also placed HHFA 
advisors on the “National Committee on Children and Youth.”100  As requested, Weaver 
further provided limited HHFA counsel to PCJD’s Washington DC project.101  However, 
PCJD-OJD, with HEW and Labor favored “their” own management of the DC 
operation.102  Weaver was left with only providing “statistical analysis” for DC’s grant.103  
And even though Weaver played a critical advisory role through Marie McGuire in St. 
Louis’ plan for social services at public housing sites, this never became a mature 
program or national model.104   
       But in 1962, PCJD-OJD pushed hard to use MFY as a national model, even though 
that would not happen for another year.105  This would soon include introducing 
something like it into 1964 election year politics.106   To stimulate growth in PCJD-OJD, 
Hackett as well tried to bring business and PCJD-OJD into a community partnership 
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through the Ford Foundation.107  However, the idea did not work nationally.108  Lastly, 
two final efforts highlighted 1962, Hackett’s “guerillas” and transitioning PCJD-OJD 
from a delinquency program to a real poverty one.  
      Hackett’s “guerrillas” consisted of PCJD-OJD employees and some others, working 
behind the scenes within federal government to sell two ideas: “that insufficient 
opportunity was the root cause of poverty,” and secondly, that correcting this required 
“community action.”109  Richard Boone, Sanford Kravitz, Sam Merrick, Lloyd Ohlin, 
Bernard Russell, Hy Frankel, Don Ellinger, Daniel Seeley, Virginia Burns of OJD, Larry 
Houston, Leonard Duhl, and lastly from HHFA, Frederick O’R. Hayes and Dave 
Grossman comprised the group.  Daniel Moynihan, later a critic, had been an original 
member.  They were already inside federal government, but had specific “covert” 
messages to sell to their colleagues.110  As Moynihan wrote, Hackett’s guerrillas were 
“living off the administrative country-side, invisible to the bureaucratic enemy, but 
known to one another, hitting, and running and making off with the riches of the 
established departments,” for the poverty program.  But as Moynihan later pointed out, 
the bigger and stronger bureaucracy would eventually win.111  Hackett’s guerrillas met 
regularly in the justice department to plan strategy.112  Yet while all this enthusiastic 
poverty work continued, at the end of 1962, JFK ominously laid out his tax cut proposal 
for 1963, with its balanced budget as an “implied task,” that sent a chilling message to the 
“guerrillas” and across the urban program.113    
      The actual shift from a juvenile delinquency program to an outright poverty one also 
came in late 1962 yet this remained known only internally within PCJD-OJD.  Hackett 
explained “I don’t think that anybody outside of the small group we worked with really 
 512
understood what we were up to.”114   “Comprehensive” completely moved from a concept 
to a reality nationally, meaning “cities” must “combine” all their resources for treating 
more than juvenile delinquency, indeed actually poverty itself.115  In late October 1962 an 
“internal” memorandum dealing with the outline for “some kind of “poverty program” 
began to circulate through the executive offices.116  Hackett though had only thirty 
million dollars, lamenting, “we felt that you could spend thirty million dollars in one city 
and not have much of an impact,” and according to him Congress would not appropriate 
more, thinking the basic legislation supported something like the “Boys’ Clubs,” but not 
a poverty program.117     
      In 1963, PCJD-OJD’s new poverty approach became an open fight.  In December 
1962, JFK “casually” asked Heller for some data about a possible poverty program and 
Heller became the contact man for the White House.  Here is where the dysfunctional 
relationship JFK never drew together could be have been directly resolved if the 
President or for that matter Heller, really dug into the matter in depth.  Because with a 
little in detailed study, what could readily have been seen was wasted and “time 
delaying” parallel effort. What Dave Hackett did at PCJD-OJD, plus Weaver’s HHFA 
plethora of parallel activities in 1963, also were duplicating some efforts in the same 
“areas” by the strong-willed Willard Wirtz at Labor.  Further, HEW offered several new 
initiatives and at least two universities, Columbia and Chicago, plus foundations 
unabashedly planned similar programs, all in splendid, parallel isolation.  Heller initially 
missed tying all it all together and JFK, no doubt aware of some of this though RFK, 
failed to focus the proper interest needed to shape it into a workable solution. 
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      Heller casually passed his initial research off to Robert Lampman, a consultant and 
researcher at CEA and BOB and an economist of the University of Minnesota, who 
permanently would link CEA and BOB into the poverty fight.118   But unfortunately 
Heller was a slow convert to Lampman’s findings and HHFA still remained on the 
sidelines.  In HHFA’s weekly reports to the president only twice was PCJD-OJD 
interaction noted in JFK’s nearly three years in office.119  Moreover, it does not appear 
JFK ever considered Weaver to replace Heller as the “point man” for a poverty program 
and only a few ideas were ever exchanged between Heller and Weaver, as Heller relied 
on his own internal strategies. Lampman produced a series of studies on the poor’s 
income distribution as an outline for “An Offensive Against Poverty.”120  Subsequently 
he released a study on “Post-War Poverty Trends.”121  Also, he concluded JFK’s massive 
1963 tax cut proposal gave little help to the poor showing that many born in poverty 
never escaped it and passed that onto their children, forming a “culture of poverty” which 
a tax cut would not fix.  In this cycle were trapped as high as 35 million Americans.122
      Armed with all this initial information in May 1963, Heller reported to Kennedy and 
told him poverty itself must be attacked.  He cited that gradual improvements in the 
economy were not going to be “taking people out of poverty,” yet he offered no 
comprehensive plan.123  JFK requested none either and asked him for simply more study 
on the issue, while continuing with his tax cut idea. 
      However, over the late spring and the early summer of 1963, the internal 
disagreements over starting a poverty program escalated into an open argument.  Heller’s 
work caught Ted Sorensen’s attention and a split developed between Sorensen, and 
Charles Schultze, Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and Wilbur Cohen 
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Assistant Secretary of HEW who all supported a “poverty program,” and Meyer 
Feldman, Labor’s Willard Wirtz, and others, who offered different ideas for help to the 
poor.124  When this debate finally caught Kennedy’s attention, instead of resolving it and 
building a comprehensive program, conversely JFK revealed he actually had strong 
reservations about a poverty program at all.  Beyond his usual lack of interest, he feared 
creating a “white backlash” and even believed that an attack on the problems of suburbia 
might make a better “central theme” for his 1964 campaign, should the middle class feel 
threatened that government worked only to improve the lot of the poor.  In June though, 
he somewhat reluctantly gave another verbal “OK” to continue to “study” the poverty 
issue.125  By coincidence, and in isolation, in late June 1963, MFY boldly stated it should 
become the national model for a “War on Poverty” and attempted to sell itself as “the” 
overall comprehensive program.126  Thus, in the summer of 1963 interest picked up 
across the boards for studying or beginning a poverty program of some kind.  
      The CEA with some help from BOB, formed a “poverty discussion group” to work  
the issue. By the early fall of 1963, Lampman released a draft of his final poverty report 
entitled an Economic Report of the President on Poverty.  While not published officially 
until January 1964, its contents nonetheless became instant discussion topics.  Lampman 
examined “black and white” poverty, and then traced income variations within both 
groups of poor through the “culture of poverty.”127  He “sketched out” elements of his 
“culture of poverty” idea into a “community action” approach in the last two pages of the 
Report’s Chapter II, becoming the “main strategy” regarding poverty.  As Capron 
explained, “we could have written that chapter before November 22 [rather than as 
published in January of 1964] and it would not have sounded substantially different.”128  
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Unfortunately and again, Weaver did not play a role and as William Capron (CEA) 
vaguely recounted, “we had someone there for a while from HUD, what became HUD, it 
was then HHFA,” placing little significance on HHFA’s role.129   
      Differences within the “poverty discussion group” quickly developed into a 
permanent feud about “community action.” William Wirtz, Secretary of Labor, violently 
attacked Lampman saying his Report, “was published over his strenuous objection.”  
Adamantly against Lampman, Wirtz insisted on a “jobs now” poverty approach and 
HEW adamantly pushed its “traditional education first” idea.  Further, Lampman’s idea 
and the overall “community action” notion of Hackett, Boone, Ylvisaker and 
Yarmolinsky, which became the ultimate strategy to eliminate poverty,  remained not 
well articulated.130   
      Notably, on October 30, 1963, the 1964 presidential campaign officially entered into 
the discussion.  Ted Sorensen wrote Heller asking him to pull together “official” poverty 
ideas for the president’s consideration for the campaign.131  Heller responded the same 
day, instructing William Capron of his staff to coordinate ideas for “some” 1964 poverty 
legislation.  Accordingly, Capron began another small “interim task force” on “program 
organization” and CEA’s Burton Weisbrod worked a “preliminary set of guidelines.”  
Contacted for input only after all this was established, Weaver was then asked to keep 
everything confidential.132   
      With preliminary work completed on November 5, Heller sent out to all major 
department and agency heads a directive asking for input for a program “aimed at 
‘widening participation in prosperity,’” requiring responses due back to him within ten 
days on November 15.  Thus the Sorenson directive and Heller memorandum launched 
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the first formal attempt to organize “an across the government” approach at the federal 
level to eliminate poverty for 1964.  “Widening prosperity” became the politically correct 
term then for a war on poverty.  Hackett, the first to respond on November 6, submitted 
two important reports, one to his boss RFK and the other back to Heller, both filled with 
good ideas.133 
      In the first one to RFK, Hackett wrote a summary of what had been accomplished in 
the juvenile delinquency program to date, particularly regarding poverty and the need for 
a comprehensive program.  Hackett also explained what “comprehensive” meant and the 
need for creating new “opportunities” for disadvantaged youth plus he outlined his 
community action concepts.134 
      But he warned in his second memo to Heller that at present the federal government 
was not yet ready “to accept” a national war on poverty because it had not reorganized 
itself to properly manage one.  No effective centralized coordination had yet occurred.  
Hackett wrote that “at the Federal level a maze of agencies, each with its own grants 
criteria, representing programs which often overlap and duplicate one another, and in 
some cases compete,” should be reorganized.  He concluded, “So while we have 
encouraged coordination at the local level, we are constantly hampered by the lack of a 
responding [Federal] coordination.”  He cited that out of the then 17 cities involved with 
the PCJD-OJD grant process, (sixteen actually received them under JFK) with new ones 
applying, weaker “cities” often had the greatest difficulty meeting “muddled” federal 
guidelines.  He “side-barred” that most cities, except New Haven had a tough time 
drafting a comprehensive plan, without federal inner-agency confusion.  Boldly Hackett 
concluded, “in some cases poverty remains unseen, and untouched by Federal 
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programs…as…resources cannot reach those in need because of an archaic filter-down 
process.”135  He cautioned the federal government should not “wage ‘a war on poverty’ at 
this time, basically because we just didn’t know enough,” but he proposed a solution.136   
      Hackett offered to Heller a Cabinet-level committee with an executive director and 
staff, to study how the federal government should manage comprehensive local 
community planning.  He also wanted five cities designated as “national demonstration 
models” for federal-community interaction, starting with St. Louis.  All departments and 
agencies dealing with poverty would send a special assistant designated by their 
Secretary or Administrator, with decision-making authority, to sit on this cabinet level 
“government reorganization committee.”137  Hackett believed federal inter-agency 
reorganization to be absolutely critical and wanted this new “committee” to begin work 
starting in early November 1963 and concluding on March 1, 1964.  Once completed, its 
efforts would be presented to the president for approval.138  This was never done.    
      For Hackett, after this reorganization, then the twelve months of initial planning for 
selected cities would commence, and after that, “demonstration” and further “action” 
phases would follow.  But all this should have been done much earlier.  Hackett viewed 
HEW and Labor as “archaic,” and as roadblocks for money effectively reaching the poor.  
Hackett believed the “National Service Corps,” or “neighborhood youth corps,” or 
“domestic peace corps,” represented good models.139  Hackett had a little planning group 
of his own convinced of this idea’s value, including Bill Cannon of BOB.140 Lastly, 
Hackett believed traditional federal agencies by late 1963, had few staff trained to handle 
delinquency or poverty programs, and even fewer with any first hand experience.  The 
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Bureau of Prisons stood as the only exception, plus most federal agencies had little 
interest in the matter.141   
      Heller’s initial report, and he would eventually have two in total of his own, 
stemming from his November 5 memo became “The 1964 Legislative Program for 
Widening Participation in Prosperity” as released on November 15, 1963.  Stamped 
“confidential,” it proved absolutely worthless because Heller himself had not yet become 
a disciple of Lampman’s community action and he offered thirty different suggestions, 
most being “retreads” of previous “marginal” programs.  Many ideas simply increased 
the poors’ income through additional welfare and nothing from Lampman’s Report 
appeared regarding community action or breaking the culture of poverty.142   
      Heller’s initial report was also just a “hodgepodge” of old agency ideas, thrown 
together.143  The only points worth noting, concerned the Section 701 planning assistance 
grants now recommended for the poverty program, and the executive order on open 
housing was to be made “comprehensive,” and many job programs added.  One strange 
“Neanderthal” idea called for “an opportunity to convert low paid female labor jobs into 
better paid male jobs.”  No doubt, this came from Wirtz.  Overall, this mundane set of 
ideas would have cost between $516 and $520 million in initial outlays.144  Bill Capron 
called it “garbage,” saying, “people simply went into their file drawers and pulled out old 
programs…and submitted them.”145  But this first report further stimulated the big fight 
over the missing piece, “community action” versus “jobs.”  
     As Daniel Moynihan noted, BOB staff when reading this initial report, wanted to go 
beyond it and became “intoxicated with the possibility of bringing about Federal reform 
from underneath” by selling the concept of community action.  Heller finally became a 
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convert after being “prepped” on the idea by Lampman at a series of meetings at RFK’s 
home, called “the Hickory Hill seminars.”146  Beyond Lampman’s work, the community 
action being sold in the fall of 1963 actually belonged to Hackett, Boone, Ylvisaker, and 
Yarmolinsky as previously mentioned, with devout converts now joining as William 
Capron of CEA and Bill Cannon of BOB and finally Heller, all crusading for it.147  The 
fight was really on with the Department of Labor and Wirtz, as the latter remained 
steadfast in his opposition.  That battle raged from November 1963 through February 
1964, and Moynihan told Adam Yarmolinsky, “there’s this big fight going on, and I’m 
delighted that you’re going to get into it.”  On the one side stood the Labor Department 
and on the other was the Bureau of the Budget, the Council of Economic Advisors and 
the poverty people advancing “community action.” It became “terribly sharp during 
November and December.148   
      As now framed, “Community action” properly applied, “structured” itself to break 
“the culture of poverty” because it integrated federal, state, county, city, community and 
private resources at “the local level” to resolve full “categories of problems,” within 
integrated solutions, tailored to each community.  It centered on local involvement and 
citizen participation with federal money.149  The Bureau of the Budget (BOB) took the 
lead in selling “community action” throughout the government in November 1963 and 
Bill Cannon became the “master of ceremonies,” bringing Hackett, Capron, and Boone, 
as “spokespersons” into meetings “all over the government.”  According to Fred Hayes, 
“it was probably the greatest hunk of scheming that ever went on in the Bureau of the 
Budget.”150  By November 1963, now with Heller aboard, “community action” slowly 
dominated Willard Wirtz’s vehement objections.  But for Kennedy and later Johnson to 
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get this through Congress and by the 1964 voters, it had to be sold as a broad based 
poverty program rather than an urban or minority one.  Capron said “we thought that it 
would be death to a bill of any kind of program as a ‘help-the-blacks program.’  But that 
doesn’t mean that we didn’t realize that this program was very important in terms of the 
black vote.”151   
      Just before Dallas Heller met formally with JFK one last time, on November 19, 1963 
and then Kennedy gave him his ultimate official blessing for an actual anti-poverty 
program for the next session of Congress.152  This was three days before his death and 
over three years after his election and his promise to find the workable solution.  Thus by 
mid-November 1963, Kennedy had finally decided some kind of poverty program would 
actually be embraced for 1964, most likely as an election year political highlight.153  JFK 
favored a “relatively modest, workable, and popular program.”154  But reluctantly Heller 
told JFK that he was having a tough time selling the poverty issue, “because of the 
bureaucratic in-fighting,” which annoyed Kennedy.  JFK wanted some kind of showpiece 
for 1964 if the tax cut did not make it, thus “thinking ahead” to the 1964 campaign, he 
wanted to make something like a war on poverty a major new initiative in addition to the 
tax cuts.155  This would be an “across the boards” urban and rural poverty program, but it 
still not synchronized into a workable solution. 
      Two problems remained unresolved due to the in-fighting.  A “new agency” or other 
agency would be needed to manage the poverty program, other than the Labor, HEW, 
DOJ, PCJD-OJD, CEA or BOB combatants.  Even Sorensen, a skilled compromiser, had 
not been able to “knock heads” and stop these battles.  Secondly, ideas were still being 
advanced about: “an income approach;” a “social service approach;” or “a participatory 
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approach” with no resolution.  “Community action” with “maximum feasible 
participation” still remained a brisk fight as to how it would be enacted.  Cannon noted 
“We were responding to a program that the president felt that he…could stand on 
politically,” and wanted to gain resolution of the direction it should take.156 
      Dave Hackett’s first November 6 memo to RJK, which Cannon received in “bootleg” 
fashion and circulated to Heller and to his CEA friends, became the cornerstone.  Right 
after the assassination in very early December 1963, Heller took these ideas, went to LBJ 
and received a tentative “OK” to keep developing a poverty program.  On December 12, 
Cannon rewrote Hackett’s ideas, added some of his own, and after receiving new 
community action input from Hackett and Bill Capron, on December 14 produced an 
outline calling for a truly comprehensive community action poverty program for 1961.157   
      Heller took this Capron piece, and with a few mark ups made it into a second 
Proposal replacing his initial November 15th one.  Subsequently, BOB’s director Kermit 
Gordon reviewed and approved it as well.  Yet only as an after thought, had it been 
hurriedly sent to Robert Weaver, on December 18 for a quick review, and then off to Ted 
Sorensen for a late Friday afternoon meeting held December 20, for final approval.  It 
was formally published on December 23, 1963.158   
      Simply entitled “Poverty Program,” in the topic sentence Heller now proclaimed in 
his second report, “I recommend that the President include a major ‘Attack on Poverty’ 
as a central feature of his 1964 legislative program.  This should be announced in his 
“State of the Union” and would be a “10-Year attack,” with emphasis on preventing 
youth from entering poverty and additional measures for helping others “exit poverty.”159 
Emphasis centered on “launching” a number of major demonstration projects under a 
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coordinated community action plan, “each focused on a significant poverty situation.”  
This stood as a victory for the Lampman, Hackett, Boone, Ylvisaker and Yarmolinsky 
philosophy and the Cannon, Capron and Heller conversions and crusades, based on the 
original Cottrell, Ohlin, Cloward and Pevin thinking, plus the HARYOU, MFY, and the 
developing Bedford-Stuyvesant experience.  Point nine, “Promote the formation of a 
Council on Poverty with a chairman appointed by the President,” with appropriate 
department and agency heads serving to oversee the program, represented Hackett’s 
impact. And, “convene later in 1964 a White House Conference on Human Needs,” 
signaled victory for all those who wanted the previous White House Conference on 
Urban Affairs.160   
      This program covered both urban poverty and rural poverty with two efforts, one 
generally defined as “community action,” and the second as “other actions.”  Community 
action covered “city-oriented concerns” with the “other actions” applied to aid to 
Appalachia, and the report came with three attachments.  Attachment “A” addressed the 
Community Action Program (CAP) for five years, proposing ten projects, one urban and 
one rural (small towns and villages implied here), in each of the five major regions of the 
country.  It “targeted” actual, specific “geographical” areas of poverty, emphasizing 
changing “human” conditions there, attacking “varieties of poverty.”  Management of the 
entire program would be through the President’s Council comprised of appropriate 
cabinet officers and agency heads.  The “other” or more rural effort, attacked “poverty 
and ignorance” in the countryside.  Here, recommendations called for specific projects in 
education, health, welfare, vocational rehabilitation, social security, delinquency 
prevention, plus the school lunch program.  Attachment “C,” encompassed a potpourri of 
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departmental favorites from Agriculture through Labor, to HHFA all hoping to get 
funded along with a sizeable budget that covered the entire proposal.161
      This overall program for Fiscal Year 1965 would cost $479 million in Non-Obligated 
Authority (NOA) and $390 million in Budget Expenditures (NBE) for Attachments A 
and B.  From Attachment C, depending on what developed, $200 million more in NOA 
and $50 million in NBE could be added making the FY 1965 package worth around $679 
million in NOA and $440 million in NBE which as over a billion dollars would have 
been a good start.  Costed out over the first five years ending in FY 1969, NOA stood at 
$1,378,000,000 and NBE $1,283,000,000, revealing planners intended to use large 
amounts of “roll over” money.162   
      In discussions with LBJ, estimated by Cannon to have taken place on either the 
evening of December 14th or shortly thereafter at the start of the 1963 Christmas 
Holidays at Johnson City, Texas, Heller and Kermit Gordon explained everything to him 
and he abruptly told them that, “he wasn’t going to have any War on Poverty Program 
and he particularly wasn’t going to have a community action program.”  Yet the 
following day, they “sweet talked” him into changing his mind.  The interdepartmental 
wrangling that bothered Kennedy as well upset LBJ, but he “bought off” on a broad 
based war on poverty, not yet fully developed.163         
      What changed immediately under Johnson in December 1963 was the “pace and 
volume.”  Heller and Hackett warned, “go stage by stage, don’t rush the legislation” as it 
remained immature.  But in urban affairs, the unsophisticated Johnson said “Go,” and off 
it (the poverty program) went without the planning and needed federal reorganization.164   
By January 16, 1964, Johnson in his “State of the Union” address “declared an 
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unconditional war on poverty” and hurriedly R. Sargent Shriver became the poverty 
program manager, effective February 1, 1964, for what would soon become the Office of 
Economic Opportunity (OEO).  Community action rapidly endorsed with little 
understanding of what it meant, expanded under Shriver immediately from Kennedy’s 
reformers list of five cities to 50, then under pressure from LBJ, to 250 cities for the first 
year.  The new legislation signed by Johnson on August 20, 1964, as the Economic 
Opportunity Act (EOA) consisted chiefly of a hodgepodge of ideas now akin to the first 
Heller report, from “job creation” to some kind of “community action” for almost all 
problems.  It required neither proven outcomes nor strict comprehensive planning applied 
by city type.  Hackett, convinced that had JFK lived the program could have been 
carefully implemented, was at a loss.165  Title II of the new program spelled out 
Community Action Program (CAP) and a tension immediately developed over the rapid 
timeline and careless implementation.166  By the end of 1964 RFK said “LBJ had 
bastardized, bloated and Johnsonized” the original concepts beyond “recognition.”167  
      During its limited life cycle, OEO spent $962.5 million on poverty and jobs, creating 
the Volunteers in Service to America (VISA) and other features, costing another later 
$462.5 million.168  With more welfare money soon added, the program rapidly ballooned  
into an uncontrolled federal “give-away,” without creating organized community 
opportunity, until the funds ran out.169  Adding to the chaos, the still undefined 
“community action” increasingly became headed by “community activists.”  Mayor 
Richard J. Daley called the White House, terrified, asking “What in the hell are you 
people doing?”  He continued, “Does the President know he is putting money in the 
hands of subversives?”  Even Johnson began to wonder if OEO wasn’t being run by “a 
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bunch of Kooks, communists and queers,” and the program began to lose political 
favor.170       
      But the “design” constituted the real problem.  Kennedy never provided an overall 
solution and LBJ never implemented one, plus Johnson’s people did not understand CAP 
and EOA’s Title II.  Hackett  authored the “maximum feasible participation of the poor” 
in the CAP piece.171   But he would have agreed with Moynihan that “what they think of 
CAP is exactly opposite of what you think of CAP, and you’re going to have all kinds of 
disappointments and conflict.”172  LBJ’s planners looked at target area “groups” not the 
poor or their representatives.  Hackett summed it up well saying, “I think that the 
community action concept was never fully explained to anybody.”173
      If LBJ had done it properly, even skeptics believed poverty could have been 
eradicated by “carefully” spending at that time $2 billion annually, less than 2 percent of 
the 1962 GNP.174  Johnson urged only $1.5 billion be spent in the first two years of the 
program through August 1966.  Yet just $350 million actually “made it to the streets” in 
that first year due to collective federal ineptitude and lack of organization.175 
      But when LBJ’s “maximum feasible participation” began to run into “control” 
difficulties, he quickly recoiled and threw the program back to local mayors.176 He also 
failed to establish a framework for its favorable transition.177  Mayor Robert Wagner of 
New York said “the sovereign government (city) of each locality … should have 
approval of the planning group.”  Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago went further with 
“We think very strongly that any project of this kind…must be administered by the duly 
constituted elected officials.”178  Local governments worked hard to avoid federal 
intent.179  Scores of local politicians, dependent on distribution of services to maintain 
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their power, undercut LBJ.180  In addition, the poverty program began to be viewed 
nationally as a minority one, chiefly helping African-Americans as another form of civil 
rights or welfare.181   But including Model Cities which became law on November 4, 1966 
and with associated welfare schemes, this would be a very expensive program, as Hackett 
said “within a six week period a program that spent thirteen billion dollars was put 
together.”  Model Cities alone according to Hackett received “five, six billion dollars 
pretty damn fast,” yet did little.182  
      Then came Vietnam.  LBJ’s Vietnam War led to his “temporary” tax surcharge that 
raised the $5 to $6 billion needed, but Congress required domestic cuts.  LBJ then began 
to back off and “He knew full well by the end of 1966 that his public pronouncements 
triumphing the coming end of want in America were unrealizable.”183,  Even Shriver 
summed it up well, lamenting that, “Vietnam took it all away,” he mourned, “every 
goddamned dollar.”184  Hackett concluded his analysis of LBJ’s urban spending saying 
that what “President Johnson did which we thought, critically, was…useless aid to the 
cities.”185  
      Kennedy though, deserves some of the blame for the debacle, as he had little or no 
interest in developing and implementing completed and workable solutions while 
possessing all the tools, yet failing to combine them into a cohesive and synchronized 
package.  Kennedy failed because he did not personally care about the issue.  His agenda 
never included taking bold steps against the conservative tide of his times, leading the 
nation that truly listened to what he said, into resolving its desperate urban problems.  
Balanced budgets, tax cuts and election year politics in 1962 and 1964 overrode this. 
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      What could have been, concludes this chapter and indeed this dissertation.  With 
focus, leadership and commitment JFK had every opportunity to find the workable 
solution to urban problems and needed only to blend the social city piece into an 
appropriate existing “structure” along with most of his current physical city programs. 
For the cities, the timing would be critical.   
      JFK had three chances to launch an “early” workable solution that might have “hit the 
streets” soon enough to avert some of the bloodshed.  Passage of the Housing Act at the 
end of June 1961, constituted his first opportunity to craft a workable solution.  The 
“honeymoon” plus that legislative success provided a public and Congressional 
“bounce,” never to return.  Secondly, after the loss of DUAH in February 1962, he had 
nothing really to further lose with his urban program, so abruptly launching a 
comprehensive workable solution with Congress might have energized some of his 
DUAH supporters.  Lastly, after his popularity soared because of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis in October 1962 and with the Democrats success in the 1962 off-year elections, in 
very early November 1962 a perfect and final chance presented itself to initiate a 
workable solution.  Kennedy chose then to only vaguely start studying the matter.   
Using the “last chance,” had a “workable solution for urban problems” really been  
drawn up in October/November 1962, and launched January 1963, if successful, great, 
but if unsuccessful it could have been become a well developed 1964 campaign 
 issue.  
      This workable solution to urban problems could have consisted of thirteen measures. 
In short, nobody in one plan ever connected housing, to social services, to mass transit, to 
jobs, and tailored these to different neighborhoods using maximum feasible participation 
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with priorities designed by those who lived there.  Washington also had to “politically” 
be willing to enforce the model on certain mayoral fiefdoms, which it could have been 
done.  Kennedy’s workable solution should have been: 
1. Appoint Weaver, his “city man,” as director of the “workable solution” 
reporting to the Vice-President for additional political clout and if 
politically untenable,  to the Attorney General; 
 
2. Designate HHFA, America’s real “city agency,” as the Agency to 
manage the workable solution, continuing “physical city” programs while 
blending in “social city” ones; 
 
3. Use the existing and well established Workable Program for Community 
Improvement (WPCI) as the framework; 
 
4. From Kennedy’s current inter-agency and intra-government commissions 
and committees, as Hackett called for, reorganize certain federal 
departments and agencies to easily accept management of a coordinated 
poverty program and workable solution;  
 
5. Customize the existing HHFA Section 701 and Section 702 urban 
planning grants and Section 314 urban demonstration grants so they 
covered poverty and social city issues, as well as their then physical city 
ones; 
 
6. Place PCJD-OJD operations including the talented Dave Hackett under 
HHFA, continuing maximum feasible participation and community 
action; 
 
7. Make the executive order “comprehensive;”  
   
8. Blend in the already written “URA-PHA-FHA partnership” in physical 
and social city redevelopment; 
 
9. Transfer ARA from Commerce to HHFA and expand the “jobs” role, 
plus add other jobs and retraining programs as needed and tailored to 
specific neighborhoods; 
 
10. Place into this mix the best of what CFA was doing in neighborhood 
facility development for the poor; 
 
11. Under the WPCI in each target areas, connect effective Mass Transit for 
the poor to job locations so they could go to work; 
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12. Implement the existing “PHA-HEW-VA social services experiment” for 
coordinated on site-social service assistance and place existing poverty 
“welfare programs” under that umbrella; 
 
13. Bring private industry into the ghetto using RFK’s Bedford-Stuyvesant 
project as a model. 
 
      A discussion of these points follows.  Initially, Dr. Robert C. Weaver, Harvard PhD 
in Economics and Administrator of the HHFA, would have made an excellent choice to 
manage the workable solution to urban problems.  Both JFK and his “reformers” left him 
out.  “Why” has already been discussed but Bob Weaver remained out of the “inner 
circle” of poverty planning for the “workable solution.”  
      Yet Weaver as a potential “workable solution” manager brought tremendous 
experience.  He participated in 1961 in a conference producing a “visionary assessment” 
for an early plan framing a landmark poverty program and workable solution.  Held on 
June 27, 1961, as “the Ford Foundation Federal Representatives Meeting” it included 
four of the “reformers” plus Weaver and Mort Schussheim and ten other “urban experts.”  
Weaver presented his ideas in an enlightened seven-page study called “HHFA Programs 
that Relate to the Concern of the Attorney General’s Office with Youth and Juvenile 
Delinquency.”  Weaver and Schussheim detailed solutions to poverty, using existing 
HHFA city overlays showing “a consistent relationship” between slum housing, 
delinquency, and other “urban” ills.186  Weaver correctly pointed out that changes in 
housing alone, would not resolve these matters, but rather that a full “rehabilitation of 
socially disorganized families” needed to occur.  Weaver’s solution encompassed using 
the Workable Program for Community Improvement (WPCI) in a three phased effort.  
Capital grants, low rent public housing, FHA reduced mortgages, and ample and effective 
urban renewal relocation, would be blended into a community’s “workable program.”  
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Next, cities would present proof their program eliminated “blight” via neighborhood by 
neighborhood “analysis,” using “citizen participation.”  All neighborhood needs would be 
included in the plan - health centers, recreation, facilities, youth clubs, housing projects, 
playgrounds, open spaces, nursery schools and settlement houses plus members of the 
community would sit on a “supervisory panel,” the citizens advisory committee.187 
Weaver wanted his three main grants programs, Sections 701, 702 and 314 to be 
expanded covering social city programs.  He also planned to use HHFA’s Urban Studies 
and Housing Research Program to assist “migrants” in poverty areas find housing, 
maintain households, and develop “cohesive” anti-delinquency programs.188  Jobs were 
absent from this study though and could have been added. 
      F. David Clarke and Burt Young of HHFA, met on July 19, 1961 with Hackett, HEW, 
Justice and the Ford Foundation representatives to sell this study, and although a steering 
committee formed, the HHFA ideas essentially went absolutely nowhere.  Clarke 
lamented, “It would be unfortunate if …[PCJD-OJD] “were to ignore and 
circumvent…these ideas,” but that is exactly what happened.189  When questioned about 
this and public works later, Weaver was asked, “But didn’t they look to you to coordinate 
things?”  He replied, “We pushed there, and we got it in Public Health [some of it].”  
“But the water and sewer program, there was a situation where HHFA and Interior were 
doing similar projects.  And I could never get either the White House or the Bureau of the 
Budget to deal with the matter.”  He recalled, “I remember one Saturday we sat 
down…with the Bureau of the Budget and the Secretary of the Interior, and they ‘wishy-
washed’ but didn’t face the Issue.”  He concluded, “With Model Cities the same thing 
was true.  In that instance, the White House did little to support HUD’s efforts to secure 
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inter-departmental and inter-agency cooperation especially in terms of anticipated 
categorical grants.”190  
      Yet Weaver offered more novel ideas.  HHFA’s Wayne Phillips headed a program for 
African-Americans to receive business administration training, and Weaver fostered new 
poverty area housing ideas.191  His legislative proposals for 1963 and 1964 included 
strengthening and expanding the “Workable Program (WPCI)” ensuring both Section 701 
and 702 urban planning grants came directly through the WPCI and HHFA, and aimed at 
comprehensive community planning.  Many of his ideas paralleled PCJD’s “planning” 
approach.192  Lastly, Weaver could have reported to the Vice-President or Attorney 
General for help managing the “workable solution,” either providing him necessary clout 
with cabinet members.193  LBJ already ran government wide employment and civil rights 
committees, and RFK the “EXCOM,” so both had external program management 
experience. 
      Secondly, using HHFA as the organization for a workable solution made sense.  As 
HUD’s forerunner, HHFA’s massive urban programs through FHA, PHA, URA, FNMA 
and CFA, touched all cities, small towns, and some of the countryside.  This mated well 
with the war on poverty’s urban and rural aspects.  And within Weaver’s HHFA empire, 
one of the largest in the federal government, mechanisms already existed to easily 
facilitate making the transition.  Inside HHFA its Office of Metropolitan Development 
(OMD) would have been an ideal home for the new program.  On November 9, 1962, 
that Office began in the HHFA central office and became the nerve center under Victor 
Fischer, “Assistant Administrator, Metropolitan Development,” for metropolitan policy 
and coordinating “common opportunities for metropolitan area planning.”194  This office 
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properly reorganized, and under Weaver’s experienced hand, would have been an 
excellent workable program manager.195  
      Thirdly, and very important, the “operational framework” for the workable solution to 
urban problems including the war on poverty, should have been the Workable Program 
for Community Improvement (WPCI).  Authority came from “the local responsibilities 
portion” of the 1949 Housing Act as reauthorized by Ike in his 1954 Housing Act, to halt 
the spread of slums, using coordinated community planning.  The WPCI operated as an 
already established community action program through HHFA and had an established 
urban and small town clientele.  NAHRO often worked with it, providing free and timely 
research, and even GAO (the Government Accounting Office) assisted in “tracking.”196 
      Coming out of the Eisenhower years, Benjamin T. Perry turned over to the Kennedy 
people on January 31, 1961, a well organized Workable Program for Community 
Development.  Weaver changed the last word to Improvements, drastically cut “red tape” 
from the former torturous applications process, and expanded membership.197  He wished 
to consolidate and grow WPCI and appointed the able F. David Clarke to manage it.  
From 1961–1963, 1,762 small communities and 131 metropolitan areas received grants 
for some kind of urban planning assistance, most through WPCI.198  Clark roundly 
supported Weaver’s desire for “a comprehensive approach to integrated regional urban 
development under the WPCI.”199  By November 1961, each approved WPCI city had a 
“Citizens Advisory Committee,” signaling the importance of citizen participation, and 
WPCI paralleled PCJD-OJD guidelines for comprehensive planning, but were never 
“merged.”  Moreover, WCPI placed a special emphasis on “minority housing” which 
PCJD-OJD did not, and some of Clarke’s work was integrated with NAACP efforts, but 
 533
without any White House notice or PCJD-OJD interest.  Further, the WPCI became a 
leader in sending racial discrimination complaints to the Civil Rights Commission.200 
Weaver in a policy memo to all regional administrators emphasized “I have strong 
personal convictions that the vigorous presentation of the Workable Program objectives 
is vital to the continued success of other programs of this Agency.”201 
      Clarke also published a rather sophisticated study in December 1961 offering ideas 
about comprehensive city planning calling for a more active community-wide citizen 
participation with subcommittees focusing on minority problems.  He emphasized 
bringing “private business” into a community’s workable program and involving the poor 
in “neighborhood analysis,” and wanted a “transportation” subcommittee, which would 
be critical to getting the poor to work, and suggested how the federal government could 
help with “technical advice.”202  But this drew no interest from the White House, or 
PCJD-OJD.  Lastly, the WPCI maintained vast data on urban problems for over ten years, 
valuable for poverty planning.203  This was never utilized under Kennedy. 
      JFK’s inter-agency commissions and the intergovernmental committees could have 
become the basis for “reorganizing” the federal bureaucracy and represented a fourth 
aspect of the workable solution. This did not happen either.  HHFA had already improved 
its “field” organization and maintained inter-agency community programs with the 
Bureau of Public Roads.204  But JFK’s Board of Federal Executives could have brought 
order to chaos, eliminated red tape, duplicity, and “choke points” that plagued existing 
poverty work.  The “implementers” could have been Kennedy’s current Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, with its permanent staff.  Both had regular 
requirements to improve government coordination in metropolitan areas and had a 
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significant “test case” already underway in DC.205  Weaver frequently testified before the 
Commission and could have led proposed reorganizations, but that never began.206  
Memorandums even as late as mid-1963 revealed no intention of using inter-agency 
cooperation to craft a coordinated program for a comprehensive solution.207 
      Properly using the existing Section 701 and Section 702 planning grants within the 
WPCI framework constitutes the fifth aspect of implementing a workable solution to 
urban programs while facilitating a war on poverty.  The Section 701 Urban Planning 
Assistance Grants remained an invaluable tool in urban planning for all city endeavors, 
beyond its frequent urban renewal use.208  Additionally, Section 701 offered planning 
help for all “community development,” and “comprehensive planning for urban areas.”  
This should have been tailored as primary grant for “the solution.”  General 
neighborhood planning had been approved under the 701 program years ago.209  In 
addition, in July 1961, HHFA’s, Hugh Mields suggested to Weaver he extend the 701 
program to all metropolitan area problems and Weaver agreed.210   The funding 
arrangement of 2/3 federal money, 1/3 other (state, county, city, private) became a much 
sought after commodity.211  As well, Section 702, the other popular grant could have been 
used in the workable solution for planning public works.  Continuity between 701 and 
702 grants remained excellent, and the 702 could have helped poor neighborhoods plan 
for and obtain needed public facility improvements.  Section 702 grants offered the same 
kind of attractive funding.  Weaver was trying to make the WPCI a prerequisite for 
Section 702 grants under CFA.212  Section 314 demonstration grants could be applied to 
either but again, none of this was ever combined into any “workable solution.”   
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      Step Six, integrating PCJD-OJD operations into HHFA should have been an easy 
transition.  Nothing but lack of foresight and “politics” precluded putting a “committee” 
and an “office” under a major Agency about to become a Department.  Weaver could 
have appointed Hackett an HHFA assistant administrator for the war on poverty, and 
Hackett would have maintained the same “rank” he held in RFK’s office.  
Comprehensive planning and “maximum feasible participation” in community action 
would have continued unabated.   
      Step Seven, recommended by most everyone from Weaver to JFKs’s own Civil 
Rights Commission, consisted of making the executive order “comprehensive.”  As 
mentioned in Chapter nine, most of Kennedy’s staff believed JFK had the authority to do 
that, but he chose not to do so. 
      Step eight, would integrate a much needed set of “physical city” programs into the 
workable solution that URA, FHA, and PHA had already fashioned into a “not-for-
publication” memorandum.  This discussed how they could combine their efforts in 
resolving poverty.  The study called for URA, PHA and FHA cooperation in solving 
social issues within the “physical city” as touched upon in chapter eight.  Nathan Glazier 
and William Slayton wrote it, recommending urban renewal venture into special 
education, child care services, welfare services, housekeeping assistance, vocational 
counseling, relief of homelessness, relocation, and even unemployment and college 
counseling.  Maximized citizen participation remained key, and a whole generation of 
new proposed federal communities along with housing and appropriate budgets were 
discussed.  A “National Institute on Urban Problems” would conduct demonstrations to 
resolve the human problems of urban renewal, housing, and public housing, and an urban 
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think tank with fellowships would be established.213  The agreement was never 
implemented. 
        As step nine, the Area Redevelopment Administration (ARA) under the direction of 
William L. Batt, Jr., should have been integrated into HHFA under WPCI, and made a 
key part of the workable solution.  Created by the Area Redevelopment Act on May 1, 
1961, if taken away from the Department of Commerce where it languished and placed 
under HHFA’s WPCI it could have continued facilitating manpower retraining, jobs and 
employment opportunities for the poor, much needed for the long-term success of the 
workable solution.  But PCJD-OJD “played down” this kind of activity.  ARA also could 
have handled the rural aspects of the poverty program, with Mr. Batt as well becoming 
another “Assistant HHFA Administrator.”  Remaining in Commerce served no point and 
ARA, as Jack Conway quipped remained “a very thin piece of legislation” with “not a 
great deal of money.”  He characterized the program as one with “a greater show of 
activity than there was activity.”214 
      ARA already planned a comprehensive program in isolation.  Accelerated Public 
Works, Public Law 87-685 of September 14, 1962, had inadvertently joined CFA and 
ARA together in a mutual effort to alleviate poverty.  This was not Kennedy’s initial 
“accelerated public works funding effort” as part of his $900 million anti-recession 
package but rather ARA became mandated to handle specific “depressed areas” with its 
own $300 million: $100 million for urban, $100 million for rural, and $100 million for 
public works in either.  With the latter ARA designated “substantial labor surplus 
commitments,” and CFA managed ARA’s public works money plus its own $400 
million.215  ARA’s problem consisted of having 663 areas of high employment or 
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“depressed areas” covering 28.6 million people in 47 states and the various islands with 
only $300 million available.  Producing new jobs, through a “new partnership” including 
several federal agencies placing resources into ARA depressed areas, (Commerce, 
Interior, Agriculture, Labor, HEW, HHFA and the Small Business Administration) plus 
helping create private industry jobs through the “multiplier effort” constituted their 
effort.216  As well, ARA required an “area” to draw up with a “feasible plan” that 
included representation from the whole community.  Other initiatives as the “National 
Service Corps,” VISTA, Neighborhood Job Corp, the “Reemployment Act of 1961,” and 
Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 could have been considered here.217  
None of this ever became centralized or coordinated under Kennedy.   
      Part ten of the workable solution, combined the best of Communities Facilities 
Administration (CFA) efforts into a single plan.  CFA under Sidney Woolner handled 
metropolitan area projects in all major cities for both middle class and poor 
neighborhoods.  CFA provided grants to cities for public works planning, made 
community facility loans, and assisted with area redevelopment.218  Filled with 
experienced urban planners, it stood as a model for helping decaying urban 
neighborhoods, with extremely poor water systems, storm sewers, sanitary facilities, 
incinerators, bridges, and sidewalks, transition into sound communities.  CFA did not per 
se allocate money for individual homes, but for entire sections of cities in cooperation 
with other federal programs under a Joint Steering Committee, plus it funded municipal 
projects that “fed” power, water and the like into these neighborhoods.219  The Section 
702 grants for public works could have been used by CFA and CFA had demonstration 
programs.220  By the end of February 1962, CFA had just over $24 million in public 
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works planning money in the field that helped generate $1.8 billion in estimated new 
municipal and private construction.221  Lastly, CFA through its early anti-recession 
spending and under the Public Works Acceleration Act, already “knew” “targeted urban 
areas” and how to draw up comprehensive plans for them.222  Woolner independently 
proposed in 1963, a comprehensive and coordinated CFA effort in “target area” cities, 
but there is no evidence it was acted upon during the Kennedy years.223  Yet Kennedy, 
rather than expand CFA’s role into targeted poverty areas, cut CFA operating budget and 
left staff vacancies open, in order to save money.224 
      Mass transit, step eleven, stood as an absolutely critical ingredient of the workable 
solution to urban problems.  Enough business or government jobs could not possibly be 
located in poor neighborhoods, so the urban poor needed to travel elsewhere to go to 
work.  They could not get there without mass transit, meaning a minimally 
comprehensive bus plan, which in many cities often deliberately avoided poor areas or 
public housing sites, particularly in the South.  Yet mass transit looked “too federal and 
much too urban” to settle well with rural Congressmen.225  During JFK’s time, an 
unavoidable power struggle raged over control of “multi-jurisdictional roads,” “roads 
running through cities,” “roads to suburbs,” and the “amount” of “urban mass transit” 
considered.  Proponents for federal urban mass transit wanted a program akin to 
Eisenhower’s 1956 National Defense Highway Act that resolved the “rural interstate” 
issue and much of the urban expressway debate.  But the real power brokers, the Bureau 
of Public Roads (BPR) whom Moynihan described as “barbarians” coming out of the 
1950s, with their conservative Capital Hill friends, stridently road-blocked federal 
funding for urban mass transit.  
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      Unfortunately, the “city’s so called” spokesman, JFK, who promised to help find the 
workable solution, did not help much either.  The Kennedy’s 1960 Platform called for 
“Federal aid for comprehensive metropolitan transportation programs, including bus and 
rail mass transit, computer railroads, as well as highway programs.”226  Yet JFK buried 
mass transit as number 22 of 29 legislative priorities for the second Session 87th 
Congress.227  He simply did not want to spend the money nor take the Congressional heat 
about trying.  When asked, “Do you remember a lot of resistance from the White House 
on mass transit?”  Jack Conway responded, “Yes.  But what we [HHFA] did was we 
worked our own will in the Senate with a lot of cooperation from the key senators” and 
got around the White House.  He concluded “I think it was the White House’s feeling that 
these things [like Mass Transit] would all be “dealt out” in conference, but we got them 
all in.  We got the best of both bills [Senate and House].”228  This became the “meager” 
mass transit portion of the 1961 Housing Act.       
      While many “real” mass transit bills were “hot topics” during JFK’s presidency the 
White House version was not.  Between six to eight bills traveled the legislative pipeline 
annually and some received administration support, some not.  Kennedy’s only “mass 
transit” success, which Conway alluded to in the above, came in Title III of the 1961 
Housing Act, doing three things: it reinstated the Section 701 urban planning assistance 
grants for the purposes of the “transportation aspects of comprehensive urban area 
planning.”  Secondly, it provided loans, allocating $50 million so states and cities could 
acquire and improve mass transit, with this money budgeted to the end of 1962, then 
subsequently extended to June 30, 1963.  Lastly, it offered demonstration grants totaling 
a scant $25 million in federal funds to states and cities for planning mass transit.229      
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      However, Kennedy’s own administration published in 1962 studies estimating that 
the cost of an effective national mass transit program would require minimally $9.8 
billion over ten years, plus huge amounts of private funding.230  Kennedy was having 
none of that with his “politics” of balanced budget and tax cut.  So in 1961, Senator 
Harrison A. Williams (D-NJ) an avid mass transit proponent, along with 18 other 
Senators, launched a bill supported by the American Municipal Association, asking for 
$1.75 billion over five years, simply as a middle ground in mass transit funding.231  
Similarly, in each of the three Kennedy years, Williams introduced provocative 
legislation.  In a memo to JFK, Weaver, hoping for a big bill like Williams’ lamented 
“Ill-conceived mass transportation…can accelerate blight.”  He continued, “only through 
inclusion of transportation planning as a key element in the comprehensive planning 
process can full benefits be obtained.”232   
      Nineteen Sixty-two witnessed an additional flurry of mass transit activity.  Again Mr. 
Williams of New Jersey and others, introduced legislation.  But JFK did not place himself 
in the forefront of mass transit leadership, and was “embarrassed” into an additional 
action beyond the 1961 Housing Act by Williams and his group.  JFK unenthusiastically 
sponsored a 1962 effort that provided three things: $500 million in grants for mass transit 
planning, apportioned over three years at $100 million for fiscal 1963, $200 million for 
fiscal 1964 and $200 million for fiscal 1965, while also continuing the 1961 Housing 
Act’s $25 million in demonstration money and $50 million in loans.233  Much wrangling 
from railroads, water companies and the Teamsters over the 1962 bill accompanied 
markup in March, all aimed at obtaining more money and Weaver and Luther Hodges of 
Commerce, testified or sent statements.234  However, by the end of the 1962 sessions, the 
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administration’s bill was tied up, in various stages of committee consideration.235  There 
is no evidence the White House became tremendously upset about this. 
      In Congress in 1963, because the president did not spend his political capital on mass 
transit to break the deadlock, the administration had only a slightly better chance than in 
1962.  Mass transit rose to third on Kennedy’s now prioritized legislative list, into 
“Category One” bills all designated to improve “the Nation’s Economy,” but not to help 
impoverished poor gain access to jobs through a comprehensive mass transit systems.236  
Additionally six separate bills were introduced in 1963, the most popular one being 
Senate 6, again by Harrison Williams, and finally on February 18, the administration 
introduced it’s lackluster 1962 version again, as the Mass Transportation Act of 1963.  
This included all the same provisions, adding only a stipulation for $30 million more in 
research and development.237  On November 1, 1963 Kennedy got a “modified” version 
of that passed by the Senate, but the House version stayed only “on calendar” when JFK 
left for Dallas, bogged down in “highway” controversies.238  Thus the first real 
commitment to subsidize bus, subway, and rail commuter systems came on July 1, 1964, 
as the Mass Transit Act of 1964 under LBJ, who put some presidential weight behind 
Kennedy’s legislation.  It represented the real mass transit act for the period, but even the 
legislatively wise LBJ, received only the money Kennedy had earmarked in his 1963 
Senate version.  Weaver concluded about Kennedy and mass transit, “I would say that his 
interest in this was really of about second priority.  I would put this as top (of the second 
set of priority of his).  I think that his feeling on these things was that we had to do them, 
but maybe there were other things that had to be done first.  And if you had to sacrifice 
something, you could delay Mass Transit.”239 
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      However the mass transit “commitment,” before being dismissed, bears further 
analysis of one final point.  It symbolized Kennedy’s duplicity in finding a workable 
solution.  Under Kennedy’s presidency, managing overall transportation needs was Dan 
Morton, in the Department of Commerce, as “Under Secretary for Transportation,” and 
“particularly incompetent” according to Weaver.  A former Los Angeles Cadillac dealer, 
he stayed far removed from the critical poverty connection of mass transit to jobs.  
Weaver wanted an “area-wide transit plan” for cities and remained miffed about 
Commerce and Morton’s dominant role, particularly in research.  Rex Whitton managed 
HHFA’s small urban mass transit portion of the 1961 Housing Act, but that represented 
all the influence HHFA had in the matter.240   
      The White House though maintained closer ties with Commerce, the BPR, and the 
road lobby.  By 1962, JFK’s federal, plus state expenditures for just the urban portion of 
highway construction funded $2.07 billion “and the highway folks maintained a firm 
grasp on their lucrative empire,” which received $11.56 billion from JFK in 1961 and 
another $2.3 billion in 1962.241  They believed, and by default Kennedy did as well, that 
moving goods, services, and people into cities and back to the suburbs constituted the 
role of urban highways, not moving the urban poor to job sites.242  Indeed, Weaver wrote 
to Dave Bell at the end of 1961 that the miniscule 1961 Housing Act mass transit money 
was hardly enough, as HHFA had requests for assistance from 61 cities, asking for $40 
million in demonstration money, with only $25 million was available, and $300 million 
in loan requests went against an available $50 million.243  The 1962 and 1963 
administration bills attempted to correct these deficiencies, but they never passed under 
Kennedy. 
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      Further, Weaver “proposed” demonstration projects for urban “target area” 
transportation, yet these were never included in any program.244  Kennedy’s response 
authorized a “massive” study of urban transportation using the Institute of Public 
Administration, with a joint Commerce/HHFA effort, but studying mass transit as a 
“poverty” issue never arrived on the agenda.245  The study was published as “For Official 
Use Only” and concluded that huge outlays as $19.6 billion over the entire 1960s would 
be needed for a real federal mass transit system involving public money at all levels plus 
some private investment.246  No action commenced as a result of this study, and even 
Kennedy’s “message on transportation” to the Congress, spoke only of the needs of 
middle class communities to have good urban expressways.247  As late as mid-August 
1963, the only new mass transit initiative coming out of his Administration consisted of 
an urban transportation research conference.248  The “New Frontier” simply did not give 
poor people consideration in the mass transit equation.        
      Finally, two last aspects of a workable solution round out the “social” side of the 
issues.  In the twelfth point, the “PHA/HEW” partnership and program of Marie 
McGuire’s would have been invaluable, yet it was never blended in.  As previously 
mentioned in chapter eight, McGuire under a PHA/HEW agreement with VA 
subsequently joining, actually brought about successful demonstrations, integrating 
public housing with social services including an effective model youth program, family 
service assistance, employment, and benefits counseling directly located on public 
housing sites all across the country.  This could have been integrated into the workable 
solution, molding public housing, elderly housing, and on site social services into a 
working “neighborhood” package.  The Veterans Administration joined with McGuire 
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and HEW, offering similar programs for poor and disabled veterans.  All of this could 
have been in decentralized “store front” locations among large numbers of poor in 
“targeted neighborhoods.”  McGuire through her proposed “President’s Public Housing 
Advisory Committee,” tried to entice private industry to join as well.249  But none of this 
sparked any interest in the White House, and there is no evidence her ideas were taken to 
heart either by the “reformers,” in their push to apply “advanced” social theory to many 
aspects of what PHA/HEW/VA were already trying to do.  Her program remained 
isolated and unfulfilled. 
      Lastly, Robert Kennedy’s Bedford-Stuyvesant (Bed-Stuy) constitutes the thirteenth 
element of what could have been.  It stood as the best of MFY and CAP all rolled into 
one, and with the other twelve measures in the workable solution, could have been the 
model’s “capstone.”  Named “Bed-Stuy,” the patrician advisers deferred to the citizens of 
Bedford-Stuyvesant, “in all matters of significance.”  Although government played an 
important role, it deferred to an influx of business and private capital for the jobs piece, 
missing in other plans. RFK called for “the active participation of the business 
community in every facet of the revitalization efforts.”250   
      “Bed-Stuy” as a neighborhood came with a multitude of delinquency problems, with 
roots going back into the Great Depression.  Geographic isolation, racism, and police 
brutality, had long taken their toll. “Poverty, dysfunctional family life, unemployment 
and powerlessness” permeated the area.  Like HARYOU and MFY, only the African-
American churches offered any real stability.  Some of the early protests under JFK’s 
administration began there, from mid-July through early August 1963, over a lack of 
hiring Bed-Stuy African-American residents for new hospital construction.251 
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      Bed-Stuy constituted a section of Brooklyn of 400,000 people, 84% African-
American and 12% Hispanic-Americans, living in brownstone tenements, “amidst 
abandoned building and trash-strewn vacant lots.”  RFK worked to invest capital into this 
target area.252  He enlisted old friends as Thomas J. Watson, Jr. of IBM, William Paley of 
CBS Television, Douglas Dillion, numerous bankers as George Moore of National City 
Bank, and McGeorge Bundy, who maintained connections with the Ford Foundation, to 
energize the project.  However, Judge Thomas R. Jones and other African-American 
Church leaders ran it.  Through tax incentives and investment credits, businesses offering 
employment were enticed to locate plants in Bed-Stuy.253   
      The plan as finally developed in 1964, formed two non-profit, tax exempt 
corporations, “functioning as partners.”  The Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration 
Corporation restored the physical city area, and the Development and Services 
Corporation provided jobs, working the “social city piece.”  From the 1964 Economic 
Opportunity Act, in 1966 an amendment called the “Special Impact Program” provided 
$7 million in new money, and public and private capital mixed.  Members of the 
community began “on-the-job- training” in welding, masonry, scaffolding, and painting, 
and later transferred those skills into construction jobs.  Ninety-six blocks received 
exterior renovation.  Moreover, IBM Corporation began to employ residents and moved a 
plant into a renovated warehouse, later building a $10.2 million facility.254  Labor, HEW, 
HHFA-HUD, OEO, SBA and FHA also “moved in” providing assistance.  FHA for 
instance, invested in 1000 buildings in the area, and the new $6 million Restoration Plaza 
Shopping Center opened.  “Home ownership” increased to as high as 90-95% in some 
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blocks and comprehensive employment placed more than 7000 residents into new jobs 
with more planned.255 
      But RFK’s feud with LBJ and Robert Kennedy’s subsequent assassination, left the 
project without lasting leadership and focus.  RFK “believed Johnson was playing a very 
complicated game in the cities that was bound to back-fire, putting [increasingly] federal 
funds in the hands of the mayors.”  Robert Kennedy also placed greater faith in business 
than LBJ did and wanted Bed-Stuy to become a national prototype for “other cities” 
which Johnson consistently opposed.  While the Bedford-Stuyvesant project left its mark, 
its authors were not around to complete the effort.256  Business leaders praised RFK’s 
work, as Robert Lyon wrote in a 1967 edition of Realtor Magazine, “Senator Robert 
Kennedy’s plan for slum housing and ghetto industries deserves our support.”257  
However, Jack Conway summed it up well saying that after RFK’s death, LBJ’s 
“managers,” Adam Walinsky in particular, “worked with an impressive lack of realism.”  
He complained, “I left it (a meeting on Bed-Stuy) thinking…this thing is going to fail.”258
      The “New Frontier” never implemented a workable solution to urban problems 
because Jack Kennedy never launched to full-scale White House effort to find it, 
although it existed in “fragments” across his own administration, in both current 
programs and future planning.  Programs needed only to be given attention “early,” as 
mentioned combined, refined, focused and funded, but that never happened.   
      Moreover, other “fragments” existed in America’s cities that would soon lead to the 
worst of times for urban America.  In the long hot summers, unrest would soon turn into 
the flames of rage.  Kennedy witnessed the rudimentary beginnings of unrest, but did not 
recognize it, because his interests remained elsewhere.  In the summer of 1962, CORE 
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blocked trucks delivering to firms that did not hire African-Americans.  Rent strikes 
began against slum landlords who refused to fix buildings under their care.  In June 1963, 
sit-ins took place in Mayor Robert Wagner’s office, over discriminatory hiring practices 
and rhetoric heated up in African-American urban churches across the country.  Picketing 
and demonstrations in DC regarding “open housing” and for expanding the executive 
order took place in May 1963 and boycotts in New York and other northern cities 
witnessed minority residents going into the streets wielding placards that read “Don’t 
Buy Where You Can’t Work,” plus urban school desegregation issues gained momentum.  
On July 22, 1963, in New York City, 1200 people participated in an anti-union 
demonstration against “all white” hiring that boiled over, resulting in the largest number 
of arrests since the 1943 Harlem Riots.  Slowly throughout July and August 1963 
demonstrations became increasingly restless and protests against police “brutality” 
regularly occurred.259   
      The “March on Washington” headed by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. on August 28, 
1963, continued the great American tradition of going to the Capital to air grievances, but 
it should be remembered that it was a “March for Jobs and Freedom.” Although non-
violent, large numbers of people were saying by their physical presence that time was 
running out for “the rhetoric of expectation.”  The over 200,000 who came signaled that a 
huge non-violent demonstration in a major city worked, yet their presence in numbers 
implied that if these means failed, large numbers of people might resort to something 
else.260  JFK died before that happened, yet the “gap” he left in “effective” programs 
reaching the streets did not. 
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      Then it came.  On the morning of July 16, 1964, a white police officer named Thomas 
Gilligan, summoned to a television store in New York City regarding a disturbance 
between the white building owner and some black teenagers felt threatened.  A fifteen-
year-old African-American, James Powell, “came” at him with a knife and in “self-
defense” Gilligan fatally shot the teenager.  The crowd that quickly gathered at the scene 
of the Powell killing, “cried in rage, ‘come on, shoot another nigger!’”  And then it 
began.  A violent riot with rocks, bottles, and garbage can lids errupted as, “the opening 
barrage in the first battle of the riot ridden 1960’s,” the beginnings of the “long hot 
summers” had started.  For the next six nights, African-American mobs roamed the 
streets of Harlem and portions of Brooklyn “attacking police and looting stores.”  One 
rioter was killed, 118 injured and 465 arrested.261  What had begun, under Kennedy as a 
“tenants revolt” awakened a huge and violent sleeping giant for another reason.  The 
police symbolized a government that promised everything, but in return gave little but 
“heartache.”  Rage and violence became the price.262  In July 1964, riots in Brooklyn, 
Harlem, Rochester, Jersey City and Philadelphia precipitated by police brutality, reflected 
deep resident frustration over the loss of civil liberties, lack of public facilities, 
segregation, notorious political actions against the poor, housing discrimination, and lack 
of positive social change.263  These events would become the bane of the Johnson years, 
where the less popular Johnson would hear “LBJ for the USA,” replaced by “Burn, Baby, 
Burn.”264 
      Newark, (NJ) and other cities erupted, and on August 11, 1965, the Watts section of 
Los Angeles exploded in flames, with rioting lasting several days and costing 34 lives, 
4,000 injured, and $35 million in property damage.265  In 1966, 53 riots occurred in 44 
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cities lasting 92 days; in 1967, there 82 riots erupted in 71 cities for over 270 days; and 
1968 witnessed 155 outbursts in 106 cities.266  Riots occurred in New York in 1969 in 
June.267  But Detroit’s 1967 mid-summer riot set the record, with 43 killed, 1,000 injured, 
7,000 arrests, and $50 million in property damage.  Some buildings there even today have 
not been rebuilt.   In Detroit, police were overwhelmed, the Michigan National Guard 
needed help and Johnson sent in elements of the 82nd Airborne Division.268  Yet in an 
ironic way, LBJ finally got his “maximum feasible participation” of the poor, 
neighborhood by neighborhood.  He just never figured it out to do it properly. 
      Kennedy’s legacy in American urban history falls between the promise and the fires.  
He had some successes domestically, but overall in urban affairs, his legacy is one of 
unfulfilled accomplishment, highlighted by “the politics of promise.”269  The fact that he 
refused to place election year politics above reaching a workable solution to urban 
problems, nor take action against the politically powerful coalition that prevented real 
help from reaching the urban poor, remains the real tragedy.  JFK never tried to untangle 
the knot of race and class that paradoxically kept conservatives in power, from city hall to 
Capital Hill, and the poor in their place.270  But unknown at the time was the fact that 
Kennedy never really tried to find the workable solution.  An adoring press, and his 
immediate staff, “camouflaged” that, and only later would this outrageous political sin be 
revealed.  For instance, it was not until Kennedy was dead, that Weaver could openly 
impose new rules on urban renewal in 1967, that curtailed city officials from 
discriminating “using local discretion.”271  Tragically, the fires had by then taken their 
toll and were continuing.  Even Kennedy’s successes, the 1961 Housing Act, urban 
renewal and continuation of the Eisenhower “housing boom” chiefly helped middle class 
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whites, and Area Redevelopment Act, the Manpower Development and Training Act, 
Accelerated Public Works, and Welfare increases really did not break the cycle of 
poverty because they either did not effectively impact the poor, were uncoordinated, or 
remained under funded.272  Kennedy was so timid with Congress, his domestic 
presidency in a way harkened back to a by-gone era of “legislative supremacy.”273  
Kennedy lent almost nothing to providing “economic modernization…from the feudal 
constraints,” that forced African-Americans into permanent “occupational and 
institutional” poverty.274  
      Regarding poverty, not attempting to weave the “fragments” of “the solution” into a 
workable framework, constituted in the words of Francis Fox Piven and Richard 
Cloward, “a breaking of the American social compact” which had been carried forward 
since FDR.  Kennedy’s uncoordinated fragmentation in urban programs hurt urban 
America, leaving the somewhat bewildered Johnson with huge ground to gain which he 
was unable and inept at accomplishing, before the fires arrived.275  And when they came, 
Johnson, who had little credibility with the poor, tried to raise their expectations, but he 
and his staff only heightened their anger.276  Studies of the time revealed that many young 
African-Americans had higher aspirations than their white counterparts, coming out of 
the Kennedy years, that things would improve, only to find out that LBJ as well could not 
deliver.277  Johnson, for that matter courted a “martyr-besotted electorate” as “heir of a 
man whom he did not particularly like and whose policies he had had, as Vice-President, 
almost nothing to do with.”  He literally “rode a dead man’s coattails into the White 
House.”278  “But you can’t build a city on pity,” and you can’t crusade for resources from 
the federal Government from the bottom to the top with consistent success.279  Neither 
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JFK or LBJ broke the “culture of poverty” or uplifted the “under class” they promised to 
help.280   
      Lastly, JFK’s failures in urban history far outweigh his successes.  DUAH went down 
in defeat, the executive order on open housing remained virtually “symbolic,” urban civil 
rights took no new bold steps forward, and public housing in spite of McGuire’s 
aggressive actions, remained small in comparison to the need, and succumbed to growing 
political isolation.  JFK’s infamous FHA 221(d)(3) program stood as an example of a 
“not well thought-out program” and his fiscal constraints on HHFA’s operating budgets 
caused huge backlogs in multi-family housing, while not producing the balanced budget 
he needed for his 1963 tax cut, to impress 1964 voters. Mass transit stayed inadequately 
funded.  White House conferences on urban affairs were not held, and Kennedy did too 
little too late regarding “regulating” poverty.  His “reformers” could not overcome their 
boss, as the poverty program and workable solution could have been well developed and 
implemented by Dallas, had the commitment been there.  Finally, JFK’s unwillingness to 
focus on the workable solution, stood in stark violation of the “trust” of the 1960 
electorate. 
      Uniquely though, JFK “sailed along” with “business as usual” toward his destiny in 
Dallas.  As noted before, his popularity remained high, from 83% in 1961 to ending his 
first year at 77%; achieving consistent scores of 71% to 78% in 1962; and by mid-1963, 
59% of the public surveyed claimed they had voted for him in 1960, which grew to 65% 
after Dallas, where in fact he actually received only 49.72% of the vote.  In polls, his 
Democratic party by mid-1963 “held the edge in handling issues” substantially over the 
Republicans.281  But Kennedy did nothing translating this popularity into votes on the 
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Hill, as the Washington Post noted about important bills on August 4, 1963, “only 19 – 
just under 5% of the President’s 403 requests had been given final approval” by then.282  
But, as Robert Thompson wrote, “We were led to believe that between January 20, 1961 
and November 22, 1963, the President of the United States was the embodiment of the 
finest traits of Sophocles, Saint Frances, Edmund Burke, William Pitt, Thomas Jefferson, 
Abraham Lincoln, and John XXIII.”283  James Reston observed, “deprived of the place he 
sought in history, he has been given in compensation a place in legend.”  Yet others saw 
“a much shallower and less accomplished figure than most Americans remembered” and 
that is what this dissertation, unfortunately, concludes about JFK’s leadership in urban 
affairs.284 
      Robert Steele, In Love With the Night: The American Romance with Robert 
Kennedy, showed how Robert Kennedy helped perpetuate the legend, turning himself 
into a continuation of it.  In fact, RFK emerged after the assassination as a stronger 
symbol of “what might have been” than did his brother, concerning poverty.285  Robert 
Dallek, An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy 1917-1963, cites that a lasting issue 
regarding JFK is one of striking contrasts, many kept out of public scrutiny, producing an 
exceptionally popular president, but one nonetheless with many pronounced flaws.286  
Three examples sum these contrasts and end this story of John F. Kennedy and the 
American city, the urban programs of the New Frontier 1961-1963.  RFK found a scrap 
of paper from JFK’s last cabinet meeting, and on it, “the president had scribbled the word 
‘poverty’ several times and circled it.”287  Why this became circled with so much interest 
in late November 1963, but not during his other chances to implement a much needed 
“early” workable solution, in June 1961, in February 1962, or October/November 1962, 
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is unknown.  Secondly, Kennedy supposedly had “seen” poverty first hand in the West 
Virginia primary, followed the press and popular magazines, had read Michael 
Harrington’s The Other America which described life in Harlem as “haunted” by racism 
and poverty, and supposedly knew that for many of JFK’s African-American supporters, 
“death is often the only time when there was real luxury,” represented by a good 
funeral.288  Yet Kennedy did little until it was too late.  Even Dave Hackett when asked, 
did he know “how the President reached his decision to get involved in this effort 
(poverty)?” had to respond, “No I really don’t.”289  Bob Weaver reiterated in a mid-June 
1963 speech, “Sophisticated whites realize that the status of Negroes in our society 
depends not only upon what the Negro does to achieve his goals…but even more, upon 
what all America does to expand those opportunities.”290
      Lastly as a sophisticated “white,” JFK never put compassion above politics and the 
poor paid the price in “the enduring ghetto.”  After Dallas, LBJ’s “compassionate 
ineptitude” became apparent in the very poor neighborhoods where unhappily, in the 
previous nearly “thousand days” little had changed.  The reformers had given their 
advice, and the excluded Weaver his speeches, but as Simon and Garfunkel warned 
during the fires, “the words of the prophets are written on the subway walls, and 
tenement halls.”291  Kennedy unfortunately would only have a “little flame,” kept alive 
“forever” in Arlington National Cemetery at a peaceful site near the Potomac, but for 
many in America’s cities, at the end of the New Frontier, the only “torch passed to a new 
generation” was in the streets.       
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 Colloq in Western European History: 1789 to Present William B. Cohen 
 Readings in Canadian History:  (non-credit) 1867 to Present Martin Ridge 
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DISSERTATION SUMMARY
  Out of necessity in 1960, John Kennedy promised to find the “workable solution to 
urban problems.”  Yet he failed to do so, because his interests lay elsewhere.  Balancing his 1963 
budget for Congressional approval to gain a 1964 tax cut meant more than an effective urban 
program.  Had Kennedy exercised leadership and emphasized implementing his promise through 
combining new and existing programs, he might have found the elusive workable solution.  
Contrasted against JFK’s lackluster leadership in urban affairs, the hard work of Dr. Robert C. 
Weaver, his Housing and Home Finance Agency staff and later the “reformers” also becomes a 
focal point.  Collectively, they came closest to finding the solution.  They tried to reshape urban 
America using available programs without being able to fully implement their newer ideas, 
before the “fires” came.  In addition, this dissertation highlights seven themes.  In urban affairs, 
JFK remained an enigma, and he wanted it that way.  Secondly, he used his office as a “modern” 
president, but thirdly, he presented many serious policy contradictions. Further, Kennedy had a 
tough time with Congress some due to his own making.  Consequently, political tradeoffs 
undercut his own urban program.  Last, blatant open racism also permeated the early 1960s and 
affected political choices everywhere. But lastly, in spite of this, Weaver plus JFK’s “reformers” 
under Robert Kennedy fostered new ideas, that if combined, implemented and funded, could 
have led to the workable solution. This dissertation studies Kennedy’s entire urban program: 
JFK’s 1960 urban message; formation of his White House and urban team; the 1961 Housing 
Act; his failed effort to gain HHFA cabinet status; his urban budget and the tax cut maneuvering; 
Kennedy’s vast suburban housing “boom;” public housing and urban renewal; his open housing 
executive order; and the early “war on poverty.”  Researched at the John F. Kennedy Library and 
the National Archives and Records Administration, this dissertation adds to the historical record 
in three ways.  It traces JFK’s level of involvement in urban affairs and clarifies his interest; it 
shows the effort made by many key members of his administration to achieve a workable 
solution to urban problems in spite of their leader; and it explains the overall importance of 
Kennedy’s program in American urban history. 
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